TOWARDS A MODEL FOR ARTIFICIAL AESTHETICS - Contributions to the Study of Creative Practices in Procedural and Computational Systems by José Miguel Santos Araújo Carvalhais Fonseca
Towards a Model for Artificial Aesthetics
Contributions to the Study of Creative Practices 
 in Procedural and Computational Systems

Universidade do Porto 
Faculdade de Belas Artes
TOWARDS A MODEL FOR ARTIFICIAL AESTHETICS 
Contributions to the Study of Creative Practices  
in Procedural and Computational Systems
José Miguel Santos Araújo Carvalhais Fonseca
Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for  
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Art and Design
Supervised by Heitor Manuel Pereira Pinto da Cunha e Alvelos, PhD 
Professor, Faculdade de Belas Artes, Universidade do Porto
Cosupervised by Fernando Jorge Penousal Martins Machado, PhD 
Professor, Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia, Universidade de Coimbra
Porto, 2010
This work was developed with the financial aid of 
the Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (FCT), 
under the Programa Operacional Potencial Humano 
(SFRH / BD / 43877 / 2008)
Acknowledgments
Heitor Alvelos and Penousal Machado, without whose valuable help, advice and 
insight this work could not have been completed;
Ana Ferreira, Golan Levin, Hans Bernhard, Lia, Luísa Ribas, Marius Watz and 
Pedro Tudela, for the advice, collaboration, help and patience;
Ademar Aguiar, Boris Kopeinig, Damian Stewart, David Muth, Diniz Cayolla, 
Ed Burton, James Tindall, Joana Cunha, João Cruz, Jörg Piringer, José Carneiro, 
Keith Blount, Kyle McDonald, Luís Sarmento, Matthew Lewis, Marc Behrens, 
Meta, Miguel Leal, Neal McDonald, Norbert Pfaffenbichler, Peter Votava, 
Ricardo Guerreiro, Rui Eduardo Paes, Sebastian Oschatz, Simon Payne, 
Tina Frank, Tom Betts & Vitor Joaquim, for the advice and help;
my family.
(blank page)
Abstract
This work proposes the development of an analytical model and associated termi-
nology for computational aesthetic artifacts. Faced with the growing presence and 
widespread usage of computational media, we start by studying how they quantita-
tively transform previous media through remediation, and the qualitative transfor-
mations induced by their procedural and computational properties. To grasp the 
creative potential and uniqueness of computational media we develop a framework 
for their practice, critique and analysis.
We resort to Espen Aarseth’s typology for cybertexts as a starting point for the 
work, studying its adequacy for the analysis of ergodic visual and audiovisual pieces, 
adapting and expanding it with three variables and associated possible values. The 
model is tested in a set of samples that represent diverse approaches to procedural 
creation and contemporary clusters of activity. A control analysis is developed to 
assert the usability and usefulness of the model, its capability for objective classifica-
tion and the rigor of the analysis.
We demonstrate the partial adequacy of Aarseth’s model for the study of artifacts 
beyond text-based systems and expand it to better suit the objects in study. We con-
clude that the model we present produces a good description of the pieces, clustering 
them logically, reflecting stylistic and procedural affinities between systems that, 
if studied from their physical or sensorial properties or from their surface struc-
tures alone would probably not be found to be similar. The similitudes revealed 
by the model are structural and procedural, attesting the importance of computa-
tional characteristics in the aesthetic appreciation of the pieces. We verify our initial 
conjecture about the importance of procedurality not only in the development and 
implementation stages of the works but also as conceptual grounding and aesthetic 
focus in artistic creation and appreciation, as an aesthetic pleasure in itself.
Keywords: Algorithmic, Art, Design, Digital, Ergodic, Generative, Media, Procedural.
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Resumo 
Este trabalho propõe o desenvolvimento de um modelo analítico e da terminologia 
a ele associada para o estudo de artefactos estéticos computacionais. Reconhecen-
do a presença e uso crescentes dos media computacionais, começamos por estudar 
como através da remediação eles transformam quantitativamente os media prece-
dentes, e como as suas propriedades procedimentais e computacionais os afectam 
qualitativamente. Para perceber o potencial criativo e a especificidade dos media 
computacionais, desenvolvemos um modelo para a sua prática, crítica e análise.
Como ponto de partida recorremos à tipologia desenvolvida por Espen Aarseth 
para o estudo de cibertextos, avaliando a sua adequação à análise de peças ergódi-
cas visuais e audiovisuais, adaptando-a e expandindo-a com novas variáveis e res-
pectivos valores. O modelo é testado através da análise de um conjunto de peças 
que representam diversas abordagens à criação procedimental e diversas áreas de 
actividade criativa contemporânea. É posteriormente desenvolvida uma análise de 
controlo para avaliar a usabilidade e utilidade do modelo, a sua capacidade para a 
elaboração de classificações objectivas e o rigor da análise.
Demonstramos a adequação parcial do modelo de Aarseth para o estudo de arte-
factos não textuais e expandimo-lo para melhor descrever as peças estudadas. Con-
cluímos que o modelo apresentado produz boas descrições das peças, agrupando-as 
logicamente, reflectindo afinidades estilísticas e procedimentais entre sistemas que, 
se estudados com base nas suas propriedades sensoriais ou nas suas estruturas de 
superfície provavelmente não revelariam muitas semelhanças. As afinidades reve-
ladas pelo modelo são estruturais e procedimentais, e atestam a importância das 
características computacionais para a apreciação estética das obras. Verificamos a 
nossa conjectura inicial sobre a importância da procedimentalidade não só nas fases 
de desenvolvimento e implementação das obras mas também como base conceptual 
e estética na criação e apreciação artísticas, como um prazer estético.
Palavras-chave: Algorítmico, Arte, Design, Digital, Ergódico, Generativo, Media, 
Procedimental.
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Introduction
The Ubiquity of Digital Media
Over the course of the last decades we have witnessed a growing presence of com-
putational media and tools in many areas of contemporary life, 1 ranging from those 
aspects that were traditionally associated with technologies to the more mundane 
details of everyday routine. As artists or designers, we are particularly aware of this 
in all that is closer to our activities, not because the phenomenon is especially preva-
lent there but perhaps because that is where we deal with it more frequently, where 
we witness that many media, as well as the mainstream communication channels, 
are taken over by computational systems. From being used as tools to becoming the 
media themselves, computational devices have been growing to be nearly ubiqui-
tous parts of our lives and their presence is doing much more than just altering the 
vehicles for communication: it is fundamentally changing the media and the work 
produced in, with and to them.
Technological, social or cultural changes in a medium alter what one can do with 
or for it by imposing different constraints and affordances on the designer or artist, 
therefore necessarily influencing the products of their work and eventually trans-
1 We should note that we are particularly mentioning Western life, but these technologies have touched 
a majority of the world’s population, both in Western countries as in the so-called developing economies. 
Not everyone has equal opportunities of access to computers, to the Internet or to the latest technologies, 
but computational media and technologies assume many different forms and exist in a complex gradient 
that surpasses the newest products and overnight builds.
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forming the medium into something altogether different. 2 The changes brought 
about by computational media are however very different from previous transfor-
mations, not only quantitatively — as we will see, computational media are excellent 
remediators and their resolution has been steadily increasing — but especially quali-
tatively — as we are for the first time able to program our media, to create artifacts 
that are autonomous from their creators and users and that, are ultimately also able 
to create themselves, to generate new messages and artifacts on their own.
Because computational media are still somewhat recent, we have not yet had the 
time to experiment and develop them into coherent and mature tools and tech-
nologies of communication. We are in a continuous process of learning and shaping 
these media, a process that is balanced by the dialectics between the so-called tra-
ditional, or precomputational forms of media — those that for the most part shape 
our historic experience, our knowledge, skills, training and lexicon — and the new 
forms — those that inherit much from them but that sometimes also transform the 
established media almost beyond recognition. We are in the era of computational 
incunabula, where experimentation abounds and its products slowly help the new 
media to be defined, a time where older media are updated by new technologies, 
new media are developed and sometimes become obsolete 3 as part of a continuous 
process of change. We are not only in the era of transformation but rather in the era 
where we realize that transformation is not only inevitable as it is permanent, that 
the media will perhaps never crystallize and become reliable, uniform and stan-
dardizable.
In the most diverse areas of artistic activity we discover creators that use compu-
tational tools and media in the development of their work, sometimes integrating 
them in noncomputational processes or devices, sometimes making them become 
the sole objects and instruments of work. Even if one disregards those artists and de-
signers that turn to computational media because their analog counterparts become 
too expensive or otherwise inconvenient to use, and look solely for those that, to put 
2 These should not be interpreted as being negative constraints or limitations, as they can very often 
represent new possibilities and open new territories for exploration. They are, nevertheless, always con-
straints, more or less long lists of dos and don’ts, of possibilities and impossibilities. 
3 See, as an example, the now defunct interactive CD-ROM, that once promised to change the cultural 
landscape and already seems to be a bygone archaeological artifact. This is far from being the only ex-
ample, at a time when besides the so-called ‘planned obsolescence’ of platforms, the media cycles seem to 
become continuously shorter.
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it simply, use what is new in the new media, there is a wealth of examples to be found 
in literature, music, visual or performing arts, communication and industrial de-
sign, architecture and fashion, of practitioners that devote their time and resources 
to the exploration of computational media and arts and that have been discovering 
a fertile ground for creation with computational systems. And there are, besides 
these more easily classifiable genres, entirely new fields of work that emerged from 
these tools and media, as for example computer games. The ubiquity of tools and 
the similarity of working methods, media and processes across artists and designers 
with diverse backgrounds, leads to a blurring of boundaries between practitioners 
and many of the fields where they are active. Therefore, it becomes increasingly dif-
ficult to classify the practices or their products as belonging to well-defined fields or 
genres. Furthermore, even if they do belong to what one may recognized as specific 
genres or fields, the commonalities of tools and processes may lead to the sharing of 
common traits among otherwise very diverse artifacts.
The Necessity of a Terminology
As we will see, the lack of an established and rigorous terminology for computation-
al media is a serious disadvantage in their practice and study. Practitioners bring 
with them terminologies that were inherited from the most diverse fields of visual 
arts, design, aesthetics, computer sciences, mathematics or life sciences, terminolo-
gies that are not always compatible and whose normalization becomes essential. A 
normalized terminology should contain a nomenclature that is rich enough to de-
scribe new and unprecedented phenomena with no clear references in other fields 
of work, while dealing with authorial, technical, narrative and dramatic issues, as 
well as with aspects from cognition, interaction and agency, and it should recognize 
computational aesthetic artifacts as being a heterogeneous set of objects and sys-
tems. It should not be dependent on ad hoc perspectives or on particular contexts of 
implementation or usage of the pieces but rather recognize the history and diversity 
of computational practices. It should also not be focused in the physical strata of 
the artifacts, that are not only very assorted as they are often volatile and described 
by other terminologies that can coexist within their specificities, but rather in their 
computational properties, where one can find the most relevant shared traits. Com-
putational aesthetic artifacts need a theory, a criticism and a terminology with fuzz-
ier boundaries between “human and machine, creative and automatic, interested 
and disinterested” (Aarseth 1997, 134) and that are able to offer a “distinctive power 
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as well as unproblematic connotations” (59) when faced with the inherent instabil-
ity of both traditional as well as ‘new’ media forms. Finally, this terminology would 
benefit from being functional and phenomenological, not dependent of (or describ-
ing) code, but rather of the actions and effects of the code.
Starting Point
The model developed by Espen Aarseth (1997) proposes a typology of textual com-
munication that is able to describe what he terms of ‘cybertexts’, characterized by 
their mode of traversal, i.e. by the ‘non-trivial effort’ that a reader needs to develop 
in their experimentation. His model synthesizes the most prominent characteris-
tics of these works through seven variables, each with a range of two to four pos-
sible values, creating a “multidimensional space of 576 unique media positions” (64) 
where each text’s profile is defined. Because of the similarities between cybertexts 
and the computational aesthetic artifacts in which we will focus our study, we find 
this model to be a solid and interesting starting point on which to base the develop-
ment of a model that is able to describe a broader scope of aesthetic computational 
artifacts, that strives to find the common characteristics among a big diversity of 
systems. For this endeavour we will need to assert the suitability of Aarseth’s model 
and to adequate or expand it with further variables if that proves to be necessary, but 
we will always keep in mind that it is essential to arrive to a model that is as simple 
and manageable as possible, a definitive requisite for its universality.
A Survey of the Clusters of Activity
As an introduction to this work we will sample some of the current clusters of ac-
tivity of computational artists and designers, where one discovers artifacts that not 
only express their computational nature as well as that of the tools used in their cre-
ation, artifacts that besides and beyond their classic aesthetic properties also encode 
and embody processes and appeal to a sense of procedurality. We will look at some 
fields that can perhaps be classified as being in the fringes of mainstream activity, 
and will not delve into other fields that although being more popular or more com-
monly perceived as making use of digital tools are nevertheless using them mainly 
as simulators, not as generators. 4 This does not mean that the contemporary us-
4 Such is for example the case in photography and cinema, by altogether different reasons. In photogra-
phy, the optical appropriation of the visible (external, real) world is generally agreed as being the central 
29A Survey of the Clusters of Activity
age of computational aesthetic systems is only to be marginally found in art and 
design practices, much on the contrary. We can find several international festivals 
and awards dedicated to media and computer arts, some of them happening for 
over thirty years — like the Ars Electronica festival in Linz — some of them more 
recent — Transmediale in Berlin, Offf in Barcelona, then Lisbon and now Paris, Pix-
elache in Helsinki, File, Festival Internacional de Linguagem Eletrônica in São Paulo 
or Future Places in Porto, among several others — that have been bringing compu-
tational arts to wider audiences and endowing them with institutional recognition 
and specialized venues. Several museums have been dedicating shows to computa-
tional arts and studying the phenomena through associated critical and historical 
publications. Recent examples are El Proceso Como Paradigma, 5 Decode: Digital De-
sign Sensations, 6 See this Sound, 7 or Design and the Elastic Mind, 8 to name just a few. 
Artists, designers, festivals and museums alike, not always strive for a differentiation 
or to underline the specificity of computational (or digital, or generative) practices, 
but often intend to affirm them as an integral part of the respective preexisting ar-
eas of work, looking at computational practices as something that although deeply 
transforming how things are done and what is done, does not however affect why 
things are done. As we shall see, this should not be taken as an a priori axiom. Com-
putational media and tools are not simply just a new way to do what was done with 
traditional resources, and much as they affect the practice and the surface struc-
tures of the artifacts, they also transform the most fundamental aspects of art and 
design, leading us to question their essence and our roles as human participants.
defining trait of the discipline. Digital technologies have for a long time been used in photography and the 
digital manipulation of analog or digital captured stills is nowadays commonplace. Retouching, enhanc-
ing and editing images with digital tools is as commonplace as any other step in the work process of a 
photographer but the link with physical reality, however tenuous, cannot be breached, if one is still to talk 
about photography as a genre and not amend our classification and use photography simply as a classifier 
for a technical resource used in the production of something else. When considering cinema, and under-
standing it as the deeply narrative art form that has been developed for well over a century now, it is also 
very rare to find digital technologies used in the production of works that are not deeply linked with the 
human experience of reality, no matter how spectacular and otherworldly may the special effects be — or, 
conversely, how discreet and omnipresent may digital manipulation be in a given film. In a sense, nothing 
can ever be truly new in narrative film because if it is, it will cross the genre border and probably start to 
be classified as something different: visual art, visual music, animation or ‘experimental’ film, the adjec-
tive usefully distinguishing it from the mainstream and preparing the viewer for something that shares 
properties with a familiar medium but that does not follow some of its conventions.
5 Curated by Susanne Jaschko and Lucas Evers at Laboral in Gijon, April 23 to August 30, 2010.
6 At the Victoria & Albert Museum in London, December 8, 2009 to April 11, 2010.
7 At the Lentos Art Museum in Linz, August 28, 2009 to January 10, 2010.
8 Curated by Paola Antonelli and Patricia Juncosa Vecchierini at the Museum of Modern Art in New 
York, February 24 to May 12, 2008.
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Literature
Literature was one of the fields where computational media were first explored in 
creation. The relative simplicity of the resources needed for writing and for the en-
coding of text allowed literature and text-based media to explore the creative poten-
tial of these tools earlier than other fields that demanded higher resolution, band-
width or processing power. Electronic texts, hypertexts or other types of text-based 
systems — collectively referred to as ‘cybertexts’ by Aarseth — have been produced 
in or with computers since the mid-twentieth century and many authors have since 
studied literary production with computers. 9 
Being as they are deeply linked to language, literature and text-based communica-
tion have also been fields of interest for computer scientists working in artificial 
intelligence and creativity. Software and language are “intrinsically related, since 
software may process language, and is constructed in language” (Cramer 2008, 168) 
but naturally, research on artificial intelligence goes far beyond and has many other 
concerns besides natural language systems.
Fig. 1: Afternoon, a Story (Joyce 1990).
9 One of the first creation-oriented pieces of software was the word processor, a “medium for the creation 
and modification of linguistic structures that play a role in human communication” (Winograd 1990, 5) 
and a tool that is “empty of information” (Ullman 1997, 79) and that waits “patiently and passively for their 
human owners to put something interesting into [it]”. Although its relevant domain, in the user’s perspec-
tive, is not a computational one, it turned the activity of writing into a computational activity and added 
to it new levels of abstraction and new affordances. Starting as a simulator of a typewriter, the word pro-
cessor evolved into something much more complex, even while it was physically attached to a typewriter. 
“We cannot take the activity of writing as an independent phenomenon. Writing is an instrument — a tool 
we use in our interactions with other people. The computer, like any other medium, must be understood 
in the context of communication and the larger network of equipment and practices in which it is situated. 
A person who sits down at a word processor is not just creating a document, but is writing a letter or a 
memo or a book. There is a complex social network in which these activities make sense. The significance 
of a new invention lies in how it fits into and changes this network.” (Winograd 1990, 5-6)
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Fig. 2: Branded (Pullinger and Memmott 2003).
Fig. 3: Patchwork Girl (Jackson, 1995).
Language is not only words and sentences. It is a type of semiotic activity that pro-
vides us with insights into the vaster domain of communication, but that does not 
serve as its general model (Wilden 1987, 124). Human natural languages are symbol 
systems and these are the root of human communication, regardless if they are or-
ganized into what we may recognize as a human language or if they take any other 
form. 10 Art is one of those forms, one that can be understood as a complex collec-
tion of symbol systems (Lee 2006, 30), but naturally, not all symbol systems have the 
same capacity to encode and transmit information, or to communicate, to refer to 
or to represent things in the world. They depend, as we will see, on their capacity to 
be notational.
10 “Let it be emphasized that the communication of information does not necessarily imply the use of 
(human) language, nor consciously perceived sending or receiving, nor consciously intended communi-
cation, nor consciously noted understanding.” (Wilden 1987, 124)
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Music
Western music depended on notational written languages for centuries before com-
puters were developed and eventually started to be used in composition and later on 
music recording and performance. Nowadays it is becoming hard to picture how 
contemporary music can be produced, performed and recorded without the assis-
tance of digital tools, but most of the times these tools are still used as replacements 
and simulators of their analog forerunners. We can however find several fields of 
music creation that came into existence due to the development of computational 
tools and media or that explore a particular interest in the computational aspects 
of music creation — from academic composers to computer musicians and sound 
artists — and this has been one of the areas of artistic production where a steady 
production of conceptually interesting work has been recorded since the early 1950s. 
There is not only a large corpus of theory published on computation and music (and 
the use of computers in music), as there are several journals, academic publications 
and conferences dedicated to this field. 
Fig. 4: Bars 1-5 of the score of ST/10-1, 080262 (Xenakis 1956-62), computed in an IBM-7090 (1992, 154).
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Fig. 5: View from Florian Hecker’s 2010 show at the Ikon gallery, Birmingham.
This work will not focus exclusively in the fields of literature and music, rather it 
will study the usage of computational tools in the creation of visual arts and design, 
mentioning however several examples from both areas whenever they are necessary, 
aware that textual and sonic communication are indispensable components of many 
contemporary artistic and design practices.
Visual Arts and Communication Design
Fig. 6: Hummingbird (Csuri and Schaffer 1967).
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Visual arts have been a fertile ground for experimentation with computational sys-
tems. Later in this work we will develop a brief historical survey of pre- and early 
computational systems used by visual artists, and many of the works cited as ex-
amples during this text will be drawn from contemporary arts.
Not only because of a necessity for absolute innovation (or originality) that is insti-
tuted in the practice of visual arts but also because more often than not contempo-
rary artistic production focuses on the construction of singular objects rather than 
multiples or mass-produced copies — not necessarily subjected to requirements of 
compatibility with existing media, platforms or conventions, or of ease of use and 
familiarity of users with tools and media 11 — this is often a field where there is a 
great capacity for experimentation and innovation, along with the possibility to de-
velop prototypes of systems and processes that can then be posteriorly redeveloped 
in other fields.
 
Fig. 7: Bion (Brown and Fagg 2006).
Fig. 8: CodedocII (Simon 2003).
11 Actually, often productively exploring the effects of strangeness or misfit with conventions as part of 
the artwork’s conceptual schema.
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Communication design is one of the fields where we traditionally witness the rede-
veloping of formal and technical research originating from visual arts. 12 It is also, 
somewhat conversely, an area where it is difficult to avoid or choose the media and 
tecnologies, as they are often specified by clients or audiences. Although it may be 
somewhat common to find that communication designers tend to develop a more 
conservative approach than visual artists, it is nevertheless possible to find several 
designers that are in the forefront of contemporary procedural creation — often 
working across the borders that split commercial design and artistic practice and 
possible to be classified as artists, designers or programmers.
Since the popularization of desktop publishing in the late 1980s there were successive 
waves of digitally influenced styles 13 in communication design, exploring the possi-
bilities that were opened by digital typography, typesetting, photography and by all 
the various tools of the trade that were computerized or created from computers. By 
and large, however, during most of the later years of the twentieth century, the me-
dia to which communication design catered were analog or, using a definition that 
is more useful and accurate in the context of this work, noncomputational. Even if 
designers were working with digital tools, the outputs of their work were ultimately 
converted to analog tokens and even when the work process involved procedurality 
(in the sense we will define it here) the final artifacts that were produced could not, 
in most cases, support it. As digitalization of the media became more pervasive, the 
opportunities to develop design works as processes have therefore grown.
Fig. 9: Cover for Get Out (Frank 1999).
12 Communication design’s entanglement with visual arts in general and this redevelopment in particu-
lar are in themselves broad subjects, that although fascinating, we cannot pursue in this work.
13 Or trends, or fads, sometimes leading to almost baroque excesses.
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The idea of developing works as processes is in itself nothing new in communication 
design. In various ways it is present in many corporate identity projects, and in book 
or magazine design for example, should one choose to view them in this perspective. 
Systems and rules for variation and derivation in design projects are an integral part 
of design work, as is the necessity to develop artifacts that will ultimately become 
independent from their creators or contexts of creation: e.g. logos, brands and cor-
porate identities, typefaces or layout projects for periodical publications. Still, before 
computational media these systems had to be deployed and explored by other artists 
or designers, and could not be autopoietic, that is, could not develop themselves, in 
autonomous or semi-autonomous ways.
Newer computational media allow designers to create digital tokens that incorpo-
rate processes and that are processes, to create works that are not static media mes-
sages but that are as complex and diverse as the audiences with whom designers 
communicate. Identity projects become more than sets of rules aimed at designers 
and start to be able to dynamically interpret those rules and to generate variable 
outputs adjusted to particular contexts or media. 14 This can of course be done at a 
superficial formal level, creating multiple variations of a design or multiple designs 
based in the same set of formal rules but can also be taken further, massively cus-
tomizing designs to provide individuals with unique artifacts, tailored to their own 
needs, requests or contexts of usage. 15
14 One of the earliest procedural identity projects was developed for an online medium: the rhizome.org 
logo (Weisbeck and Hauschild 2001) was generated on the fly from the IP addresses of the last four visitors 
to the website, keeping the same typographic structure but recomposing the remaining graphic elements 
in the logo. At the time of the writing, the logo has already been redesigned, eliminating the procedural 
component.
15 An example of which is the so-called adaptive design of interfaces, an approach to website design that 
instead of composing layouts as fixed pages rather searches for optimal strategies to vary compositions 
across different devices and display aspect-ratios and resolutions, in order to provide a consistent user-
experience and platform identity across a range of possible alternatives.
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Fig. 10: Visual identity of the onedotzero festival (Wieden + Kennedy London and Schmidt 2009).
Digital printing frees the designer from the forced repetition of mechanical repro-
duction and allows the development of a variety of outputs even in print form, not 
congealing one analog token from a process but rather representing the process 
through a vast number of tokens that are articulated in a project. Unlike paper-
based hypertexts, 16 identical printed tokens that can be read differently by each read-
16 That some would perhaps prefer to call ‘protohypertexts’ in an attempt to distinguish electronic texts 
from paper-based texts with paths or similar devices (Aarseth, 1997, 75).
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er, these artifacts provide different readings because they can, quite literally, be cre-
ated different from each other. 17
Fig. 11: Identity for the United Nations Climate Change Conference (NR2154 and Shiftcontrol 2009).
 
Fig. 12: Books from the Faber Finds collection (Wall and Schmidt 2008).
17 An interesting example is the work-in-progress book Written Images, edited by Martin Fuchs, created 
from programmed images, with each print calculated individually, each book a unique token.
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Fig. 13: Three postcards for the Lovebytes Festival (Universal Everything 2007).
 
Fig. 14: Postcards for the Lovebytes Festival (Universal Everything 2007).
An area of communication design that has been particularly affected by computa-
tional technologies is that of information visualization. The visual display of quanti-
tative information 18 has for a long time been a part of communication design, help-
ing authors and readers to assimilate and interpret large volumes of data. Interactive 
visualization has been developed practically since the first capable computer systems 
allowed it and have since been used in science and engineering. 19 The mass media-
18 To borrow Tufte’s title (2006).
19 It is not surprising to discover that Charles Babbage, whose Analytical Engine we will discuss later, 
worked in the recording and visualization of information concerning vibrations and motions of railway 
carriages drawn by locomotives at known velocities (Tomas 2004, 37).
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tion of interactive information visualization has been growing along (or with) digi-
tal technologies, media and networks. As digital data becomes more abundant and 
accessible and the infrastructure to communicate and visualize it becomes more 
powerful, the visualization tools need to not only allow the mapping of a particular 
(and closed) dataset as to be able to update and filter the data according to the user’s 
needs, something that cannot be done without an understanding of the data, of vi-
sualization techniques and of the computational processes involved in these.
Audiovisuals, Performance Arts
Digital capture, editing and manipulation has radically transformed several areas 
of the audiovisual industry, turning much of contemporary film into a melting-pot 
of analog and digital processes. 20 A clear growth of the weight of digital processes 
is noticeable, extending to all areas, including television production, newscasting, 21 
fiction, entertainment, set design, etc.
  
Fig. 15: Pixilation (Schwartz and Knowlton 1970).
Film was among the first media to be used in computer art — if a process could be 
output as a sequence of frames, independently of the rendering time necessary for 
each frame, an output to film would allow the creation of animated sequences out of 
otherwise static outputs — but the ongoing increase in processing speed of compu-
tational media allowed digital animations to start to be created in real-time 22 and for 
artists to develop visual pieces that were not film- or video-based (neither in capture 
or archival media) but were rather displayed as the system processed its program. 
This created the potential for the creation of ever-changing dynamic artworks, that 
were in a sense close to traditional visual arts but different from anything ever pre-
20 The capture of image or performance — which includes motion-capture — is still normally involved, 
even with computer-generated imagery, when the actual images of the actors are not used. To be exact, the 
capture itself is a digital process so, as we will see in chapter 1, it is not analog but rather somatic.
21 An area where information visualization is also of particular importance.
22 Or in some cases, faster than real-time.
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viously developed. John Maeda refers to these non-interactive dynamic visual com-
positions as ‘motion paintings’, other artists, as for example C.E.B. Reas, prefer to 
define them as installations. Regardless of the semantic distinction, the exhibition 
of computational animations has become common over the last decades.
Fig. 16: Amber Waves (Maeda 2003).
Whenever audiovisual articulation may be an issue, when the animations develop 
a defined narrative or whenever there are constraints with the archival and dif-
fusion media, computational animation is often offset to digital video, thus losing 
the potential for variability but gaining in ease of access. When not only created in 
real-time but also performed to an audience 23 (with or without music) and taking 
23 The concept of performance generally implies, as we will see, a coprocessing with a human performer. 
This is a topic that in itself would justify a longer discussion but that very often can be defined by the pres-
ence of a human interactor or performer that controls or collaborates with the computational system, in a 
performative context — that is, a context where the actions of the performer as well as the outputs of the 
performance are both visible and presented as the artistic act. If the human performer is not present or if 
the performative act is not readable (i.e. not necessarily visible, but somehow perceivable) by the audience 
(however complex and strenuous it may be) then the audience will often tend to perceive the presentation 
as a ‘reproduction’ (as in cinema) or ‘diffusion’ (as in electronische musik) and not as a performance.
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the center role in the performance, we can speak about real-time visual performance, 
live visuals, video-jockeying 24 or visual music.
Fig. 17: Live visuals performed at the Hugo Wolf festival (Lia 2010).
Fig. 18: Performance of Scribble (Levin, Shakar and Gibbons 2000) at the Ars Electronica Festival.
24 Or VJ, a term that although understandable for historical origins, is somewhat dubious when used to 
refer to artists that develop generative images and do not use video sources (i.e. captured video) in their 
work. Regardless of the techniques and resources used, it is still a common designation for live visual 
performance artists, especially when coupled with disc-jockeys, or DJs.
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Fig. 19: Performance of Scribble (Levin, Shakar and Gibbons 2000) at the Ars Electronica Festival.
Other performance arts, such as theater or dance, have incorporated live computa-
tion as part of the set design or as performance resources, with varying degrees of 
process intensity 25 or of human/computer performance ratio. If at times the com-
putational systems are used as secondary elements in the performance — as back-
grounds or other scenic elements that even when transient play minor roles in the 
show — there are also many cases where the computational systems are brought to 
the fore to act with human performers or to even replace them on stage altogether 
and be presented as the performance. Messa di Voce (Tmema, Blonk and La Bar-
bara 2003) is an example of an interplay between human and computational perfor-
mances. In this piece both singers and computational systems form a performing 
unit, either of which unable to take the central role alone. Granular Synthesis’s 26 
performances Modell 3 (1992) and Modell 5 (1994), by eliminating humans altogether 
from the stage (although keeping their representations) are examples of the later, as 
is Ryoji Ikeda’s Datamatic [Prototype-Ver.2.0] (2006), a live performance presented 
through a single-channel projection and stereo sound, resources more commonly 
used for cinema than for live performance.
25 A concept we will later elaborate on.
26 A project by Kurt Hentschläger and Ulf Langheinrich.
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Fig. 20: Stage design for Rua! Cenas de Música para Teatro (Tudela 2003).
Fig. 21: Modell 3 (Granular Synthesis 1992).
 
Fig. 22: Datamatic [Prototype-Ver.2.0] (Ikeda 2006).
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Sharing venues and contexts with music or audiovisual performances we find sev-
eral artists that bring into the performance not only the computational tools but 
also the act of programming sound, images or both, in what has been commonly 
referred to as ‘live coding’. These artists not only regard coding as a craft, as they 
see it as a performative act (Magnusson 2008, 240) and thus present its elaboration 
and manipulation as an integral part of the performances, writing programs in real-
time, without restarting processes, with every adjustment to the code reflected in 
the audio or video output. 27
They program in conversation with their machine, playing with instructions 
while a computer follows them. Here, there is no distinction between creating 
and running a piece of software — programs run while they are being created, 
gaining complexity via source code edits. We can think of coding live in the 
sense of working on electricity live, re-routing the flows of control around a 
program with the real danger that a faulty loop will get activated, causing the 
program to crash in sparks of logic. (…) It is not only the relationship between 
programmer and code that defines live coding, but also that between program-
mer and audience. Live coding can be a performance art, where an audience 
watches an artist write code while enjoying the output. As with all improvisa-
tions some preparation is necessary, but for many the aim is to begin with an 
empty text editor and live code their performance from scratch. (McLean 2008, 
224)
If similar resources for the creation and projection of images are used outside con-
ventional performance contexts and venues, particularly in outdoors urban public 
space, they may fall into what is referred to as ‘digital graffiti’, the attempt to bring 
computational technologies into the field of work for graffiti artists, or, as the Graf-
fiti Research Lab puts it in their mission statement, to outfit “graffiti artists with (…) 
technologies for urban communication.” (Roth and Powderly 2006)
27 “Outside of the context of time based arts, live coding is generally termed dynamic programming. It 
began in the form of bit twiddling — modifications of low level machine instructions while they were be-
ing followed. This was done for debugging, experimentation, and hackerly fun, although in the early days 
of computing, hands-on access to computers was hard to come by.” (McLean 2008, 227)
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Fig. 23: Digital graffiti from the EyeWriter initiative (Quan et al. 2009).
Fig. 24: Graffiti Research Lab activities in Barcelona (Roth and Powderly 2007).
Fig. 25: Projections in The Hague (Lia 2008b).
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Fig. 26: Projections in The Hague (Watz 2008a).
Games, Game Art
Interactive gaming is one of the largest entertainment industries to arise from com-
putational media and a growing area of work for digital artists and designers, as 
well as a very active and fertile area for research — either on action and gaming (or 
research in ludology) or in their narrative aspects (narratology). 28 Digital games are 
native computational forms that are developed through interaction and sensorial 
outputs. As such they share properties and characteristics with several of the sys-
tems we will study in this work but they will not be our primary focus. We should 
however note that some game systems allow the creation of user-generated content 
and the transformation of the game or its engine into new and different games or 
game variations, 29 and as such can be used as media for the creation of new artworks. 
Several artists have explored the possibilities offered by customizable game engines 
or by their hacking and deconstruction, as Joan Leandre, 30 JODI 31 and Brody Con-
don, sometimes developing new narratives from the altered game space but often 
exploring glitch, obfuscation and lack of control and altering the illusions originally 
meant to be created by the games, revealing the artificiality of the representational 
spaces in a form of media hacking.
28 Bogost chooses these two terms as a convenient shorthand for identifying the study of rule-based 
systems and story-based systems in games (2006, 68).
29 Also called game ‘mods’.
30 Also known as Retroyou.
31 The collaboration of Joan Heemskerk and Dirk Paesmans.
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Fig. 27: SOD (JODI 1999).
Fig. 28: Untitled Game (JODI 2001).
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Fig. 29: Nostal(G) _ Phoenix West (Leandre 2003) and Adam Killer (Condon 1999).
Naturally, several other authors choose to develop games from scratch, following 
models from well-established games or developing original concepts that can alter-
natively be presented as games or art, and are often both, realizing not only narra-
tive and interactive, as well as a complex aesthetic experience that “can be enthrall-
ing. Not only can it arouse emotion, but its emotional power is one of its strengths 
and a major factor in its appeal.” (Lopes 2010, 116)
 
Fig. 30: Sleep is Death (Geisterfahrer) (Rohrer 2010).
 
Fig. 31: Triggerhappy (Thompson and Craighead 1998).
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Fig. 32: The Graveyard (Harvey and Samyn 2008).
Games and game systems are also used in the creation of machinima, 32 a cinematic 
appropriation of the systems to create linear narratives using the resources provided 
by the games instead of traditional camera capture or other animation techniques.
 
Fig. 33: Red vs. Blue (Rooster Teeth Productions, 2003-2010) a machinima series created in Halo. 
Architecture, Industrial Design
A survey of the applications of aesthetic computing in the realm of three-dimension-
al production may start with architecture, where generative or evolutionary design 
models have been used by several architects 33 in the creation of architectural draw-
ings and building plans and where a considerable amount of theoretical work has 
been developed. But computational technologies applied to architecture can reach 
much further than the design, project and planning stages of a building, they can 
be used in the fabrication or construction stages and can later be used in (or by) the 
building itself. 34
32 From the misspelled portmanteau of ‘machine cinema’.
33 Such as Zaha Hadid, Frank Gehry, Herzog & de Meuron or Will Alsop, to mention just a few.
34 Creating what is sometimes referred to as ‘intelligent’ buildings. That however extends to far more 
than the mere development of amenities like self-regulating window-shades or air conditioning.
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Similarly, areas as industrial and fashion design have been increasingly using com-
putational technologies, not only for design, prototyping and simulation but, as in 
architecture and as the technologies allow it, also for the embedding of computa-
tional power in the objects themselves. The majority of objects produced are still, 
however, classic objects, 35 in the sense that they do not themselves develop compu-
tational processes, although they are created through them or make them visible 36 
and although they can contain computational elements or parts. 37 The non-classic 
objects 38 are those where processes are not only visible but actually deployed by the 
objects themselves, as we will see. 
Fig. 34: Computationally generated knitted patterns (Kurbak and Yavuz 2007).
 
Fig. 35: Computationally generated tissue prints (Reas and Reas 2008).
35 ‘Artifacts’, ‘machines’ or ‘products’, according to Sterling (2005).
36 To create the patterns shown in the example the designers tap into raw news data, automating the 
creative process and “turning semantics into aesthetics. The metaphorical process of weaving draws from, 
and relies on, the internet’s densely connected web of current, topical information.” (Klanten et al. 2008)
37 In this sense we can consider that most ‘intelligent’ buildings simply contain some computational ele-
ments and cannot be regarded as being or developing a computational system.
38 ‘Gizmos’ or ‘spimes’ according to Sterling (2005).
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Fig. 36: Weather Bracelet (Whitelaw 2009).
Fig. 37: Baskets (2006), a collaboration between architects Aranda/Lasch and Native-American basket 
weaver Terrol Dew Johnson.
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All computational artifacts, whether physically embodied, whether virtual and im-
material, share a substantial number of common properties and traits, overcoming 
differences that were very clear (and almost natural) in noncomputational artifacts. 
These differences are not only to be found in how the artifacts are conceived and 
produced but also in how they are, how they work and how they communicate — 
either with humans or with other systems. This work will focus in the study of aes-
thetic artifacts — regardless of whether they are produced as artistic or as commu-
nicational devices — that is, in media, tools or other devices that achieve their goals 
and fulfill their purposes through their aesthetic properties.
(blank page)54
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1.1 Media and Computation
1.1.1 From Somatic to Digital Media
The human body was the earliest asset for communication and artistic expression. 
Its presence and energy were put to use in the production of signs, creating messages 
to which Pierre Lévy calls somatic, because they imply the effective presence, com-
mitment, energy, and sensibility of the body in the production of signs, as in the 
living performance of speech, dance, song, or music in general (Lévy 1997, 45). Out-
side and beyond somatic technology, traditional media for art and design have been 
material technologies for the fixation and transmission of those somatic messages. 
The human body was the connection to the earth, it was the originator and the re-
ceptor of signs and when these were for the first time transferred to other physical 
media — to carved bones or painted cave walls, to papyrus, clay or stone, to paper 
and metal — the originally multimodal somatic messages became unimodal me-
dia messages. The original (and inescapable) physical relation that was an essential 
characteristic of somatic messages was transferred to these artifacts, as they became 
their containers and the preservers of their integrity. Media technologies focused on 
reproducing signs in ways that somatic technology never managed, inseparable as it 
was from the ever-changing contexts of production and communication, and they 
also ensured that they would travel farther, improving their “distribution through 
space and time” (46). As Walter Ong 39 puts it, the thought of media or medium of 
39 1912-2003.
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communication suggests that communication is a pipeline transfer of units of mate-
rial called information from one place to another: “My mind is a box. I take a unit of 
‘information’ out of it, encode the unit (that is, fit it to the size and shape of the pipe 
it will go through), and put it into one end of the pipe (the medium, something in 
the middle between two other things). From the one end of the pipe the ‘informa-
tion’ proceeds to the other end, where someone decodes it (restores its proper size 
and shape) and puts it in his or her own boxlike container called a mind.” (1982, 172)
Although always affecting message production in one way or the other, most con-
ventional media tried to accurately represent the fixed messages, focusing on (and 
almost obsessing with at times) the ideal of fidelity, of the precise preservation and 
reproduction of signs, or the precise notation of instructions for the recreation of 
signs. As Cornelius Cardew 40 wrote, “notation is a way of making people move” (qtd. 
on Yuill 2008, 74). Time could not be recorded by conventional media, only sets of 
instructions to be performed or repeated in time could. It follows that “conventional 
media are not, as a first approximation, technologies for sign creation” (Lévy 1997, 
46). They record gestures, vocalized sounds, material situations. They fix signs with-
out, for the most part, creating them. This physical relation between man and media 
only started to fundamentally change with the development and widespread use 
of electric media in the nineteenth century, and with the subsequent revolution in 
communications during the first half of the twentieth century.
Electric media were ethereal, disembodied and transient. Classic media were static, 
material and permanent. Electricity encoded time, classic media kept space. Classic 
media sometimes encoded actions but never actually registered them. Electric me-
dia, perhaps starting from the telegraph and continuing with the radio, phonograph, 
cinema and television, were able to record and communicate time, and thus actions 
were for the first time fixed. Even photography, 41 by freezing the time in front of the 
camera to a two-dimensional still was already in a way recording time, albeit only a 
single slice per photo.
Temporal media were the first to go beyond the recording of somatic signs. They 
were the first to allow the creation of new signs, becoming “manufactured temporal 
40 1936-1981.
41 Photography is of course a chemical medium, but contemporary to electric media and with the excep-
tion of some fringe techniques, almost impossible or at least very difficult to realize without electricity.
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items” (Moles 1966, 106). In the early twentieth century, after a period of fifteen or 
twenty years of early movies that were little less than ‘photoplays’ or documental 
moving pictures created by pointing cameras at sets with actors, pioneer directors 
like Edwin Porter, 42 Edward H. Griffith 43 or Sergei Eisenstein 44 started to develop 
artifacts that presented a revolutionizing new cinematic language (Deutsch 2003, 
28), artifacts that explicitly contested the “simplistic division between original and 
reproduction” (Lévy 1997, 46). They discovered how montage allowed the establish-
ment of larger horizons for action and storytelling and how it allowed the creation 
of new signs besides the playback of those that were somatically produced and di-
rectly registered in the film (Murray 1997, 66). 45 They started to turn the medium 
of cinema into an “act of imagination and construction, not an act of recording or 
transmission.” (Sherman 2006)
If traditional media and somatic messages are material entities, electric media are 
for the first time manifestations of energy, manifestations of what Manuel De Landa 
(1991, 68) calls the ‘machinic paradigm’ of the motor. This paradigm is historically 
preceded by that of the clockwork, of a strictly mechanical device that works by 
deriving all motion from an external source as a spring or a pendulum, and is un-
able to produce motion on its own, as the motor does, internally. When studying 
communication technologies, we can apply this paradigm to how the information is 
handled by different media. Clockwork media are unable to produce any informa-
tion, being limited to convey information that is supplied by external sources, while 
motor media, being able to preserve and transmit external information also have 
the capacity to internally produce new information. 
Electric media start to coexist with material media at a time when the mechani-
cal seeds of what would later become information media were being developed. 
42 1870-1941.
43 1894-1975.
44 1898-1948.
45 Wilden places the birth of montage in 1902, when Porter, a director at the Thomas Edison’s company, 
directed the ten-minute film The Life of an American Fireman. Trying to make the best of his tight bud-
get, Porter started with a dream sequence created by double exposure of the film, he then dissolved to a 
close-up of the fire alarm and cut to stock footage of the firemen preparing for the action in the firehouse, 
then to an external shot of the fire engine in motion and ended the sequence with the fireman rescuing a 
mother and child about to be overcome by smoke. This edited sequence, as trivial as it may seem nowa-
days, excited and delighted contemporary audiences, that had never witnessed anything similar before 
(1987, 269-70).
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Around 1833 Charles Babbage 46 designed the Analytical Engine, a general-purpose, 
programmable computer (Huff 1976). 47 This device already pointed to the next ma-
chinic paradigm, the organizational form of our days, the network. The Analytical 
Engine would have been something completely new and revolutionary, as Babbage 
noted when he described it as “a Locomotive that lays down its own railway” (qtd. in 
Tomas 2004, 103). We would nevertheless have to wait until the middle of the twen-
tieth century to actually find the first realizations of this machinic paradigm, as the 
Analytical Engine was never built during Babbage’s lifetime. 48
The organizational form of the network, as defined by De Landa (1991) and Manuel 
Castells (2001) is a system of organized chaos, characteristic for its self-organizing 
and emergent properties. Contemporary digital media, incorporating information 
besides energy and matter are characteristic of this polylogic essence (Joyce 1995), 
they are part of the knowledge space of signification and freedom that Lévy presents, 
a space that “doesn’t produce only a knowledge of chaos and fractals,” but “also fab-
ricates a chaotic, fragmented knowledge.” (1997, 213)
The physical, electric and digital layers in the network are additive. Electric media 
do not dispense material technologies and material support, they actually are an 
“operation of matter on itself” (Fuller 2005, 19). Digital media do not dispense energy 
and matter, either to work, to be incorporated on or to convey their outputs to hu-
mans and machines, uniting the three layers in an effective synergistic whole.
46 1791-1871.
47 According to De Landa (1991, 159), the roots of software can even be traced to some years earlier, when 
in the early years of the nineteenth century Joseph Marie Jacquard (1752-1834) introduced his control 
mechanism for pattern-weaving looms, coding the weaving process into punchcards, in an elaboration of 
earlier ideas of his countrymen Basile Bouchon, Jean-Baptiste Falcon and Jacques Vaucanson (1709-1782), 
and as the result of about a century of experimentation. De Landa argues that the Jacquard Loom trans-
ferred control and structure from the “human body to the machine in the form of a primitive program 
stored as punched holes in paper cards, the earliest form of software: a rigid sequence of steps to be fol-
lowed sequentially in an unbroken chain.” Babbage himself, a student of the labor process, saw the idea of 
the instruction cards controlling the weaving process as a form of abstract assembly line and understood 
the importance of the Loom for the future of mechanical computation, appropriating the idea in the 
designs of his Analytical Engine.
48 Maybe the Analytical Engine was conceived too much ahead of its time, as Bolter suggests when we 
says that Babbage “was trying to fashion out of clockwork a device that really belongs to the age of elec-
tronics” (1984, 33).
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The processes of montage that were first discovered and developed with cinema and 
subsequently explored in many of the electric media became central to digital me-
dia (Manovich 2001). Montage was a natural language of electric media and it was 
remediated by their historical successors, which by encoding all the information in 
what is fundamentally the same digital ‘alphabet’, regardless of its original textual, 
visual or temporal nature (Noble 1997, 88), facilitated the transcoding of informa-
tion. Transcoding is digital media’s tendency to computerize even those aspects of 
life that are not digital and due to this influence, contemporary artistic expression 
is therefore affected by computerization even when digital media themselves are not 
used in production.
Transcoding is akin to what Anthony Wilden defines as ‘mapping’, a fundamental 
act in the process of abstraction or pattern recognition, not necessarily a means of 
visual representation, but a way of structuring information (1987, 107). To Wilden a 
mapping is a translation from code to code, “a translation of selected features of a 
‘territory’ into another medium or another code of representation, or the translation 
of one kind or level of mapping into another kind”. It is one of the most important 
activities of systems that depend on information. 49 At one or several levels, mapping 
is developed in the simplest of mechanical simplicities like a thermostat or a steam 
engine governor (Robinson 2008, 26) as in the still relative simplicity of the mapping 
of patterns of numbers in a computer, and also in the complexity of an organism’s 
environment or in the “high complexity of the many maps of many territories at 
many levels characteristic of human beings” (Wilden 1987, 109).
We can find examples of transcoding in several artistic and cultural fields. Trans-
coding in science, arts or culture means leveling all sources of information. It gives 
us the ability to cross-reference and to use information from any field in whatever 
particular work is being developed. As in musique concrète, every sound and every 
sonic object, independently of its source or original context, is valid as a piece in 
the assemblage of a sequence that is sufficiently ordered to be intelligible (Moles 
1966, 169). In the contemporary transcoding culture, every information and every 
data is usable, reusable and possible to remediate in multiple contexts, being freely 
copied and mass distributed (Parikka 2008, 70). In the transcoding culture, digital 
49 Systems that according to Wilden include (in order of increasing diversity and complexity) cybernetic 
machines (including robots, with feedback), computers, organisms, persons, corporations, armies, and 
societies (1987, 107-9).
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technologies become a “universal representational medium for describing structure 
and process” (Mateas 2005), they become the primal vehicle for remediation (Bolter 
and Grusin 1999). As Lawrence Lessig (2008) shows, digital media reintroduce a 
read/write culture to the read-only landscape of the twentieth century industrial 
society, maybe ending it (Cooper, Reimann and Cronin 2007) or maybe just add-
ing to it and increasing its intensity (Thackara 2005), but in any case transform-
ing it almost beyond recognition. Transcoding virtually interconnects all digitized 
messages (Lévy 1997, 49) and helps to create a cybersphere of contemporary culture. 
It operationalizes Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s 50 proposed noosphere (1959), that 
“emergence of an informational membrane enveloping our planet and unifying the 
human mind” (Flichy 2007, 111) and collectivizing human thought (Morowitz 2002, 
175). Louis Rossetto sums it up by emphasizing the communicational properties of 
digital media: “The more minds that connect, the more powerful this consciousness 
will be. For me, this is the real digital revolution — not computers, not networks, but 
brains connecting to brains.” (qtd. in Flichy 2007, 112)
So as this transcoding culture 51 accelerates, information technologies are developed 
and massively adopted 52 and the place that electric media occupy shrinks. As Alvin 
Toffler predicted, “the demassification of the media demassifies our minds as well… 
This, in part explains why opinions on everything (…) are becoming less uniform 
[, why] consensus shatters.” (1980)
1.1.2 Three Types of Information
Nature can be interpreted as matter, energy, and information (Campbell 1982, 16). 
Energy is a system’s capacity to do physical work, to “set matter in motion” (Wilden 
1987, 71) and although the term is commonly put to different uses, its scientific mean-
ing is precise. Every process, every movement or change in the real world involves 
the conversion of energy from one form to another (Ball 2004, 19). Information, on 
the other hand, is the capacity of a system to do logical or structural work, it is its 
capacity to organize matter, energy and/or information (Wilden 1987, 71). If matter 
has been studied at least since Aristotle and Plato, energy only started to be ex-
50 1881-1955.
51 Or ‘convergence culture’, if we prefer to use Jenkins’s term (2006).
52 At least in the developed world, but also in many of the developing countries albeit maybe in a not so 
clearly visible way.
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plored during the nineteenth century, and information became a scientific concept 
much more recently, during the first half of the twentieth century when scientists 
as Claude Shannon 53 “fashioned it into a theory, provided it with laws, festooned it 
with equations, and, as is their practice, wrung as much of the vagueness and mys-
tery out of it as they could” (Campbell 1982, 16). In much the same way as scientific 
laws for matter and energy were in principle not restricted to specific contexts and 
were devised as being universal, so were Shannon’s laws for information (1949), urg-
ing one to confront the fact that information is as universal as matter and energy 
(Campbell 1982, 17).
Matter-energy and information, however universal, are nevertheless distinct. When 
Rudolf Clausius 54 established the laws of thermodynamics he concluded that the 
energy of the universe was a constant, while the entropy of the universe tended to a 
maximum (Campbell 1982, 37). The first of these statements concerned energy, while 
in the second Clausius was already talking about information (Lloyd 2006, 66). We 
are able to transform, exchange and use both matter and energy, but we cannot cre-
ate or destroy any of them, while information is continually created and destroyed 
in ordinary human, biological or physical activities (Wilden 1987, 71). According to 
Wilden, matter and energy are real and do not depend for their existence on being 
perceived by living creatures or human minds or senses, information on the other 
hand, may be symbolic, imaginary, or real, and does depend for its existence on 
being perceived by living creatures or human minds or senses (72) (or, somewhat 
simplifying things, information depends on being perceived by any system that may 
be aware of it). 
On a more common reading, and at a human communicational level, information is 
usually not defined in this primary sense from the natural sciences, as a fundamen-
tal property that can be measured. Information refers to data that we perceive from 
the environment, data that may be relevant to decisions, however mundane these 
may be. As Paul Starr notes, ‘information’ is not synonymous with ‘knowledge’, be-
cause the later refers to abstract concepts and judgments, it provides a basis for the 
understanding of the world and of the actions one may undertake in it. Informa-
tion “carries the connotation of being more precise, yet also more fragmentary, than 
knowledge” (2004, 17).
53 1916-2001.
54 1822-1888.
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Thinking about this human perception of information, and not so much about its 
mechanical codification, Wilden (1987) proposed a classification of information in 
three types: analog, digital and iconic. The three types of media previously discussed 
— physical, electric and digital — are able to convey any of the three types of infor-
mation despite what may at first be suggested by their designations. Analog infor-
mation, like analog technologies, is based on difference and is continuous; digital 
information, based on distinction, is discrete, while iconic information is defined by 
Wilden as being based on both difference and distinction and as being simultane-
ously continuous and discrete. Analog differences are more-or-less differences and 
are related by continuity, while digital distinctions are either/or, or, more often than 
not all-or-none, and are separated by gaps (1987, 222).
As obvious examples of analog information, Wilden presents time and space as we 
perceive them on the middle scale of our organisms, almost in the middle of the 
size of the universe. 55 Time and space can be measured and divided, but always 
along a continuum that forces our measurements to be relative, never absolute. The 
alphabet, the whole numbers, money, the genetic code or the pieces in a game of 
chess are equally obvious examples of digital information, consisting as they do of 
discrete units separated by distinct gaps, in a way that makes the gap itself become 
an integral part of the syntax or of the ordering principles of the system. If the infi-
nite sequence of the whole numbers is digital, each integer separated from the next 
by a distinct, unfillable and regular gap, the infinite sequence of the real numbers 
is purely analog, because of the continuum of infinitely many differences between 
every other difference in the system (223). Analog information lacks the syntax to 
communicate the fundamental logical operation of identity and cannot represent 
zero, and while it can express the and function, it is unable to express the other three 
truth functions of analytic logic, either/or, if… then and not, functions that require a 
digital syntax based on identity and contradiction, and the capability to distinguish 
logical types (224).
By pointing out how humans perceive space, Wilden also suggests how analog cod-
ing can be a fundamentally human construction. The continuities that we identify 
as analog are either human intellectual constructions, like the infinite series of real 
numbers or time itself (Spengler 1962, 77), or are caused by the fundamental limits of 
55 “The smallest things we know about are approximately 30 orders of magnitude smaller than ourselves, 
and the largest structures in the universe are about 30 orders of magnitude bigger.” (Kelly 2009a).
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our perception at the meso scale, where all of the quantum phenomena are impossi-
ble to detect. Having evolved in what Richard Dawkins calls the ‘middle world’ of our 
scale, our senses and intuitions have grown to deal with objects much larger than in-
dividual atoms (Lloyd 2006, 5) or the even smaller subatomic particles at which scales 
quantum ‘weirdness’ happens. We perceive the world as being continuous, although 
to the best of our knowledge we know it to be discrete and discontinuous. Along our 
history, we discovered digital coding and, after the fact, produced the concept of the 
analog to describe the way the world seems to work for us (Wark 2007, 089).
The discovery of zero may well be one of the first occurrences of digital coding. Zero 
was a product of the calculation through positional numbers and it was originally 
the gap that made the syntax of the system work (McLuhan 1964, 125). Originally 
discovered in India about two thousand years ago (Seife 2001), and with written 
records dated around 800 CE, it was introduced in Europe in the tenth century CE 
(Wilden 1987, 104). In the thirteenth century the Arab word for ‘gap’ or ‘empty’, صفر 
(şifr), was Latinized as ‘cipher’ (zephyrum) and eventually became the Italian zero 
(McLuhan 1964, 125). Incidentally, it was also around this time that the space be-
tween words started to be used as a punctuation mark, a fact that is hard to dissoci-
ate from the discovery of zero (Levy 2001, 14) and that turned the alphabet into a 
real digital system. 56 
Zero was a difficult abstract concept, rejected by ancient Greeks 57 but it was made 
visible and somewhat clearer by one of the earliest devices to perform digital encod-
ing, the abacus (Lloyd 2006, 12). By turning every whole number into a discrete 
digital unit, the abacus created the space to the possibility, or rather the reality, of 
the zero to become clear.
The terms ‘analog’ and ‘digital’ were originally derived from the distinction 
between analog computers (computing by means of variations in continuous 
quantities, such as volume, potential, or length) and digital computers (com-
puting by means of the selection and combination of discrete elements). ‘Iconic’, 
meaning ‘form’ or ‘image’, is derived from the visual and plastic arts, but may 
56 We could argue that without the spaces and the vowels, as in Semitic writing systems, alphabets are 
still a very analog system, as they create a continuum of information to be interpreted in sometimes very 
arbitrary ways.
57 To whom, according to Wilden, even the numeral 1 was reluctantly called a number, because as Aris-
totle said, numbers measure pluralities and the numeral 1 is the measuring unit, not a plurality (1987, 253).
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equally well be applied to dreams, music, meaning, ideas, any distinct bodily 
sensation, and so on. (Wilden 1987, 222)
Curiously, since analog devices employ digital coding in computation and control 
— the divisions in the dial of a clock, the distances marked on a ruler — strictly 
speaking they are both analog and digital, they are iconic devices (223). The same 
could perhaps be said of those digital devices that simulate analog devices. Analog 
and digital coding can be found in all communication systems, where the digital is 
instrumental to the analog communication of context and relationship, from where 
it follows that the two codings do not oppose but rather complement each other and 
make each other possible (225).
From here Wilden identifies three levels of knowledge: sensing, where the analog 
continuity dominates the digital discontinuity; meaning, where analog and digital 
combine to form iconic coding; and signification, where digital coding dominates 
its analog counterpart. From a definition of information as coded variety, “sensing 
can be defined as coded information, meaning as coded sensing; and signification 
as coded meaning.” (225)
1.2 The Computer
1.2.1 As a Tool
If writing is a medium of thought, then software is an agent of will. (Levin 
2004, 140)
Since its invention, the computer 58 has been used as a tool. Initially it was uniquely a 
tool for the mind (McCullough 1998, 17), accelerating and expanding it, and produc-
ing symbols: not mechanical artifacts nor physical power, but abstract information 
and mathematical power. Tools are machines, and machines automate and replace 
work that was originally done by humans, and so did computers, named after the 
workers whose job they were designed to replaced (Turing 1950). Machines process 
and alter materials according to standardized processes. In this sense the computer, 
as a machine and a tool, acts on and modifies information (Schubiger 2005, 343).
58 Unless otherwise noted, whenever we write computer we will be referring to a digital computer, not to 
analog computers.
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It is useful to set a distinction between two different uses of computers, the first be-
ing the use of programmed computers, when hardware and software are taken as 
the tool to use, and the second being that of programmable computers, when both 
physical and logical components can be freely manipulated by the user. This clas-
sification does not propose to rank the usages, or the goals pursued by the users of 
computers, but simply to describe two alternative ways of operation, that many us-
ers occasionally intersect. In the sake of simplicity let us call these two modes after 
the nomenclature proposed by Michael Joyce (1995, 41) and define them as explor-
atory and constructive uses of the computer.
Exploratory usage approaches the computer and ready-made software as a multi-
tool that can perform very complex tasks in a short time, outperforming the human 
abilities to manipulate symbols in formal languages by several orders of magnitude 
(Dorin 2008, 290). Through exploratory use a computer can be made to work in cal-
culations, algorithmic simulations or other operations on information for which it 
was programmed, and aid humans with complex operations, or even replace them 
in some cases. A constructive usage, on the other hand, goes beyond ready-made 
software and creates its own, allowing users far more than just disposing of a very 
fast and effective tool but rather opening up the possibility for them to also become 
toolmakers, to create tools that will in turn generate or operate the solutions for the 
problems at hand.
Exploratory use of computers allows users to perform sets of predefined functions in 
a given work process or design. Ready-made software is intended for specific kinds 
of usage and will consequently tend to impose models of operation that with few ex-
ceptions must be followed by the user. Programmable computers may however also 
become tools that allow completely different approaches to the task of design, that 
allow new modes of usage, by not “functioning as graphic translators or organizers, 
but by requiring input in the form of rules, gestures, goals and parameters, and a 
defining grammar which governs the combination thereof.” (Ceccato 2001, 4) The 
first mode of usage represents what Harold Cohen called “the use of the computer as 
a tool in the sense that a camera is a tool”, it is “the antithesis of autonomy” (1973b) 
and therefore although useful, it doesn’t focus on one of the “most fundamental 
and radical concepts associated with digital computers: that of computation itself” 
(Manovich 2002).
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If you hold a hammer in your hand, everything in the world begins to resemble 
a nail. (Small 1999)
Through exploratory use, computers and software, much like any other tool, recreate 
the world in their own image. They are projections of slim parts of ourselves, models 
of processes that need to be used in predefined ways and that simulate and stimu-
late the realities of the original designers of the software. Through constructive use, 
however, users are able to go several steps further in the positive investigation of the 
potential of the technology, not only extending the mind but also the hand in ways 
that were not necessarily foreseen by others and that may approach design problems 
in idiosyncratic and truly original ways. 
Dave Griffiths (2008, 250-51) describes how it is possible to break down the develop-
ment of software into three broad categories based on intent, or on the nature of the 
goals that it is designed to fulfill. 59 ‘Classical tools’ embody the conventional idea of 
a software that is designed to achieve some clear and simple goal. The simplicity of 
the goals does not derive from their inherent low complexity, because there may be 
several goals to achieve and their resolution can be highly complex from a software 
design point of view, but rather from the fact that all the goals are clear and defined 
a priori. As examples of classical tools, Griffiths points the ‘ls’ command in Unix 
systems or a web server as Apache. Any computer user could add to this list dozens 
or hundreds of other classical software tools used daily in personal computers, from 
media players to calendars, task managers, etc.
The second of Griffiths’s categories is that of ‘environments for working in’, software 
developed when the nature of the goals is more complicated, and involves more 
human issues. Environments for working in offer the user a series of functional-
ities through a framework, usually a text-based or a graphical user interface. More 
complex goals are harder to predict and define a priori, therefore the solutions need 
more flexibility so that they can be useful in the long run. Finally, the third cat-
egory is what Griffiths terms of ‘artistic’, software designed to achieve very complex 
goals, difficult to define in any way, let alone to predict. Goals that are ambiguous, 
that sometimes are expressed merely by existing, using software as the only way to 
express something. In art, design and communication, this is the domain par excel-
59 Three gross simplifications, according to Griffiths, as most software typically consist of a blend of 
these types.
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lence for the constructive use of computers, it is the domain of designers that create 
their own tools as an artistic process of research and investigation (251). The first 
two of Griffiths’s domains are typically the field of the exploratory use of computers, 
of work processes that, we could argue, regard the computer and its software (in a 
somewhat simplistic view) as not much more than traditional mechanical tools.
But digital technologies are more than tools. As Caroline Schubiger notes, if with 
a tool there must be some difference between input and output, between pre- and 
post-usage states, otherwise the tool would have served no real purpose, in a me-
dium, the alterations to the conveyed messages should be kept to a minimum or 
otherwise the medium will be poor or noisy. “Input must be as similar as possible 
to output, or else the medium will have defeated its purpose.” (2005, 343) Digital 
technologies can be used to store, reproduce and communicate information, they 
are communication paths that in Lévy’s perspective are media, carrying messages 
that were originated elsewhere.
1.2.2 As a Medium
Defining media, Henry Jenkins turns to historian Lisa Gitelman and to her model 
that describes media on two levels, in the first place as technologies that enable com-
munication and then as sets of associated protocols or social and cultural practices 
that grow around those technologies. This points to a coexistence between what 
Jenkins calls ‘delivery technologies’, simply and only technologies, and ‘cultural 
systems’, that persist as layers within the complex information and entertainment 
stratum after the technologies die or become obsolete (2006, 13-14). Marshall McLu-
han 60 would identify these as the figure and ground of a medium, the ground being 
the situation that gives rise to it, the technology, and the figure the “whole environ-
ment of services and disservices that it brings into play” (1988).
Agreeing with this view, Schubiger reminds that media have a ‘double-nature’ that 
is on the one hand tied to their communicational potential, and on the other to the 
social systems that form around the technologies (2005, 343). She develops this idea 
by pointing to how mass media produce and disseminate information, presenting a 
single view of authority and offering no feedback option. Two-way media differ by 
the existence of a counterpart that permits reciprocity, by a bidirectional transmis-
60 1911-1980.
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sion and reception of information. Two-way media transform those that in mass 
media were just recipients into de facto participants. Therefore, Schubiger concludes, 
if “we take a closer look at the computer, we see that it, too, can be considered a two-
way medium that sends and receives information. The computer is a medium. It 
stores information. The computer is a two-way medium that allows for an exchange 
of information between man and machine.” (343)
Nicholas Negroponte followed the same line of thought when in Being Digital he 
chose the broadcast television as an example of a medium in which all the intelli-
gence is at the point of origin, and he suggested that an evolutionary step in televi-
sion would eventually be “a change in the distribution of intelligence — or, more 
precisely, the movement of some intelligence, from the transmitter to the receiver” 
(1995, 19). This was what pioneers like Douglas Engelbart (2003) and J.C.R. Lick-
lider 61 (1960), or Roy Ascott (2003) perceived in the 1960s: how big was the social 
potential of computer-mediated communication (Lévy 1997, xx), how digitally con-
trolled cognitive prostheses could transform our intellectual capabilities as clearly 
as, according to Lévy, “the mutations of our genetic heritage” (xxiv).
Looking to Jenkins’s delivery technologies, in his view old media never die or fade 
away. What dies are the tools that are used to access media content, like Floppy 
disks, Beta tapes, VHS tapes, Compact Cassettes, DATs, Mini Discs and many, many 
others. These are delivery technologies and they are what becomes obsolete and gets 
replaced while media, on the other hand, persist and evolve. “Recorded sound is the 
medium. CDs, MP3 files, and 8-track cassettes are delivery technologies” (Jenkins 
2006, 13) or, in the words of Donald Byrd, “print is the content, not the form, of elec-
tronic media” (qtd. in Joyce 1995, 21). As an example, the medium of cinema keeps 
moving away from its material delivery technologies, and nowadays most ‘film’ is 
captured by charged coupled devices, the editing is digital, as is much of the dis-
tribution and projection. As bits take over, we find that if we look at delivery tech-
nologies alone, as Tom Sherman said, ‘film’ has become just another word for video 
(2006). Better still, ‘film’ is increasingly being transcoded as digital video, abstracted 
as bits. But cinema is a medium that shows no signs of being at risk of disappearance.
Computers were embraced by every presentational medium (Nelson 2003, 306) and 
as a consequence the current delivery technologies are bits, bandwidth, file formats 
61 1915-1990.
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and communication protocols. Early computer engineers regarded bits as resources 
for mathematical processing, missing the part they played as a universal medium 
(Hofstadter 2007, 244). Today our culture keeps failing to see bits in this way, but 
for an altogether different reason, actually, according to Douglas Hofstadter, for the 
opposite reason: as all those numbers are hidden behind screens, computers and 
networks, we utterly forget they are there. Aarseth identifies a breaking into two 
independent technological levels: the ‘interface’ and the ‘storage medium’, leading to 
a divorce between the surface of reading and the information stored behind it (1997, 
10). Following similar lines of thought, and fundamentally disagreeing with McLu-
han’s understanding of ‘media’, both Wilden and Negroponte propose a break with 
his most famous axiom, that “the medium is the message” (1964). Wilden notes that 
if energy is the capacity of a system to set matter in motion and information is its 
capacity to do logical or structural work, its capacity to organize matter, energy and/
or information in ways not found in ordinary physical systems, matter-energy and 
information should thus be understood as functionally distinct. It then follows that 
the medium is not the message but rather the means of communication (1987, 71). In 
Negroponte’s view, in the digital world the medium is no longer a message but rather 
an embodiment of it, and any given message may have multiple embodiments that 
are automatically delivered from the same data (1995, 71).
In Technologies of Freedom (1983), Ithiel de Sola Pool 62 enunciated the concept of 
convergence in media. Understanding the role of electronic and digital technologies, 
he foresaw a revolution in communication that would have effects as profound as 
those of the printing revolution:
For untold millennia humans, unlike any other animal, could talk. Then for 
four thousand years or so their uniqueness was not only that they could move 
air to express themselves to those immediately around them but also that they 
could embody speech in writing, to be preserved over time and transported 
over space. With Gutenberg a third era began, in which written texts could be 
disseminated in multiple copies. In the last stage of that era phonographs and 
photographs made it possible to circulate sound and pictures, as well as text, in 
multiple copies. Now a fourth era has been ushered in by an innovation of at 
least as much historical significance as the mass production of print and other 
media. Pulses of electromagnetic energy embody and convey messages that up 
62 1917-1984.
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to now have been sent by sound, pictures, and text. All media are becoming 
electronic. (Pool, 1983, 24)
This convergence blurs the borders between media, the two-way, point-to-point 
communications, and mass communications, when a single device or a limited 
group of devices is able to carry services that in the past were provided separately. 
At the same time, those services that in the past were provided by one medium, like 
telephony, broadcast or press, are now provided in concurrent ways, eroding the 
one-to-one relationship that used to exist between a medium and its use (Jenkins 
2006, 10).
Today, all media collapse into digital technologies. Analog media do not disappear 
in the process, but they are transformed. If according to McLuhan (1964), the con-
tent of a medium is its predecessor, and every medium therefore remediates those 
that preceded it (Bolter and Grusin 1999), digital technologies contain and remedi-
ate all of their predecessors. We do not live anymore in Gutenberg’s Galaxy (McLu-
han 1962), we live in Turing’s Galaxy (Grassmuck 1994).
1.2.3 As a Metamedium
The double role of the computer as tool and medium has originated several discus-
sions among those that used it in artistic practice. Already in 1976 Edward Ihna-
towicz 63 mentioned that the distinction, as arbitrary as it seemed, was in fact very 
important because “it distinguishes those artists whose inspiration comes from out-
side the world of computing and who use the computer simply for convenience from 
those whose ideas have originated as a result of computing experience” (1976). Frie-
der Nake described the computer as a “medium that we use instrumentally as a tool 
while communicating with it as a medium, thus it is both machine and mediation 
simultaneously” (qtd. in Pold 2008a, 32), a statement that led Søren Pold to conclude 
that in this new kind of media-machine, the instrumental is mediated as the rep-
resentational medium is functionalized. In other words, function is mediated and 
the mediated representation becomes functional (2008a, 33). As David Tomas notes, 
we can identify the ‘newness’ of digital media from their development as ideas that 
are amplified and transformed again and again through space and time — and cul-
ture, we might add — “the distant past to potential and possible futures since each 
63 1926-1988.
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of these transformations would engender their own mental systems and associated 
perceptual spaces” (2004, 186).
More than just accelerating cognitive functions and mathematical capacity, com-
puters also expand the human mind by simultaneously working as media and by 
remediating multiple other media. They contribute to the remembrance of particu-
lar pieces of information, to the safe-keeping, the search and the retrieval of memo-
ries, and they create a new repository for our collective memory and new forms 
of instrument-based identity (158). And the effect they have in individual humans 
and in humanity is nothing short of remarkable, altering our view of the world 
and transforming our intellectual capabilities, as Lévy puts it, sharply accelerating 
‘hominization’, or the process of the emergence of the human species (1997, xxiv). In 
Understanding Media, McLuhan cited Stéphane Mallarmé, 64 who thought that the 
world existed to end in a book, while emphasizing that we were not in a position 
to already go beyond that idea and to transfer “the entire show” to the memory of 
a computer (1964, 65). Nowadays, more than forty years after he wrote that, we are 
at a moment in history when much of the ‘show’ can already be transferred to the 
memory of computers, to networks, databases, wikis, websites and e-books. Man, 
McLuhan added, is not like merely biological creatures, for he possesses something 
more than his genetic heritage: he possesses apparatus of transmission and trans-
formation that are based on the power to store experience and to draw from it, ap-
paratus that expand human nature.
The feeling of being expanded by digital technologies can be strong to the point of 
leading a writer as Michael Joyce to describe himself as being “possessed of two 
minds: my own and its augmented silicon” (1995, 2). The prosthetic expansion, the 
merging of artificial and biological intelligences (Rosenberg 1994, 268), turn humans 
into something of a cyborg 65 in the sense proposed by Donna Haraway (2004). They 
make “the difference between natural and artificial, mind and body, self-developing 
and externally designed, and many other distinctions that used to apply to organ-
64 1842-1898.
65 The word cyborg was coined by Manfred Clynes, a neurologist working in the field of space medi-
cine, from the words cybernetic organism. Clynes used it to describe how a new symbiotic entity results 
from an alliance between humans and their technology (Aarseth 1997, 53). If this alliance was originally 
thought to exist in closed artificial environments such as space capsules or space stations, the miniatur-
ization of technology and, above all, the ubiquitous and facilitated access to digital technologies allowed 
the term to be applied to a series of other relations.
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isms and machines” become thoroughly ambiguous, and lead us to conceptualize 
both machines and organisms as “coded texts through which we engage in the play 
of writing and reading the world” (11). They lead us to see our personal computers 
as cybernetic mirrors (Pold 2008b, 220) and to develop a computational view of 
ourselves and of the world.
Alan Kay observed that computers are representation machines that can emulate 
any known medium: “The protean nature of the computer is such that it can act like 
a machine or like a language to be shaped and exploited. It is a medium that can 
dynamically simulate the details of any other medium, including media that can-
not exist physically. It is not a tool, although it can act like many tools. It is the first 
metamedium, and as such it has degrees of freedom for representation and expres-
sion never before encountered and as yet barely investigated.” (1984, qtd. in Laurel 
1993, 32-33) 
Michael van Schaik warns us against mistakenly regarding the computer as a me-
dium that just reproduces all earlier media without changing them (2008, 182). If 
in the early stages of any medium there usually is a tendency to use it to emulate 
previous and better established media, developing incunabula that simultaneously 
try to prove the medium’s value and search for its fundamental traits, it is not until 
a medium reaches some maturity in its contact with the public and in its use by 
content creators and communicators that it begins to take a life of its own and to 
display its uniqueness (Lansdown 1997, 13). This is what happened with cinema, what 
happened with books in Gutenberg’s time (Murray 1997, 28) and what happened 
with many other technologies (Starr 2004; Zielinski 2006). According to van Schaik, 
many metaphors still in use in digital media are tied to previous media and restrict 
its actual hyper-qualities and its nature as a metamedium (2008, 183), a point of 
view with which Lev Manovich concurs when he proposes that instead of “digital 
multimedia”, of designs that simply combine elements from different media, we see 
“metamedia”, i.e., the remixing of working methods and techniques of different me-
dia within a single project (2008, 123). Manovich identifies two major consequences 
of the production workflows that digital technologies currently allow: a hybridity of 
the media language we see in the contemporary design universe and a similarity of 
techniques and strategies used, regardless of the output media or the type of project. 
He elaborates: “Like an object built from Lego blocks, today’s typical design com-
bines techniques coming from multiple media. It uses the results of the operations 
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specific to different software programs that were originally created to imitate work 
with different physical media”, and “while these techniques continue to be used in 
relation to their original media, most of them are now also used as part of the work-
flow on any design job” (124). Once again we find transcoding, not of information or 
data, but now of languages and ways to communicate.
After digital technologies are introduced to human activities they can no longer be 
factored out. The introduction is, according to Joseph Weizenbaum, 66 an irreversible 
commitment (1976, 28), because the plasticity and polyvalence of the metamedium 
means that it is thoroughly integrated with the structure and deeply enmeshed with 
vital substructures of any domain where it can act. Thus, according to Norbert Bolz, 
media theory is confronted with its transformation into computer theory, in what 
will certainly become the metatheory in the area of communication, connecting the 
electronic media and the metamedium that is the computer (2004, 25).
1.2.4 As a Simulator of Media
As we have seen, digital technologies sample analog and iconic information into 
bits, sometimes reducing the amount of information to the point where it can be 
described in a finite (and adequate) number of words. With digitalization come the 
advantages of a better signal-to-noise ratio, of the reduction of the power required 
to transmit signals, of the ease of interpolating boundaries and of storing the infor-
mation in digital memory (Wilden 1987, 223) and also the power to remediate and 
simulate other media. Following the work of McLuhan, and specifically his proposal 
of how each medium contains its historical antecedents, Jay David Bolter and Rich-
ard Grusin (1999) proposed that all media fundamentally work by remediating other 
media, that is, by translating, refashioning, and reforming other media, both on the 
levels of content and form. Print, photography, radio, film, and television have al-
ways borrowed from other media, not only their antecedents but also their concur-
rents, in a process of cultural competition between or among technologies (Bolter 
2001, 23-24), where new media forms always claim to be improving or reforming 
earlier forms, even when they are in fact simply paying homage to them (2003, 28). 
Manovich draws from examples in human-computer interfacing to argue that the 
history and present development of digital media fit Bolter and Grusin’s thesis, be-
cause there is no shortage of examples of borrowing, reformatting and combining 
66 1923-2008.
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other media, those media’s conventions and even those from human-made physical 
artifacts (2001, 95).
If remediation pays homage to and shifts media, it also creates opportunities to their 
development. Bolter exemplified this by going back to as far as the invention of writ-
ing and by showing how writing “remediated oral communication by involving the 
eye as well as the ear and so giving the words a different claim to reality” (2001, 23). 
He also elaborated on how ancient Greeks and Romans conceived of alphabetic writ-
ing in a dialectic tension between the oral tradition that it only partially replaced: 
“prose, even philosophy and history, was often highly rhetorical, as if the writing 
were still trying to imitate and improve on oral presentation” (24). After discussing 
several other examples, he concludes that digital technology is turning out to be one 
of the most traumatic remediations in the history of Western writing, because of the 
way it fundamentally changes the ‘look and feel’ of writing and reading.
But although they are largely based in text, and largely used to communicate text, 
digital technologies remediate several other media and they do it so well as to be-
come their ultimate simulations. In Simulacra and Simulation (1994), Jean Baudril-
lard 67 defines simulacra as the ways in which a heterogeneous system of symbols 
is used in diverse strategies of communication, and he classifies them in three cat-
egories according to the technologies used in their creation: counterfeits, replicas 
and simulations. Counterfeits are traced to technologies that were intended to cre-
ate illusions that would pass for reality, to images that imitated life to the point of 
becoming virtually indistinguishable from it. 68 De Landa cites painting, sculpture 
and stagecraft as the three main forms of imaging reality during the late sixteenth 
century, when they were used to visually codify passages of the Bible, imposing 
an unambiguous interpretation on them and fixating a real, or better said, an ‘of-
ficial’ meaning (1991, 188). Siegfried Zielinski (2006) cites examples from Ignatius de 
Loyola, 69 Giovanni Battista della Porta, 70 Robert Fludd 71 and especially Athanasius 
Kircher 72 and his mechanical exhibits of elaborate contraptions that functioned like 
audiovisual automata (125) and created a “perfect mise en scène of God as omnipres-
67 1929-2007.
68 At least at the light of the time when they were produced.
69 1491-1556.
70 1535-1615.
71 1574-1637.
72 1601/2-1680.
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ent watcher and prompter,” with sculpted heads that would “begin to speak when-
ever anyone passed by, and no one knew where the voices came from” (127). It is also 
in Kircher’s work that we find early examples of the magic lantern, used in his own 
lectures or for theatrical productions, and of optical “metamorphosis apparatus for 
the allegorical transformation of an observer” that allowed to position mirrors so 
that the observer could view the image of an object but not his own reflection (136). 
This device had such a powerful dramatic effect that Kircher eventually added a sec-
ond observer to the setup, in a position where he would be capable to watch the first 
observer’s interaction with the illusion machine and its images (138). 73
When photography was invented a new kind of image began to populate the 
world: mechanical replicas. When the first movie was shown to amazed audi-
ences in 1895, the ability of photography to replicate the arrangement of objects 
in space was supplemented with film’s ability to replicate a pattern of events in 
time. These technologies created new possibilities for the development of simu-
lacra, perhaps first truly exploited in World War II by Goebbels and his Reich 
Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda. In his hands newsreels 
and documentaries (like those of Leni Riefenstahl) became part of the spiritual 
currency of the Nazi state.
Finally, the advent of computers has made possible a new breed of image, and 
the possibility of a third kind of simulacrum. Reality ceased to be imitated or 
replicated, and began to be simulated: the new breed of image was generated 
through computers, using mathematical models of real physical phenomena. 
The best-known example of this kind of image is perhaps the flight simulator, 
the machine used to train pilots to expensive warplanes by confronting them 
with real-time graphic models of the landscapes through which they will even-
tually have to fly. (De Landa 1991, 188-89)
Returning to Bolter, in Writing Space (2001) we find how he identifies two apparently 
contradictory expectations for media that have been developing in our culture since 
the Renaissance (25). On one hand, in line with Baudrillard, the goal of representa-
tion has been to achieve transparent depictions where the medium is supposed to 
73 We can find a parallelism with how contemporary interactive systems are sometimes enjoyed through 
direct interaction but sometimes also become enjoyable to watch as a shared performance between a 
system and an interactor.
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function as a window through which the viewer can see the actual objects that are 
represented. Artists and audiences have generally treated media as being transpar-
ent 74 but transparency is not always what artists and audiences desire. Sometimes 
they are both likely to prefer to be made conscious of and even surrounded by the 
media, an effect that Bolter names hypermediacy and that he describes as “an in-
tense awareness of and even reveling in the medium” (25). Television is the most 
common example of a medium that at times can function transparently but that 
most of the times is highly hypermediated. 75 Among digital media, Bolter mentions 
the World Wide Web as being the most often characterized by hypermediacy, nev-
ertheless pointing that it is common to find the same medium striving for transpar-
ency on one case and for hypermediacy in another, and that today “we swing back 
and forth between a desire for transparent contact with the ostensibly real (unmedi-
ated) world and a fascination with the possibilities that media offer us. Because the 
number of old and new, analog and digital, media available to us today is very great, 
we live in an environment that is conducive to hypermediacy. Yet the desire for a 
transparent medium remains strong” (25).
The computer therefore mediates messages and remediates media messages, doing it 
mostly through transcoding and simulation. The computer is a mimetic medium, in 
the sense proposed by Aristotle and Plato (Kamper 2004, 14), and is capable of great-
ly extending the range of systems whose behavior can be imitated, due to its abstract 
character and symbol-manipulating generality (Simon 1969, 14). The computer si-
multaneously operates in what Weizenbaum calls ‘performance’ and ‘simulation’ 
modes (1976, 164), creating what is certainly an hypermediated medium, but also 
bringing authenticity and simulation together in a new, and revealing, transparency. 
When properly programmed, a computer can simulate any medium, allowing us to 
draw inferences from the simulation, and to directly translate them into inferences 
applicable to the media (145). Furthermore, as even electric media have progressively 
been digitized over the years, what we once regarded as simulations are nowadays 
the media themselves, the simulations and models have become the reality. We no 
74 As a series of historical accounts and anecdotes attest to, one of the most famous (and probably apoc-
ryphal) being the telling of the terror that audiences felt when watched the projection of Lumière’s 1895 
short-film L’arrivée d’un train en gare de La Ciotat (The Arrival of a Train at La Ciotat Station). This film 
showed the entry of a train pulled by a steam locomotive into a train station in the French town of La 
Ciotat. It is a single, unedited real-time shot lasting approximately 50 seconds.
75 In many contemporary television fictions, the breaking of the fourth wall has become rather common 
and somewhat of a trend.
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longer use computers to simulate media but rather build the media with computers, 
sometimes leaving a physical distribution technology, as with newspapers or books, 
sometimes still using an electric or electromagnetic distribution technology, as with 
radio, but more often than not, converting all of the medium’s infrastructure to the 
digital realm.
As Iannis Xenakis 76 summarizes, creative thought gives birth to mental mecha-
nisms, a process that takes place in all realms of thought, including the arts; some 
of these mechanism can be expressed mathematically and can be mechanized, thus 
possible to simulate by computers (1992, 131).
1.2.5 Four Essential Properties
In Hamlet on the Holodeck (1997), Janet Murray tries to understand how the com-
puter and computer networks will affect the production of narratives and the pro-
duction and consumption of aesthetic artifacts and communication. She maps the 
“continued loosening of the traditional boundaries between games and stories, be-
tween films and rides, between broadcast media (like television and radio) and ar-
chival media (like books and videotape), between narrative forms (like books) and 
dramatic forms (like theater or film), and even between the audience and the author” 
(64), and she presents what she identifies as four essential properties of digital en-
vironments. In this order, Murray states that digital environments are procedural, 
participatory, spatial and encyclopedic, adding that “[t]he first two properties make 
up most of what we mean by the vaguely used word interactive; the remaining two 
properties help to make digital creations seem as explorable and extensive as the 
actual world, making up much of what we mean when we say that cyberspace is 
immersive” (71).
Encyclopedism, the fourth of the properties is, according to Murray, more a differ-
ence in degree than a difference in kind. Due to the enormous (and ever increasing) 
storage capacity of computers and computer networks and the relatively small foot-
print of digitally encoded information, the storage and retrieval of vast quantities 
of information becomes possible and we are able to virtually extend the human 
memory. Technologies like hypertext and search engines help to expand, connect 
and organize these resources while at the same time establishing a topological space 
76 1922-2001.
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within them. Although some conceptualize it as a non-space (Morse 1996, 195), when 
confronted with the vastness of the information that is accessible through comput-
ers and digital networks, most of the times we cannot escape a “sense of spatial im-
mensity, in greatness and smallness, disarticulating and spacing out” (de Chardin 
1959, 33). This is accentuated by the visual presentation of the information, displayed 
in computer screens that are not only physical devices per se but are also understood 
as boards for transient and impermanent information, read as stages and interpret-
ed as places. Screens are like supermatter, “once switched on, all attention turns to 
them, and their material qualities are demoted to the status of package or container 
as the viewer searches for the real content, information. Unlike sound, which can be 
nondirectional, screens tend to give a space a specific orientation.” (Dunne 2005, 125) 
The sense of vision is responsible for the acquisition of more raw data than all the 
other human senses combined (Hall 2008), Zielinski reminds us that “ever since Ar-
istotle the faculty of vision has been privileged over all the other human senses with 
which we perceive the world” (2006, 84) and vision also allows us to perceive spaces, 
to locate ourselves in spaces, even if they’re abstract constructs and not concrete 
physical realities. We conceptualize the digital domain as a cyberspace, 77 “an envi-
ronment with its own geography in which we experience a change of documents on 
our screen as a visit to a distant site on a world wide web” (Murray 1997, 80) and we 
use all sorts of spatial and physical metaphors to describe our digital experiences 
‘there’, from ‘pages’ to ‘maps’, from ‘landscapes’ to ‘navigation’, to ‘topography’, and 
the like. These metaphors emphasize the immersive quality of our experiences with-
in it. Even more than with any other technology or medium, “one gets inside. While 
cinema permits an illusion of participation, cyberspace is predicated on it. From the 
very first computer games, the graphical Spacewar 78 and the text-based Adventure, 79 
77 Lévy (1997, 118) notes the origin of the word ‘cyberspace’: of American origin, it was used for the first 
time in 1984 by the science-fiction writer William Gibson in his novel Neuromancer (1984).
78 Spacewar! was programmed by Steve Russel, Martin Graetz and Wayne Witaenem on a DEC PDP-1 
computer at the MIT in 1962. In Spacewar! the players navigated two spaceships around the (circular) 
screen, while shooting torpedoes at one another. They would also have to be careful enough not to let 
either of the ships get too close to the star in the center of the screen which pulled them towards it. There-
fore, the players not only interacted with the ships but with the space itself. Although this space was not 
navigable — one could not move through it — the simulation of gravity made it a truly active presence, 
and just as the player had to engage with the spaceships, he had to engage with space (Manovich 2001, 219).
79 Adventure or Colossal Cave Adventure was programmed by William Crowther and Don Woods (1976) 
for the DEC PDP-10 computer. It was the first game of its kind and defined an entire genre of computer 
games. Adventure was strictly text-based, describing all the spaces where the player could move and all 
the actions performed by this and other non-playing characters as text, “YOU ARE STANDING AT THE END 
OF A ROAD BEFORE A SMALL BRICK BUILDING. AROUND YOU IS A FOREST. A SMALL STREAM FLOWS OUT OF 
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the model of the disembodied, simulated subject moving through Cartesian space, 
[…] the cybersubject, was already in place” (Bailey 1996, 34). 
We have allowed cyberspace to become a set of real spaces where we can meet and 
interact with others (Reville 2009), but cyberspace is less the new media for the 
transmission of information than it is all the new and original modes or informa-
tion exchange, creation and navigation of knowledge. As Lévy reminds us, cyber-
space is the social relations that the new media bring about (1997, 118), once everyone 
is equipped with a screen from where to access the world’s digital libraries (Flichy 
2007, 61).
Hence, digital environments are also participatory. They allow unprecedented forms 
of communication, starting with the two-way exchange of information between man 
and machine that we normally call interaction (Schubiger 2005, 343), ever since the 
internal actions of the computer were conveyed to its exterior in a pace close to real-
time, representing actions in which humans could participate (Laurel 1993), which 
humans could change (Nake and Grabowski 2006, 53) or influence through their 
somatic actions (Joyce 1995). Digital environments turn passive spectators into ac-
tive participants (Zajec 1976) and assemble humans and machines into a synergistic 
whole (De Landa 1991, 193) by providing the user with the ability to modify system 
parameters through interactive devices that (for the most part) do not force them to 
ever think about numbers or about the internal processes that are being developed, 
thus reducing the demands on the users’ prior knowledge about the system or the 
models it runs (Csuri 1976). This was regarded by Licklider as a fundamental shift in 
computing, a shift from problem-solving to problem-finding or problem-exploring 
through vast spaces of possibilities (qtd. in Murtaugh 2008, 144). Interaction with 
the users not only allows them to retrieve information from the computer in a vari-
ety of ways as, and perhaps most importantly, allows the computer to get informa-
tion about the human (Lloyd 2006, 108) thus turning her into a real participant in 
the developing digital processes.
The space of the computer screen then becomes more than a stage where informa-
tion is presented or where data patterns emerge and is converted into “a place where 
the very workings of the computer could be controlled, a surface of contact between 
THE BUILDING AND DOWN A GULLY.”, and requiring player commands to be input as text strings, as for 
example “GO IN”.
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humans and machines where their evolutionary paths could be joined symbioti-
cally” (De Landa 1991, 193). In this space we could for the first time witness a series 
of feedbacks between users and systems, feedbacks that turn the clean inner space 
of the algorithms into an unpredictable space of very real contact with the external 
world and the user’s senses, feedbacks that turn it into a dynamic and shared space 
(Murtaugh 2008, 147), feedbacks that opened the way to the development of strange 
loops (Hofstadter 1999) in the user-system cooperation and forced the exploration 
of the outer environment as a prerequisite for the realization of the system’s func-
tionality. As De Landa says, the work of Licklider, Engelbart and others transformed 
the surface of the computer screen into a place where the partnership between two 
machinic species could be achieved, where the evolutionary paths of humans and 
computers could be linked symbiotically, but it also made the computer interface 
become a surface of contact between people (1991, 221).
Participatory systems create responsive machines that acknowledge their own in-
completeness and pursue “experiences that are playful, insightful, and potentially 
surprising” (Murtaugh 2008, 148). For Joyce the true index of interaction is coau-
thorship (1995, 193), when the participatory nature of digital environments not only 
makes it possible as it makes it commonplace to experience a complex sense of co-
creation with digital systems. Peter Bøgh Andersen gives us a semiotic definition: 
“An interactive work is a work where the reader can physically change the discourse 
in a way that is interpretable and produces meaning within the discourse itself. An 
interactive work is a work where the reader’s interaction is an integrated part of the 
sign production of the work, in which the interaction is an object-sign indicating 
the same theme as the other signs, not a meta-sign that indicates the signs of the 
discourse.” (qtd. in Aarseth 1997, 49) Murray sums it up by stating that in participa-
tory environments it is not only the human that programs the computer but also the 
computer that has the opportunity to program the user (1997, 77). All interactors, 
human, machine, individual or collective become agents in the processes (Thackara 
2005, 132).
In Computers as Theatre, Brenda Laurel (1993) elects these participative properties as 
the most interesting feature of computers, but Murray classifies them as second in 
a list of four properties, that, as Ian Bogost defends, are hardly equivalent (2006, 13). 
The procedural properties of the computer are what allow participatory properties 
to be created and developed in the first place, what allow the systems to interact with 
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their users, what create the possibility for spatial properties to emerge in digital en-
vironments and ultimately also what make their encyclopedic nature possible. This 
view is shared by Manovich, for whom it is “computation itself” that is really fun-
damental in computers, more than interactivity, networking or multimedia (2002).
Murray defines procedurality as the “ability to execute a series of rules” by a device 
that is not “fundamentally a wire or a pathway but an engine (…) designed not to 
carry static information but to embody complex, contingent behaviors” (1997, 72), 
later adding that “[t]he most important element the new medium adds to our reper-
toire of representational powers is its procedural nature, its ability to capture experi-
ence as systems of interrelated actions.” (274)
As Kenneth Knowlton points, the possibility to define or execute complex processes 
exists independently of the computer (1976). Günter Bachelier mentions how Wil-
liam Latham produced evolutionary artworks on paper long before he started work-
ing with computers (2008, 252), defining his process as non-computerized, although 
in our view it was computational, as John R. Searle’s Chinese Room Thought Experi-
ment (1981) reminds. In Searle’s experiment, we are led through the description of 
how a human placed in a black box, performs by hand all the algorithmic opera-
tions that a computer would realize in a complex procedure for the decoding and 
interpretation of Chinese texts. The human is unable to understand the meaning 
of the Chinese symbols she manipulates and only comprehends the set of English 
instructions that are presented to her. Nevertheless, because the human is able to 
manipulate the information in ways that, to external observers, seem to demon-
strate an actual understanding of the original texts, the system as a whole works as 
a computer. In fact, we could say that the system as a whole is a computer. But the 
Chinese Room Thought Experiment also reminds us, as Hofstadter underlines in his 
reflections about Searle’s text, that the illusion “Searle hopes to induce in readers 
(…) depends on his managing to make readers overlook a tremendous difference 
in complexity between two systems at different conceptual levels” (1981, 373), and 
to neglect how arduous, boring and extremely long any simulation of an artificial 
intelligence system (or for that matter most of even the simplest computational pro-
cesses) would be if manually realized by a human. However fast and effective the 
human could be, the computer would nevertheless outperform her by many orders 
of magnitude (Dorin 2008, 290). What the computer effectively makes possible is to 
execute these complex processes fast enough to conclude them in a humanly reason-
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able amount of time, accurately enough to avoid the mistakes that would be expect-
able if a human computed the algorithm, and cheaply enough to afford plenty of 
time and resources for experimentation.
In digital environments work is quantified, abstracted and established as proce-
dures that are independent of the particular person or device carrying out the tasks. 
When a programmer writes code, in the words of Kay, he “generates processes” (qtd. 
in Reas and Fry 2007, 3), and as these are reduced to pure abstraction, to a set of be-
havioral laws that specify what the system should do at every step (Rucker 2005, 12), 
they become “open to algorithmic mutation, sorting, looping or making tirelessly 
repetitive, subject to an ‘inhuman’ increase of speed” (Fuller 2005, 66). Abstrac-
tion is achieved by breaking processes into small units, articulated in programs, 
sequences of symbolic representations (Winograd and Flores 1990, 11; Bolter 2001, 
30) of instructions suitable for execution by the computer or any other device that 
can interpret and run the programmed code. The word program is sometimes used 
synonymously with the word algorithm (Bolter 1984, 52), a word that in its turn, ac-
cording to Robert Kowalski is synonymous with ‘logic’ and ‘control’ (qtd. in Goffey 
2008a, 15). 80 More than referring to individual steps in a process, ‘algorithm’ identi-
fies the complete set of instructions that are fed to the machine in order to solve a 
problem or to describe the strategy for its resolution (Bolter 1984, 52; Goffey 2008a, 
16). Alan Turing 81 was the first to describe this as an ‘effective procedure’ and the 
notion is one of the most important not only in modern mathematics as also in 
computing (Weizenbaum 1976, 46; Goffey 2008a, 16). 
We must be reminded that a functioning computer program, Turing’s effective 
procedure, does not need to “be ‘effective’ in the sense of succeeding in the task 
for which it is used: doing addiction, recognizing a harmony, writing a sonnet. All 
computer programs are effective procedures, whether they succeed in that (task-
related) sense or not.” (Boden 2004, 89) A series of unambiguously defined steps is 
80 This word’s etymology comes from the name of ninth-century Arabic mathematician Abū ‘Abdallāh 
Muhammad ibn Mūsā al-Khwārizmī, from where we currently also locate the root of the mathematical 
term ‘algebra’ (Ball 2004, 128). Al-Khwārizmī’s treaty On Calculation with Arabic Numerals from 825 CE 
was translated in the 12th century as Algoritmi de numero Indorum, where ‘Algoritmi’ was the translator’s 
rendition of the author’s name, intending to convey ‘Al-Khwārizmī on the numbers of the Indians’ or 
‘Al-Khwārizmī on the Hindu Art of Reckoning’. Misunderstanding ‘Algoritmi’ as a Latin plural, people 
started to use it as a synonym of calculation method. The ‘th’ is usually explained as being due to a false 
cognate with the Greek word ἀριθμός (arithmos), meaning ‘number’.
81 1912-1954.
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guaranteed to produce a result, however a priori undetermined that result may be. 
As we will see further on, as deterministic as it may be, an effective procedure may 
produce non-deterministic outputs. Bogost warns us against the tendency to under-
stand effective procedures as established and entrenched ways of doing things, being 
the term as it is so close to the realm of officialdom and bureaucracy (2008, 122). A 
computational effective procedure, an algorithm, is not a static course of action, it is 
a set of constraints that structures all sorts of behavior following a formal language 
that defines sets of permissive rules, rules that specify what is possible to do, not 
what has to be done (Weizenbaum 1976, 49). In this sense, effective procedures cre-
ate vast possibility-spaces to explore — spaces that without procedurality would not 
only not exist but wouldn’t even be thought of (Lansdown 1997, 18).
1.2.6 Universal Machines
Florian Cramer states that a “computer program is a blueprint and its execution at 
the same time. Like a pianola roll, it is a score performing itself”, a score that col-
lapses “the second and third of the three steps of concept, concept notation and 
execution.” (2002) It is procedurality, the ability to computationally follow a series 
of rules in a formal system, that defines computers as something fundamentally 
different from the media and tools that preceded them (Bogost 2008, 122). Proce-
durality and programmability divide digital and analog machines, but this does not 
mean that analog machines cannot be programmed, it means that what is meant by 
programming is fundamentally different in the analog or digital realms. As Wendy 
Hui Kyong Chun explains, in the analog realm programming is descriptive, whereas 
in digital devices it is prescriptive (2008, 225). Whereas in an analog computer the 
entire machine performs the computation in a continuous process, by employing 
numerical methods and by breaking down all the processes into series of arithmeti-
cal operations, the hardware of a digital computer is in a sense a layer of the machine 
that can (at least theoretically) be replaced by any other machine that is capable of 
reading the executing the same code.
“With appropriate programming, a computer can embody any conceivable process” 
(Mateas 2005), performing arbitrarily long sequences of simple instructions and 
transformations (Lloyd 2006, 50) that are ultimately reducible to a limited set of 
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universal logic gates — NOT, COPY, AND and OR — as proved by George Boole 82 in his 
book An Investigation of the Laws of Thought (1854). 
Turing and Alonzo Church 83 hypothesized that any possible mathematical manipu-
lation could be performed algorithmically (Lloyd 2006, 51) by the thought experi-
ments, or abstract devices that we now know as Turing machines (Wiener 1948, 13). 
A properly set machine would be able to interpret and process symbols, acting on 
the information by performing simple operations upon informational units of the 
simplest kind. The blueprint that Turing developed (1936) showed that the instruc-
tions on how to act on the information, as well as the information to be acted upon 
and the information coding the results of the processes, could all be specified in the 
same language and communicated to and from the computer in a uniform code 
(Sack 1996). According to Marvin Minsky, while it is often said that it did not re-
ally affect the practical development of the computer, 84 this was indeed the moment 
when, in essence, the modern computer and some of the programming techniques 
that accompanied it were invented (1972, 104).
Turing demonstrated that the internal workings of a programmed computer, or for 
that matter any machine that operates on symbols, could be specified by a table of 
behavior that would abstract the operations of the machine as a list. Any Turing-
complete 85 machine programmed with the table of behaviors of a real-world physi-
cal machine (as a typewriter or a calculator) would be able to read the list of behav-
iors and perform whatever action it indicated as appropriate for each context, being 
therefore able to simulate the original machine. From any machine, an appropriately 
82 1815-1864.
83 1903-1995.
84 The practical development of the computer was later accelerated during World War II (De Landa 1991, 
129), and Turing was one of the many that contributed, on both sides of the conflict, to that development. 
The first electronic digital computer was built in Germany, by Konrad Zuse (1910-1995), in the early 1940s 
(Lloyd 2006, 52). Herbert Franke (1987) notes that the development of the computer in such a context, 
tied to what McKenzie Wark calls the ‘military entertainment complex’ (2007) is an historical accident 
and that the computer’s development, under different historical and political circumstances could have 
nevertheless happened.
85 Galanter (2008, 315) reminds us that in order to be Turing-complete, a system should theoretically dis-
pose of unlimited storage space, which is by any means impossible to achieve. This is however a criterium 
that can usually be disregarded in practical implementations of computational devices. Although Turing 
describes the machine, he doesn’t name it after himself, rather describing it as a set of deterministic me-
chanical procedures to be hypothetically executed by a human ‘computer’.
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assembled list of behaviors would create an abstract machine able to recreate its 
original actions.
In a further development, Turing proved that this abstract machine could itself be 
described to and be deployed by a lower level universal Turing machine, capable of 
operating from the description of another machine, interpreting it one step at a time 
and in effect imitating the other machine’s behavior (Minsky 1972, 112; Kittler 1995). 
Although theoretically simple, the universal Turing machine “can do pretty much 
anything with information” and “generate mathematical patterns of any level of 
complexity” (Lloyd 2006, 51). Through repetition and recursion the machines built 
upon machines built upon machines are rated by Noam Chomsky as the most com-
plex of abstract automata (Chomsky 1957; De Landa 1997). In general, as Stephen 
Wolfram summarizes, universality means that the setting of appropriate initial con-
ditions in a given system will allow it to emulate any behavior that can occur in any 
other system (2002, 694). In other words, “a universal system can perform any com-
putation that is theoretically possible to perform; such a system can do anything 
that any other formal system is capable of doing, including emulating any other 
system” 86 (Mateas 2008, 269). A universal computation can compute any computa-
tion and, as we will see, is in principle equivalent to any other computation. In his 
definition, Rudy Rucker adds that although common sense may lead one to expect 
that universality would be fairly hard to come by, it is in fact quite the opposite that 
is to be found both in natural and artificial systems (2005, 43). Once any computa-
tional system advances past a certain threshold, that Hofstadter calls “Gödel-Turing 
threshold” (2007, 241), it becomes universal. And this threshold is fairly low: being 
able to perform addition and multiplication may be more than enough, while some-
times even more rudimentary capabilities will suffice (Rucker 2005, 43). Wolfram 
goes as far as to suggest that there seems to be reason to believe that a large number 
of naturally occurring computational systems may support universal computation, 
something he terms the ‘Principle of Computational Equivalence’ (2002, 715) and 
that will be discussed in more detail ahead.
Universal machines read information, write information, and finally, are able to act 
on the information and, as a consequence of being themselves described as informa-
tion, universal machines can literally act on themselves (Fuller 2005, 25). Universal 
86 Provided, of course, that such system is computable.
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machines are transcodable and they are universal media for both structure and pro-
cess (Mateas 2005).
1.2.7 Abstract Machines
In her study of creativity, The Creative Mind, Margaret Boden elects representational 
systems as being some of the most important human creations (2004, 107). Rep-
resentational systems include formal notations as the Arabic numerals, chemical 
formulae, musical scores and, more recently, programming languages. Formal nota-
tions are codes that make it possible to declare and develop effective procedures of 
many different kinds.
The term ‘machine’ is problematic to adequately define in more detail than what is 
provided by the simple definition of ‘a device that uses energy to perform an activ-
ity’. A machine needs to be defined based on its actual use, not on its composition or 
structure (Minsky 1972, 3), therefore, when talking about a machine we must have 
in mind not only the actual physical object that it may be as well as a relatively clear 
idea of its purpose.
The design of a machine is always an abstraction. Designs are independent of the me-
dia in which they are recorded, or of the particular ways in which they are expressed. 
They are abstract ideas, just as they are functional specifications. In a sense then, a 
design is an abstract machine (Weizenbaum 1976, 43). Effective procedures, being 
designs of processes, are descriptions that will be simulated by universal machines 
and are therefore in a sense mechanism-independent. They are conceptualized as 
abstract machines, single “mathematical mechanisms” capable of being incarnated 
in many different physical mechanisms (De Landa 1991, 18).
The computer was born as an abstract machine and as such it remained for over a 
decade, until it finally was embodied as a result of the pressures of cryptological 
research during the course of World War II (129). The machine that more than any 
other device or mechanism allows us to abstract machines started its existence as 
an abstraction. Turing described a vague and sketchy physical contraption, making 
use of components such as an ‘infinite tape’ and a read/write/erase head that would 
operate on that tape. The logical workings of the system were described in consid-
erable detail, but this description was far from being implemented as a real physi-
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cal embodiment. The Turing machine was, perhaps almost too literally, machine-
independent, it was a Body without Organs (BwO) in the sense defined by Gilles 
Deleuze 87 and Félix Guattari 88 (1988), rejecting from its inception the boundaries of 
the material, dispensing with matter and energy because it was primarily informa-
tion. It was the first step towards crossing the frontier between the world of abstract 
machines of De Landa’s machinic phylum and that of the concrete assemblages of 
human practices (De Landa 1991, 229). 89
The classical idea of the machine does not explain the BwO because it does not cap-
ture its spirit, it does not understand anything besides the physical workings and 
the transmission of force or energy (Minsky 1972, 7) and the design, the abstract 
machine and the BwO are information.
The devices that incorporated the machinic paradigms of the clock and the mo-
tor were undoubtedly concrete physical assemblages before being abstracted. The 
‘five simple machines’ — the wheel and axle, the lever, the pulley, the wedge and 
the screw — were abstracted by Hero of Alexandria, 90 in ancient Greece. During 
the renaissance, Galileo Galilei 91 worked out their complete dynamic theory in Le 
Meccaniche 92 (c. 1600), understanding that they do not create energy but simply 
transform it. A century earlier, Leonardo da Vinci 93 abstracted several early geared 
mechanisms, and Sadi Carnot 94 abstracted the steam motor a hundred years after 
it was originally born as a concrete assemblage (De Landa 1991, 142). True to its na-
ture, the mechanisms of the machinic paradigm of the network started out by being 
abstractions and were only later assembled in their many different (but equivalent) 
material embodiments.
87 1925-1995.
88 1930-1992.
89 In a sense, the universal Turing machine is still an abstract machine, and will, perhaps forever, con-
tinue to be impossible to fully implement. Besides a read/write head, a finite set of instructions and a finite 
state register, the universal Turing machine requires a memory device, described by Turing as an infinite 
tape. As big as memory banks have become over the years, it is clearly impossible that they can ever be 
infinite, so if for practical purposes it is possible to build computational devices that we can classify as 
Turing complete, this final requisite will never truly be fulfilled, and universal Turing machines will al-
ways be only abstract and theoretical machines.
90 c. 10–70 CE.
91 1564-1642.
92 On Mechanics.
93 1452-1519.
94 1796-1832.
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Software — a running program — is a machine that gets its power and substance 
from another machine, the computer where it is run, or any other machine. Run-
ning code is a machine that has been embodied by the universal machine (Gelernter 
1998, 23), making it become a new machine. This is often referred to as a ‘virtual 
machine’, something that does not exist as a matter of actual physical reality (24) 
but only exists while it is being executed by a universal machine. This concept clari-
fies what it is exactly that programmers do — and by extension what artists and 
designers that work with digital technologies do — they are machine designers, they 
program abstract machines that are automatically and only temporarily converted 
into the things themselves when they are handed over to a computer. “A smart artist 
makes the machines do all the work” (Cornelia Solfrank qtd. in Blais and Ippolito 
2006, 17), more to the point, an artist’s work is the creation of the machines that may 
then do the work.
1.2.8 Process Design
When programming, engineers, designers or artists 95 do not create objects or prod-
ucts, as they have for centuries done using traditional media: they create artifacts 
that are processes, artifacts that are “more comparable to a continual flow that to 
an object that is divisible into units.” (Perret 2005, 248) As Alan Cooper, Robert 
Reimann and David Cronin underline in the introduction of their book About Face 
3, although the practice of programming is also concerned with form, its focus is 
something that traditional design disciplines do not often explore: the design of 
behavior (2007, xxvii). As digital environments open to the external world and to 
interaction, their designers no longer may know anything for certain, they no longer 
control the well-defined space of possibilities that existed in traditional media and all 
they can offer are the contents of their own heads, “where internal imagination meets 
the external world of reality” (Dunne 2005, xvii). And although being largely virtual, 
and rooted in the transformation of data and not in physical dynamics (Lee 2009, 2), 
digital artifacts must often nevertheless have some sort of physical embodiment.
In his book Hertzian Tales (2005), Anthony Dunne 96 discusses four alternative com-
mon approaches to address the conflict between the solidity of objects and the flu-
95 For simplicity’s sake we will refer to all of these software producers simply as ‘designers’.
96 The head of the Design Interactions program at the Royal College of Art in London.
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idity of digital media: packages, fusions, dematerialization and juxtaposition, four 
strategies to link the immaterial and the material through design. 
Packages are identifiable in the way that commercial design’s approach to digital 
objects has long been to treat them merely as containers for technology, dedicating 
resources to many clearly secondary aspects of the objects and devoting far less care 
and time to the development of their fundamental digital cores. This is clearly vis-
ible in many digital consumer products — for example cellular telephones — that 
although being primarily and fundamentally digital devices (that also happen to 
make phone calls) are often marketed and sold based on almost every feature they 
present besides their actual software. Physical packages for digital devices are treat-
ed as independent objects and not entirely as supporters of their digital functions or 
as an integral part of those.
With fusion the digital object becomes a confusion of conceptual models, symbolic 
logic, algorithms, electrons and matter in what Dunne sees as a closing of the gap 
between the scales of electronics and objects by the direct manipulation of materials 
as volumes of electrons. Smart materials are an area where this gap is being closed, 
although primarily for technical reasons so far, as designers have not yet explored 
the aesthetic dimension of the new materials with the same energy that engineers 
have made the most of their functional possibilities. Therefore, with fusion and with 
physical materials that are themselves also computational devices, Dunne concludes, 
most work in this area does not yet encourage poetic and cultural possibilities to 
converge with practical and technical ones.
With dematerialization, the digital object is taken to the threshold of materiality. 
“Although ‘dematerialization’ has become a common expression in relation to elec-
tronic technology, it is difficult to define in relation to the tangle of logic, matter, 
and electrons that is the electronic object” (11), and its meaning varies, depending 
on what it is defined in relation to: immaterial/material, invisible/visible, energy/
matter, software/hardware or virtual/real. What is certain is that if communication 
with humans is to be established, the physical can never be completely dismissed, as 
a physical layer must always be involved in the communication act, and a physical 
media must transport the message from the informational device to the material 
body, where it can then reach another informational device: the brain. The most 
prominent form of dematerialization is found on the role of objects as interfaces. 
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When the designer is no longer simply packaging the digital technology, she will 
focus on behavior and procedurality, designing the dialogues between people and 
digital machines, through physical objects that are interfaces, that are zones of trans-
action. Most of the current work in this area tends to reduce the object to a Graphi-
cal User Interface on screen, but there are several examples of explorations of other 
media, devices and metaphors in the search for an aesthetics of use.
Finally, juxtaposition permits us to discover “analogue complexity in digital phe-
nomena without abandoning the rich culture of the physical, or superimposing the 
known and comfortable onto the new and alien. Whereas dematerialization sees the 
electronic integrated into existing objects, bodies, and buildings, the juxtaposition 
of material and electronic cultures makes no attempt to reconcile the two: it accepts 
that the relationship is arbitrary, and that each element is developed in relation to 
its own potential. The physical is as it always has been. The electronic, on the other 
hand, is regarded only in terms of its new functional and aesthetic possibilities; its 
supporting hardware plays no significant part.” (17) Although this may remind us of 
a certain Cartesian dualism (King 1997), what we really face with juxtaposition is a 
multi-modality of the objects, reminiscent of what happens with somatic messages 
(Lévy 1997, 45). Different scales and technologies coexist in the same object and they 
grow obsolete at their own paces. Robert Rauschenberg’s 97 sculptural installation 
Oracle (1962-65), presents an interesting example, because in the course of thirty 
years and several showings, it has had its technology updated three times, while its 
materiality and cultural meaning have remained unchanged.
97 1925-2008.
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Fig. 38: Oracle (Rauschenberg 1962-65).
Jack Burnham, an American critic and theorist of contemporary arts, mentioned 
already in 1968 that sculpture was apparently obliterating itself by abandoning tra-
ditional sculptural concerns for a ‘dematerialized dynamism’. Burnham identified a 
transition from object to system that was evident in forms as kinetic sculpture, light 
art, cybernetic art, and environment art (qtd. in Whitelaw 2004, 18). Also somewhat 
presciently, around the same time, McLuhan noted how private and corporate lives 
were becoming information processes, “because we have put our central nervous 
systems outside us in electric technology” (1964, 57). McLuhan understood how 
with the newly available technology man was heading to a learning and knowledge 
economy — what we nowadays call an information economy — where all forms of 
employment would become “paid learning” and all forms of wealth would result 
from the movement of information (64).
Returning to Dunne, he reasons that the most difficult challenges for designers 
nowadays lie in the realms of metaphysics, poetry, and aesthetics, where little re-
search has been carried out comparatively to the realms of technical and semiotic 
functionality or performance. Dunne defends that in a world where practicality and 
functionality can be taken for granted, the aesthetics of what he calls the ‘post-op-
timal objects’ can provide new experiences to everyday life, new poetic dimensions. 
This observation points us to the practice of a ‘poetics of knowledge’ described by 
Richard Wright: “an aesthetic or cultural practice that articulates and is informed 
by scientific knowledge but can function in a wider cultural context” (1997, 24).
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Designing algorithmic processes, the computer programmer creates universes of 
virtually unlimited complexity for which she alone is the lawgiver (Weizenbaum 
1976, 115), an idea that is recovered by Lessig (2006) who stresses that though able 
to create spaces of freedom, computer programs can also create spaces of oppres-
sive control and high regulation because both the freedoms as the constraints and 
controls are embedded in the architecture of code. But being the lawgiver doesn’t 
necessarily mean that the designer is always an omnipotent puppeteer or that she 
minutely controls all the details in her creations. As we shall see, the designer’s role 
can be demiurgic but it can also be, as Mitchell Whitelaw (2004) so elegantly puts it, 
that of a gardener, planting seeds of processes that will evolve and grow somewhat 
independently and autonomously, processes that are not micromanaged but rather 
nurtured.
Hiroshi Kawano chooses a metaphor of learning when describing these processes, 
comparing the relationship between programmer and computer to that between a 
parent and her child. When teaching a child to, for example, draw a picture, more 
than instructing very concrete and absolute steps to achieve an outcome, a parent 
rather tries to lead the child to achieve by herself. Kawano compares this ‘how to 
draw’ with the algorithmic procedure of picture-drawing, concluding that in order 
to pass it on to the child, the parent must know it beforehand, and that the more ex-
plicitly she knows and teaches the algorithm, the better results will the child achieve, 
that is, in a sense the quality of the child’s pictures will depend only upon the quality 
of the algorithm that the parent had already possessed and taught her (1976).
1.2.9 Descriptive and Generative Processes
If a designer programs comprehensive tables of behaviors that carefully and pre-
cisely describe all the details of an artifact, including actions, narratives, images, 
sounds, or every possible message necessary, we can say that the processes being 
programmed are descriptive, whereas if on the other hand the processes are less 
restrained and some of the control is intencionally relinquished by the designer, the 
processes being programmed will be in a sense generative. 98
98 In some sources, generative processes are alternatively called procedural (Carranza 2001).
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In The Sciences of the Artificial (1969), Herbert Simon 99 cites Euclid’s Elements twice, 
demonstrating what he defines as a ‘state description’, “a circle is the locus of all 
points equidistant from a given point”, and a ‘process description’, “to construct a 
circle, rotate a compass with one arm fixed until the other arm has returned to its 
starting point”. It is implicit that by following the process specified in the second 
sentence, one will produce an object that satisfies the definition of the first. Simon 
presents these two modes of description as being something very common in our 
experience, likening the first to pictures, blueprints, diagrams and chemical struc-
tural formulas, and the second to recipes, differential equations, and equations for 
chemical reactions. “The former characterize the world as sensed; they provide the 
criteria for identifying objects, often by modeling the objects themselves. The latter 
characterize the world as acted upon; they provide the means for producing or gen-
erating objects having the desired characteristics.” (111) Christian Jacob and Gerald 
Hushlak (2008, 145), while discussing design methodologies in science, art and mu-
sic, choose the exact same terms, ‘blueprints’ and ‘recipes’ to describe this difference 
in approaches, and Pablo Miranda Carranza reminds that in nature, it is the second 
one that we commonly find, as macroscopic organisms are epiphenomena (2001), or, 
as Philip Galanter puts it, emergent phenomena (2008, 313).
We could draw a parallelism with numerical and analytical models, as they’re com-
monly defined in sciences. While an analytical model involves mathematical ex-
pressions for the relationships between different bulk properties of the medium 
being described, a numerical model tries to describe and enumerate each of the 
component parts of a system, letting the overall behavior of the system emerge from 
them (Ball 2004, 14). The example chosen by Ball is the motion of liquids or gases, 
explained by analytical models that work statistically instead of trying to define 
the properties of the motion and behavior of each of the molecules. 100 On the other 
hand, Gregory Bateson 101 presents us with an analogy drawn from biology, asking us 
to consider all the propositions that may be required to describe an organism, mil-
lions of them in some cases, orders of magnitudes more in others, interconnected 
in “loops and circuits” of interdependence and holding for each of them specific 
metavalues, desired or ideal states (1979, 156). Analytical models are top-down ap-
99 1916-2001.
100 These methods were in fact developed because it would be impossible to accurately and effectively 
compute all the individual molecules in a liquid or gas.
101 1904-1980.
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proaches that dissect the whole into its constituent parts and exactly because of that, 
they are bound to miss precisely the “emergent (or ‘synergistic’) properties [that] 
belong to the interactions between parts,” (De Landa 1997, 17) as “analyzing a whole 
into parts and then attempting to model it by adding up the components will fail to 
capture any property that emerged from complex interactions, since the effect of the 
latter may be multiplicative (e.g., mutual enhancement) and not just additive” (18). 
If in biology, as noted by D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson, 102 form follows function 
(1942), we need to understand that, in order to achieve forms akin to nature, we need 
to let form also follow process, the processes of growth and evolution that occur in 
the living world (Hemberg et al. 2008, 168).
Analytical models embed a priori assumptions about systems, while numerical 
models, although arguably never totally free from those assumptions, by changing 
their scale allow the discovery of synthetical, a posteriori phenomena. Although 
examples from the real world are the more commonly conveyed, Aarseth reminds 
that programmed systems are not always necessarily models or representations of 
something, as they can be evolving and self-organizing entities whose behavior can-
not be described as the sign production of a human programmer or as being a mi-
metic simulation of an external phenomenon (1997, 30-31). As one example of such 
systems Aarseth presents the cellular automaton 103 known as the Game of Life, cre-
ated by John Horton Conway in the late 1960s after systems proposed by John von 
Neumann 104 and Stanislaw Ulam. 105
In the Game of Life each cell holds a single bit, existing at every moment in one 
of two possible alternative states — alive or dead. The universe of the game is an 
infinite two-dimensional orthogonal grid of square cells, where every cell interacts 
with eight direct neighbors: the cells directly vertically, horizontally or diagonally 
adjacent. At each step in the process, all the cells are updated from their current 
state based on four simple rules: 1) Any live cell with less than two live neighbors 
dies, as if by underpopulation; 2) any live cell with more than three live neighbors 
dies, as if by overpopulation; 3) any live cell with two or three live neighbors lives on 
102 1860-1948.
103 A system of a periodic array of cells that hold information by existing in one of several different states.
104 1903-1957.
105 1909-1984.
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to the next generation; and finally 4) any dead cell with exactly three live neighbors 
becomes alive.
This simplicity does not stop information from being transmitted across the sys-
tem and it allows the development of patterns of information that are capable of 
duplicating themselves elsewhere on the matrix (Ball 2004, 241). The Game of Life 
is then an example of an emergent system, a system in which a handful of simple 
rules combine and interact, making the array of automata largely exceed the com-
plexity of each single automaton, and leading to consequences that were hitherto 
unpredictable (Bogost 2006, 95). In Life one can find structures that stay forever 
still if undisturbed, 106 structures that oscillate with various regular periods 107 and 
structures that move along the plane of the world, 108 we can find structures that 
grow forever, that create new structures 109 and observe very complex interactions 
between these structures.
We may postulate that in the Game of Life and in other systems that we will further 
study, a generative process is programmed because a numerical model is put in mo-
tion by the code. In this generative process we are able to develop many (or all, in the 
sense that, according to Wolfram (2002, 676) these processes are universal) descrip-
tive processes and analytical models.
The question here doesn’t so much regard the absolute loss of control between de-
scriptive and generative processes, although this may exist to a certain extent. Pro-
cesses gain generative potential when some of their variables are left uncontrolled 
by the programmer. In low-level systems, as the current example of the Game of 
Life, the designer specifies the system in greater detail than in many other (and less 
generative) cases, because she sets in motion a world for which she has written the 
fundamental laws. In doing so she is transferring to the system itself the power over 
many variables, delegating levels of control and creating more chances for unex-
pected and novel behavior. 
106 So-called ‘still lives’ as the blocks, the beehives, the loafs or the boats.
107 Such as the blinker, the toad, the beacon or the pulsar.
108 Usually called ‘spaceships’, as the glider and the lightweight spaceship.
109 Such as the glider guns or the puffer trains.
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Directing our analysis to communication and art, we find that Cramer (2002) sim-
ilarly distinguishes between non-algorithmic digital code and program code, the 
first being exemplified by audio CDs and MP3 files, by hypertext or digital video, 
while the later would be better represented by algorithmic composition, algorith-
mically generated text or a graphical demo. Although we can have no digital data 
without programs, in Cramer’s view, the question is who programs, and whether 
designers use software layers that they take for granted or design them themselves. 
In this context we could equate Cramer’s non-algorithmic digital code to media 
code, code that samples 110 and preserves a message instead of creating it, whereas 
the algorithmic program code performs synthesis, i.e., creates something new. Re-
turning to Lévy’s technologies of information, we see that digital technologies are 
able to convey information produced by other technologies at a far greater degree 
than both the media and somatic technologies that preceded them. They mediate 
and remediate information, while at the same time also create new information al-
most ex nihilo, thus becoming closer to the generative power of the original somatic 
technologies.
With some exceptions, most of the processes that a designer programs will be si-
multaneously descriptive and generative. In order to manage to communicate in 
the contemporary media landscape, descriptive processes, conveying non-algorith-
mic content, should never be disregarded, as they are responsible for much of what 
makes digital environments be encyclopedic, and they are where much of our cur-
rent cultural preservation is taking place. Generative programming, on the other 
hand, is what makes digital technologies be far more dynamic, useful, surprising 
and altogether helpful than strictly analog media technologies could ever be, in-
dependently of their greater or lesser encyclopedic extent. Vannevar Bush’s 111 Me-
mex (1945) comes to mind as an example of what, shouldn’t digital technologies be 
available, would never become more than a concept. Recovering Edward de Bono’s 
definitions, we could suggest that descriptive processes are ‘vertical’, selective and 
analytical, while generative processes are ‘lateral’, instigative and nonlinear (Cope 
2005, 10).
110 Both in the more common sense of music and pop culture as in the more strict technical term from 
signal processing, when a continuous signal is converted to a discrete signal.
111 1890-1974.
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1.2.10 Grammars (Generative and Transformational)
This leads us to a concept, first enunciated by Chomsky (1956; 1957) when, in the 
study of linguistics he moved away from the surface appearance of sentences to-
wards the abstract principles of language and grammar, to the devices used to gen-
erate the sentences. Chomsky proposed the existence of an intrinsic universal gram-
mar that defines what a speaker knows about the language rather than what he 
actually does with it, a knowledge “which is partly hidden and unconscious, gener-
ates an enormous quantity of outgoing information in the form of spoken sentences, 
while relying on relatively little incoming information, in the form of what others 
say” (Campbell 1982, 95). This grammar is termed ‘generative’ because it provides to 
language something equivalent to what DNA provides to a cell: a space of possibili-
ties. Chomsky’s approach was a radical departure from previous work in linguistics 
because it pointed to the reasons why language is universally creative: “We do not 
need to copy sentences others have already spoken, although we often do. The point 
is that we are always capable of inventing new sentences of our own, and we do so 
spontaneously, in the most casual of conversations.” (95) Grammatical rules can 
certainly be used to check the validity of sentences, but they are primarily a resource 
for the formation of new sentences, setting the basic framework of a sentence and 
later transforming it and filling it with the materials of a real language (De Landa 
1997, 217-18). Chomsky understood the existence of these two types of rules, naming 
them ‘generative’ and ‘transformational’. The generative components of grammar 
define a structured place of possibilities and the transformational components allow 
the movement through and the construction in this space.
Ong identifies a fundamental difference between programmed processes and hu-
man languages, in that the rules of computational processes must always be stated a 
priori, while the rules of grammar are “used first and can be abstracted from usage 
and stated explicitly in words only with difficulty and never completely.” (1982, 7) 
But according to Chomsky, there is an a priori universal grammar that stands be-
hind both the generative and the transformational components, a universal gram-
mar that is tied to deep and abstract internal principles in the mind and that ex-
plains why language is so universal in certain of its aspects, independently of local 
cultural differences (Campbell 1982, 179; Pinker 1994). Grammar thus becomes an 
antichance device, that both lays the structure for the formation of language as it 
keeps it regular and law-abiding (Campbell 1982, 165). On a different perspective, 
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programming may not always need to happen a priori. Going back to the example 
of the Game of Life, if the space and the ‘physical laws’ of the world are certainly 
programmed a priori, the structures that are developed in that space are, in a sense, 
altogether different programs from Life. These programs are not specified in the 
same programming language as the particular implementation of the Game of Life 
is written 112 but are programmed inside Life itself, so Life becomes their program-
ming language. Furthermore, these programs can be constructed by humans or can 
emerge from a particular structure or configuration of the matrix of Life: if we look 
at a glider as a program, then a gosper glider gun structure constructs a glider once 
every 30 steps; if eight gliders happen to interact in a determined way then they can 
create a gosper glider gun that will in its turn produce more gliders.
Fig. 39: Eight gliders in collision to produce a gosper glider gun.
Fig. 40: Gosper glider gun.
112 C++, Java, etc.
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Fig. 41: Gosper glider gun after producing three gliders.
If we can eventually draw a direct parallelism between generative processes and the 
generative components of grammar, we must be careful to note that generative pro-
cesses are not achieved only with generative components. Transformational compo-
nents are also essential to generative processes, as they are necessary in descriptive 
processes, and often outlined by these. Transformational components overlap the 
domains of generative and descriptive processes. However, the main interest here 
is to understand how in language, the universal, generative and transformational 
components of grammar build a set of rules that constrain the space of possibilities 
while at the same time make rich expression possible. Without such rules “purely 
random changes in letter and word sequences in a written language [would] destroy 
sense and lead to gibberish. But if the changes are random, yet grammatical at the 
same time, interesting new sentences may result.” (Campbell 1982, 98) Constraints 
are not causes, or positive controls that make something happen, rather they are 
limits that define conditions for what is not allowed or not supposed to happen in a 
system (Wilden 1987, 77). They are an antichance device that allows abundant space 
for novelty, leaving the system of language essentially open and unbounded (Camp-
bell 1982, 98).
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1.3 Procedural Practices
1.3.1 Historical Procedural Practices
The exploration and usage of procedural practices in artistic contexts did not start 
with the development of computers. 113 Of course that the mere existence of com-
puters and the later availability of personal computers provided artists and design-
ers with an easy and progressively more economical access to devices that allowed 
experimenting with procedural systems. The development of the computer and of 
computer networks into media, the Internet and the continued digitalization of 
electrical media nowadays provide grounds for a massive exploration, but even be-
fore the computer was invented, procedural creation was already experimented.
As early as the eleventh century, Guido d’Arezzo 114 developed a formal technique to 
compose a melody to accompany a text. His scheme assigned a pitch to each vowel, 
so the melody varied according to the vowel content of the text (Roads 1996, 822). 
Such a system would for all purposes lock the basic melodic creation to a text that 
most often than not was not written by the composer.
In plastic arts we can find that by the sixteenth century, Pieter Bruegel the Elder 115 
numbered the colors of his characters in order to determine their distribution in a 
painting through a roll of dice (Berge 2003, 177).
Johann Sebastian Bach 116 explicitly used algorithms when composing some of the 
preludes in his Das Wohltemperierte Klavier 117 (BWV 846–893) published in 1722 
(Cope 2005, 165). 118 Bach’s process qualifies as a ‘paper algorithm’, a written recipe or 
sets of instructions for completing a composition that were processed manually. The 
113 Or in particular with the development of personal computers, or microcomputers, as they were 
called in the earlier years.
114 c. 991-after 1033, usually regarded as the inventor of modern musical notation in his 1026 treatise 
Micrologus.
115 c. 1525-1569.
116 1685-1750.
117 The Well-Tempered Clavier.
118 This is attested by the autograph score of an early version of the first prelude (in C major). “What 
are chords here appear as repeated groups of arpeggiated sixteenth notes in the final version (…) Clearly 
Bach intended the example chords to act as a kind of shorthand for the eventual lute-like strumming that 
emerges in the final version.” (Cope 2005, 165)
1011.3 Procedural Practices
twenty-four pairs of preludes and fugues in each of the two books of Das Wohltem-
perierte Klavier were composed to a rigid conceptual program, that imposed severe 
constraints to the composer. The first prelude and fugue pair in each book was com-
posed in C major, the second in C minor, the third in C-sharp major, then C-sharp 
minor, and so on, in a rising chromatic pattern that continued until B minor. Bach’s 
self-imposed constraints certainly left a big space for his personal intervention in 
the process of composition, but it is important to note that by using them, he was al-
ready delegating the control over some aspects of production and handing creation 
over to an external system, as well as many decisions that were usually left to the 
moment-to-moment intuitive choices of the artist or composer.
Looking for examples that historically precede Bach, and forerunners of what he 
calls “generative art”, Galanter (2008, 317) mentions ancient art forms based on til-
ing patterns, as Arabic decoration motifs used by architects or artisans in materials 
as diverse as metal, wood, stucco, mosaic, tapestry or paint (Bourgoin 1973). Accord-
ing to Galanter, the placement of individual elements in these compositions was not 
decided by the artisan who handcrafted the work or by the architect in charge but 
was rather dictated by manually executed symmetry-based algorithms (2008, 317). 
We can find some of these systems in the theoretical works of Albrecht Dürer, 119 
as for example the Underweysung der Messung, mit dem Zirckel und Richtscheyt 120 
(1525) where several systems for the creation of geometrical patterns are described.
Fig. 42: Dürer’s Underweysung der Messung, mit dem Zirckel und Richtscheyt (1525, 63).
119 1471-1528.
120 Four Books on Measurement, as it is commonly translated, or Teaching of Measurement, with the 
Compass and the Ruler, in a more literal translation.
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These highly ordered systems seem to be quite ubiquitous in the history of the arts 
and crafts. In fact they are so common that Galanter suggests that they can be as 
old as art itself:
Many are familiar with the discoveries of representational cave paintings some 
35,000 years old that depict animals and early man’s daily life. But in 1999 and 
2000 a team led by archaeologist Christopher Henshilwood of the South Afri-
can Museum in Cape Town uncovered the oldest known art artifacts. Etched 
in hand-sized pieces of red ochre more than 70,000 years old is an unmistak-
able grid design made of triangular tiles that would likely be recognizable as 
such to Escher or generations of Islamic artists.
While the etchings, like most ancient archaeological finds, are not without con-
troversy, many find them compelling examples of abstract geometric thinking 
with an artistic response. In a related article in Science anthropologist Stanley 
Ambrose of the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign says “This is clearly 
an intentionally incised abstract geometric design … It is art.” (Galanter 2008, 
318-19)
Besides highly ordered grid-like systems of composition, the most common proce-
dural resources to be found in the arts previously to the development of the comput-
er (or even of electric media) were the use of randomness or chance in composition 
and the recombination of modular parts and often, combinations of chance and re-
combination. This is what Lluis Mestres calls procedural-aleatory art, a conceptual 
term that identifies artworks that need to be deployed as computational processes 
(2004, 108).
Recombination is a method for producing new forms of data through the use of 
existing pieces of data in new logical orders (Cope 2005, 88). Digital information 
systems are recombinant, like the alphabet, from which, by multiple arrangements 
of letters we can get all the books ever written in a given language. The same hap-
pens with most of the Western (classical) music, that consists of combinations of 
the twelve pitches of the equal-tempered scale and their octave equivalents, and the 
recombinations of the groupings that result from these combinations (89). Recombi-
nation of enough parts with a versatile enough grammar allows a stream of endless, 
and potentially infinite, end results. Recombination of a more limited number of 
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parts either with an even stricter grammar, or with such a degree of freedom that 
can for all purposes be seen as equivalent to the absence of any type of rules, can be 
found in examples dating from the eighteenth century CE or even as far as the fourth 
century BCE.
One of the oldest, and more famous, examples of chance and recombination systems 
is the I Ching, the Book of Changes, an oracular system from the fourth century BCE 
still widely used in East Asia. The I Ching is built of a combination of sixty-four sets 
of six lines called hexagrams, each hexagram being the binary combination of six 
whole (unchanging) or broken (changing) lines (26 = 64). Each hexagram is linked to 
a main text and to six smaller ones, one for each line. By manipulating three coins 
or forty-nine yarrow stalks according to a randomizing principle, 121 texts from two 
hexagrams are combined, producing one out of 4,096 possible results. These final 
texts contain the answer to a question written in advance by the user of the I Ching 
(Aarseth 1994, 769).
In Western Europe, one of the simplest early examples is the German landscape 
game described by Wilden as a case of “combination without complexity” (1987, 173). 
This game consisted of a set of 24 cards that could be rearranged to form landscapes 
of varying size and diversity by exploring the possible permutations of the full set 
of cards. 122 Each card was designed with the same controlled number of ‘planes of 
depth’, between four and six, and this allowed them to be freely aligned in some-
what harmonious land- and seascape results.
121 The method of the yarrow stalks is a biased random number generator, producing results that are 
not equiprobable. During the Han Dinasty (206 BCE–220 CE) this method was gradually replaced by the 
method of the three coins. Nevertheless, the accuracy of the randomness is not important as far as the 
divination properties of the I Ching are concerned because the fundamental idea underlining a system of 
divination is that the appropriate answers will eventually be produced, regardless of the statistical prob-
abilities.
122 1,686,553,615,927,922,354,187,720 possible combinations, to be exact (Wilden 1987, 173).
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Fig. 43: An eighteenth-century game of landscapes, showing two rearrangements of the same subset of 
seven cards (Wilden 1987, 174).
Although it can be argued that these card games were not intended as artistic pro-
ductions and that they were certainly not produced as consciously developing a pro-
cedural system, they were nevertheless aesthetic artifacts whose appeal and efficacy 
derived directly from their recombinational (and therefore procedural) nature.
The most famous documented early example of the use of randomization and re-
combination in the creative process of an artwork is a composition attributed to 
Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, 123 the Musikalisches Würfelspiel im C K516f 124 written 
in 1787 and published in 1793. 125 The Musikalisches Würfelspiel’s score provides 176 
measures of prepared music and a grid that maps the throw of a pair of dice and a se-
quence number (first throw, second throw, etc.) into the numbers from 1 through 176. 
The composition to perform would be created by the performer through a sequence 
of dice throws, and the assembling of the corresponding measures in a sequential 
score (Galanter 2003, 14). This would show how one might compose, as stated in the 
title page for the J.J. Hummel edition of 1793 “without the least knowledge of music 
so much German Walzer or Schleifer as one pleases, by throwing a certain number 
123 1756-1791.
124 Musical Game of Dice in C.
125 Pajot is very skeptical about the real authorship of this piece, defending that “there is absolutely no 
evidence, even a hint beside Mozart’s name being on the title pages of the above issues, that these games 
had anything to do with Mozart”.
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with two dice” (Pajot 2004). Actually, the total number of possible compositions is 
so large 126 that as Martin Gardner 127 remarked, “any waltz you generate with the 
dice and actually play is almost certainly a waltz never heard before (…) if you fail 
to preserve it, it will be a waltz that will probably never be heard again.” (qtd. in 
Peterson 2001)
In eighteenth century Western Europe these games enjoyed some popularity, not 
necessarily involving the throw of dice but always trying to infuse a somewhat 
controlled amount of randomness into the process of musical composition or per-
formance. Other documented examples of musical dice games are Johann Philipp 
Kirnberger’s 128 Der allezeit fertige Polonaisen und Menuetten Komponist 129 from 1757 
and Joseph Haydn’s 130 Gioco Filarmonico 131 from 1790. In 1783 Kirnberger published 
a more elaborate system, explaining how to compose sonatas, symphonies and over-
tures, an how-to-do-it book that was intended for the hours of leisure of music lovers, 
dispensing them of resorting to professional composition (Wager 2000). Maximilan 
Stadler 132 is also attributed with the creation of a table to compose minuets and trios 
that also required the use of a pair of dice, the Tables from Which One Can Toss Off 
Countless Menuets and Trios for the Klavier, from 1781. 
The root of these games goes back to much earlier than these works. Samuel Pepys 133 
is reported to have had some sort of music composing machine that he used quite 
often, although there are no details about its format or working mechanisms (Wager 
2000). Earlier still we find Marin Mersenne 134 stating in his Traité de l’harmonie uni-
verselle 135 from 1636-7 that music is only algebra translated into sound and that with 
the help of the sequential method, any lay person could become a composer within 
the space of an hour or less (Zielinski 2006, 143). This observation was heavily criti-
cized by many of his contemporaries, but some others, like Kircher, shared this view 
of music as a discipline subordinate to mathematics. He demonstrates it in book 8 
126 As many as 1116 or 45,949,729,863,572,161 (Peterson 2001).
127 1914-2010.
128 1721-1783.
129 The Ever Ready Composer of Polonaises and Minuets.
130 1732-1809.
131 Philharmonic game, sometimes also translated as Philharmonic Joke.
132 1748-1833.
133 1633-1703.
134 1588-1648.
135 Treatise of Universal Harmony.
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of his treatise Musurgia Universalis from 1650, that focuses on the mechanical arts 
in music and that, among plans for the construction of water-powered automatic 
organs, notations of birdsongs, diagrams of several music instruments and stud-
ies of the human ear, also proposes an apparatus for the composition of music, the 
Arca Musarithmica. 136 The construction of this Arca Musarithmica would be simi-
lar to that of other combinatorial boxes that Kircher conceived, like the Cassetta 
Matematica, 137 also called Organum Mathematicum 138 built in 1661 (142): it would be 
a relatively small and portable wood box containing specific organizing systems that 
used thin sliding slats. The slats were positioned vertically one behind the other, and 
the units of information inscribed on them were arranged so that, by following the 
rules of operation, they could also be linked horizontally (141). 
Fig. 44: Kircher’s Cassetta Matematica or Organum Mathematicum (Zielinski 2006, 142).
On the front of the Arca Musarithmica we would have clefs and at the back, arranged 
in tables, would be the keys that could be used in the composition. The slats inside 
the box would be marked on the front with sequences of four-note chords and on 
the back with rhythmic variations that could be combined with them. The Musurgia 
136 Box for rhythmic sequences of notes.
137 Mathematical box.
138 Mathematical organ.
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Universalis, that this box was supposed to accompany, notes the chord sequences as 
rows of numbers and explains the method of composing music with the help of the 
device (143). Due to the extremely vague descriptions formulated by Kircher, and 
the confusing terminology used in the book, it is not clear to music historians what 
the precise functioning of the box was supposed to be, or how the music it produced 
would sound, and different accounts are often so divergent that Zielinski sometimes 
has the impression that they were describing completely different devices (144).
Fig. 45: Kircher’s design for the Arca Musarithmica (Zielinski 2006, 146).
Independently of the vague, contradictory or sketchy details provided by Kircher, 
the essence of the Arca’s design is a collection of precomposed musical, poetic, and 
rhetorical patterns from where it was possible to create variable, harmonic composi-
tions. Zielinski identifies here the principle of an electronic music sequencer, storing 
sound sequences and delivering them to different instruments for reproduction or 
further processing (145). A somewhat simple process, but with far-reaching conse-
quences, as Kircher himself noted at the end of chapter 3, On Using the Arca Musa-
rithmica: “It is apparent from that which is put forward here the infinite number of 
possible combinations, which are given by the different ordering of the five columns. 
Assuredly there are so many that had an angel begun with the combinations at the 
dawning of the world, it would not be finished today” (qtd. in 145).
Already in the nineteenth century we can find two more examples of combinato-
rial systems for the composition of music: the Kaleidacousticon system, advertised 
in the newspapers of Boston, Massachusetts in 1822 (Roads 1996, 823). This system 
was comprised by a deck of playing cards with instructions indicating how to use 
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them to compose up to 214 million different waltzes. In 1865 in the United King-
dom, Professor J. Clinton of the Royal Conservatory of Music in London sold the 
Quadrille Melodist, marketed as a practical aid to composition. This was also a set of 
cards, presumably noted with fragments of music notation, and it “enabled a pianist 
at a quadrille party (an early square dance) to keep the evening’s pleasure going by 
means of a modest provision of 428 million quadrilles” (825).
Simple combinatorial systems of this kind do not increase diversity or create com-
plexity (Wilden 1987, 173), no matter how large is the number of possible numeri-
cal combinations (175), but they nevertheless allow the systematic exploration of a 
sometimes vast field of possibilities (Gombrich 1984, 70) by the reader / user / inter-
preter of a piece, infusing it with a level of uncertainty that wasn’t normally found 
in artistic pieces of the time. Although still authoring the pieces, the authors or 
composers of the systems abdicated of a big level of control and, in a sense, created 
frameworks for the production of final works rather than creating the final works 
themselves. This would open the doors to the increasing exploration of a large num-
ber of systems for metacreation, that were however often presented as games or toys 
— something that in retrospect may seem inevitable, especially at the time of the 
highly trained and gifted romantic artists.
Before the advent of computers, automatic or semi-automatic music composition 
was not only developed with formal systems but also with a variety of machinery. 
The Aeolian Harp, known since antiquity, was described by Kircher in his book Pho-
nurgia Nova, 139 from 1673 and became rather popular during the eighteenth century.
Aeolian harps are built with wooden boxes where strings are stretched across two 
bridges. When placed in front of an open window, the wind blows across the strings, 
making them resonate and producing a variety of aleatoric sounds that depended 
on the force of the wind, the number, tension, material and caliber of the strings and 
also on their relative tunings (Roads 1996, 825). 140
139 The full title of which is Phonurgia Nova, sive conjugium mechanico-physicum artis & natvrae 
paranympha phonosophia concinnatum.
140 The physical mechanism that is responsible for the functioning of the Aeolian harp is the von Kar-
man vortex effect, first abstracted by Lord Rayleigh (1842-1919) in 1915.
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The Componium was a room-sized mechanical instrument, constructed in 1821 by 
Dietrich Nikolaus Winkel, 141 that composed novel music through the simultaneous 
revolution of two barrels that took turns performing two measures of randomly 
chosen music, thus exploring several possible combinations of the stored fragments 
of music. Some years later, a large-scale mechanical machine similar to the Com-
ponium was devised by a Baron Guilani and exhibited in Vienna (825).
Fig. 46: The Componium.
The experimentation with recombination systems was also developed in the literary 
arts, and also there we can find examples of games and tools for composition and 
writing.
Gradus ad Parnassum 142 was the common designation for a dictionary of Latin and/
or classical Greek that provided epithetic and other phrases from classical poets, 
with the long and short syllables conveniently marked for metrical fit, to help begin-
ners (Ong 1982, 21). The first Gradus was compiled in 1687 by the Jesuit Paul Aler 143 
and there were several more published in the following years, by Thomas Morell in 
1762, F.J.M. Noël in 1810, E. Maltby in 1815, John Brasse in 1828, Liddell-Scott-Jones in 
1843, C.D. Yonge in 1850, Charles Lewis and Charlton Short in 1879 and A.C. Ainger 
141 1773-1826.
142 Literally ‘Steps to Parnassus’, sometimes shortened to Gradus. This is also the title of an unrelated 
textbook on counterpoint, musical theory and composition written in 1725 by Johann Joseph Fux (1660-
1741).
143 1656-1757.
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and H.G. Wintle in 1890, to name just a few. The student or aspiring poet could use 
a Gradus to assemble a poem by simply selecting the building blocks and keeping 
tabs on the metrical fit. “The overall structure could be of his own making but the 
pieces were all there before he came along.” (22)
In the seventeenth century, the German poet and language researcher Georg Philipp 
Harsdörffer 144 sought to systematically exhaust the potential of combinatorics in 
linguistics and poetics. He designed a combinatorial morphologic word creation 
machine, the Fünffacher Denckring der Teutschen Sprache 145 from 1636 that should 
in principle permit anyone to generate all existing and potential words of the Ger-
man language by the combination of what Harsdörffer called ‘syllables’, but modern 
linguists currently call ‘morphemes’ (Cramer 2005, 46). It is with this work that, 
according to Cramer, language is for the first time turned into a computational and 
algorithmic system, into a program.
Fig. 47: Georg Philipp Harsdörffer’s Denckring (Cramer 2005, 47).
Harsdörffer also wrote what Berge would later call ‘factorial poetry’, but was by then 
more commonly referred to as ‘protean poetry’, 146 following Julius Caesar Scaliger 147 
who supposedly invented the genre (Berge 2003, 179) and named it after the Greek 
god who perpetually changed his face (Cramer 2005, 44). In these poems, certain 
elements of the text could be permutated in all possible ways as the reader saw fit or 
144 1607-1658.
145 Five-fold thought ring of the German language.
146 Poetices Proteos.
147 1484-1558.
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chance defined, changing the meaning but preserving syntactic correctness. Cra-
mer defends that the origin of this permutational poetry is even older, going back to 
Publilius Optatianus Porfirius 148 in the fourth century CE, specifically to the Poem 
XXV from his Carmina, 149 in which the words can be rearranged to create new verses 
with coherent meaning. The poem is composed of just four lines and twenty words:
Ardua conponunt felices carmina Musae  
dissona conectunt diversis vincula metris  
scrupea pangentes torquentes pectora vatis  
undique confusis constabunt singula verbis. (qtd. in Edwards 2005)
The text itself invites the reader to rearrange the words and to form new verses, ma-
nipulating words within their designated lines or exchanging them with words of 
similar metrical qualities in other lines to create new verses. Assuming certain met-
rical rules are observed, a total of 1,792 verses can be created from these four lines 
(Edwards 2005). From an operational point of view, Harsdörffer’s protean poems 
were much simpler, requiring less skills for the manipulation of their contents. One 
of Harsdörffer’s protean couplets was:
Ehr, Kunst, Geld, Guth, Lob, Weib und Kind
Man hat, sucht, fehlt, hofft und verschwind. 150 (qtd. in Berge 2003, 179)
The ten words composed in italics could be permuted by the reader without altering 
the rhythm, as they are all monosyllabic. This system therefore allows the creation 
of 3,628,800 different poems, all of them grammatically correct. 151 Berge’s designa-
tion, ‘factorial’, is derived from the way one can calculate the number of possible 
permutations. With n words to permute, the number of possibilities would be n 
factorial, that is, the number n! = 1 × 2 × … × n (Berge 2003, 179).
148 233-c. 305 CE.
149 The poems of the Carmina or Carmina Figurata were published collectively in one volume for the 
first known time in 1590 (Edwards 2005).
150 Honor, Art, Money, Property, Praise, Woman, and Child / One has, seeks, misses, hopes for, and 
disappears. (Berge 2003, 179)
151 Provided one changes sucht to Sucht, fehlt to Fehl, man to Mann, according to Berge (2003, 179).
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Based on Harsdörffer’s work, on Kircher’s Ars magna sciendi, sive combinatoria 152 
from 1669 and in the work of Ramon Llull, 153 the German poet Quirinus Kuhl-
mann 154 composed the sonnet XIV. Libes-kuss: Vom Wechsel menschlicher Sachen 155 
in 1671, consisting of 13 × 12 nouns that could be arbitrarily shuffled to a total of 
13!12 ≈ 3,399 × 10117 permutations (Cramer 2002).
In 1666, Gottfried Leibniz 156 publishes his Dissertatio de arte combinatoria, 157 where 
he cites several other examples in monosyllabic Latin, from Bernhardus Bauhusius, 
Thomas Lansius, Johan Philippus Ebelius and Johan Baptistus Ricciolus (Berge 2003, 
180).
1.3.2 Twentieth Century Pre-Computational Procedural Practices
In 1965, French novelist Marc Saporta would write and publish a factorial novel, 
Composition Nº 1, consisting of 150 loose pages, unnumbered and printed on one 
side only, one of which is the title page, while all the others are the novel. The cover 
of the box that holds all the pages provides the following instructions: “The pages 
of this book may be read in any order. The reader is requested to shuffle them like a 
deck of cards.” (qtd. in Badman 2004)
Saporta’s novel is an example of what today we refer to as proto-hypertexts (Kolb 
1994, 329) or incunabular hypertexts (Moulthrop 1994, 300), nonlinear and com-
binatorial literary works of variable extension that were designed to be read quite 
unlike linear books, thus demanding a more elaborate and active role from the read-
ers and (at least potentially) providing each of them with slightly different or all 
the way contrasting reading experiences. One other good example would be a book 
that is itself a commentary on hypertext and culture, Deleuze and Guattari’s Mille 
Plateaux (1988), a book that although shaped as a print artifact, was designed as a 
matrix of independent but cross-referential discourses which the reader is invited to 
enter more or less at random (xx). Mille Plateaux has no defined sequence, beyond 
a stipulation that the conclusion should be saved for last, and the book’s sections, 
152 The Great Art of Knowing, or Combinations.
153 1232-1315.
154 1651-1689.
155 14th Kiss of Love: On the Permutation of Human Matters.
156 1646-1716.
157 Dissertation on the art of combinations.
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or plateaux, may be read in any order, therefore bestowing upon the reader the task 
of building a network of virtual connections throughout (and beyond) the book 
(Moulthrop 1994, 300).
We can find the same principle in Un Conte à votre façon 158 from 1973 by Raymond 
Queneau, 159 a short story in 21 parts that starts with a question and two commands 
for action as answers to this: “1. Would you like to read the tale of the three sprightly 
peas? If so, go to [part] 4; if not, go to [part] 2.” (Queneau 2003b) From here the 
reader is led through a series of alternative paths that inevitable lead to one of two 
possible endings and as a consequence force to leave several possible parts of the 
path along the way.
Texts such as these, by opening to reader choice and selection in the determination 
of the structure to be read, point to the idea of a “multiple authorship responsibility 
in which the specific functions of the composer, the performer, and indeed the con-
sumer overlap” (Gould 1984b), an idea that Glenn Gould 160 expands in The Prospects 
of Recording (1984a): “Because so many different levels of participation will, in fact, 
be merged in the final result, the individualized information concepts which define 
the nature of identity and authorship will become very much less imposing”.
One of the masterworks of combinatory literature was produced by Queneau in 1961, 
the Cent mille milliards de poèmes, 161 a small book of ten pages, each containing a 
single sonnet. Each of the ten pages is cut in fourteen horizontal sections, allowing 
the replacement of any of the lines in a sonnet by one of the nine alternatives, thus 
enabling the composition of 1014 = 100,000,000,000,000 different poems, respecting 
in each case the constraints of sonnet composition. Berge classifies this particular 
type of combinatory literature as ‘exponential’, for the number of poems of x verses 
that one can obtain is given by the exponential function ex (2003, 180). The number 
in this case is so high, that it lead the French mathematician and Dada poet François 
Le Lionnais 162 to write in the postface of the French edition of Cent mille milliards 
de poèmes that “The work you are holding in your hands represents, itself alone, a 
quantity of text far greater than everything man has written since the invention of 
158 Yours for the Telling, in John Crombie’s translation (Queneau 2003b).
159 1903-1976.
160 1932-1982.
161 A Hundred Thousand Billion Poems, in Stanley Chapman’s translation (Queneau 2003a).
162 1901-1984.
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writing, including popular novels, business letters, diplomatic correspondence, pri-
vate mail, rough drafts thrown into the wastebasket, and graffiti.”
Le Lionnais and Queneau were the founders of the influential Oulipo, the Ouvroir 
de littérature potentielle, 163 a group that also included as members Georges Perec, 164 
Italo Calvino, 165 Claude Berge, 166 Jean Lescure 167 and Marcel Duchamp, 168 among 
several others. The motivation of the Oulipo was the exploration of literature, much 
in the same sense that one could explore mathematics (Lescure 2003, 173), searching 
for historical constraints and procedures in literature and setting out to discover 
new ones, new processes, new structures. Having a strong interest in experimen-
tal literature, the Oulipo’s initial name was S.L.E., short for séminaire de littérature 
expérimentale, 169 later changed to Olipo, and finally, for the sake of symmetry, add-
ing the second letter of the word ouvroir to the O, which definitely rendered Olipo 
as Oulipo (173).
The word potential, according to Queneau, “concerns the very nature of literature; 
that is, fundamentally it’s less a question of literature strictly speaking than of sup-
plying forms for the good use one can make of literature. We call potential literature 
the search for new forms and structures that may be used by writers in any way 
they see fit.” (qtd. in Lescure 2003, 176) Le Lionnais, adds that “[i]t is impossible to 
compose texts that have poetic, surrealist, fantastic, or other qualities without hav-
ing qualities of potential. Now it is these last qualities that are essential for us. They 
are the only ones that must guide our choice.” (qtd. in Lescure 2003, 176) For the 
Oulipo, the goal of potential literature was to furnish writers with techniques for a 
new liberty and, although the first literary work of the Oulipo is the combinatorial 
Cent mille milliards de poèmes, the Oulipo is about far more than just combinatory 
literature (Berge 2003, 178). 
163 Workshop of potential literature.
164 1936-1982.
165 1923-1985.
166 1926-2002.
167 1912-2005.
168 1887-1968. Lescure reported that “Marcel Duchamp, from one of the Americas, became interested 
in the Oulipo. The Ouvroir flattered itself to count him among its corresponding members. He died an 
Oulipian.” (2003, 176).
169 Seminar of experimental literature.
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Le Lionnais defined two lipos, an analytic and a synthetic, analytic lipo developing 
a historical, critical and almost archaeological work by seeking possibilities existing 
in the work of certain authors unbeknownst to them, and the synthetic lipo consti-
tuting its principal mission: the opening up of new possibilities previously unknown 
to authors (Lescure 2003, 176). For Berge, an analysis of the Oulipian tendencies 
will reveal not two but rather three currents or vocations of the Oulipo: the search 
for new structures, the research into methods of automatic transformation and the 
transposition of concepts from different branches of mathematics into the realm of 
words (178). Potential literature was therefore not a homogenous and closed field of 
work but rather a melting pot of complementary experiments (Mestres 2004, 95).
The first vocation sought to replace traditional restraints like the sonnet or the haiku 
with other linguistic constraints, namely palindromes or ‘lipograms’. 170 Perec wrote 
Le Grand Palindrome in 1969, with roughly 1,500 words 171 and the 300-page long 
novel La Disparition 172 also in 1969, a lipogram in e, where the letter e (the most 
common in the French language) is not used during the entire text, 173 and Les Reve-
nentes (1972), a lipogram in a, i, o and u. An earlier example of a lipogram in e is 
Gadsby: Champion of Youth, a novel written by American writer Ernest Vincent 
Wright 174 in 1939. 
Perec’s La Vie mode d’emploi (1978) was developed from a massive list of constraints 
that specified contents for each chapter, like e.g. the number of people involved, the 
length of the chapter in pages, countries, quotations from other novelists, etc. Other 
lipograms would keep the authors from using arbitrary sets of letters, like the pris-
oner’s constraint that forbid letters with ascenders or descenders 175 (Bogost 2008, 
121) or imposed more complex rules, like serially allowing or disallowing letters in 
the text. In 2004 French author Michel Thaler, 176 not associated with the Oulipo, 
170 While palindromes are structures that can be read the same way in any direction, lipograms, (from 
the Greek lipagrammatos, missing letter) are systems of constrained writing in which a particular letter 
or group of letters is not allowed.
171 A more recent example is Nick Monfort and William Gillespies’s 2002 (2002) a palindromic novel of 
2,002 words (Bogost 2008, 121).
172 The Disappearance, a novel that follows a group of people that cannot find a hunting companion.
173 La Disparition was translated to English by Gilbert Adair also as a lipogram in e, A Void, and to 
Spanish as a lipogram in a — the most common vowel in Spanish — titled El secuestro.
174 1873?–1939.
175 b, d, f, g, h, j, k, l, p, q, t, and y.
176 A pseudonym for Michel Dansel.
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published the 233-page long novel Le Train de Nulle Part 177 that was written without 
using a single verb. ‘Homosyntax’ proposed the replacement of all the words in a 
given text by new words, while preserving grammar and syntax, or to build prose 
from a given syntactic sequence such as VVSSSSASSVVSSSVSASASVSASSSSVVSSASSV 
(V=Verb, S=Substantive, A=Adjective), while the ‘snow ball’ proposed the writing 
of texts with a number of elements that would be progressively increased to a set 
point and then decreased back to the original value. Outside the Oulipo, we can 
find similar working methods being used by Austrian-American composer Arnold 
Schoenberg, 178 that tested and transformed the structure of musical space in much 
the same way as the Oulipo explored the literary space. Schoenberg created con-
straints for his compositions, sometimes ruling a priori that a piece should use the 
full range of the chromatic scale, whereas at other times, much like in lipograms, 
he avoided — or insisted upon — the repetition of certain notes or series of notes 
(Boden 2004, 72). 
The second Oulipian vocation, the research of methods of automatic transformation, 
is exemplified with Lescure’s ‘S+7’ (sometimes called ‘N+7’) method of text produc-
tion, one of the most cherished discoveries of the Oulipo (Mestres 2004, 96), ex-
plored by Lescure himself but also by Queneau in Traslation. The simple, yet labour 
intensive text production process implied starting from any given preexisting base 
text and, with the help of a dictionary, to replace every name (substantive, S) by the 
seventh following name (+7) found in the dictionary, counting upwards. The results 
will naturally vary depending on the dictionary that is used, on alternatively per-
forming the transformation on other lexical classes, such as verbs, or on performing 
multiple transformations in each text. 
The ‘definitional method’ replaced the components of a text — verbs, nouns, adjec-
tives, adverbs, and so on — by their dictionary definitions, generating a multitude 
of different texts from somewhat short source-texts. This process was also called ‘lit-
térature sémo-définitionnelle’, shortened to L.S.D. and was developed in the P.A.L.F. 179 
project by Perec and Marcel Bénabou (97). ‘Vocabulary clept pomes’ are achieved by 
writing a poem and then delivering to another poet a simple list of the words used in 
the poem, intended to be used as materia prima for a new work, this method is very 
177 The Train from Nowhere.
178 1874-1951.
179 Production Automatique de Littérature Française or Automatic Production of French Literature.
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similar to ‘pied poetry’, that involves rearranging all the words of a poem to achieve 
a new one (the rules allow varying punctuation and capitalization) (Sneyd 2005).
Finally, the third vocation is exemplified by recursive or iterative processes, repeated 
‘infinitely’ so that a given source text can spawn a variety of new texts. We can also 
find examples in combinatorial works such as the aforementioned Cent mille mil-
liards de poèmes or Jacques Roubaud’s collection of poems ∈ (1967), that proposed 
the reading of a set of 361 texts in four alternative but well-determined orders, refus-
ing any sort of randomness or reader determined choice (Berge 2003, 180). Finally 
we can mention the tangential poems of Le Lionnais, Jacques Duchateau’s inter-
section of two novels and Queneau’s multiplicative texts, composed from algebraic 
matrices (179).
Oulipo’s sometime very strict formal procedures were naturally influenced by cy-
bernetics and communication theory, but their motivation was not found in elec-
tronics or computation but rather in literature, and their starting points, as well 
as their objectives were related with the essence of writing. As a key to Oulipo’s 
inspiration we find a deep reflection about the literary craft, and constraints, com-
binatorics, textual distribution strategies and their rules are converted into the core 
of the writer’s work (Mestres 2004, 94). Oulipian formal procedures are often criti-
cized as being mannerist, as if somehow they may drive the heart of the artwork 
from more essential matters, however, these critics fail to see that the main differ-
ence between mannerism and the Oulipo are their disparate goals: while the man-
nerist intended to create a sense of wonder, having a formal goal that arose from the 
formal, the Oulipian saw text as the one and only goal, and it was in text that one 
could effectively understand form and content (99). Oulipo was perhaps the most 
organized group studying formal writing procedures, but it was far from being the 
first to be interested in them. 
In 1920, Tristan Tzara 180 published the Dada Manifesto on Feeble Love and Bitter 
Love (1987), in the eight part of which he presents the recipe to create a Dada poem, 
formulated in a way that can literally be read as software (Cramer 2002):
180 1896-1963.
Computation, Media and Creativity118
To make a Dadaist poem: 
Take a newspaper. 
Take a pair of scissors. 
Choose an article as long as you are planning to make your poem. Cut out the 
article. 
Then cut out each of the words that make up this article and put them in a bag. 
Shake it gently. 
Then take out the scraps one after the other in the order in which they left the 
bag. 
Copy conscientiously. 
The poem will be like you. 
And here you are a writer, infinitely original and endowed with a sensibility that 
is charming though beyond the understanding of the vulgar. (Cramer 2002)
By this time, Alexander Rodchenko, 181 Kazimir Malevich, 182 Vladimir Tatlin, 183 
Naum Gabo 184 and several others in the Soviet Union were establishing Construc-
tivism, developing a truly systematic approach to art making (Glimcher and Rose 
2005, 7). It was Malevich’s Suprematist work that drove many of them from Cub-
ism to nonrepresentational or totally abstract art, and to divide the development of 
artworks in two separate stages, starting with the theoretical study of the elements 
from which the artwork would be constructed and following it by what they referred 
to as a ‘laboratory’ analysis of how these should function together. Early Construc-
tivists believed that this would lead to works that had been ‘constructed’, and not 
‘composed’ in the traditional manner of art. Rodchenko describes a group of spatial 
constructions from 1921, and the rule-based method that he followed:
These are the latest spatial constructions. I developed them experimentally. The 
exclusive purpose was to bind the constructor to the law of expediency of the 
forms used, to make him uphold their lawful coherence as well as to demon-
strate universality, so that one can build out of these identical shapes all kinds 
of constructions for various systems, types and applications. In these works, 
which are real constructions, I promulgate a mandatory condition for the fu-
181 1891-1956.
182 1879-1935.
183 1885-1953.
184 1890-1977.
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ture industrial builder: Nothing random or uncontrolled. Everything has to be 
reduced to universal initiative; it has to be simplified, generalized. (Glimcher 
and Rose 2005, 8)
It is interesting to note how Rodchenko refers to a law that guides the design: the 
expediency of forms, a self-imposed rule that the least number and types of forms 
should be used to achieve a given construction. He also implies that the construc-
tion of the artwork is not dependent on the artist’s singular hand, he rather suggests 
that the artist’s job is that of designing the constructions of the work (8).
William S. Burroughs, 185 describes Tzara’s presentation of this process at a surreal-
ist rally, causing a riot among the audience and leading André Breton 186 to expel 
him from the movement on the spot (2003, 90). In the 1950s, the British-Canadian 
painter, writer, artist at large and regular collaborator of Burroughs, Brion Gysin, 187 
developed a cut-up method that intended to bring to writers the method of collage, 
that at the time had been used by painters for already fifty years. 188 According to the 
description that is given by Burroughs, Gysin’s method was not too different from 
Tzara’s:
The method is simple. Here is one way to do it. Take a page. Like this page. 
Now cut down the middle and cross the middle. You have four sections: 
1 2 3 4 . . . one two three four. Now rearrange the sections placing section 
four with section one and section two with section three. And you have a new 
page. Sometimes it says much the same thing. Sometimes something quite dif-
ferent — cutting up political speeches is an interesting exercise — in any case 
you will find that it says something and something quite definite. Take any 
poet or writer you fancy. Here, say, or poems you have read over many times. 
The words have lost meaning and life through years of repetition. Now take the 
poem and type out selected passages. Fill a page with excerpts. Now cut the 
page. You have a new poem. As many poems as you like. As many Shakespeare 
Rimbaud poems as you like. (Burroughs 2003, 90)
185 1914-1997.
186 1896-1966.
187 1916-1986.
188 And used also by photography and cinema: “all street shots from movie or still cameras are by the 
unpredictable factors of passers by and juxtaposition cut-ups. And photographers will tell you that often 
their best shots are accidents” (Burroughs 2003, 90).
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Tzara’s method relied on one act of selection, one single choice from the operator 
or writer, the choice of “an article as long as you are planning to make your poem”, 
while Gysin’s cut-up technique allows for far more arbitrary decisions and is not at 
all exempt from selection, revision and rewriting (Montfort 2003). Tzara said “poet-
ry is for everyone”, Burroughs added that “cut-ups are for everyone” (2003, 90), that 
everyone could make them, and that they were experimental in the simple sense 
of being something to do “right here write now. Not something to talk and argue 
about.” (90) According to Burroughs, all writing is in fact a process of cut-up, a 
collage of words, just made more explicit and subject to extension and variation by 
the use of scissors and glue. Cut-ups could be applied to fields other than writing, 
in science, games and military strategy, bringing chance, accidents and serendipity 
to the world. Cutting and rearranging the world, there would be no reason for any-
one to accept a second-rate product when they could have the best — “and the best 
would be there for all” — because the processes and tools would be freely available 
for anyone wishing to write.
Burroughs described the cut-up technique as a live montage that did not have to 
obey common restrictions imposed on literary practice, furthermore he already 
pointed to an interpretation of the technique that would place it at the core of digital 
practices in the new media: “Somebody is reading a newspaper, and his eye follows 
the column in the proper Aristotelian manner, one idea and sentence at a time. But 
subliminally he is reading the columns on either side and aware of the person sitting 
next to him. That’s a cut-up.” (qtd. in Fuller 2005, 38)
If with Tzara, Gysin, Burroughs and the Oulipo, the texts are seemingly always the 
goal, we can nevertheless also find a very strong presence of a certain poetics of 
programming, of code, algorithms, calculus, chance and effective procedures at the 
heart of the creative practice (Mestres 2004, 101). We can find the will to distribute 
the tools and the processes of creation and to make this poetics readily available for 
everyone, but also to make audiences and critics aware of the nature of the processes 
being deployed. If Bach used algorithms, he certainly did not feel the need to pub-
lish those along with the compositions that were created with them, and most likely 
regarded them as a useful composition tool that was not, in any case, neither a fun-
damental part of the creative process nor art in itself, but perhaps more of a shortcut 
for certain parts of the artwork that could be solved mathematically. Twentieth-
century composers and artists, on the other hand, not only valued the processes 
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and the methods for automatic or semi-automatic composition, 189 as they often also 
found them to be as artistically determinant as any other aspect of the process and 
as fundamental as the end results themselves.
John Cage, 190 one of the most important twentieth century American composers, 
was famous for using composition processes that involved indeterminacy and also 
for seeding the pieces with chance operations, either by forcing choices on the per-
formers or by using mechanisms that were far from being totally controllable by the 
performers, thus opening the door to the unexpected and to disparate outcomes in 
each performance.
Cage composed several pieces for (or including) the ‘prepared piano’, a transforma-
tion of the classical concert piano through the placement of several ‘preparations’ or 
objects between or on the strings, on the hammers or dampers of the instrument. 
The preparations for each piece were usually specified by Cage, but no matter how 
rigorous this specifications would be, 191 the preparation was usually intended to alter 
the timbre of the piano in varying ways, so that the repeated stroke of the same key 
could (and often would) produce somewhat controlled but impossible to control 
variations of timbre.
His piece 4’33” (1952), in three movements, was composed for any instrument or 
combination of instruments, which are instructed not to play during the entire du-
ration of the piece. 192 Deeply inspired by Zen Buddhism, that Cage studied since 
the 1940s, 4’33” epitomized Cage’s idea that any sounds constitute, or may constitute 
music, because the piece was not designed to be heard as four minutes and thirty-
three seconds of silence, but rather to consist of all the sounds heard, but not played, 
during that length of time. More importantly, if considering the injection of chance 
in composition and performance, 4’33” is a piece created by sounds that are not com-
189 Surrealists explored a different sort of ‘automatic’ writing and drawing, intended to explore the sub-
conscious and the psyche of the artists, so their use of the term was more related to the lack of conscious 
control over the process of artistic production than to the transfer of that control to a mechanized or 
formal process. It was, nevertheless, about relinquishing control over the pieces and over the final output 
of the processes.
190 1912-1992.
191 Including not only the positioning and assembling of the preparations as well as their descriptions: 
nuts, bolts, rubber bands, or other objects of various sizes.
192 The first being of 30 seconds, the second of two minutes and twenty-three seconds and the third of 
one minute and forty seconds.
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posed or performed but are brought to the piece by all possible systems except the 
traditional channels of music performance (whichever these may be at any given 
time, space or context).
Other pieces composed by Cage included elements of surprise or chance by using 
sound sources that were only partially controllable by the performer. Imaginary 
Landscape Nº 1 (1939) was scored for two conventional instruments, a muted piano 
and a cymbal, and two variable-speed amplified phonographs playing sinusoidal 
single-tone test records. Besides being one of the first examples of electroacoustic 
music, this was also one of the first pieces where Cage deliberately seeded random 
instructions, or instructions to indeterminacy, to the performers (Mestres 2004, 60). 
Imaginary Landscape Nº 4 (1942) for 12 radio receivers detailed precise instructions 
for each performer’s modulations of volume, but naturally left to chance, context 
and serendipity the precise sounds that each performer’s radio receiver would play-
back to the audience. Music of Changes (1951) used chance operations throughout 
the composition process: using the I Ching (that also inspired the title of the piece) 
and an elaborate formal system based on charts with 64 × 64 cells, chance processes 
would determine which sound event to select from the chart, and then the duration 
and dynamics of that sound event, selected from two other charts. Silences were 
also dictated by the system and almost nothing in the final score was left to the 
composer’s discretion (Cage 1973, 57). Cage saw randomness and chance as a way to 
simulate the chaotic behaviors of nature, but he was also drawn by the formality of 
the method, that allowed him to escape his ego and will during the process of artis-
tic creation (Mestres 2004, 66).
By the late 1950s and early 1960s we can find several artists engaged in experimenta-
tion with serial and grid systems and creating artifacts that they see as real objects, 
as hypermediated, and as being completely anti-illusionistic, in the sense that they 
defied the canvas’s traditional role as a framed window and displayed their own in-
trinsic nature frontally on the picture plane (Glimcher and Rose 2005, 9). Ed Ruscha 
and Andy Warhol 193 both developed conceptual projects from early on their careers, 
with an architecture that could be diagramed as follows:
193 1928-1987.
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Step 1: Action by artist. 
Step 2: Create record and preserve evidence of that action. 
Step 3: Repeat n times. 
Step 4: Assemble multiple records to create work. (Glimcher and Rose 2005, 11)
Early pop art pioneers emphasized what they perceived as culturally critical issues 
by focusing their attention on the development and elaboration of step 1, but this 
framework lends itself equally well to the simplification of the first step and the 
elaboration of steps 2 and 3, a methodology that was characteristic of the work of 
early Minimalists and Conceptualist artists (11).
In 1966 Hans Haacke, expressed his program as an artist in a statement that, accord-
ing to Galanter, can almost be read as a manifesto for procedural artists that explore 
complex systems (2003, 18):
...make something which experiences, reacts to its environment, changes, is 
non-stable...  
...make something indeterminate, which always looks different, the shape of 
which cannot be predicted precisely...  
...make something which cannot ‘perform’ without the assistance of its envi-
ronment...  
...make something which reacts to light and temperature changes, is subject to 
air currents and depends, in its functioning, on the forces of gravity...  
...make something which the ‘spectator’ handles, with which he plays and thus 
animates... 
...make something which lives in time and makes the ‘spectator’ experience 
time...  
...articulate: something natural... (Haacke 1966)
Sometimes, the process alone turned out to be the artwork itself. “Ideas alone can be 
works of art” said Sol LeWitt, 194 “they are in a chain of development that may even-
tually find some form”, and they do not even need to be made physical (1969b). It was 
a musician, American minimalist composer La Monte Young, that proposed the 
seminal example of conceptual procedural artwork, with his Composition 1960 #10 
(1960), a single piece of paper containing the written instruction “Draw a straight 
194 1928-2007.
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line and follow it.” This is the quintessential conceptual piece, consisting of an in-
struction that is unambiguous enough to be performed by a man or a machine, but 
at the same time, physically impossible to thoroughly execute by either of them 
(Cramer 2002).
Three of Young’s Compositions 1960, #7, #9 and #10, composed mainly of words, be-
came primary influences on the Fluxus movement, created after George Maciunas 195 
met Young in New York in 1960-61. Composition 1960 #7 was a more traditional 
musical score, comprised of the sustained interval of a perfect fifth, B and F#, with 
the single instruction “to be held for a long time”. It was a distillation of Young’s 
previous works to a radical minimal conclusion “even less than a haiku: no season, 
no place, and, in musical terms, no theme, no development, no variations, no con-
trast, just a concern for time (long) and pitch relationships (…), just B and F# to be 
sustained for a long time.” (Young 2001)
Composition 1960 #9 was a straight line drawn on a file card, intended as a score to 
be interpreted by a performer, and was conceived as an answer to the graphic nota-
tions of Cage. These steps towards progressively more minimal compositions culmi-
nated with Composition 1960 #10, the first to not even be specified as an instruction 
for a piece of music or for a performance but simply as an instruction. These pieces 
led Henry Flynt to define concept art as “an art of which the material is ‘concepts,’ 
as the material of for ex. music is sound” and since concepts “are closely bound up 
with language, concept art is a kind of art of which the material is language.” (1961) 
As such, whenever concept art defines formal instructions or logical scores, it can 
be seen as being software, even if it is not expressed as formal instructions to a com-
puter. According to Cramer, Tzara’s recipe for a Dada poem qualifies as software in 
much the same way as a Perl or Java expression of the same process would. In this 
sense, a piano score is software, whenever its instruction code can be executed by a 
human pianist as well as by a player piano or a computer connected to a midi piano 
(Cramer 2002).
In Young we find a curious duplicity of concept notation and executable code that 
can also be found in several pieces produced by the Fluxus network of artists dur-
ing the 1960s and 1970s or in LeWitt’s 1971 Plan For a Concept Art Book, a series of 
pages bearing exact instructions on how to draw lines on them, how to strike out 
195 1931-1978.
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specific letters from the printed contents or how to manipulate them in various ways. 
If Young’s piece was a concept notation creating an artwork that itself would exist 
only as a concept, LeWitt’s is only a concept notation for a material, graphic artwork 
(Cramer 2002) but it nevertheless is expressed as both a concept and a set of formal 
instructions to deploy it.
In a sense, pure concept art as Composition 1960 #10 does not need to be material-
ized. More than engaging the viewer’s eyes, emotions or senses, this piece engages 
the mind, as LeWitt puts it in his Paragraphs on Conceptual Art (1969b). The piece 
starts as an idea, and “the idea becomes a machine that makes the art”. The piece is 
not made physical in any sense, as an image, sound, motion or volume, its software 
is not loaded into computers, but it runs in human brains.
1.3.3 Procedural Literacy
The fact is that by using a mechanical contrivance, a violinist or an organist 
can express something poignantly human that cannot be expressed without 
the mechanical contrivance. To achieve such expression of course the violinist 
or organist has to have interiorized the technology, made the tool or machine a 
second nature, a psychological part of himself or herself. (Ong 1982, 83)
In 1974 Theodor H. Nelson wrote Computer Lib / Dream Machines, a double book 
that was doubly subtitled as You Can and Must Understand Computers Now / New 
Freedoms Through Computer Screens — A Minority Report and that was devoted to 
the premise that “everybody should understand computers” (2003, 303). In it Nelson 
discussed the unfortunate historical circumstances that made computers become a 
mystery to most of the world, and defended that knowledge and understanding of 
computers should be readily available to anyone, introducing the idea of ‘software 
literacy’ (Reas and Fry 2007, 3). Nelson described computers as being simply a neces-
sary and enjoyable part of life, much like food or books, not being everything, but 
an aspect of everything. Not knowing this would be “computer illiteracy, a silly and 
dangerous ignorance” (2003, 303). The importance of software literacy resided in 
contemporary life’s immersion in media — “we live in media, as fish live in water” 
(306) — and in the urgency of being able to control this environment, of making the 
best use of it, of managing to live with media in the best possible way. Nelson be-
lieved that the more one knew about computers, the better one’s imagination would 
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be capable of flowing between the technicalities, of sliding the parts together, and of 
discerning the shapes of what one would have these things do. Not seeing the com-
puter as a limitless partner, Nelson nevertheless found it to be deeply versatile, but 
called our attention to the necessity of understanding what it could do, what were 
the options and the costs of working with it.
It is interesting to note how already in 1974, when many of the media that would be 
digitalized in the following decades were still analog, when the ARPANet was still 
in its early years, 196 Nelson was already putting such a strong emphasis in the usage 
of computers as media and as communication tools, focusing on literacy issues in 
Computer Lib and covering the potential of the computer as a medium in Dream 
Machines. Concluding that the media, or the structured transmission mechanisms 
(and the messages they carry) cannot escape being personalized by those who run 
them, Nelson appealed to the necessity of understanding how they work, so as to 
balance the “understanding of the things that media misrepresent” (318).
It is of course common sense that understanding how things work is necessary to 
know how to make them (Laurel 1993, 41), but that at which Nelson pointed was 
at how difficult it may be to acquire this knowledge. On a superficial level, and ac-
cording to Friedrich Kittler, contemporary GUIs dispense with writing and hide a 
whole machine from their users (1995). 197 From the user’s point of view, a machine 
can very often be regarded as a closed box with which one interacts through input 
and output channels. The user occasionally acts on the machine through the input 
channels and from time to time the machine will act on the user through output 
channels. It follows that normally the user will not need to know the details of what 
exactly is happening inside the box, thus dealing with the machine as a ‘black box’, a 
term used by Minsky as a way to indicate the user’s lack of concern and knowledge 
about the machine’s interior (1972, 13). A large majority of machines is designed like 
this, hiding their inner workings and presenting just a simple interface to the user. 198
196 Nelson was undoubtedly familiar with both the ARPANet and email, already one of its biggest uses 
at the time.
197 Kittler places the last historical act of writing in the early 1970s, at the moment when Intel engineers 
laid out several meters of blueprint paper to design the hardware architecture of their first integrated 
microprocessor. This manual arrangement of circa two thousand transistors and their interconnections 
was then miniaturized to the size of the actual chip — gigantic, by today’s standards — and was written 
into silicon layers by electro-optical machines (1995).
198 We can think of examples as a washing machine, a microwave oven, a telephone, even of machines that 
demanded more practice or even specific training for their use, as photographic cameras or automobiles.
1271.3 Procedural Practices
Being the computer such a complex and multilayered machine, it is naturally in the 
user’s best interest to have some of its internal workings — and more likely than not, 
most of its internal workings — abstracted through various interfaces and high-
level software. When developing an exploratory use of the computer, having to deal 
with all the inner workings of the software being used, with the operating system, 
the BIOS, the registry, the peripherals, would make most of the tasks become nearly 
impossible to accomplish. On the other hand, once one is particularly interested in 
understanding the inner workings of the machine or in modifying them, when one 
wants to develop a constructive use of the computer, one will need to know more 
than just the machine’s input-output properties (Minsky 1972, 13). The structure of 
the machine needs to be considered in more detail, to the point of understanding 
the interactions between parts and the functioning of the machine as a whole (32).
Software involves the mechanization of the means to put into service the resources 
of the computer’s hardware and the logical resources of other software. It is, very 
literally, ‘control machinery’ or, to put it simply, control (De Landa 1991, 155). When-
ever one chooses to use software, one is using resources that were programmed by 
third-parties, and therefore is, for all purposes, delegating some control of the logi-
cal machine to these resources, and abdicating from their direct control. Paul Vir-
ilio went as far as to identify an enslavement of the human being to these machines, 
a programmed symbiosis of man and computer in which the so-called dialogue be-
tween man and machine hardly conceals the disqualification of the human in favor 
of the definitive instrumental conditioning of the individual (1995, 135). This is not 
an enslavement to machines or to the people who build and own them, but, strictly 
speaking, to the conceptual models, the values and systems of thought that those 
machines (and the software they run) embody (Dunne 2005, 21). Although most 
interfaces are translators or facilitators meant to help, in many cases they also make 
users less powerful, because users are only allowed to operate previously set func-
tions within a given interface: “[y]ou can only compute what the software lets you 
compute, and only manipulate what you see” (van Schaik 2008, 180), in other words, 
one is confined to producing that which happens to be easy to produce, or produc-
ible at all, within existing tools (Mateas 2005). Because it hides processes from end 
users, and because it diverts control from them, prepackaged software carries para-
digms of untouchability, of ways of doing things and of choices presumed by the 
programmers that are presented as defaults beyond which the users are presumed 
(or even discouraged) to go to. This is a problem that is often presented as being part 
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of the political and philosophical foundations of the Free/Libre/Open Source Soft-
ware (FLOSS) movements (Mansoux and de Valk 2008b).
Shrink-wrapping of code in a GUI certainly allows artists and designers to focus on 
working the sensorial fields, relying in the software to generate whatever appropriate 
code objects will simulate their media. The designer thus feels ‘above’ the medium, 
able to calibrate it to her needs and unaffected by its mechanisms and technicalities 
(van Schaik 2008, 182). However, as we have seen, while being a metamedium that 
is able to remediate other media, the computer is never a neutral carrier and in the 
process of remediation it more often than not creates radically new media. Staying 
locked in metaphors from earlier media can lead designers to restrict the creative 
usage of the new media forms (183). Simple examples with profound repercussions 
can be found in the excessive imitation of print media when designing online media, 
with websites that ‘flip’ pages or emulate the layouts of broadsheet newspapers 199 
(183) or in the font selection mechanisms of current desktop publishing and word 
processing applications (Lafuente 2008, 198). 200
Jef Raskin 201 wrote that GUIs are not human-compatible, that they had “become so 
pervasive (or is it perversive?) that many computer users can’t even think about any-
thing else as a human-computer interface” (1993), because they are “habit-forming, 
even addictive. Start to use them and you are hooked forever.” When we build mech-
anisms for repetition and for deferred control into the technologies and get used to 
them, we tend to assume them as indisputable and unquestionable truths. If artists 
do not understand the black box, they may end regarding it as a dictator of aesthetic 
199 Recent applications for reading digital books try to simulate printed books to such levels that come 
close to kitsch, ‘turning’ the pages and presenting simulated pages behind the one currently being read 
(in a fixed number that does not change regardless of where in the book a reader happens to be). They use 
serif typefaces regardless of the resolution of the display and justify text in blocks even if the systems do 
not allow hyphenation, thus creating true typesetting aberrations.
200 In general these applications offer a whole collection of typefaces in a drop down menu, listing all 
fonts or font families alphabetically, or in some cases creating subgroups for the different alphabets: Ro-
man, Greek, Cyrillic, Chinese, and so on. This simple GUI encourages users to pick a font and get to work 
in the document right away, ultimately even dispensing users from this choice, should they prefer to stay 
with the predefined default selection. As useful as this may be for many users and some specific contexts 
of utilization, it also helps to build the perception of a font as a finished product, when in most cases the 
font files can be opened and manipulated like every other file by anyone with access to an appropriate 
editor and fonts (as many digital artifacts) could also likely be understood as resources that one could edit, 
mutate and evolve to suit one’s particular needs. Fonts are digital, Read/Write, tokens (Lessig 2008, 37), as 
are many (if not all, ultimately) of the objects one can access, manipulate or create in digital technologies.
201 1943-2005.
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paths linked to standard interfaces, and to be blinded by the dependency on which-
ever new products or formats are made available to them by the industry or other 
third-parties (Balvedi 2008, 263). If media users and scholars do not understand 
the black box and how code operates as an expressive medium, they will loose the 
crucial relationship between authorship, code and audience reception (Mateas 2005).
Therefore van Schaik raises a question that reflects the concerns of Nelson: “It takes 
us years of education to learn to read, write and talk as ways of interacting with our 
environment. Isn’t it strange, then, that one receives barely any kind of education 
in interacting with computers (as a modern communication environment)?” (2008, 
180) If we look at the traditional practice in the fields of fine arts, design and music, 
to mention just a few examples, we find that they used to involve the development of 
fine skills of craftsmanship to produce works of virtuosity. After modernism those 
skills included the comprehension of the underlying systems of the media in which 
artists worked, and their modes of production, distribution and consumption. Now-
adays, crafts are abstracted (McCullough 1998) and virtuosity takes another mean-
ing, involving not so much motor skills but an understanding of computer science, 
digital signal processing and mathematics applied to media (Magnusson 2008, 236).
Programming is a very abstract activity, but it has many of the properties of a con-
crete craft. Programming is a “combination of writing and mechanical tinkering” 
with which designers build “elaborate Rube Goldberg machines” (Mateas 2005) 
that are pregnant with expressive power. Addressing “computer painting”, Duane 
Palyka defended that artists using the computer wouldn’t need to know about their 
medium below the plastic level any more than the painter has to know about the 
chemistry of paints, but he was careful to note that in a computer, this plastic level 
includes programming (1976).
Seymour Papert defended that programming is a skill that should be available to ev-
eryone not as a ‘technology’ — a mechanism for the manufacture that is abstracted 
from human labour — but as a means of conceptual exploration (qtd. in Yuill 2008, 
74). As Kay explains, the ability to read a medium means that one can access mate-
rials and tools that were created by others, making full use and benefiting of them. 
The ability to write in a medium means that one can generate materials and tools 
for oneself and others. In order to be literate, one must have both abilities. “In print 
writing, the tools you generate are rhetorical; they demonstrate and convince. In 
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computer writing, the tools you generate are processes, they simulate and decide” 
(qtd. in Reas and Fry 2007, 3). “To use a tool on a computer, you need little more than 
point and click; to create a tool, you must understand the arcane art of computer 
programming” (Maeda 2004, 113).
With digital technologies, an artist or designer doesn’t just create solutions with 
the tools she is provided but is empowered to expand her role and to become a 
toolmaker, creating tools that will in turn generate the solutions to the problems at 
hand. And the power of computation comes precisely from the ability to, as far as 
one can describe any process in detail, being able to actually turn the computer into 
that process, mechanism or contraption, effectively bringing it to existence. Con-
versely, that is where the greatest difficulties also reside, because in order to program, 
“you have to understand something so well that you can explain it to something as 
stonily stupid as a computer” (Fuller 2008, 10). A designer is never absolutely free 
in any case, because programming languages are also themselves tools that were 
programmed by someone else but by developing a strong computational literacy 
designers are allowed to open up a region of freedom, “to climb up and down the 
dizzying tower of abstraction” (Mateas 2005) to better encode their messages and 
ultimately to create artifacts that are truly native to the medium.
Artists and designers need to recognize the computer as the tip of a techno-cultural 
iceberg and understand that the most interesting work to be done in digital tech-
nologies is likely to derive from a deeper comprehension of the underlying scien-
tific and technological principles that have guided their development over the years 
(Wilson 2002, 6).
Scientia potestas est: “Knowledge is power”. So said Sir Francis Bacon (1561-
1626), pioneer of modern science in his Meditationes Sacrae (1597). But not all 
knowledge is equally powerful. Knowledge of principles, knowledge of codes, 
knowledge of structure, knowledge of strategy — this is not mere knowledge 
but literacy. Literacy is power. Literacy gives one power over the details, the 
messages, the parts, the tactics of whatever topic, activity, field, or discipline is 
concerned. (Wilden 1987, 58)
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1.3.4 What Makes Digital Media Unique?
“What is unique about computation as an artistic medium?”, asks Alan Dorin (2008, 
290), offering a clue to a possible answer in the high rate at which symbols are ma-
nipulated by computers and digital technologies. This rate is so high as to make 
individual symbols disappear in what we humans perceive as fluid flows of informa-
tion, and to turn our experience of them akin to that of interacting with physical, 
dynamical systems. We notice how our perception systems have thresholds that are 
surpassed, blending individual symbols into a seemingly continuous flow, as atoms 
and molecules are seen as macroscopic solids. Noting that our interactions with 
computers are often at the level of the symbols they manipulate rather than with the 
machines per se, Dorin argues that there doesn’t need to be a hard experiential dis-
tinction between the two levels and that our interactions with the computer “have 
the potential to be as rich and rewarding as our interactions with the physical envi-
ronment” (290). This has profound implications on art and communication.
Digital media are software. Computational artifacts are both objects and processes, 
and they cannot be read as texts, listened to as music, or seen as cinema or video. 
As Alexander Galloway states, an active medium rooted in cybernetics and infor-
mation technology is one whose materiality moves and restructures itself, it is an 
action-based medium (2006, 3). Galloway distinguishes two basic types of actions 
in computational artifacts: ‘machine actions’ and ‘operator actions’. The distinction 
is made between those actions that are performed by the software or hardware and 
those that are performed by the user, or the human part in the human-computer 
system. Using computer games as an example, he writes: “winning Metroid Prime is 
the operator’s act, but losing it is the machine’s. Locating a power-up in Super Mario 
Bros. is an operator act, but the power-up actually boosting the player’s character’s 
health is a machine act.” (5) According to him, although theoretically useful, this 
distinction is completely artificial because both the machine and the operator work 
together in a cybernetic relationship and the two types of action are ontologically 
the same, existing as “a unified, single phenomenon, even if they are distinguishable 
for the purposes of analysis.” It is also important to remember that even when digital 
media remediate previous media forms, the transcoding that creates the sensorial 
level of the communication is, much like the action on a theatre or live performance, 
happening at that moment in time (Murray 1997, 81). Manovich expands these ideas 
by noting that if conventional media like books or film tend to position a user inside 
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a diegesis whose structure is fixed by the author, digital media and modern human-
computer interfaces generally allow the users to perform complex and detailed ac-
tions on the data that is presented to them, to get information about objects and 
processes, to copy them, move them to other locations and even to configure how 
they are presented. By offering direct modes of interaction with information, the 
numeric representations of data become more communicative and the user is given 
the means to view the process of change that is a consequence of her intervention, 
better understanding “the complex relationships that produce the results for which 
his intervention is responsible” (Csuri 1976). Conventional and digital media thus 
allow two fundamentally different approaches — and ultimately incompatible (Ma-
novich 2001, 95) — that need to be mediated in digital environments. 
Action-based media need to be experienced and are always dependent on either 
some level on interaction or time-based reading. Even in cases where by any reason 
the action is not directly perceived, many of the digital technologies reveal some de-
gree of prochronism. This term, used by Bateson, refers to how biological organisms 
maintain a physical record of how, in their own past, they successively solved formal 
problems in growth and pattern manipulation (1979, 12). This record is carried in 
the forms of organisms (229), in the shell of a snail, in the morphology of plants, 
insects, and mammals, and presents the temporal transitions that they underwent 
during their individual processes of growth (Chen 2008, 66). According to Bateson, 
the time that the living organism underwent from being an embryo to its present 
state can be swiftly read, supplementing temporal observations on how the organ-
ism may interact with the surrounding environment. Although it may not detail 
every aspect of the interactions, it nevertheless carries enough information about 
each organism, it keeps a record of the system’s growth over time and consequently, 
of its past actions.
But unlike living biological organisms, the space of morphological or behavioral 
possibilities of digital systems is not bound by DNA or evolution. It is bound by pro-
gramming, by the interactions with other natural or artificial systems and with op-
erators. Therefore, beyond prochronism, action based media always offer the poten-
tial for new actions. They are always multilinear and indeterminate, even when only 
potentially.
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Norbert Wiener’s 202 theory of cybernetics (1948) presented a model in which organ-
isms and machines were treated as equal. It depended on three insights: 1) the role 
of the sense organs in the creation of a new stage in the history of automata; 2) the 
fundamental role of feedback in the regulation of the behavior of both living sys-
tems and machines; and 3) a new conception of the relationship that linked mes-
sages and organisms. Wiener suggested that one of the basic differences between 
older forms of machines or automata and the new cybernetic automation was to be 
found in how the later were coupled to an external world. This coupling was realized 
through exchanges of energy between the devices and their surroundings and also, 
and more importantly, by “a flow of impressions, of incoming messages, and of the 
actions of outgoing messages. The organs by which impressions are received are the 
equivalents of the human and animal sense organs.” (42) Therefore, in contrast to 
earlier forms of automata, limited in their ability to communicate and interact with 
their environment, cybernetic automata are able to exchange information with their 
environments and to assess that information in such a way as to modify future ac-
tions on the basis of past performance (that is itself, assessed as information) (Tomas 
2004, 52).
Man is immersed in a world which he perceives through his sense organs. 
Information that he receives is coordinated through his brain and nervous sys-
tem until, after the proper process of storage, collation, and selection, it emerg-
es through effector organs, generally his muscles. These in turn act on the 
external world, and also react on the central nervous system through receptor 
organs such as the end organs of kinaesthesia; and the information received 
by the kinaesthetic organs is combined with his already accumulated store of 
information to influence future action. (Wiener 1954, 17)
Wiener calls this process of adjustment and information exchange of ‘feedback’, 
and sees it as providing a fundamental way to establish a common ground between 
the living organisms and the communicating machines, since it is through the con-
tinual self-adjustment that entropy in either kind of system is controlled and in-
ternal order is maintained, while at the same time keeping away from equilibrium 
(Seife 2006, 89). Wiener’s third insight focuses on the relationship between mes-
sages and organisms. He proposes that an organism can be treated as a message and, 
consequently, that it can be described analytically, without trying to “specify every 
202 1894-1964.
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molecule in it,” or to “catalogue it bit by bit.” (Wiener 1948, 95) All one has to do is 
only “to answer certain questions about it which reveal its pattern: a pattern which 
is more significant and less probable as the organism becomes, so to speak, more 
fully an organism” (95). And ‘pattern’ is synonymous with ‘message’, and both are 
coextensive with ‘information’ (Tomas 2004, 52). So, “messages, patterns, organiza-
tion and information link and regulate the behavior of living organisms, machine 
systems, and even social systems on the basis of a common cybernetic ecology” (53). 
Cybernetics thus proposed a dissolution of the traditional conceptual boundaries 
between living organisms and machines, suggesting that all systems could be ana-
lyzed similarly. And in a sense, inorganic artifacts become more alive as they gain 
the potential to develop what Christopher Alexander calls ‘living structure’ (2002b) 
but that we could perhaps call naturally occurring structure or behavior, as Alexan-
der does not connect his definition of living structures with biological or organic life. 
Wiener further proposes that his new science of cybernetics, the study of “automata, 
whether in the metal or in the flesh” is a branch of “communication engineering, 
and its cardinal notions are those of a message, amount of disturbance or ‘noise’ (…), 
quantity of information, coding technique, and so on” (1948, 42).
Communication engineering or the mathematical theory of communication largely 
regarded the model of the transmission of a signal from point A to point B, studying 
what happens with digital media, how information is coded and how protocols are 
established, packets are transported, checksums calculated, etc. Fuller reminds us 
that we need to carefully analyze the aspect of computation itself, of effective pro-
cedures and algorithms, because it is it that opens up the possibilities of virtuality, 
simulation, abstraction, feedback and autonomy of processes in digital technologies 
(2008, 4).
Unlike digitized information, 203 algorithmic code allows a generative process. In-
stead of creating new information by juxtaposition or by letting the reader fill the 
interstices like media technologies did, 204 computation opens a whole new world of 
possibilities within reach of digital media creators when they themselves design the 
software layers.
203 Conventional data such as images, sound or text documents.
204 Or computers do when they are used as storage and transmission media.
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1.3.5 Epigenesis
Roman Verostko, an American artist that has been working with computers since 
the late 1960s, identifies himself as an ‘algorist’, a term he coined (1995) to describe 
artists like himself, Hans Dehlinger, Cohen or Ken Musgrave, that created using 
algorithmic procedures applied to a very broad spectrum of art practices.
Since the late 1960s Verostko has been developing paintings and drawings elabo-
rated by his self-written software Hodos 205 (that has gone through multiple versions) 
and painted by a pen-plotter that controls brushes, pens, pencils or other tools he 
chooses to attach. Conceding that the physical materialization of his artworks is 
created by the pen-plotter, Verostko works by writing code, instructions to how his 
plotters should paint, and likens his code to a score written by a composer to be per-
formed and interpreted by other musicians. “When hearing a performance today we 
assume that Chopin’s musical idea, as he conceived hearing it, has reached us via the 
musical score — an instruction, an algorithm. Inasmuch as Chopin’s musical idea 
is adequately represented in the score, and, inasmuch as the performer interprets 
the score as Chopin intended, then we enjoy an experience of Chopin’s ‘mind-ear’” 
(2003). Certainly, he continues, the performer’s contribution “colors each perfor-
mance in a unique way and is not taken lightly” but “the musical score transcends an 
individual performance and continues to have a meaningful existence over genera-
tions.” (2003) He clarifies that the score is written in a code that consists of symbols 
that specify time and qualities of sound such as pitch and relative loudness and that 
when the term ‘code’ is used we generally refer to such instructions or algorithms in 
notational form, to a language that was developed for representing instructions. We 
are basically talking about process descriptions.
In his text Epigenetic Painting, Verostoko states that “the software code is a for-
mal system equivalent to the art concept, an isomorphism in a computer language” 
(1988), and he develops an analogy with the biological process of epigenesis. This is 
the process by which genetics and life sciences describe how a mature life form de-
velops from its embryo or seed, growing a phenotype, the physical organism, from 
a genotype, the DNA. The term was coined by Conrad Hal Waddington 206 for his 
205 The Greek word οδός means path or way. Verostko notes that μέθοδος (meta-hodos) is the etymo-
logical root of the word ‘method’ (Verostko 2003).
206 1905-1975.
Computation, Media and Creativity136
central field of interest, whose old name was embryology, and it “stresses the fact 
that every embryological step is an act of becoming (Greek γένεσις, genesis) which 
must be built upon (Greek επί, epi) the immediate status quo ante” (Bateson 1979, 47). 
Verostko suggests that the transition from the code to the physical materialization 
of the artworks can be seen as being epigenetic, because it generates a phenotype 
(a painting, drawing or other physical artifact) from a genotype (the algorithms or 
program code) (Blais and Ippolito 2006, 208). His software has information about 
how to ‘grow’ the painting through a series of “recursive graphic routines; each un-
folded offspring is a variant of its predecessor” (Verostko 1988). Verostko is careful 
enough to stop the analogy here, as in his work the offspring cannot in their turn 
create a new generation of artworks, although they certainly influence the artist 
in the design of new generations of software. 207 Verostko’s rules do not evolve in a 
literal sense, as they do in artworks developed by artists as Karl Sims, for example. 
Therefore Verostko was not describing a real evolutionary computation, in the sense 
that computer sciences nowadays understand them, but he was calling attention to 
a fundamental concept in the design of computer generated artworks, by explicitly 
separating these two layers of the processes.
In evolutionary computation, the distinction between genotype and phenotype 
(whether or not they are named as such) is necessarily explicit and a fundamental 
part of the conceptual design of the code and of the system as a whole. Sims devel-
ops works that explore artificial evolution and that are implemented using evolu-
tionary computation. He describes the genotypes as the coded representations of a 
possible individual or problem solution (Sims 1994b, 1), whereas phenotypes are the 
morphologies (whether real or virtual) that are generated from the genotypes. His 
algorithms typically use populations of genotypes that are mapped to phenotypes 
that are then evaluated according to some fitness criteria and selectively reproduced, 
by copying, mutation and/or combination, restarting the cycle. The fitness criteria 
themselves are not necessarily a part of the code, because they can be defined by hu-
man choices, either of the artist himself or of the viewers/users of the artworks. This 
is the case in the Galápagos installation (1997b), that he described as an “interactive 
Darwinian evolution of virtual ‘organisms’” (1997a). In Galápagos twelve computers 
simulate the growth and behavior of a population of abstract animated forms that 
are displayed on twelve different screens arranged in an arc. The viewers participate 
in this exhibit by selecting which organisms they find most interesting and stand-
207 And therefore, in a sense, closing the circle of information and influence.
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ing on step sensors in front of those displays (1997a). The selected virtual organisms 
will continue to live, and they will copulate, mutate and reproduce (Manovich 2001, 
79), spawning new generations of virtual organisms. The remaining organisms are 
removed from the system, and their computers are occupied by new offspring from 
the survivors. These are copies and combinations of their parents, with their genes 
altered by random mutations. As the evolutionary cycle of reproduction and selec-
tion continues, more and more interesting organisms can emerge (Sims 1997a).
 
Fig. 48: Two grids of ‘relatives’ from the same evolutionary progression in Sims’s Galápagos (1997).
This division between genotype and phenotype was very clear for Verostko, as it was 
actually hardcoded in his process, dependent as it was from different technological 
resources, different spaces and times. Working for more than forty years, Verostko 
has embraced this split as part of his artistic discourse, and has been perfecting the 
plastic expressivity of his plotter-driven brushes. By the mid-seventies, the avail-
able output devices for computers were generally limited to technologies that would 
either produce fixed, immutable outputs (line printers, microfilm plotters, pen plot-
ters, etc.) or that through the creation of analog signals could produce some (howev-
er simple) temporal outputs (oscilloscope screens, laser beams). Graphic interactive 
usage of computers, as we know it today, was still in a distant horizon. 208
208 The Boeing company coined the term ‘computer graphics’ in 1960, when it developed simulations 
of landings on runways designed to determine the movements of a pilot sitting in the cockpit. A figure 
representing the pilot was animated in real-time through an entire range of movements from a sitting 
position (Reichardt 1971, 15; Brown 1997). Ivan Sutherland’s Sketchpad project had been developed in 1962 
(2003), allowing users to construct complex line drawings on screen by using a lightpen as an input device. 
With Sketchpad users could interact with drawings, creating, deleting, moving or transforming lines in 
ways that until then had been impossible to experience in computers, as outputs were typically limited to 
plotters and paper (Levy 2001, 148). Engelbart’s ‘Mother of all demos’, A Research Center for Augmenting 
Human Intellect, (Engelbart 2003; Atkinson 2007) happened late in 1968, the same year when Suther-
land developed the first head-mounted visual display (Negroponte 1995, 118), but however revolutionizing 
these and other seminal projects were, it would still take a few good years until the concepts were devel-
oped into usable technologies.
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It was then almost natural that artists using computers would identify multiple 
roles as canvas and environment, as tool and creator (Tyler 1976), that were per-
formed by separate parts of the systems. Very naturally, the outputs were regarded 
as Lévy’s media technologies, as surfaces where phenotypical materializations were 
registered. In 1976, William Kolomyjec described his artistic tools as comprised of 
“the digital computer and peripheral graphic equipment”, going as far as to already 
classify different outputs as different media, depending on the nature of the periph-
erals that created them: “with a plotter or hard copy unit, the medium should be 
considered as ‘printmaking.’ When a computer and a digagraphic display console 
with refresh capabilities are joined, computer graphics can be considered as cinema-
tography. One final example would be three dimensional output. A computer and a 
numerically controlled machine, such as a milling machine, could produce a form 
of output which, for all practical purposes, would be sculpture.” (1976)
In most of the contemporary computational art and design however, the same does 
not often happen. Nowadays the computer’s screen is seen as an integral part of 
the machine, not as a peripheral. Save for specific cases, artworks are developed 
on screen and for screen: projectors are seen as screens, not as different media, and 
printouts are often regarded as printed screens, fabricated objects are seen as three-
dimensional realizations of what modeling applications present on screen: this is 
the legacy of WYSIWYG. 209 But we could argue that theoretically it is always possible 
to identify a division between genotype and phenotype, even if the coincidence of 
spaces between where the code is programmed and where the artwork is executed, 
somehow blurs the perception of the two phases. As an extreme example, Joline 
Blais and Jon Ippolito (2006, 208) present what they identify as a system without 
phenotype, Tom S. Ray’s Tierra (1991), an artificial-life system that does not offer 
much more than simple documental graphs as visible outputs of the myriad of com-
plex systems that it continually develops.
We are reminded of an important distinction made by Chomsky (1957) between com-
petence and performance. He saw competence as being regular and orderly while 
performance would be more entropic (Campbell 1982, 181). In digital aesthetic sys-
tems we may eventually describe both as having the opposite characteristics: com-
petence, having some somatic characteristics, although orderly, logic and in that 
209 Acronym for ‘What You See Is What You Get’, used to describe a computer system that presents the 
editable content as a very realistic simulation of the final output.
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sense regular, can be made to be very entropic. Performance, akin to media tech-
nology, is usually factual and precise. As Carranza notes, usually the description of 
the form is declarative and closed to interpretation, because there is a one to one 
mapping between the genotype and the phenotype (2001) but in nature, he further 
adds, this is not often the case. In nature, the mapping from genotype to phenotype 
is procedural and not descriptive. Nature’s evolution didn’t make it become a space 
of mere uniform replication, but rather a space of change fed on randomness that 
leads to creativity, learning and evolution (Bateson 1979, 47). Bateson notes:
(…) the realms of epigenesis and of evolution are, at a deeper level, typified in 
the twin paradigms of the second law of thermodynamics: 1) that the random 
workings of probability will always eat up order, pattern, and negative entropy 
but 2) that for the creation of new order, the workings of the random, the 
plethora of uncommitted alternatives (entropy) is necessary. It is out of the 
random that organisms collect new mutations, and it is there that stochastic 
learning gathers its solutions. Evolution leads to climax: ecological saturation 
of all the possibilities of differentiation. Learning leads to the overpacked mind. 
By return to the unlearned and mass-produced egg, the ongoing species again 
and again clears its memory banks to be ready for the new. (48)
The analogy of the genotype, of this conceptual model, used in an evolutionary com-
putation or integrated in some other set of processes usefully points us to the di-
lemma between ‘software formalism’ and ‘software culturalism’ enunciated by Cra-
mer (2002). In his view digital aesthetic artifacts and software art can be evaluated 
according to their focus on formal poetics and aesthetics of code and the individ-
ual subjectivity expressed in algorithms, a point of view curiously termed as “code 
(form)” by Blais and Ippolito (2006, 24) or conversely, what they define as “result 
(function)”, and Cramer “a cultural, politically coded construct” (2002).
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1.4 The Ubiquity of Computation
1.4.1 Definitions of Computation
Computation is a general term defining any type of information processing, ranging 
from simple mathematical calculations to human thinking, from the interactions 
between elemental particles in nature to artificially programmed digital environ-
ments. Following Turing’s abstract model, we see that computing — to process in-
formation by a computer or any other device — is nothing more than to “replace 
discrete symbols one at a time according to a finite set of rules” (Bolter 1984, 47). A 
simple definition proposed by Rucker is that a “computation is a process that obeys 
finitely describable rules” (2005, 11) and if in general when we discuss computers and 
human-made technology these rules should be defined using a model that is under-
stood and can be expressed in an algorithm, we nevertheless can also use the term to 
define processes that are less formal. Regardless of the kinds of elements involved, as 
long as the process follows definite rules it is a computation of some sort (Wolfram 
2002, 716). The term also refers to the abstraction and not to the actual physical pro-
cesses that are involved in each particular case. If this was not so, the description of 
a process in the form of a programming language would not define a computation, 
but only the description of the physical process itself would. Regardless of how it is 
executed, a computation is the same (Lee 2009, 5). Generalizing, we can regard a 
computation as a process that transforms inputs into outputs, being the inputs and 
the outputs the states of the underlying system that supports the computational 
process (Rucker 2005, 13).
Kevin Kelly proposes a thought experiment that considers all technology as a type 
of computation (2009b). While we normally think of computation as being just the 
domain of computers, in his view it is really a formal arrangement of matter and 
energy that can occur in every substance and that is naturally occurring in nature, 
without any predefined goal or latent meaning (Rucker 2005, 60). Kelly uses exam-
ples of systems that actually perform computations in nature, such as DNA, but his 
suggestion extends further and follows the many ideas developed over the years by 
scientists as Konrad Zuse, 210 Edward Fredkin (1992a), Martin Davis (2004), Charles 
Seife (2006), Seth Lloyd (2006) and Wolfram (2002), among several others, that pro-
posed that the universe was fundamentally a universal digital computer. Looking at 
210 1910-1995.
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the universe as a physical system, this radical view, described alternatively as digi-
tal physics, digital philosophy, universal automatism or pancomputationalism, sug-
gests that the evolution of the universe is a computation and that all the processes of 
nature can be described computationally; it describes the universe as being a com-
putational system — or a network of computational processes — that by following 
fundamental physical laws computes, that is, dynamically develops, its next state 
(output) from the current one (input). Described as a computer, the universe and all 
of nature can be studied as one.
Rucker gives us an example of how to regard the world as a massively huge parallel 
computation that has been running for thirteen and a half billion years and keeps 
constantly running: “To get a good image of physical parallelism, imagine sitting 
at the edge of a swimming pool, stirring the water with your feet. How quickly the 
pool’s surface is updated! If you toss a twig into the pool, the ripples spread out in a 
perfectly uniform circle. How do the ripples know where to go? The patterns emerge 
from reality’s parallel computation.” (2005, 89) Elaborating, he proposes an archi-
tecture for classical physics, consisting of: many processors, distributed, ubiquitous 
and without any central control; one shared memory because reality is one; locality 
as each processor only accesses its local neighborhood; homogeneity, as each proces-
sor obeys the same rule; and synchronization, because there’s a uniform speed at 
which all processors run.
This seems like a very normal — perhaps even unavoidable — conclusion to arrive 
to once one starts to study computers and computation, and develops new scientific 
frameworks that allow the formation of new ontologies. In the light of our contem-
porary culture and our current civilizational metaphors, we can even speculate that 
should the computer already be available when in 1623 Galileo described nature as 
being “written in mathematical language” (qtd. in Spengler 1962, 43), he wouldn’t 
alternatively have described it as being ‘computational’ or as being written in a com-
putational language. 
Wolfram summarizes (2002, 465), describing how the history of physics has seen the 
development of a sequence of progressively more accurate models for the universe, 
from classical mechanics through quantum mechanics, to quantum field theory 
and ever beyond, leaving one to wonder whether this process will go on forever or if 
it will eventually come to an end where we will reach a final ultimate model for the 
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universe. Actual results in physics suggest that whenever one tries to achieve a new 
level of accuracy, one always finds more complex phenomena and, according with 
traditional scientific intuition, one will need models of progressively greater com-
plexity. In Wolfram’s view, universal automatism seems to suggest that underneath 
all the complex phenomena that we observe in physics there may lie a set of simple 
programs which, if run for a long enough time would be able to reproduce the uni-
verse in every detail. He never claims to have already found these programs, not 
even if the discovery of these programs is possible, but he amasses a number of clues 
that seem to lend some credibility to the hypothesis. The discovery of the existence 
of such programs, or program 211 would be the ultimate validation of the idea that 
human thought can comprehend the construction of the universe, but it wouldn’t 
necessarily mean that one could immediately deduce every aspect or behavior of the 
universe (or any system in the universe, from elemental particles to sentient human 
beings). As we will see, there is a big distance between a system’s underlying rules and 
its overall behavior, which is precisely why, according to Wolfram, it is conceivable 
that a simple program could reproduce all the complexity that we see in physics (466).
The history of the universe could then be seen as the record of all the steps in an 
ongoing enormous computation, and the universe as a computer that would be com-
puting itself (Lloyd 2006, 3), as every other computation occurring in the universe 
(K. Kelly 2009b). Of course that an explicit simulation of the universe would by 
definition be impossible to realize, because even if it is in principle always possible to 
work out the outcome of any program by simply running it and watching its output 
(Wolfram 2002, 465), if the universe is computational, it could only be simulated ef-
ficiently by a computer that was as big and powerful as itself (Lloyd 2006, 54).
To see this universal information-processing technology in action, one need 
only open one’s eyes and look around. The machine performing the ‘universal’ 
computation is the universe itself. (16)
1.4.2 The Principle of Computational Equivalence
Wolfram states that whenever one finds behavior that is not evidently simple, in es-
sentially any system, if one thinks of it under a computational point of view, one will 
find it to be equivalent to many different kinds of processes (2002, 716). He calls this 
211 We can always consider any larger set of interacting programs as a single program.
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the ‘Principle of Computational Equivalence’ (PCE) and although it can be stated in 
various ways, the simplest and most general is just to say that “almost all processes 
that are not obviously simple can be viewed as computations of equivalent sophis-
tication” (716).
We have seen how a computational process can emulate (or simulate) other process-
es. We have also seen that a computation is universal when it is able to emulate any 
other computation, and that the threshold for universality is indeed low: Wolfram 
(2002) and Matthew Cook proved that a simple cellular automata with Wolfram’s 
Rule 110 is Turing complete and computationally universal (Rucker 2005, 69), and 
both Wolfram and Rucker suggest that when we examine the naturally occurring 
computational systems that surround us, like air currents, growing plants, even dry-
ing paint or the human brain, there seems to be reason to believe that the vast ma-
jority of these systems are able to support universal computation (Rucker 2005, 43).
Wolfram therefore states the PCE as being extremely broad, and applicable to es-
sentially any process of any kind, either natural or artificial, with implications in 
natural sciences, mathematics, philosophy and elsewhere in human culture (2002, 
715). He presents as the key unifying idea in the formulation of the principle the 
hypothesis that “all processes, whether they are produced by human effort or oc-
cur spontaneously in nature, can be viewed as computations” (715). Following this, 
Rucker proposes that we take “of equivalent sophistication” to mean “able to emu-
late each other” and understand the PCE as stating that most naturally occurring 
complex computations are universal (2005, 49).
Knowing that a particular computational system is universal just tells us that it is 
possible to set initial conditions that will lead the system to emulate any other sys-
tem and eventually to cause a sophisticated computation to occur, it does not tell us 
what will happen if the system is initiated from typical (or random) initial condi-
tions (Wolfram 2002, 719) nor it will help us in setting initial conditions that can 
actually simulate other systems. Any process that is universal can be programmed 
— through the setting of initial conditions that will bound the development of the 
process — to become another process. Any process that is not universal 212 will not 
be able to be programmed to such an extent.
212 As several naturally occurring processes that are below the Gödel-Turing threshold.
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1.4.3 Computational Classes
In either case, all computational systems can be classified as belonging to one of four 
classes identified by Wolfram in the 1980s 213 and discussed at length in his book A 
New Kind of Science (2002). Based on the observation of the patterns produced by 
the outputs of several computational systems, but more systematically in the map-
ping of the outputs of all the 256 possible rules for the programming of two-color 
two-dimensional cellular automata, Wolfram noticed that while the output of every 
process differed in detail, the number of different types of patterns found in all the 
outputs was limited and could be fitted into just four classes of behavior that he 
numbered in order of their increasing complexity (231).
Fig. 49: Examples of the four classes of behavior as seen in the evolution of two-dimensional cellular 
automata from random initial conditions (Wolfram 2002, 231).
Each of the classes evidences distinctive features. In class 1 the behavior is simple 
and almost all the initial conditions for a given process will lead to the exact same 
uniform final state (235), the system dies out or becomes uniform (Rucker 2005, 68) 
in one of the two possible states. 214 In class 2 computations there are many more 
different possible final states, but each of these will consist of just a certain set of 
simple structures that either remain the same forever or simply repeat every few 
steps (Wolfram 2002, 235) and class 2 becomes periodic, generating repetitive or 
nested patterns (Rucker 2005, 68). These first two classes are described by Rucker as 
being simple computations, the remaining two are complex computations (25). Class 
3 computations show an intricate behavior that seems confusing and in many as-
pects random, although some structured patterns can sometimes emerge. 215 Finally 
213 Wolfram claims to have arrived at this classification scheme for cellular automata in 1983, publishing 
it in 1984. He cites work developed by Christopher Langton, Wentian Li, Norman Packard, Hyman Hart-
man, Hughes Chaté and Paul Manneville for ordinary, probabilistic and continuous cellular automata 
(2002, 948).
214 Black or white, 0 or 1.
215 Such as the small triangles visible in the example.
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class 4 computations present a mixture of order and randomness where one can find 
localized structures that move around and interact with each other in complicated 
ways (Wolfram 2002, 235). Where in class 3 the outputs are disordered and confus-
ing, in class 4 they are ‘gnarly’ (in the sense proposed by Rucker), 216 that is, they are 
non-repeating and rich with persistent local structures.
If we think about physical matter, a vacuum, as described by newtonian physics, can 
be the example of the simplest, most orderly state of matter, where nothing at all ever 
happens. A crystalline solid is orderly in a periodic and predictable way whereas flu-
ids as liquids or gases are extremely disorderly, close to that Wolfram would classify 
as a class 3 computation (Rucker 2005, 115). Class 4 computations can be discovered 
in phase transitions of matter (although some of the simpler cases can be nested 
class two structures) and in living beings.
It is not always clear where the borders between the computation classes are, espe-
cially between classes 3 and 4, or between classes 2 and 4, because systems can ap-
pear to be non-repeating for a long time and then turn out to be periodic but to have 
a very long cycle (25). These four classes were not formally defined by Wolfram, 217 
so although there are certain requisites that a system needs to fulfill to belong to 
any of the classes, it can be difficult to prove beyond any doubt what is the class of a 
particular computation.
We should also be reminded that in all cases where computations are not closed 
systems, the exchanges of information developed with outside systems will affect 
behaviors of the system. Ultimately, exchanges of information can be responsible for 
the emergence of behaviors. Returning to Rucker’s example of a swimming pool as 
a computation (2005, 89), we can imagine its calm and undisturbed surface as being 
a class 1 computation 218 but when we throw in a twig, the interaction will result in 
216 Rucker explains that the original meaning of ‘gnarl’ was simply “a knot in the wood of a tree”. In 
California surfer slang, ‘gnarly’ started to be used to describe more complicated and rapidly changing 
surf conditions and, by extension, it started to be used to describe anything that presented a more than 
average degree of intricate detail. Rucker presents as examples clouds, fire and water as being gnarly in 
the sense of being beautifully intricate, of possessing patterns that seem purposeful but that are not quite 
comprehensible. All things living are also gnarly, because they inevitably do things that are much more 
complex than one might expect (2005, 112-14). In Rucker’s view, class 4 computations are always gnarly.
217 Rucker suggests that it can be impossible to do so (2005, 25).
218 Macroscopically speaking, at least, as at the microscopic level the pool is most certainly a class 3 
computation.
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the temporary development of a class 2 computation that will fade to the original 
class 1 stillness.
Systems can exhibit more than one type of behavior, depending on their inputs, and 
the ordering by complexity that Wolfram establishes is also a hierarchical order-
ing, because only class 4 computations are capable of exhibiting all the four classes 
(Rucker 2005, 68). More precisely, after we determine that a system is capable of 
exhibiting a class 4 behavior, we will know that given the proper inputs, the system 
will be able to exhibit any of the other three classes of behavior. This does not neces-
sarily mean that a class 4 system is universal, but as Rucker notes, all universal com-
puters are able to exhibit all four classes of computation because they will be able 
to simulate them. Another critical feature of any class 4 systems is that there must 
always exist certain structures that can persist forever in them (Wolfram 2002, 281), 
being resilient to the normal procedures of the computation and even eventually to 
external influence.
Fig. 50: Grid of examples from a totalistic cellular automata involving nearest neighbors and four possible 
states per cell (Wolfram 2002, 241).
When laying out a grid of examples taken from totalistic cellular automata involv-
ing nearest neighbors and four possible states for each cell, Wolfram concludes that 
although the numbering of the classes reflects their overall complexity, it is often the 
case that class 4 computations somehow fall between classes 2 and 3, intermediate 
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to both in terms of what one might think of as overall activity (2002, 242). Systems 
of class 1 and 2 rapidly settle down to states in which essentially there is no further 
activity, while class 3 systems are continuously changing and in a sense maintain a 
permanent high level of activity. Class 4 systems are in the middle of 3 and 2, never 
dying out completely nor remaining at the high levels of class 3.
In some respects it is not surprising that among all possible cellular automata 
one can identify some that are effectively on the boundary between class 2 and 
class 3. But what is remarkable about actual class 4 systems that one finds in 
practice is that they have definite characteristics of their own — most notably 
the presence of localized structures — that seem to have no direct relation to be-
ing somehow on the boundary between class 2 and class 3. (Wolfram 2002, 242)
The real significance of these four classes, of the different responses to changes in 
initial conditions or to external inputs fed to the systems is, according to Wolfram, 
that they reveal the basic differences in the ways in which each of the classes handles 
information (252). Wolfram sees class 1 systems as always forgetting information 
because whatever the initial conditions are or whatever information is fed to the 
system at a given point, they quickly evolve to a single final state that shows no trace 
of the original information. If we think about the twig and the pool, although there 
is a disturbance caused to the system, it rapidly normalizes the information received 
with that disturbance and resumes the ‘forgetful’ class 1 state. Class 2 retains some 
information in the final configuration of structures, but this information is always 
completely localized and the system never manages to communicate the initial con-
ditions or external inputs from any of its parts to another. The information that is 
communicated to the system has a local effect, and maybe even permanent reper-
cussions but is kept from traveling through the system.
Class 3 systems, on the other hand, have the very characteristic feature of being able 
to develop long-range communication of information. Any change made anywhere 
in the system will almost always be communicated, sooner or later, to even the most 
distant parts of the system. This doesn’t mean that the information is preserved 
by the system, but that its effects in the system can eventually be global. Class 4 
systems are then intermediate between class 2 and class 3: although possible, long-
range communication of information does not always occur, because any particular 
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change in the system is only communicated to the other parts if it affects the local-
ized structures that move across the system (252).
The existence of these moving structures is a fundamental feature of class 4 systems, 
it is what makes these systems capable of preserving and communicating informa-
tion between their different parts and what ultimately allows the emergence of their 
characteristic complex behaviors (281). With appropriate initial conditions, class 4 
systems will generally be able to emulate the behavior of all the other three classes 
(291) and Wolfram strongly suspects that any system that shows overall class 4 be-
havior can turn out to be computationally universal (691). 219
Rucker further identifies four subregions in class 4 computations, from the borders 
with class 2 to just before the total randomness of class 3, at the interface between or-
der and disorder. The most orderly of class 4 computations are quasi-periodic, seem-
ing just like class 2 computations with a slight and apparently unpredictable drift. 
Increasing the level of apparent disorderliness we can find systems that generate 
easily visible structures, like the gliders in the Game of Life. Rucker calls these struc-
tures ‘strange attractors’, after the attractors of chaotic dynamical systems. “Then 
we enter a critical transition zone, which is the heart of the gnarl” (2005, 116) and 
we see systems that display bifurcations, that is, systems that show multiple strange 
attractors and that alternate attractors. ‘Bifurcation’, in this sense, means the change 
of something in a system in such a way as to make its behavior move to a different at-
tractor. As disorder increases in a class 4 system, it begins experiencing bifurcations 
in which a strange attractor repeatedly gives way to another, displaying varying 
configurations as the computation evolves. Finally, at the tip of disorder, just before 
reaching class 3, we find what Rucker calls ‘pseudorandom chaotic systems’, produc-
ing outputs that are empirically indistinguishable from true randomness, systems 
that, unless we have some prior knowledge about their nature as class 4 computa-
tions, we would probably classify as already being class 3.
Rucker links the behaviors of these four different classes to the different drives that 
a system needs to satisfy and to the system’s homeostasis (174). This term, originated 
in biology, reminds us that biological organisms can also be seen as computational 
processes, even if not as simple systems but rather as very complex ‘systems of sys-
219 Or maybe we can think that computationally universal systems are those that we can clearly define 
as being class 4 computations?
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tems’. Whenever a system has a single drive to satisfy, it will in principle find a fixed 
point in its phase space, or a single internal state and stay there. This is what will 
typically happen with class 1 computations, whereas a system with two drives may 
develop a class 2 computation, hunting across the equilibrium, often in a regular 
and periodic way. Whenever there are more than two drives to satisfy, a class 3 or 4 
computation will inevitably ensue. Computation always exists, and class 1 systems 
remind us that even when there is no apparent activity, whenever the system seems 
to be idle, to stand still or to be ‘dead’, computations are nevertheless always hap-
pening. 220
In a biological perspective, everything dies, so in a sense, all biological processes ul-
timately become “simple class one computations. For most inputs In and most times 
t, an organism’s output state P(In, t) is ‘Sorry, I’m dead now.’” (433)
1.4.4 Determinism
To address determinism in computation we need to discuss the concepts of feasibil-
ity, predictability and the two types of unpredictability proposed by Rucker.
The definition of a computation as a process that obeys finitely describable rules 
implies on the one hand that the rules act as a guide or a kind of recipe for generat-
ing every possible future state of the computation, and on the other that a computa-
tion should be utterly deterministic (Rucker 2005, 11). Although there may be some 
margin to consider subatomic quantum processes as being fundamentally nonde-
terministic (Lorenz 1995, 159), 221 beyond the scale of the subatomic, and for the pur-
poses of this work, we can regard all computations as being deterministic, as being 
systems where temporal evolution is governed by precise laws (7) and where the 
present state and inputs completely determine the future (8).
Rucker defines a computation as being ‘feasible’ if it produces its result in a humanly 
reasonable amount of time (2005, 19). This is a very important concept when dis-
cussing the deterministic nature of computational processes because feasibility is 
220 Class 1 computations do not die in a literal sense, they rather keep producing the same outputs at 
every step of the process.
221 And even at this level, there are discussions as to whether so-called random quantum behaviors can 
in fact be considered to be nondeterministic or if they are just simply unpredictable as we will further see.
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a relative notion, one that depends on the system one intends to use in running a 
particular computation, and something may be ruled unfeasible on a given system 
if it takes longer than one is reasonably willing or able to wait (23). Unfeasibility is 
therefore not synonymous with uncomputability. 222 All naturally occurring compu-
tational processes are, naturally, computable in their systems, although it may not 
be feasible to emulate them in other systems.
A computation must always be decidable, it must be, tautologically, computable. In-
dependently of its feasibility, we can then define it as being ‘predictable’ if we can 
devise another computation that achieves the same results in a shorter time than 
the original computation. Rucker gives us an informal definition: “P is predictable 
if there is a shortcut computation Q that computes the same results as P, but very 
much faster. Otherwise P is said to be unpredictable.” (20) If a computation is un-
predictable, the only way one has to find its final state (or any arbitrary state in its 
future) will be to wait until the computation reaches said state.
Rucker proposes three possible classifications for how predictable any computation 
may be. He defines systems as ‘predictable’ if there is a way to exponentially acceler-
ate the computation, therefore arriving to its results much sooner than the original 
system would. An ‘unpredictable’ system cannot be speeded up exponentially, and 
although some shortcuts may lead to small increases of velocity, for practical pur-
poses the gains will not be too noticeable or radical. Finally, a ‘strongly unpredict-
able’ system will be impossible to speed up, not even by a linear factor.
Simple computations 223 are in principle always predictable, because by entering ei-
ther a uniform state or a cyclic series of states, they will always be possible to emulate 
in another system with exponential gains of speed. Complex computations 224 will 
on the other hand very often be unpredictable or strongly unpredictable, depending 
on where they are run.
222 Uncomputability or undecidability is an altogether different concept. Gödel’s incompleteness theo-
rems showed that the capacity for self-reference leads to paradoxes in logic, this led Turing (1936), in his 
study of Hilbert’s Entscheidungsproblem and the ‘halting problem’ in Turing machines to prove that self-
reference leads to uncomputability and that there are no analytical shortcuts that can tell the future state 
of some general computation any faster than by doing the computation step by step (1992).
223 Class 1 and 2.
224 Class 3 and 4.
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From here, from the aforementioned Principle of Computational Equivalence and 
from Turing’s theorem, 225 Wolfram proposes his ‘Principle of Computational Irre-
ducibility’ (that Rucker prefers to alternatively name as ‘Principle of Computational 
Unpredictability’), stating that most naturally occurring complex computations are 
unpredictable (49).
According to this principle, the reason that leads a human observer to think of any 
given natural computation as being nondeterministic is the fact that these computa-
tions are usually many orders of magnitude more complex and faster than anything 
we can simulate with the systems one has access to: digital computers or human 
brains. This means that it is unfeasible to simulate processes like ripples in the sur-
face of the pool, ocean waves, global weather, or many others, but this does not mean 
that they are not the result of deterministic computations carried out in the physical 
world, computations that we have every reason to suspect to be class 4 and strongly 
unpredictable (115). This means that at least in principle all physical processes can 
be digitally emulated, but there are other difficulties besides unfeasibility when one 
tries to do so: the initial conditions and the supplemental inputs of the system (104).
In emulating complex systems it will usually be extremely difficult to possess all 
the information that is necessary to correctly define the initial conditions of the 
computation. Dynamical systems such as (the real or the mathematical models of) 
a swinging pendulum, a rolling rock or a breaking wave vary deterministically as 
time progresses. In principle the state of these systems at any given moment can be 
specified by the numerical values of one or more variables (Lorenz 1995, 8). Scientists 
usually interpret natural dynamic systems as either varying in perceivable discrete 
steps, when systems are technically known as ‘mappings’ and describable by differ-
ence equations that express the values of all the variables at the next step in terms 
of the values at the current step, or alternatively, as varying continuously, when sys-
tems are technically known as ‘flows’ and describable by differential equations that 
express the rates at which all of the variables are currently changing (12-13). As one 
would expect from a computational view of the systems, it is always possible to cre-
ate a mapping from any flow by observing the flow at selected intervals of time (13), 
by sampling it at an appropriate frequency. The problem with natural computations 
is that the number of variables that need to be considered is tremendously high. Ide-
225 Stating that every universal computation has an unsolvable halting problem (Rucker 2005, 400).
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ally, every particle in the system should be considered in the computation and no 
statistical models should be used as shortcuts.
If all the required variables cannot be known, the insufficient initial conditions will 
lead to an accumulation of errors in the computation, and will make it impossible to 
accurately simulate the system in the short or long-run (1995, 12). This is a phenom-
enon that scientists that study chaotic systems define as the ‘sensitive dependence 
on initial conditions’ (Gleick 1998, 8) and it extends to more than the enumera-
tion of all the variables required to initialize a system but also to the accuracy with 
which these are detailed. Complex systems with many different interacting parts 
can evolve to significantly diverse states by amplifying omissions and errors but also 
very small inaccuracies in the initial values (Morowitz 2002, 13). It is often difficult 
to measure physical quantities with an exact degree of accuracy (and below a certain 
threshold it becomes actually impossible, according to quantum mechanics) so in a 
sense, it may very well be that it is always unfeasible to perfectly simulate a naturally 
occurring computation.
Therefore, a naturally occurring or physical computation is not repeatable, although 
it can be approximately repeated. The fuzziness of the natural world keeps its com-
putations from being precisely repeatable because we do not, and cannot, have a per-
fect control over the input of the computations. We can have a very close value to the 
input, but we will not have an exact value, and every time we try to approximate it, it 
will vary in some different way, producing in the long run various fluctuations in the 
output (Rucker 2005, 99). A physical computation, unlike artificial computations, 226 
can never be reset to the exact same initial input, so that we can observe the exact 
same series of outputs. This happens because the dynamics of the system amplify 
the tiniest details of the initial and interactive inputs so that they have large and no-
ticeable effects (100). So outputs seem random or chaotic or both, but only because 
the details of the initial and interactive inputs are not fully known (101).
A key distinction between bouncing balls and PCs is that our PC computations 
are repeatable. This is because PCs are digital, with a feasibly small range of 
initial values and because they are well isolated from unwanted inputs. But 
because bouncing balls are analog, their computations are not repeatable. The 
difference between analog systems and digital systems is not that the analog 
226 That we can develop with computers.
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computations are in any way less accurate. The difference is that analog sys-
tems have so many states that it’s physically impossible to control the inputs 
of an analog computation precisely enough as to make them repeatable. As it 
happens, the physical computations we enjoy watching are the least likely to be 
repeatable. (102)
Under the light of pancomputationalism we can regard the entire universe as a mas-
sive computation (Lloyd 2006, 3) so in a sense, every computation in the universe 
will be a part of this colossal system and will have some information exchanges with 
other computations, outputting information and, more importantly in this context, 
inputting information from other systems, constantly interacting with them. These 
interactions will affect the processes, sometimes in catastrophic ways, sometimes 
slightly, but regardless of this scale, they will influence the development of the com-
putation. This influence is deterministic, like every other computational process, 
but, much like the initial conditions, in a majority of the cases it will be very hard to 
make an inventory of all the interactions and to determine their values with exact-
ness.
On a more human perspective, Boden (2004) proposes a psychological classification 
of the predictability of events (or the perception of the outcomes of processes) in three 
categories. ‘Absolutely unpredictable’ (A-unpredictable) events are unforeseeable in 
principle because they are subject to no laws or whatever determining conditions 
(243). Although in may be a useful abstract and absolute category to consider, stated 
in this terms, this A-unpredictability directly contradicts the premises of Wolfram, 
Rucker and other proponents of universal automatism, and approaches some inter-
pretations from quantum mechanics, embracing the idea of the possibility of total 
indeterminacy that the universal automatism thesis necessarily denies. Regarded 
as a psychological category, however, A-unpredictability becomes very real and is a 
useful description of how human observers interpret phenomena that are apparent-
ly void of any understandable causality, internal logic or order. A-unpredictability is 
the unpredictability of class 3 computations, of the toss of a (true) coin, of systems 
that are so intricate, complex and ‘noisy’ that one quickly stops trying to find some 
sense and predictability in their outputs. Even if one believes that all processes are 
deterministic, one will be unable to understand the computations behind A-unpre-
dictable processes, let alone simulate them.
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‘Relative unpredictability’ (R-unpredictability) is defined as the impossibility to pre-
dict an event in practice, in the sense that it may be unforeseeable by human beings 
and/or by other finite systems, including computers. This category is so called be-
cause this sense of the term is defined relatively to the predictor and, naturally, all 
A-unpredictable events must also be R-unpredictable, with respect to all predictors. 
This is also an important psychological classification of unpredictability, because 
R-unpredictability can be overcome by knowledge, by information or by tools of in-
formation. Failure to predict R-unpredictable events is attributed by Boden to igno-
rance (of details and/or general principles) and/or to the complexity of the event. By 
discovering new scientific laws, by inventing more accurate measuring instruments 
or more powerful tools, the ability to predict may be much improved and therefore 
R-unpredictable events may become predictable (245).
Finally, ‘butterfly-unpredictability’ (B-unpredictability) is related to a system’s sen-
sitive dependence on initial conditions, it is the unpredictability of computations 
that cannot be accelerated and can be computed “only by actually working through 
the consequences of the equations” (250). It is also the unpredictability of chaotic 
phenomena like the weather system or turbulence in fluids.
In conclusion, we have that all computational processes are fully deterministic, al-
though they may not be feasible or predictable. ‘Determinism’ should then be inter-
preted only in its technical meaning of obeying finitely describable rules and, as we 
have seen, what we usually interpret as lack of determinism, free will or randomness 
in the decision processes may be consequences of unpredictability. This conclusion 
does not imply (or even suggests) ideas such as religious determinism, fate, destiny 
or any lack of free will.
This means that against common sense, deterministic computational processes 
are able to yield genuine surprise and must not necessarily flow along in a routine 
fashion (Rucker 2005, 20). The intuition that the mathematics needed to describe 
the natural world involved only smooth functions that would always provide a rea-
sonable approximation to reality in the same degree as the accuracy of the data 
gathered, turned out to be mistaken (Boden 2004, 249). Unpredictability cannot 
always be overcome, no matter how rigorous and precise are our measurements of 
the world, deterministic systems can be sources of real surprise and an increased 
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level of detail, that extra decimal place in the measurement of initial conditions can 
be the grounds for astonishment (248).
In response to the objection that computers cannot think because they merely follow 
human instructions, Turing noted that machines took him by surprise with great 
frequency (Chun 2008, 227). This was not because they could think (not at the time, 
and not nowadays still) but because we are not able to fully understand in advance 
all the consequences of one’s program. If this is true with artificial computations, 
those programmed by humans, it becomes even truer when those computations in-
teract with other artificial computations or with natural computations, with the en-
vironment or with humans. When universal automatism proposes that all natural 
processes are computational, it implies that mental processes and human creativity 
are also deterministic, something that is apparently contradicted by our sense of 
having a free will. Wolfram’s Computational Irreducibility answers by showing that 
the mind is a computation that is simultaneously deterministic and unpredictable 
(Wolfram 2002, 1135; Rucker 2005, 294; Hofstadter 2007). 227
Let me make one more point. If you fear that determinism means you’re a 
machine without a soul, consider that, given what we know about class four 
computations, there’s no reason to think that we can’t be both deterministic 
and unpredictable, no reason to think that your soul couldn’t in some sense 
be a gnarly computation. Consider: The world could be perfectly deterministic 
and still look and feel exactly the same as it looks right now. Indeed, I think 
that’s the true state of things. Quantum mechanics simply doesn’t go deep 
enough. And we have nothing to lose by moving beyond it to a fully determin-
istic universal automatism. (Rucker 2005, 121)
The inevitable questions that derive from these beliefs are whether machines will 
ever be able to display imaginative or creative activity, whether we will be able to 
program machines to develop these behaviors and whether we will recognize these 
behaviors should they ever be shown by machines.
When machines are R-unpredictable and their computations are unfeasible to us, 
they force us to adopt the “intentional stance” towards them. De Landa (1991, 157) 
227 Wolfram associates the amount of free will related to any particular decision with the amount of 
computation required to arrive at it (Wolfram 2002, 1135).
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exemplifies by describing how one plays a game of chess against a machine. If the 
machine is slow and takes several minutes or hours to make a move, we do not ac-
tually confront it face-to-face but rather tend to view it as a clever contraption that 
can be outsmarted directly via the logical considerations of its internal design. We 
have time and opportunity to consider the features of the machine’s internal logic 
and to develop our strategies based on this analysis. If the machine is able to play in 
real time, that is, as fast or faster than a human, we will have no other choice than 
to confront it as an opponent by attributing it beliefs and desired of its own. We will 
have to relate to the machine’s strategies by formulating questions related to the 
will of the machine, its view of the game and ultimately its view of the opponent in 
order to be able to win the game (157). We will start thinking about the machine in 
much the same terms as we think about a human opponent, we will think about the 
machine as we think about ourselves.
1.4.5 The Principle of Computational Irreducibility
In the notes to A New Kind of Science Wolfram develops a short history of computa-
tional irreducibility (2002, 1132) and of the discussions that since antiquity have been 
developed around the notion that there could be fundamental limits to knowledge 
or predictability. Most of these discussions assumed that there was a fundamental 
inadequacy of the various models that were developed but that once the models 
were available there would in principle be no difficulty in working out their con-
sequences and consequently of understanding the phenomena that they described.
Already in the 1500s, when symbolic algebra was introduced, and formulas for solv-
ing cubic and quartic equations were discovered, the expectation began to develop 
that with good enough formulas it would in principle be possible to solve any purely 
mathematical problem. A century later, after several models for natural systems 
were developed, it was generally assumed that their basic consequences would al-
ways be possible to find in terms of formulas or geometrical theorems. However, 
in 1684 Isaac Newton 228 was already commenting that calculating the gravitational 
interactions between many planets would exceed the capacity of any human mind. 
Although during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries there were successful for-
mulas found for many of the great problems in mathematical physics, the three-
body problem continued to pose serious difficulties.
228 1643-1727.
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In the nineteenth century it was then shown that the three-body problem could 
not be solved in general in terms of ordinary algebraic functions and integrals, 229 
but perhaps in part because of a generalized shift towards probabilistic theories 230 
there was still the conviction that for the relevant aspects of behavior, with sufficient 
cleverness or insight, it would be possible to arrive to formulas for their accurate 
description.
By the 1950s computers began to be used to work out numerical solutions to equa-
tions and a few experiments were done in systems with simple underlying rules, typi-
cally assuming that their results were just approximations to what could in principle 
be represented by exact formulas. This view was strengthened in the 1960s, when the 
question whether computer simulations would be able to outrun the actual systems 
being simulated — particularly with weather systems — was often discussed. It was 
normally assumed that the issue was about getting better approximations to the 
underlying equations (that would always exist), of achieving better initial measure-
ments or about other factors that would eventually be resolved, but not something 
more fundamental as is the Principle of Computational Irreducibility as stated by 
Wolfram.
During the 1940s and the early 1950s, particularly in the context of von Neumann’s 
game theory and Wiener’s cybernetics, the idea that it should be possible to make 
mathematical predictions even about complex human situations started to develop, 
but by the 1970s, these attempts were usually regarded as unsuccessful, not because 
of any fundamental reason but rather because there were just too many disparate 
elements to handle in practice, so it was generally believed that an increase in com-
putational power or in data collection would eventually solve the problem.
Although some of the notions behind computational universality and undecidabil-
ity emerged in the 1930s, starting with Kurt Gödel’s 231 incompleteness theorem, they 
were in general regarded as not being relevant to the questions that arose in natural 
sciences. In the 1940s these notions were presumably in the basis of some arguments 
about free will and fundamental unpredictability of human behavior in the area 
229 In the 1820s it was proved that quintic equations (polynomial equations of degree five, in the form 
ax5 + bx4 + cx3 + dx2 + ex + f = 0, where a ≠ 0) could not, in general, be solved in terms of radicals and by the 
1890s it was demonstrated that degree 7 equations could not be solved even if elliptic functions are allowed.
230 Such as quantum and statistical mechanics.
231 1906-1978.
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of economics, and in the late 1950s some philosophers tried to establish a connec-
tion between Gödel’s theorems and determinism, although, according to Wolfram, 
“mostly there was just confusion centered around the difficulty of finding countable 
proofs for statements about the continuous processes assumed to occur in physics.” 
(2002, 1132) In the 1960s, the development of algorithmic information theory led to 
the discussion of objects whose information content cannot be compressed or de-
rived from anything shorter. This, however, is not quite the same idea that Wolfram 
presents as computational irreducibility. During the 1970s computational complex-
ity theory began to investigate questions regarding overall resources needed to per-
form computations, concentrating however on computations that performed fairly 
specific practical tasks. In the following decade it was noted that certain problems 
about models were NP-complete, 232 but this was not immediately connected to any 
underlying general phenomenon.
The interest in issues of predictability in models of physical systems started to in-
crease in the late 1970s, and it became clear that when the equations in these models 
are nonlinear it often becomes difficult to find their solutions. It was at least at some 
levels assumed that this was associated with sensitive dependency on initial condi-
tions and with the phenomena of chaos. In the 1980s, the use of computers for the 
study of models of natural systems increased, along with various approaches that 
usually tended towards higher process intensity and larger quantities of processing 
time, implicitly assuming that “this was necessary in order to overcome the ap-
proximations being used, and not for some more fundamental reason.” (2002, 1132) 
Examples of what Wolfram now identifies as PCI were found in physics and other 
fields, but no special significance was attached to them. Wolfram devised the con-
cept during the early 1980s, while studying cellular automata and failing to devise 
formulas that predicted their behaviors.
232 The complexity class NP-complete, with NP standing for nondeterministic polynomial time, is a class 
of problems with two properties: 1) any given solution to the problem can be verified quickly (in polyno-
mial time); 2) if the problem can be solved quickly (in polynomial time) then so can every problem in NP. 
Although solutions can be quickly verified, there is however no known efficient way to compute a solution 
in the first place. The most important characteristic of NP-complete problems is that we do not know any 
fast solution to them, that is, the time required to solve the problem using any currently known algorithm 
increases very quickly (faster than polynomial time) as the size of the problem grows. As a consequence, 
NP-complete problems are usually addressed using approximation algorithms.
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Wolfram believes that one of the reasons why computational irreducibility was not 
identified before is because for more than two centuries students and scientists have 
been led to think that basic theoretical science could somehow always be done with 
convenient formulas — and almost all textbooks tend to discuss only the cases that 
happen to come out this way. Although during the 1990s and 2000s a broader range 
of examples of PCI have been identified, there still remains a widespread belief that 
if a theoretical result about the behavior of a system if truly fundamental, then it 
must be possible to state it in terms of a simple mathematical formula. Much of what 
Wolfram presents and discusses throughout his book is the view that this must not 
always be the case, and that very often it is a computational description of the system 
that is able to foresee its future behavior. This description is however in many cases 
irreducible, meaning that whatever results it produces are unpredictable.
1.4.6 Randomness
Edward N. Lorenz 233 defined randomness as the lack of determinism (1995, 7). If a 
deterministic sequence is one in which one and only one thing can happen at the 
next step, in a purely random sequence anything that can ever happen may happen 
next (6). A tossed coin would be the best mundane example of complete random-
ness, as in the long run the statistical results of a large number of tosses will split 
evenly between heads and tails. A broader definition of randomness would however 
present a random sequence as one in which any one of several things can happen 
next, even though not necessarily anything that can ever happen may happen next.
If we believe that all computations are deterministic and that the thesis of universal 
automatism is valid, then every process in the universe is inevitably determinist and 
this definition can only be understood as a construct in the sense proposed by Henri 
Margenau 234 — as an entity that the mind creates in order to understand the sensory 
world in a hierarchy of emergences (Morowitz 2002, 173) 235 — and not as a real-
ist definition of randomness. Lorenz’s definition allows us to state that something 
looks random (and this is enough in his context) but certainly does not allow us to 
know what it is to be random.
233 1917-2008.
234 1901-1997.
235 According to Harold Morowitz, building constructs is something uniquely human (or perhaps 
uniquely sentient), part of the search for ontology, for the reality behind cognitive events (2002, 173).
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An appropriate definition of randomness can only be formulated if one considers 
issues of perception and analysis and still, a standard definition has not been so far 
produced by mathematics or statistics (Wolfram 2002, 552). In spite of some claims 
for particular definitions, and a singular intuition that everyone has about the na-
ture of randomness, the concept has remained quite obscure.
On discussing randomness, determinism and their meanings on the study of cre-
ativity, Boden (2004) finds three different categories for randomness. The first two 
categories are very closely related and are defined as ‘absolute randomness’ (A-
randomness) and ‘explanatory randomness’ (E-randomness). A-randomness is the 
abstract classification of the total absence of any order or structure in the domain 
concerned, whether this is a class of events or a set of numbers (239). Recognizing 
that it is extremely difficult to define A-randomness technically, Boden proposes 
only this intuitive definition of it.
From a phenomenological point of view, E-randomness is not very different from 
A-randomness, and is defined as the total lack, in principle, of any explanation or 
cause for the absence of order or structure (239). As with R-unpredictability, E-ran-
domness can be explained by ignorance and overcome by knowledge or information.
Finally, ‘relative randomness’ (R-randomness) is the lack of any order or structure 
that is relevant to some specific consideration. As an example, Boden presents pok-
er-dice, that fall and tumble R-randomly with respect to both the knowledge and 
the wishes of the players (239). This is usually what is meant at the level of everyday 
language, when someone observes that something seems random — that there are 
no significant discernible regularities in the phenomenon, at least with whatever 
methods of perception and analysis one uses at the time (Wolfram 2002, 552).
If an event is A- or E-random, then it must also be R-random with respect to all con-
siderations. An R-random event however, is not necessarily A- or E-random, since 
it may be strictly constrained in some terms other than the aspect by reference to 
which it is R-random. Actually, outside of those terms, an R-random event may very 
well be not random at all (Boden 2004, 239).
The natural occurrence of all the three types of randomness proposed is a contro-
versial question. While there is no disagreement about whether R-randomness hap-
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pens — being relativistic and contextual, defined by the particulars of the informa-
tion that the observer holds — some A- or E-random events are believed to exist by 
quantum physicists, while strict determinists and pancomputationalists believe that 
they are “like the unicorn: an intriguing concept that does not apply to anything in 
the real universe” (239).
Given the everyday notion of randomness and the three categories proposed by 
Boden, we will need to build on them to develop more precise definitions, so that 
we can eventually be able to understand the role and importance of randomness in 
the creative process, and in aesthetic systems. The first step for this, according to 
Wolfram (2002, 552) is to be able to understand exactly what it means to not be able 
to recognize regularities in something.
Regularities in any system are synonymous with the existence of some degree of 
redundancy in it (552). Redundancy, as stated by Shannon’s second theorem of infor-
mation theory (1949) makes information be reliable in an otherwise unreliable and 
noisy world, allowing to (at least theoretically) protect a message from any amount 
of noise by shielding it with an appropriate amount of redundancy. Therefore re-
dundancy, repetition of content or structure, is potential information. It is coded 
diversity available for use as and if required and it is structure (Wilden 1987, 187). Re-
dundancy means that more signals are present and sent than those that are strictly 
necessary to transmit the essential information in a message (188). Shannon asserted 
that the English language is about fifty percent redundant when he considered sam-
ples of eight letters at a time, while with sequences of up to one hundred letters the 
amount of redundancy rose to approximately seventy-five percent and with longer 
samples the figure would become even higher, as in whole pages or chapters, where 
the reader is able to get an idea of the long-range statistics of a text, including its 
theme and literary style (Campbell 1982, 71). According to Shannon, this means that 
much of what we write is dictated by the structure of the language and is therefore 
more or less forced upon us by default.
If a structure would be absolutely not redundant, if no aspect of its structure could be 
inferred from any other, then the structure itself would be its most compact possible 
description (Simon 1969, 110). Simple structures display a high degree of redundancy, 
from complete uniformity and consequently total redundancy in class 1 systems, to 
periodic repetition in class 2. Complex structures display significantly smaller de-
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grees of redundancy, that lowers as the overall activity of the system increases. Class 
4 computations are therefore more redundant than class 3 computations and these 
last can eventually display a zero degree of redundancy. 236 If no redundancies can be 
identified, then there is no shorter description of a system than the system itself. 237 
Wolfram presents as an example the following three images, each of them contain-
ing 6,561 cells from a two-dimensional cellular automaton: 
236 Simon (1969) described the three types of redundancy that could be found in complex systems: ‘re-
combination of parts’, ‘decomposability’ and ‘recoding’. The first of these happens in systems that are 
composed of only a limited kind of subsystems, as e.g. proteins, whose variety arises from the rearrange-
ment of only twenty different amino acids. Likewise, the 117 elements in the periodic table provide all 
the building blocks for an almost infinite variety of molecules, or, looking at the human body, we find 
that with as little as two hundred and ten different types of cell, a structure is built with as many as one 
hundred trillion (1014) total cells. A system that is composed by a recombination of parts is necessarily 
redundant to some degree and can be described with a restricted alphabet of elementary terms that cor-
respond to the basic set of elementary subsystems from which the complex system is generated (1969, 
110). At a related level, systems may be decomposable, and in this case only aggregative properties of their 
parts will enter into the description of the interaction of those parts. From a generalization of this notion, 
Simon presents the ‘empty world hypothesis’: most things being only weakly connected with most other 
things, a tolerable description of reality needs to take into account only a tiny fraction of all possible inter-
actions, thus, adopting a descriptive language that allows the absence of something to go unnoticed, it is 
possible to describe things quite concisely (110). Finally, through appropriate recoding, one may discover 
redundancies that may not be obvious in the structure. The most common of recodings is the description 
of a dynamic system’s time path by a differential law that generates that path. The simplicity of this resides 
in a constant relation between the state of the system at any given time and the state of a system a short 
time later. As an example, the structure of the sequence 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, etc. can be most simply expressed 
by observing that each member of the sequence can be obtained by adding two to the previous member 
(111). This description gives us an insight of the structural redundancy of the sequence, and, should this 
be extended to infinity, one could easily understand its state at any given point n by simply applying the 
description to its value and getting as a result n+2 — incidentally, this is the sequence that Galileo found 
to describe the velocity at the end of successive time intervals of a ball rolling down an inclined plane (111).
237 And the information of the system cannot be compressed. An extremely ordered structure, like 
those produced by class 2 computations can be reduced to a small description. “A trillion digits of this 
sequence, 0101010101010..., can be perfectly compressed, without any loss of information, into one short 
sentence with three commands: print zero; then one, repeat a trillion times. On the other hand a highly 
disordered sequence like a random number cannot be reduced. The smallest description of a random 
number is the random number itself; there is no compression without loss, no way to unpack a particular 
randomness from a smaller package than itself.” (Kelly 2009a).
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Fig. 51: Different degrees of apparent randomness in cellular automata (Wolfram 2002, 552).
Each of the images presents a different degree of apparent randomness: a and b dis-
play obvious regularities, a being modular and b nested, so, as difficult to describe 
as they may be, they wouldn’t probably be classified as random by many observ-
ers. Image c, however, has almost no obvious regularities, thus seeming quite ran-
dom. In any of the three cases, a full and detailed description of the image could be 
achieved by describing the colors of each of the many cells that they contain. This 
would produce a fairly lengthy list of 6,561 values for each of the images, so this de-
scription would have exactly the same length for any of the images regardless of the 
redundancies present in their structures. If we use the regularities and redundancies 
that we can see in the first two images, we will readily construct much shorter, but 
still precise and complete, descriptions, while on with the third we will still have to 
detail every single color value in the grid (552).
But as it turns out, image c, like images a and b, was generated through a quite 
simple computational process, so it can be fully described by a program that has 
the exact same length of those behind a and b. The point in this example is that the 
simplicity of the process does not affect the fact that with our standard methods of 
perception and analysis, the third image is for all practical purposes, totally random 
while the other two are clearly not (552). Our visual perception and our intellectual 
deductive powers do not reveal any significant regularities that would allow us to 
produce a shorter description of the image 238 so, if one cannot have access to the al-
gorithmic description behind image c, one will most likely have little choice besides 
specifying the colors of each individual cell (553).
The question this raises to Wolfram is if our knowledge of the existence of a short 
description, of a program that originates image c, should make us see it as not being 
238 And, incidentally, neither do the standard methods of mathematical or statistical analysis.
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random? From a practical point of view the fact that there is a short description may 
not be too relevant if that description is not available or easily discoverable by any 
of the methods of perception and analysis that are available to us (554). Without the 
description, image c is E-random; if and when the description is known, the image 
will no longer be E-random, although it may still be R-random. From a conceptual 
point of view, Wolfram deems unsatisfactory to have a definition of randomness 
that depends on our methods of perception and analysis and that is not, somehow, 
absolute (554). David Cope agrees, deeming perception as variable from observer 
to observer and often far from reality. Randomness is a process, not a thing, and as 
such, it cannot be discerned from its outputs alone (Cope 2005, 52).
A possibility would be to define randomness so that something is considered ran-
dom only if no short description whatsoever exists of it (Wolfram 2002, 554). But we 
wonder, is such an epistemological definition useful? Maybe not. Wolfram strongly 
suspects that no useful description of randomness can be based solely on this al-
gorithmic approach, but that a definition must make some reference to how such 
short descriptions are supposed to be found (555). We need a precise definition of 
randomness under the light of universal automatism: “something should be consid-
ered to be random whenever there is essentially no simple program that can succeed 
in detecting regularities in it” (556). This is similar to a definition offered by Murray 
Gell-Mann: “applied for instance to a single string of a thousand digits, random 
means that the string is incompressible. In other words, it is so irregular that no way 
can be found to express it in shorter form. A second meaning, however, is that it 
has been generated by a random process, that is, by a chance process such as a coin 
toss, where each head gives 1 and each tail 0.” (qtd. in Cope 2005, 52) Complexity, or 
incomprehensibility are then common definitions (or explanations) for randomness, 
but there are further attempts to arrive at a more precise, and testable, definition, 
one of which is to test processes under identical conditions (52). 
The key to thinking about randomness is to imagine such a system to be in 
some particular state, and to let it do whatever that particular system does. 
Then imagine putting it back into exactly that initial state and running the 
whole experiment again. If you always get exactly the same result, then the 
system is deterministic. If not, then it’s random. Notice that in order to show 
that a system is deterministic, we don’t actually have to predict what it will 
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do; we just have to be assured that on both occasions it will do the same thing. 
(Stewart 1997, 280)
But, as we have seen, predictability and randomness are both sensitive to initial con-
ditions. If with software it is in principle possible to repeat the exact same initial con-
ditions for a process, once one steps out of the virtual machine, it will in principle 
always be impossible to have such a fine degree of control. Although in abstract this 
may seem like a good test for randomness, not only it will always be affected by that 
worldly inaccuracy as, it will very often be impossible to actually test, especially with 
more complex systems. 239 It is no surprise then, that Lorenz states that tangible phys-
ical systems generally possess at least a small amount of true randomness (1995, 5).
1.4.7 Three Mechanisms for Randomness
In tangible physical systems, especially in nature and in naturally occurring com-
putations, one of the single most common things one encounters are systems that 
exhibit randomness. It could well be that in each and every of these systems there 
could be a different cause for randomness but Wolfram argues that this is not the 
case and he identified no more than three basic mechanisms for randomness (2002, 
299).
The first, and most commonly considered in traditional sciences, essentially cor-
responds to the assumption that there are sources of randomness in the external 
environment that continuously affect the system under observation. As an everyday 
example we can consider a boat that bobs up and down on a rough ocean. Although 
there is nothing intrinsically random about the boat itself, there is randomness in 
the continually changing ocean surface where the boat floats. As the motion of the 
boat follows the ocean’s surface, it will also seem random to an external observer 
(301). Naturally occurring computations, being almost impossible to isolate from in-
teractions with other computations, are frequently affected by such external inputs.
In the second mechanism there is no interaction with the environment but there is 
a source of randomness at the initial conditions. The system then computes deter-
ministically and predictably, involving no other random inputs beside those fed at 
its origin. A tossed coin, a wheel of fortune, a roulette wheel, and other similar gen-
239 Such as biological, geological, cosmological processes, etc.
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erators of randomness work in essentially this way. They do not develop a process 
that generates randomness but their mechanism is sensitive to that randomness that 
is present in the initial conditions provided for their operation. 240 The phenomena 
studied by chaos theory are examples of such a great sensitivity to initial conditions 
that no machine with fixed tolerances can ever be expected to produce repeatable 
results (306).
In both these cases we will have two variations of the same general property, two 
manifestations of the sensitive dependence on initial conditions. In the first the in-
fluence of external conditions will be permanent, in the second it will only be pres-
ent at the start of the computation, and this is where the difference really resides, in 
permanent influence or in a single event that communicates some randomness to 
the system, thus affecting its future development. 241 Both these mechanisms assume 
that the randomness one can see in any system will ultimately come from outside 
the system so in a sense, neither will take any responsibility for explaining the ori-
gins of randomness, they both in the end just say that randomness comes from the 
outside of whatever system one may happen to be observing (300).
The third mechanism tries to explain the origins of randomness. As Wolfram shows 
(27), computational processes can produce apparently random behavior even when 
they are given no random inputs whatsoever, when they are initialized from con-
trolled initial conditions and have no interaction with other systems. 
And they do this without relying on the so-called pseudorandom processes. Most 
programming languages provide these as a way to produce unpredictable results, an 
easy method to pseudorandomly take any of a range of possible actions. Pseudoran-
domness is however totally deterministic because it is generated from deterministic 
algorithms. There are several methods to generate seemingly random sequences of 
values, usually starting by some hard to predict, like the internal date of the com-
puter’s clock, the time it has been running so far, or other schemes. The fact is that 
240 It is indeed possible to build precision mechanisms that can toss coins or spin wheels in ways that 
always produce a certain outcome, void of whatever randomness is usually present in the systems.
241 In deterministic systems the initial conditions are, in a sense, just the conditions that the system 
happened to be in when an observation is started. A system’s state at any point in time can be taken as the 
initial conditions for a new computation, that which the system will develop from that time onwards. The 
setting of random initial conditions can then be compared to the perturbation of the system at any point 
during its computation by interaction or through the communication of random information.
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whenever a programmer calls a pseudorandom function from a programming lan-
guage, she will actually be relying on the irrelevance of the data that is chosen to 
provide the sense of randomness (Cope 2005, 53). With enough time and if provided 
with the generating algorithm, a programmer could, if necessary, accurately predict 
the sequence that the random number generator would produce. 242 This means that 
pseudorandom generators are theoretically predictable and not random in a strict 
sense of the word.
As a consequence of Wolfram’s discovery that simple programs can generate ran-
dom behaviors, we can reasonably expect that similar mechanisms can also occur 
in many systems in nature (2002, 301), to the point of, as he believes, being in fact 
ultimately responsible for a large fraction, if not essentially for all, of the random-
ness that is discovered in the natural world (301).
The first two mechanisms that Wolfram presents are not responsible for creating 
randomness ex nihilo but rather for the communication of randomness between 
systems. That means that although they are not able to explain how randomness is 
produced at the lowest level, they will be useful in describing randomness that is 
observed in particular systems (301). Wolfram presents the third mechanism as the 
one that is most common in nature (299), which leads us to conclude that random-
ness is not always a reflection of our ignorance but that it emerges from computa-
tional processes.
1.5 Computation and Creativity
1.5.1 Artificial Creativity
Pancomputationalism proposes that everything in the natural world is the outcome 
of computation and computational processes. However skeptical one may be about 
this view of things, compelling cases defending it were presented by several scien-
tists and philosophers, so we can, at least for the purposes of this discussion, accept 
the argument as valid or at the very least plausible. Under this view of the universe, 
all the behaviors that can be observed in nature, organic or otherwise — the be-
havior of plants, animals and humans, the behaviors of planets and stars, as well as 
242 In fact, most programming languages allow the programmer to control the random number genera-
tor and to use it to generate sequences that look random but that are totally deterministic and repeatable.
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that of atoms and subatomic particles — can be regarded as being computational in 
essence. Although all computations are deterministic, through Wolfram’s principle 
of computational irreducibility we know that many of these computations, if not the 
majority, are unpredictable.
Although apparently contradicting what common sense identifies as free will, hu-
man behaviors and traits can be regarded as being computational and as such, if we 
follow the principle of computational equivalence, at least some of its aspects can 
in principle be explained or emulated, partially or in full, by other computational 
systems.
Using this analogy, and through the use of computers, we can better understand 
human creativity or we can try to create something that we perhaps call machine 
creativity, trying to develop computational systems that are, or appear to be, cre-
ative to some degree (Boden 2004, 1). We can develop media and artworks that not 
only reflect the human author’s creativity (as in traditional media), not only make 
use of the human user or wreader’s 243 creativity (as in interactive media) but that can 
actually act creatively.
Much along the same lines as artificial intelligence is studied — itself also a field that 
simultaneously tries to study human intelligence and to develop computational sys-
tems that are intelligent, that try to simulate intelligence or to apply aspects of intel-
ligent behavior in other systems — we can think about artificial creativity. We may 
understand that all creativity requires intelligence and that therefore artificial cre-
ativity must be a part of artificial intelligence (Cope 2005, vii), much in the same way 
that we can consider that all intelligence requires life and that therefore all forms of 
artificial intelligence must necessarily be forms of artificial life. But we can likewise 
consider that creativity is a subset of intelligence and that the later is a subset of life 
and that aspects of creativity can be developed independently of the development 
243 The portmanteau word ‘wreader’ identifies the fusion of the acts of reading and writing that is de-
veloped in interactive systems as hypertexts, computer games and other digital environments. In these 
systems the user is very often not a passive receiver of the information but she also actively contributes to 
the organization of the materials, to the definition of the structure of the narrative or, ultimately, to the 
creation of the contents of the piece. In constructive systems (borrowing Michael Joyce’s term), the user 
is required to “create, change, and recover particular encounters within a developing body of knowledge 
or writing process” (Joyce 1995, 101) which necessarily equates his work, at least partially to that of the 
original creator, or writer, of the piece or system.
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of intelligence, as well as aspects of intelligence may exist without life (however one 
may define it) can be identified or existent.
Although the term ‘artificial creativity’ can be, as Cope points, too broad to cover the 
study of the various ways by which humans invent new art (vii), it is nevertheless true 
that all artistic practices are developed through the usage of different combinations 
of human creative abilities and that if we want our media, our aesthetic systems, to 
act creatively, we will need to understand what are these abilities, how do they work 
and what makes us identify their outputs as being creative. As with artificial intel-
ligence, we need to understand whether or not computer programs can effectively 
model creativity and if they can in fact create. As artificial intelligence gave rise to 
a new approach in studying the mind, computational psychology (Boden 2004, 15), 
artificial creativity may come to give rise to new approaches in aesthetics and design.
1.5.2 Creativity
In The Creative Mind (2004), Boden develops a study of creativity and gives us an 
overview of work being developed in the field of artificial intelligence, looking at 
computer scientists, computer artists and to what she calls ‘unromantic artists’ (147), 
the computer programs concerned with the arts, and art making.
In order to understand the phenomenon of artificial creativity (a term that Boden 
herself never uses) she starts by trying to define and understand creativity. Accord-
ing to Boden, creativity is the ability to come up with ideas or artifacts that are 
“new, surprising and valuable”. ‘Ideas’ in this context can include abstract notions 
as concepts, as well as more concrete but still immaterial things as poems, musical 
compositions, scientific theories, cooking recipes, choreographies, jokes and so on. 
‘Artifacts’ include paintings, sculptures, steam engines, vacuum cleaners, pottery, 
origami, and many other things one could name in the realm of physical objects or 
systems (1).
Cope defines creativity as “[t]he initialization of connections between two or more 
multifaceted things, ideas, or phenomena hitherto not otherwise considered actively 
connected.” (2005, 11) Dorin sees creativity as a defining trait of human artistic prac-
tice and recognizes that it is not something that science finds easy to explain, despite 
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its recognized significance and the many attempts that have been made to elucidate 
its virtues from the arts (2008, 294).
Creativity is indissociable from originality, and if we understand something as be-
ing original if it has never been seen or produced before in the exact form that is 
presented to us, we find that computers are quite able to easily generate seemingly 
original output, pseudorandomness functions simplifying this process. Almost end-
less recombinations of modules can easily be programmed, generating infinite me-
lodic or rhythmic sequences, or infinite books, like in Jorge Luis Borges’s 244 library. 
Whether these are understood by the human audience as being original or are seen 
as being creative is an altogether different concern, and a much more complex phe-
nomenon. To be creative it is not enough to be original in this sense, because this 
originality only satisfies the first of Boden’s requisites, novelty. As randomness is 
continuously used in the production of ever-novel outputs, it ceases to be surprising 
and, ultimately, it may cease to be valuable, if it ever was in the particular context 
where it was initially used. Therefore, although indissociable from creativity, origi-
nality should not be the focus of its definition (Cope 2005, 12).
Cope presents the two modes of thought proposed by de Bono since the mid 1960s, 
who distinguished between a selective and analytical mode of thinking that he 
called ‘vertical’ and a more creative, generative and instigative mode that he termed 
‘lateral’ thinking. While vertical thinking proceeds by logical steps and usually con-
forms to learnt patterns or modes of operation, lateral thinking is open to the intru-
sion of information that may be possibly relevant, it is inclusive and nonlinear in 
essence, striving to disrupt habitual lines of reasoning (10). Lateral thinking must be 
nurtured and new stimuli must be introduced to the thought process, either will-
ingly or by chance, in order to shift the thinking in new directions. 
Cope, like de Bono, sees creativity as a process, not as the result of a process (44). 
This process, Boden explains, happens in three main ways, corresponding to three 
sorts of surprise that are generated: combinatorial, exploratory and transformation-
al creativity (2004, 3). The first of these, combinatorial creativity, involves making 
unfamiliar or novel combinations out of familiar ideas and/or artifacts. Examples 
include analogy, collage, poetic imagery and the manipulation of recombination 
systems. New combinations can be generated deliberately or, very often in the case 
244 1899-1986.
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of human creativity, unconsciously, through the association of aspects in two ideas: 
when a physicist compares an atom to a solar system, when a journalist or cartoonist 
compares a politician with an animal, or in many other examples from literature or 
visual arts.
Combinatorial creativity is from the three that which is behind a big part, or per-
haps even most of human creativity. It is also perhaps the easiest of the three to 
model in a computer, because it is relatively simple to choose any two different ideas 
or data structures and to put them alongside each other (7). Transcoding helps the 
programmer to use data structures that originally were in different domains and to 
find a common ground between both, or to produce a convergence of both in the 
final output. This way, images and sounds, for example, can be combined creatively, 
even if automatically and almost without constraints. Through the swift generation 
of multiple combinations, arising from composition or concatenation, eventually 
selected by the computer according to some preprogrammed rules of selection, one 
can enhance human creativity by engaging in what Aarseth calls a ‘postprocessing’ 
collaboration with the machine (1997, 135). Given a multitude of outputs, of novel 
combinations that are performed automatically by a computer, a human designer 
can select from those the few (or many) in which she identifies some value, which 
surprise her, and that will potentially surprise her audience.
Like Bach and his algorithms, we nowadays find artists and designers working with 
digital technologies, and creating systems for their private creative use, systems that 
are not destined to users or audiences and that are not creative per se but that are 
programmed to reinforce or enhance the designer’s creativity — systems for creativ-
ity, not systems that are creative.
The other two modes of creativity are quite different from the first, because they 
involve the definition of a conceptual space, 245 its subsequent exploration and even-
tually even its transformation. Once a conceptual space is established, creation 
through its understanding and methodical research will constitute an act of explor-
atory creativity, while the deliberate transformation or transcendence of this space 
245 A formal definition of conceptual space and of the concepts of exploratory and transformational 
creativity is given by Geraint A. Wiggins in Towards a More Precise Characterisation of Creativity in AI 
(2001) and in Categorising Creative Systems (2003).
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will be a far more radical, challenging and rarer form of creativity, labeled by Boden 
as transformational creativity (2004, 4).
Exploratory and transformational creativity depend on the existence of a conceptu-
al space, on the existence of ‘rules’ and ‘constraints’ — both in the context of human 
creativity, 246 as in the context of artificial creativity. The conceptual space is a search 
space of partial and complete possibilities, but it is not the space of all possibilities, 
rather a subset of this universe of possibilities, a superset of the conceptual space at 
any given point in the creative process (Wiggins 2001, 1). 247 Rules and constraints 
define the grammar of the creative processes and also their phase-space, their space 
of possibilities and freedom. Therefore, “far from being the antithesis of creativity, 
constraints in thinking are what make it possible” (Boden 2004, 95), even in the 
mode of combinatorial creativity, where in principle constraints are less of a con-
cern, as the conceptual space does not need to be so well-defined, or to be defined at 
all. As Boden notes, creative ideas are surprising because they go against our expec-
tations, but something that is totally unconnected with the familiar does not arouse 
surprise but more often than not bewilderment and confusion. When a conceptual 
space is not minimally defined, there may be a real lack of connection with what 
happened previously in the process and people will not be able to see the creative 
output as relevant to what they may have regarded as being the problem-domain in 
question (97). Because of conceptual spaces, or creative phase-spaces, creativity is al-
ways contextual (Cope 2005, 13), even in the combinatorial mode, when the context 
is defined by the reader, and not by the author, by the user of the system and not by 
its creator. Boden adds an important point:
246 Although here these may be existent but less clearly defined.
247 Wiggins (2001) defines this universe, U, as a multidimensional space whose dimensions are capable 
of representing anything, and where all possible distinct concepts can find a correspondence with distinct 
points of U. U is not restricted to concepts that are capable of representing the domain in which we wish 
or need to be creative, as this would rule out the cross-domain transfer of ideas, through processes as 
analogy and metaphor. Wiggins proposes that we should assume that U contains all complete and partial 
concepts and that, although it may be possible to distinguish between complete and incomplete concepts, 
in most cases it is nevertheless enough to think of both partial and complete concepts simply as “concepts” 
(2001, 2). He presents four axioms for the definition of U: 1) All possible concepts are represented in U; 2) 
All the concepts represented in U are mutually distinct; 3) All members of the type of conceptual spaces 
are strict subsets of U; and 4) All conceptual spaces include the most partial concept of all, the empty 
concept, notated as ⊥, therefore ⊥ ∈ U (2001, 2).
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If, by some miracle, a composer had written atonal music in the sixteenth 
century, it would not have been recognized as creative. To be appreciated as 
creative, a work of art or scientific theory has to be understood in a specific re-
lation to what preceded it… Only someone who understood tonality could real-
ize just what Schoenberg was doing in rejecting it, and why. (Boden 2004, 74)
Although substantially more complex and difficult to achieve than combinatorial 
creativity, exploratory creativity can also be developed with computers, in either of 
the three regimens of human-machine collaboration enunciated by Aarseth: pre-
processing, coprocessing and postprocessing (1997, 135). Abiding to constraints, after 
all, comes naturally in computers, programmed using formal languages that are 
themselves creators of possibility spaces. Some artificial intelligence systems can 
transform their conceptual space, by altering their own internal rules, but the main 
problem is not to make the transformations themselves, but rather to manage to, 
while programming, state our aesthetic values clearly enough to enable a system to 
successfully evaluate each transformation (Boden 2004, 9).
If we manage ways to transform and evolve the grammar of a system over time, 
these transformations will inevitably be reflected in the products of the system. Jer-
emy Campbell gives us an example: “Mutation of a single letter in a DNA sequence is 
one thing. Mutation of a rule is quite another, and the consequences are likely to be 
more interesting. A change of rule could lead to an innovation, a burst of originality, 
so easy to explain in terms of language, but so hard, until now, to make plausible in 
terms of Darwinian evolution.” (1982, 98)
According to Boden, when considering exploratory creativity, in order for a comput-
er program to be really creative or just to appear to be creative, it must inhabit and 
explore a conceptual space that is rich enough to yield indefinitely many surprises. 
Ideally, when developing transformational creativity, it should be able to extend this 
space, eventually even breaking out of it and constructing new ones. The results 
of the process must be individually unpredictable, because they are original, but 
they should all bear some sort of recognizable conceptual style, and they should be 
generated by the program alone, using only its computational resources rather than 
inputs from human operators (2004, 163). Furthermore, the process must involve 
some sort of judgment, that is, it must involve decision processes and aesthetic cri-
teria. In this sense, purposeful behaviors should be more common than random 
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processes and any randomness that is integrated in the process must be constrained 
by the creative domain and the contexts concerned. There must be also some pro-
cesses that allow either memory and/or retrospection, so that the program is able 
to sometimes reconsider its past choices when deciding the following steps. Finally, 
novel data structures that the program produces must be recognized by humans or 
other systems as being valuable in some way, as being aesthetically pleasing, as be-
ing effective from a communicative point of view or as containing new and relevant 
information — the program itself should ideally be able to at least partially evaluate 
this degree of value when selecting between possible alternative structures for itself, 
avoiding nonsense or cliché. “If the relation between the program’s generative strat-
egies and its results casts light on human creativity, not forgetting the creativity of 
those who interpret the novel ideas, so much the better.” (164)
Boden further distinguishes two instances of creativity, regardless of their modes, 
and talks about psychological creativity, and historical creativity, or if we prefer, 
relative (or personal) and absolute creativity. Psychological creativity (P-creativity) 
involves surprising and valuable ideas that are new to the person or system that 
conceives them, hence their relativity, while historical creativity (H-creativity) is 
achieved with absolutely original ideas or artifacts, that no human or system have 
created ever before and that arise for the first time in history (2). Although in the 
context of arts H-creativity is extremely valued, in the context of communication 
design and of its products it is less clear whether its value should be the same. For 
the purposes of this work it will maybe suffice to speak of creativity, assuming, as 
Boden also proposes, that all instances of H-creativity are naturally also P-creative 
and that very often the distinction between both is fortuitous and dependent on fac-
tors that are external to the creative process itself.
1.5.3 Strong and Weak Artificial Intelligence
Computer scientists and artificial intelligence researchers often distinguish two sce-
narios for the study, development and usage of artificial intelligence systems: the 
so-called ‘strong artificial intelligence’ 248 and ‘weak artificial intelligence’. 249
248 Or artificial general intelligence.
249 Alternatively known as ‘narrow’ or ‘applied’ artificial intelligence.
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Put simply, strong artificial intelligence seeks to develop general purpose systems 
that match or equal the intelligence of human beings. Usually developing bottom-
up processes, its primary goal is to create machines or systems that can successfully 
perform any intellectual task that a human being can, with similar or preferably 
higher efficiency and ideally with the same versatility. Scientific research (and sci-
ence fiction) often associate this ability to perform general intelligent actions with 
human traits as consciousness, sentience and self-awareness, because along with 
other traits like perception and cognition, these seem to be an integral part of the 
processes of intelligence. It is nevertheless unclear whether these traits are indeed 
necessary for an artificial system to reason as well (or as badly) as human beings 
can — if for example one is able to simulate the neural correlates of consciousness, 
one would not automatically gain the ability to represent knowledge or to use natu-
ral languages. Consciousness or self-awareness are still somewhat vaguely compre-
hended phenomena, intuitively understood but difficult to explain in precise scien-
tific terms, as is emphasized by Rucker (2005) and Hofstadter (2007), and precisely 
because they are central to the research in artificial intelligence (as well as in other 
fields), they are still at the core of much of the work being developed in the field.
It is of course also possible that some of these traits that we commonly identify as 
‘human’ — particularly consciousness and self-awareness — are emergent properties 
from a fully intelligent system and that it may become natural to also ascribe them 
to machines once they begin to act in ways that are clearly intelligent, regardless of 
the approach used to develop that intelligence in the first place. Hofstadter seems to 
defend this perspective in I Am a Strange Loop, proposing the existence of variable 
degrees of sentience in each animate being or system as ‘strange loops’ 250 that come 
into existence within the system (2007, 360), due to that system’s ability to think, to 
possess a sufficiently large repertoire of interpretable and triggerable symbols (203).
Donald Norman argues that much of human intelligence results from the abil-
ity to devise and construct artifacts that increment the very cognitive capabilities 
and physical traits that are associated with intelligence itself. As capable as human 
brains are, they are nevertheless finite in capacity and limited in power, but through 
250 Strange loops may involve self-reference and paradox and arise when one finds oneself back at the 
starting level while moving up or down through a tangled hierarchical system, or an heterarchical system, 
as Hofstadter calls them. The concept was originally proposed and discussed in Gödel, Escher, Bach (1999) 
and subsequently elaborated in I Am a Strange Loop (2007).
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the invention of tools, artifacts or theories, humans have discovered ways to over-
come those limitations. Our technologies don’t only expand our bodies but, as Nor-
man says, they quite literally “make us smart” (1993, 7). Norman’s argument also 
points a fundamental problem with ‘intelligent’ technologies: the fact that in most 
of the cases the intelligence does not reside within the technologies themselves but 
rather in their designers (2007, 13). This means that technologies do not ‘think’, that 
they are not intelligent, but that they materialize and operationalize ways of mak-
ing things that contribute to an optimization of the processes in which they are 
used. Most technologies develop relations with humans that are symbiotic in the 
sense that Licklider proposed of a merger of two components, one human, one ma-
chine, where the mix is smooth and fruitful, and the resulting collaboration exceeds 
what either is capable of alone (22). Technologies can therefore provide means to 
expand intelligence without actually being endowed with any intelligence — ex-
amples abound, from pocket calculators to most of the software in personal com-
puters. When describing what computers could do for intellectual work, Licklider 
envisioned that in due course they would be integral parts of the formulation of 
problems and of real-time thinking, problem solving, researching and the conduc-
tion of experiments, they would get into literature and would mediate and facilitate 
communication among humans (Flichy 2007, 37). But they would do this without 
intelligence, albeit with other resources that at the time seemed more urgent and 
attainable than intelligence, such as vast memory and extraordinary speed. Nowa-
days these resources are for the most part so common and taken for granted that we 
start valuing the intelligence that a system may manifest, however small, besides the 
simple access or speed that it may provide us with.
As an alternative or a complement to strong artificial intelligence, weak artificial in-
telligence seeks to use software and computational processes to study or accomplish 
specific problem-solving or reasoning tasks that do not necessarily encompass the 
full range of human cognitive abilities (and sometimes are even completely outside 
of these). The models used in the task resolution are not necessarily derived from or 
trying to emulate the human approaches to the same problems, but rather trying to 
search for the most adequate or efficient solutions to a given problem, regardless of 
any similarity with human reasoning or operation.
Both approaches to artificial intelligence, strong and weak, derive from the already 
mentioned Chinese Room Thought Experiment (Searle 1981). In the text, these terms 
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were used as names for two alternative arguments that distinguished different hy-
pothesis about artificial intelligence. The ‘strong artificial intelligence hypothesis’ 
proposed that computers could eventually be developed to the point of thinking and 
of effectively having a mind, 251 making a much stronger statement than the weak 
artificial intelligence hypothesis, that almost imposed the impossibility of higher 
thought and merely stated that an artificial system could only act like it thought 
and had a mind. The strong hypothesis assumed that something special happens 
to the machine or system, something that goes beyond the capabilities one can test 
and that this something is intelligence. Many researchers in artificial intelligence 
do not put much emphasis on a literal interpretation of the strong hypothesis, us-
ing this term to describe any system that acts like a mind, regardless of whether a 
philosopher would be able to determine whether it actually has a mind or not. What 
researchers are interested in can then be expressed in a related statement that de-
scribes the strong artificial intelligence hypothesis more loosely, as being interested 
in systems that can think, or can act as they think, as well as or better than humans 
do.
This apparently small concession is not without consequences. As Weizenbaum 
noted, the work on artificial intelligence tends to be conceptualized in one of two 
modes, often called performance mode and simulation mode (1976, 164). If the goal 
of artificial intelligence is to build machines that behave intelligently, whether or not 
they are in fact endowed with intelligence at the human level or whether or not they 
are able to shed any light on human intelligence, contributing to its understanding, 
then they are working in performance mode. If on the other hand the comprehen-
sion of human intelligence is fundamental to the development of the artificial intel-
ligence, if the system accurately tries to simulate the workings of the human mind, 
we may then say that it is working in simulation mode. The dividing line between 
both modes is naturally far from being absolute (165).
Since the Turing machine and the Turing test 252 were proposed that machine intel-
ligence has historically been conceptualized as imitation, by imagining the machine 
not only as having the ability to mimic or emulate other machines but also as being 
251 A mind, an I or a soul, following Hofstadter’s terminology (2007).
252 What we now call Turing test was proposed by Alan Turing (1950) as a method to answer the ques-
tion of whether a computer could think. His original model was called The Imitation Game and proposed 
that a human interrogator would communicate with two agents, one of them human, the other a machine, 
by means of a text-based interface. This interface, similar to a teletype terminal or to an Internet Messag-
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able to imitate humans. As Andrew Goffy notes, although imitation has the merit of 
encouraging a speculative exploration of the cultural aspects of computing, it also 
has the problem of narrowing the possible approaches to the question of machine 
intelligence, of limiting the space of possibilities for artificial intelligence (2008b, 
133). The human mind is the only example of general intelligence to which we have 
access, so it is naturally the first example to study when trying to understand intelli-
gence as it manifests in humans but, unless we are too anthropologically centered, 253 
it can be difficult to imagine it as being the only possible general intelligence.
ing system is proposed as a way of removing the aural qualities of speech and the visual appearance of the 
subjects, dispensing with the need to embody the computer.
If by using written communication alone the interrogator is not able to distinguish the human from 
the machine, then in Turing’s view, the machine wins the game and can be considered as having achieved 
thinking and intelligence. In his text he does not define either thinking or intelligence, as also does not 
claim that passing the text proves either, he merely uses it in the attempt to prove an epistemic point.
This imitation game became somewhat of a standard for the evaluation of strong artificial intelligence, 
independently of the strategies used in the programming of the computer agents that play it. Turing left 
out from his description many of the practical details of the implementation of such a test: which sort of 
questions should be asked, how may different interrogators and agents should be used, what should their 
qualifications be and how long should the tests last. Although these may lack for the specification of a 
particular test, if we think of the tests as evaluating an artificial general intelligence then all these details 
will not be significant, because ultimately the machine will have to be versatile enough to always (or in a 
significant percentage of the tests) pass as human, independently of the context. The one suggestion that 
Turing did specify was that multiple tests should be perform so that the final result would be averaged and 
not the outcome of a single conversation.
Turing himself predicted that by the year 2000, an average interrogator would, after five minutes of 
conversation, be able to make a correct identification (that is, to defeat the computer) in 70 percent of the 
cases (Stewart Copeland qtd. in Ariza 2009, 50). Ray Kurzweil predicted that machines would be able to 
pass the test by the end of the 2020s, while Mitchel Kapor was less optimist and was convinced that no 
machine would do it until then (Ariza 2001, 51). Others still, defend that with current technology it may be 
impossible to pass the test and that we will need to wait for further advances in computational hardware 
before any machine is able to successfully and repeatedly demonstrate the skills required. Such is the case 
of Seth Lloyd, a researcher on quantum computing, a technology that he expects will be able to provide 
the means for the successful development of strong artificial intelligence (2006).
Several alternative tests have been proposed over the years, some of them related in setup and methods, 
like the John Henry test (a competition between a human and a machine in which there is a clearly de-
fined winner within a narrowly specialized, and not necessarily intelligent, domain), the total Turing test 
(that replaces the text-based interface with a full physical and sense-based interaction with a robot) or the 
Lovelace test (that tries to evaluate creativity in particular and not general intelligence) (Ariza 2009, 54). 
Some other proposals were made in which tests would be developed in alternative media, using music, for 
example, but in the end, any kind of language, such as music, should be roughly equivalent in the context 
of these tests, as Turing’s proposal makes clear that written human language has more than the required 
abilities to represent human-level thinking (2009, 56).
253 And we certainly are anthropologically centered in many cases, especially on those matters that 
pertain to something as human as intelligence.
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1.5.4 Strong and Weak Artificial Creativity
Much along the same lines we can think about a distinction between strong arti-
ficial creativity and weak artificial creativity, where a strong approach would try 
to understand and follow human creativity, operating in simulation mode, while 
a weak approach would try to make artificial systems act creatively regardless of a 
human model, focusing in the performance mode.
In a talk about generative art, 254 Marius Watz (2006) proposes a similar distinction 
applied to generative art systems, identifying with the idea of strong generative art 
those pieces where one can find a dominant conceptual focus, where the process 
or system is itself conveyed as the aesthetic object, where the perceived purity of 
chance or logic operations is embraced by both artist, system and audience and 
where, ultimately, there is a tendency for the removal of the author from the artistic 
process or object. 255 Weak generative art is exemplified by pieces or systems that 
develop computational models of form, by semi-automated creation processes that 
integrate chance or randomness, by combinatorial systems that explore permuta-
tions of parametric systems and finally by pieces that explore the plastic qualities 
of the software. Regardless of the approach, Watz identifies a series of implications 
from generative art practices, the most important of them being the possibility to 
provide us with knowledge and with a testing ground for a computational model of 
creativity. Not a computational model of human creativity, one is inclined to un-
derline, especially after the ‘removal of the author’ has been pointed out among the 
characteristics of strong generative art, but rather a model of how computational 
systems can act creatively in different (specific, not general) domains and therefore 
how they can be used creatively or simply be creative.
1.5.5 Artificial Aesthetics
We can extend these considerations from artificial intelligence and artificial cre-
ativity to a narrower field that is concerned with the use of computational systems 
in design, communication and art. Authors as Galanter (2003; 2006), Watz (2006), 
254 Watz follows Galanter’s definition of generative art: “any art practice where the artist uses a system 
(…) which is set into motion with some degree of autonomy contributing to or resulting in a completed 
work of art.” (2003)
255 That are more often than not viewed as the same.
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Whitelaw (2007), Dorin (2008), Matthew Lewis (2008) or Griffiths (2008), to cite 
just a few, choose to talk about ‘generative art’. Other authors and artists commonly 
use the designations ‘digital art’ or ‘digital design’ when discussing these fields, as 
Murray (1997), Aymeric Mansoux (2008a), Blais and Ippolito (2006) or Peter Luin-
ing (2004), while some others prefer ‘computer art’ (Lopes 2010). Cramer (2002) and 
Thor Magnusson (2008), for example, seem to prefer using the term ‘software art’, a 
designation that is not commonly applied to design. 256
Paul A. Fishwick introduces a new perspective with the term ‘aesthetic computing’ 
(2006a). He however defines it mainly as being concerned with the impact and ef-
fects of aesthetics on the field of computing (3), rather than the opposite way around, 
as we would prefer to do in this context. Fishwick presents us with an introductory 
reflection regarding the term aesthetics 257 and he follows to define aesthetic comput-
ing as “the application of the theory and practice of art to the field of computing. (…) 
Aesthetic computing relates to the following sort of sample activities 1) represent-
ing programs and data structures with customized, culturally specific notations; 2) 
incorporating artistic methods in typically computing-intensive activities, such as 
scientific visualization; 3) improving the emotional and cultural level of interaction 
with the computer”, and continues by stating that in general “aesthetic computing 
involves one of two types of aesthetics applications: analysis and synthesis. Analytic 
applications tend to evaluate artifacts of computing and mathematics from the per-
spective of classical aesthetic qualities such as mimesis, symmetry, parsimony, and 
beauty. Synthetic applications tend to employ aesthetics as a means of representa-
tion of the artifacts. The word ‘representation’ is broadly defined to encompass the 
concepts of interaction and interface, rather than simply static presentation.” (6) 
Conceding that art that uses the medium of programming involves a greater reflec-
tion and emphasis on the computing, or on programming as a sub-area of comput-
ing (8), aesthetic computing, as proposed by Fishwick is nevertheless an area that 
stands to the field we’re trying to define as software design stands to the design with 
256 ‘Software design’ is traditionally used to designate the processes of designing the software. It is used 
not to describe the design of the communicational or aesthetic perspectives of the software, more com-
monly described by terms as ‘interface design’ or ‘user experience design’, but the technically more nar-
row processes of designing the functionalities of the software and the code itself and not those of produc-
ing design through software (itself increasingly almost the only way of producing visual design nowadays, 
although the software tools are typically used as non-intelligent resources).
257 A word that stems from the Greek αισθητική (aisthitiki), derived from aisthesis, i.e. ‘perceived by the 
senses’ (Fishwick 2006b, 4).
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software, i.e., it is interested in using knowledge from aesthetics, art or design, for 
the production of computational artifacts, and not the other way around.
For our purposes, for studying the ‘impact and effects’ of computing in aesthetics, 
we should perhaps follow a similar nomenclature scheme to artificial intelligence 
and artificial creativity and to define the field as artificial art, artificial design or 
more broadly perhaps, as artificial aesthetics. ‘Artificial’ would allow us to empha-
size how the systems are synthetic and man-made, rather than natural, and how 
the artifacts they produce (in those cases where the artifact is distinguishable from 
the system or in the cases where the artifact is part of or the system itself) are not 
directly produced by humans — as aesthetic artifacts typically are — but by com-
putational systems that are in their turn created by humans, or created by computa-
tional systems that were ultimately created by humans. ‘Aesthetics’ would allow us 
not to put a strong or discriminatory emphasis on the use of these systems for strict 
artistic purposes or for broader communicational and utilitarian purposes, but to 
place them in both fields simultaneously (as well as in other related fields, whenever 
sensorial communication is used, regardless of its purpose or particular context).
We can consider artificial aesthetics to be a subset of artificial creativity which is 
in its turn a subset of artificial intelligence. Not disregarding a possible conceptual 
and operational split between strong and weak artificial aesthetics, we would prefer 
to focus on a pragmatic and performance-oriented approach, in the sense that in a 
majority of cases, artists and designers are not objectively researching on human 
aesthetics and creativity or on its simulation, but rather trying to implement cre-
ative traits in the systems. This doesn’t mean that what is developed is something as 
a weak artificial aesthetics, if we consider this to be the implementation of aesthetics 
and creativity as a secondary aspect of the system, 258 rather that, whatever aesthetic 
aspects are implemented by artists and designers, in a majority of cases, do not aim 
towards a generalized usage, polyvalence or total autonomy, and are not burdened 
by the mimesis of the human processes.
If in the domains of artificial intelligence and creativity we can develop systems that 
totally eschew the human model. When thinking of artificial aesthetics we must 
258 As it happens for example with the coding of artificial intelligence in non-playing characters or foes 
in computer games or in household devices and appliances, or in the multiple daemons that populate our 
personal computers or the Internet.
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however note that although similar approaches are in principle possible, they must 
nevertheless always manage to communicate across the computer-human frontier, 
meaning that whatever process is developed, its ultimate goal is always to be per-
ceived by a human, or to have its products perceived by humans. Human perception, 
psychology, cultures and languages cannot ever be totally absent from the processes, 
at least at the level of the outputs, and must be real concerns for their creators, that 
otherwise risk total ineffectiveness.
We can learn from imitation games, from many of the interactions that we so far 
developed with computers and computational systems and from the many ways in 
which we have integrated them in our lives, that computational systems do not need 
to be human, as they do not even need to act or to have any sort of human-like 
traits or qualities. As Hofstadter says, some critics of computers and artificial intel-
ligence are eager to find things that computers cannot do or will never be able to do, 
and they tend to search for that in domains as art or creativity, classifying them as 
being fundamentally uncomputerizable. But that is hardly the implied (or the logi-
cal) conclusion, because we still do not have good enough models of such things as 
human perception, memory, mental categories, learning, and so on. In fact, we are 
still quite a long way from having those, but there is no valid reason to assume that 
achieving these is in any way impossible (1995, 209). We may have partial models, 
some of them partially or totally developed outside the domain of computers or 
computation, like Gestalt theory, cognitive psychology, neurology, and many other 
areas of research, be it formalized or not 259 and in the lack of comprehensive models, 
these can be effectively used to overcome the cognitive frontier between computers 
and humans. Computational systems need to reach humans, but that may just be 
easier than fully embodying their look and feel and behavior.
1.5.6 The Eliza Effect and Comtivity
In fact, creativity, along with other human traits can be almost unwittingly con-
veyed by a computational system, or to be more precise, understood by humans as 
existing in the computational system, regardless of its original purpose or that of its 
creators.
259 As in crafts, tradition or in the personal practice of an artist.
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In Computer Power and Human Reason (1976), Weizenbaum describes the creation 
of ELIZA, a system that attempted to simulate a Rogerian therapist, 260 working on a 
text terminal and, in a rough analogue of a human therapist, attempting to com-
municate with a human counterpart by using natural language. 261
A typical ELIZA session may resemble something like this example (where capital-
ized lines are ELIZA’s responses):
— Men are all alike. 
— IN WHAT WAY? 
— They’re always bugging us about something or other. 
— CAN YOU THINK OF A SPECIFIC EXAMPLE? 
— Well, my boyfriend made me come here. 
— YOUR BOYFRIEND MADE YOU COME HERE 
— He says I’m depressed much of the time. 
— I AM SORRY TO HEAR YOU ARE DEPRESSED 
— It’s true. I am unhappy 
— DO YOU THINK COMING HERE WILL HELP YOU NOT TO BE UNHAPPY 
— I need some help, that much seems certain. 
— WHAT WOULD IT MEAN TO YOU IF YOU GOT SOME HELP 
— Perhaps I could learn to get along with my mother. 
— TELL ME MORE ABOUT YOUR FAMILY 
— My mother takes care of me. 
— WHO ELSE IN YOUR FAMILY TAKES CARE OF YOU 
— My father. 
— YOUR FATHER 
— You are like my father in some ways. 
— WHAT RESEMBLANCE DO YOU SEE 
— You are not very aggressive but I think you don’t want me to notice that. 
— WHAT MAKES YOU THINK I AM NOT VERY AGGRESSIVE 
260 Also known as person-centered therapy or person-centered psychotherapy, Rogerian therapy is a form 
of talk-psychotheraphy originally developed by the psychologist Carl Rogers in the 1940s and 1950s. The 
therapist tries to aid patients to find their own solutions to their problems by demonstrating empathy and 
an unconditional positive regard, thus creating a comfortable and non-judgmental environment.
261 The counterpart is sometimes described as an ‘interrogator’ (although ELIZA also poses questions) 
or alternatively even as a ‘patient’, a term that can be seen as a reinforcement of the role-playing game but 
risks suggesting that the software may indeed have medicinal properties.
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— You don’t argue with me. 
— WHY DO YOU THINK I DON’T ARGUE WITH YOU 
— You are afraid of me. 
— DOES IT PLEASE YOU TO BELIEVE I AM AFRAID OF YOU 
— My father is afraid of everybody. 
— WHAT ELSE COMES TO YOUR MIND WHEN YOU THINK OF YOUR FATHER
— Bullies. 
— DOES THAT HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE FACT THAT YOUR BOYFRIEND 
MADE YOU COME HERE (Weizenbaum 1983)
ELIZA was an experiment in natural language processing, the application received 
the user’s input, parsing it into units of meaning that it could manipulate, and con-
sequently it assembled a response and presented it to the user. This response in-
cluded the proper grammatical transformations that were necessary to maintain 
the illusion of a minimal fluency with language. 262 As Weizenbaum was always care-
ful to note, ELIZA had no real understanding of the meaning of the user’s inputs 
and of the answers it derived from them. It much less was able to properly follow a 
conversation or to have any sort of a real memory from past conversations, it was 
merely taking the input and “spinning it into a possible conversation”. ELIZA was “a 
machine for generating conversations according to procedures” (Bogost 2007, 11). 263
There are several anecdotes about occasions on which people communicated with 
ELIZA believing that the terminal was connecting them to a human counterpart, 
thus engaging in reasonable amounts of interaction without suspecting that they 
were talking to a piece of software that was not really able to understand the conver-
sation (Suchman 2003, 608). Weizenbaum (1976) describes how at one point his sec-
retary became so engaged on a conversation with ELIZA that she asked him to leave 
the room so that she could converse with the machine in private. As N. Katherine 
Hayles notes, this is all the more extraordinary because, according to Weizenbaum, 
his secretary was very aware that ELIZA was a piece of software and not a terminal 
connection to a human, and was also aware of how the program worked. Therefore 
she was not deceived by the illusion that the machine could in any way understand 
262 As an example, ELIZA searched the input for some keywords such as ‘I am’ or ‘you’ and used them as 
starting points for a series of precoded transformations, as is exemplified by the excerpt cited.
263 This description stems directly from Weizenbaum’s own words when denying the intelligence of his 
program and explaining it as being “a mere collection of procedures” (1976, 23).
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her problems or the conversation that was happening (2006, 155). Weizenbaum was 
actually so concerned by the intensity of his secretary’s engagement that he felt the 
need to issue a warning about how humans should not think that computers were 
able to make any ethical, moral, or political judgments — indeed any judgment at 
all — as in his view, judgment always requires understanding, a faculty that accord-
ing to him only humans possess (155).
Weizenbaum’s secretary and all the protagonists from the various anecdotes were 
perhaps the first people to experience what later Hofstadter called the ‘Eliza effect’, 
the unconscious projection of sentience, even intelligence, onto the mechanical sys-
tem with which one interacts (Aarseth 1997, 130). As Hofstadter describes, due to the 
Eliza effect, people are led to feel that computers are able to understand the physical 
world, that they can make analogies, or they can reason abstractly, that they make 
scientific discoveries and that in general they are or can be insightful cohabiters of 
the world (Hofstadter 1995, 157). He defines the Eliza effect as the susceptibility of 
people to read far more understanding than is warranted into strings of symbols 
(especially words, because language is such a uniquely human tool) that computers 
can string together:
A trivial example of this effect might be someone thinking that an automatic 
teller machine really was grateful for receiving a deposit slip, simple because 
it printed out “THANK YOU” on its little screen. Of course, such a misunder-
standing is very unlikely, because almost everyone can figure out that a fixed 
two-word phrase can be canned and made to appear at the proper moment just 
as mechanically as a grocery-store door can be made to open when someone 
approaches. We don’t confuse what electric eyes do with genuine vision. But 
when things get only slightly more complicated, people get far more confused 
— and very rapidly, too. (158)
Hofstadter suspects that we are often tricked by the Eliza effect into finding appli-
cations of artificial intelligence or artificial creativity to be really intelligent or cre-
ative. According to him, a system like ELIZA, programmed with a complex grammar 
expressed formally and a reasonably long repertoire of words linked to semantic 
tags can achieve some pretty interesting and impressive outputs. Even if one just 
chooses the paths through the grammar randomly and constrain the choices by 
the semantic properties of whatever has already been generated, a trivial insertion 
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of semantics goes a long way in making written discourse appear to be superficially 
plausible (470).
Indeed, it may seem so plausible so as to not only engage people in interaction, and 
lead them to treat the interaction as if it was a real conversation, as it leads some 
authors to actually describe its experience as a proof that ELIZA may have passed 
the Turing test in a life-like situation (Grassmuck 1994) or as Weizenbaum himself 
describes “a striking form of the Turing test” (qtd. in Ariza 2009, 51). Regardless 
of these somewhat exaggerated claims, ELIZA is one of the early instances of suc-
cessful interaction between human and machine, because it effectively exploited 
the natural inclination of people to find the sense of actions or patterns that are 
assumed to be purposeful or meaningful, what the sociologist Karl Mannheim 264 
termed the ‘documentary method of interpretation’ (Suchman 2003, 609). In simple 
terms, this refers to the observation that people take appearances as evidence for, or 
the document of, an ascribed underlying reality, while taking the reality so ascribed 
as a resource for the interpretation of the appearance. In ELIZA’s case, the computer 
generated text was rationalized by the users on the grounds that there must be some 
intent behind them, an intent that may not be immediately obvious to the user play-
ing the role of a ‘patient’, but that is nonetheless perceptible (609).
If, for example, one were to tell a psychiatrist “I went for a long boat ride” and 
he responded “Tell me about boats,” one would not assume that he knew noth-
ing about boats, but that he had some purpose in so directing the subsequent 
conversation. It is important to note that this assumption is one made by the 
speaker. Whether it is realistic or not is an altogether different question. In any 
case, it has a crucial psychological utility in that it serves the speaker to main-
tain his sense of being heard and understood. The speaker further defends his 
impression (which even in real life may be illusory) by attributing to his con-
versational partner all sorts of background knowledge, insights and reasoning 
ability. But again, these are the speaker’s contribution to the conversation. They 
manifest themselves inferentially in the interpretations he makes of the offered 
response. (Weizenbaum 1983, 26)
The Eliza effect is viewed as a consequence of the natural and inevitable anthropo-
morphization of technology, sometimes regarded as perilous, as we can find in the 
264 1893-1947.
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writings of the British neurosurgeon Geoffrey Jefferson 265 who saw a “new and great-
er danger threatening — that of anthropomorphizing the machine” (1949, 1110). We 
are accustomed to identify (or project) emotions into house pets or other animals 
and, as Jefferson predicted, we nowadays often anthropomorphize computers by 
also projecting emotions into them, by reading their behavior as being something 
other than purely mechanic things.
Hofstadter characterizes the Eliza effect as being a “virus that constantly mutates,” 
that reappears “over and over again in (…) ever-fresh disguises, and in subtler and 
subtler forms” (1995, 158) thus making it extremely difficult to objectively assess how 
successful are the implementations of artificial intelligence or creativity outside of 
the laboratory. ELIZA certainly made natural language conversation with a computer 
possible (Weizenbaum 1983, 23), provided one was willing to converse in the terms 
allowed by the program, that supplied the minimal building blocks for sustaining a 
conversation and, more importantly, caused the Eliza effect.
Weizenbaum also pointed to a fundamental shortcoming in the strategy used in the 
creation of the conversations:
ELIZA in its use so far has had as one of its principal objectives the concealment 
of its lack of understanding. But to encourage its conversational partner to offer 
inputs from which it can select remedial information, it must reveal its misun-
derstanding. A switch of objectives from the concealment to the revelation of 
misunderstanding is seen as a precondition to making an ELIZA-like program 
the basis for an effective natural language man-machine communication sys-
tem. (27)
This is much like humans do when conversing, but as we see it, misunderstanding 
is only reached after the total lack of understanding is surpassed. In a sense, ELIZA 
did not misunderstand the conversation, because it simply did not understand it. 
The core of the Eliza effect may therefore perhaps be found in the concealing of the 
processes that create that lack of understanding, i.e., those processes that are funda-
mentally different from human processes but that nevertheless produce end results 
that are very operational and meaningful in computer-human interaction. Even if 
the processes developed in ELIZA have some similarities with the clinical process of 
265 1886-1961.
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a therapist, they’re nevertheless fundamentally different and, as such, cannot be eas-
ily understood by humans that are engaged in a conversation and that expect ELIZA 
to develop a similar engagement at all levels.
Christopher Ariza (2009, 51) describes how in what can be understood as a vari-
ant of the Eliza effect, very often surprise is confused with success. The surprise of 
discovering that a computational system was able to perform some feat that so far 
only humans could perform often leads to an overestimation by the observers of 
the phenomenon. The fact that a program does something is conclusive proof that it 
has the generative power to do so, that its structural and procedural constraints are, 
without doubt, rich enough to make such a computation possible (Boden 2004, 98). 
The same happens with the surprise of witnessing any totally unexpected outcome 
from a given process, something that, if we have Wolfram’s principle of compu-
tational irreducibility in mind should not be totally unexpected in the first place. 
According to Ariza, this is one of the reasons behind some of the effectiveness of 
computer-generated art and music.
The Eliza effect can thus be described as the outcome of three different but comple-
mentary phenomena: 1) the anthropomorphization of technology, that has roots in 
the anthropomorphization of animals and inanimate things, whether natural or 
man-made; 2) the concealing of processes that are not relevant to the human-side of 
the interaction or may not be easily or directly understood by the human counter-
part; and 3) the strong effect of surprise — or what we can also call of a “violation of 
expectation” (Barratt 1980, 292) — when using or interacting with a computational 
system.
Designers can aim to develop programs that really understand humans, that reason 
like humans and may even ultimately come to think as humans. But often, fostering 
the illusion of comprehension while providing signs that are readable by humans is 
not only enough, as it can eventually even be the best possible strategy to develop 
efficient and meaningful experiences in human-computer interaction. Although ar-
tificial intelligence or creativity can be successfully put to use in systems for artistic 
or communication purposes, their existence is not a prerequisite for the success of 
a system.
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The Eliza effect is also related to a different experience of artificial creativity systems, 
something that can lead humans to mistakenly identify creativity in a system in 
much the same way as the Eliza effect leads one to see intelligence where it clearly is 
not present. ‘Comtivity’, or “complexity masquerading as creativity” (Cope 2005, 27) 
happens in systems where the level of complexity of the processes being developed 
exceeds the capacity of humans to understand those processes, or where the speed 
of the processes is too fast for these to be perceived correctly. 266 This may happen in 
relatively simple systems that make use of randomness or chance, as well as it may 
be identified in more complex systems like neural networks or genetic algorithms. 
Many of these systems are maybe capable of producing truly creative output, when 
they are adequately programmed to, but perhaps more often than not, when we 
regard them as creative, we are, according to Cope, being led to do so by comtivity 
masking the lack of true creativity. Cope defends that creativity does not need to 
be complex and that in fact, it often produces the simplest results, rather than the 
most complex (73), but maybe due to cultural factors, we tend to identify the most 
complex solutions as being creative and new, as being meaningful just because they 
openly display this apparent complexity that mesmerizes us.
1.5.7 Randomness and Creativity
The true literature machine will be one that itself feels the need to produce 
disorder. (Italo Calvino qtd. in Aarseth 1997, 129)
As we have previously seem, randomness can be useful for the creation of novelty 
with computers and can therefore be seen as an important aspect to consider in the 
achievement of creativity through artificial means. Jasia Reichardt (1971, 89) quotes 
German philosopher Max Bense’s 267 theory of generative aesthetics, based on com-
puting procedures, that pointed out that randomness, used in the programming of 
computer graphics could replace those aspects of art that are usually described as 
being ‘intuitive’. Therefore, the randomizing procedures in code would be analo-
gous to the artist’s intuition. Although this theory can be questionable, especially 
if exposed as simply as this, it nevertheless exemplifies an early attempt to find an 
266 We could draw an interesting parallelism to the threshold of perception that makes it possible for 
one to reconstruct moving images from a rapid succession of still frames, and maybe point to a threshold 
of cognition, that may make humans perceive sparks of intelligence or sentience where they do not exist.
267 1910-1990.
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equivalence between human activities in the sphere of creativity and the realization 
of equivalent processes through cybernetic artifacts.
Much in the same way as intuition is not more than a part of creativity, in the con-
text of artificial creativity, randomness may play an important role, but it is far from 
being the only resource needed or available. Actually, randomness by itself may 
very well be insufficient to achieve creativity and to produce interesting outputs. As 
Galanter suggests, perhaps even Mozart already intuitively felt that purely random 
processes do not generate good results, as his Musikalisches Würfelspiel im C already 
blends (however primitively) the order of the precomposed measures of music with 
the disorder of the randomness involved in their recombination (Galanter 2003, 14).
If Mozart had written his dice-game using random processes to determine the pitch 
and duration of every single note in the composition and not just the arrangement 
of preconstructed phrases, the construction of minuets with this system would be 
so improbable as to be utterly impossible (Boden 2004, 234). The precomposed bars 
supply the system with order and form, while the throws of dice inject in it random-
ness and novelty.
In order to have a coherent output, to have a form, we need to perceive a group 
of elements as a whole and not as the product of a random collection. As Abra-
ham Moles 268 notes, a form is a message which appears to the observer as not being 
the result of random events (1966, 57). Messages that are totally random have no 
depth, although they certainly are very complex. A highly ordered message, like 
“0101010101…”, as low on complexity and void of novelty as it may be, can at least 
present the human observer with a regular rhythm, with a periodic reinforcement of 
the part of the message that constitutes its period (K. Kelly 2009a). It may not com-
municate much, but whatever little it does is structured and is therefore perceived 
as having intent.
Randomness is widely seen as being incompatible with creativity (Boden 2004, 234). 
The Oulipians, for example, having explored it in many works, came to conclude 
that no good would be generated by pure, unbridled chance (Berge 2003, 179), thus 
limiting (or altogether ceasing) its use in their creations.
268 1920-1992.
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The first known explicit argument against the usage of completely random processes 
in creation was exposed in 45 BCE by the Roman philosopher Marcus Tullius Ci-
cero 269 in his book De Natura Deorum 270 in which Balbus the Stoic 271 presents the 
following argument against the atomists, who argued that the order of nature arose 
from the random collision of atoms: 
I can’t but marvel that there could be anyone who can persuade themselves that 
solid atoms moving under the force of gravity could construct this elaborate 
and beautiful world out of their chance collisions. If they believe this could 
have happened, then I don’t understand why they shouldn’t also think that if 
innumerable copies of the twenty-one letters of the alphabet, made of gold or 
what have you, were shaken together and thrown out on the ground they could 
spell out the whole text of the Annals of Ennius. I doubt whether chance would 
succeed in spelling out a single verse! (Cicero qtd. in Lloyd 2006, 57)
Many centuries after Democritus 272 and the atomists conjectured that the Universe 
was created from chance and randomness, a somewhat similar hypothesis was pro-
posed by the Austrian physicist Ludwig Boltzmann, 273 himself also an atomist. 274 
Boltzmann proposed that order could be generated completely at random in a uni-
verse that would, essentially, be random to its core. The theory in abstract is seduc-
tive, as much as the so-called Infinite Monkey Theorem, that in various alternative 
versions basically proposes that a monkey hitting keys at random in a typewriter for 
an infinite amount of time would almost surely type a given text by a sheer fluke or 
probabilistic inevitability, no matter how complex or long this text would be — the 
most common example that is given are the complete works of Shakespeare or the 
full text of one of his plays. But as it was often demonstrated, as seductive as it may 
be, this is a failed hypothesis. Typing totally at random, the monkeys would take an 
269 106 BCE-46 BCE.
270 On the Nature of the Gods.
271 Quintus Lucilius Balbus (fl. 100 BCE), a Stoic philosopher contemporary of Cicero and introduced 
in the dialogues of De Natura Deorum as the expositor of the opinions of the Stoics and of arguments to 
which Cicero gives a considerable weight and attention.
272 ca. 460 BCE-ca. 370 BCE.
273 1844-1906.
274 A stern defender of the atomic theory at a time when this scientific model was still very controversial.
Computation, Media and Creativity192
inconceivable amount of time to produce anything as simple as a single verse from 
one of Shakespeare’s plays, let alone a sonnet or a complete play. 275
Even in an infinite universe, the hypothesis of total randomness would fail. If the 
order we see would be generated completely at random, then whenever we would be 
confronted with the existence of new bits of information, they would also be highly 
likely to be random and all experiences would probably become as useless and void 
of surprise (because totally nonsensical) as any book chosen from one of the shelves 
in Borges’s Library of Babel. Our experience however suggests the opposite, that new 
bits revealed by observation of the universe are rarely totally random, indeed most 
of the exploration of the natural world reveals new but non-random bits (Lloyd 2006, 
58). Democritus, the atomists and Boltzmann were therefore wrong, because total 
randomness alone is not at the core of the universe’s processes. But so was Balbus 
the Stoic as described by Cicero, defending that the existence of complex and intri-
cate patterns in nature was proof that an equally complex and intricate machine 
or intelligence would be generating them and that randomness could play no part 
in the process. As we have already seen, computers are simple machines, operating 
by recursively performing a small set of almost trivial operations and, despite their 
simplicity, they can be programmed to produce patterns of any desired complexity 
(59). And the programs that produce these patterns also do not need to be complex, 
as Wolfram demonstrated (2002, 301) nor they need to possess any apparent order 
themselves: they can be random sequences of bits.
The generation of random bits does play a key role in the establishment of order 
in the universe, just not as directly as Boltzmann imagined. (Lloyd 2006, 59)
275 According to Campbell, William R. Bennett, Jr., a Yale professor of engineering, calculated that if a 
trillion monkeys were to type ten keys a second at random, it would take more than a trillion times as long 
as the universe has been in existence to simply type the sentence “To be, or not to be: that is the question.” 
(1982, 116). Of course that as this is a probabilistic assertion, it could very well happen that the sentence 
could be produced in the very first minute of typing, but the odds are infinitesimally slim, and we cannot 
also forget that if the monkeys would type with absolute liberty and total randomness, no matter how 
ordered or complex any given output had turned out to be so far, it would not guarantee that any order or 
complexity would follow. “No matter how far into Hamlet a monkey may get, its next keystroke is likely 
to be a mistake. In a universe where everything arises at random, our next breath is definitely our last, as 
our atoms immediately reconfigure to a random state.” (Lloyd 2006, 179).
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If randomness is not totally free and unrestrained but if it is limited by constraints 
or probabilities, then it can more easily produce structured results. 276 Campbell 
suggests that we look at the universe and the living forms it contains, as well as 
their predicaments, as being based on chance, but not on accident. This amounts 
to saying that forces of chance or randomness coexist with forces of ‘antichance’, or 
constraints, or probability, in a complementary and constructive relationship. “The 
276 Campbell (1982, 116-18) describes how Bennett also demonstrated that if the monkeys would not type 
at random but were instead forced to adhere to simple probabilistic rules — that could be incorporated in 
the system by for example doubling or tripling some of the keys in the typewriters so that the monkeys 
would in fact still operate with total liberty but would be more prone to strike a key such as e or a more 
often than e.g. z or q — they would, in minutes, not years or decades, produce passages containing strik-
ing resemblances to lines of Shakespeare’s plays. Bennett’s computer-simulated monkeys were provided 
with the twenty-six letters of the alphabet, the space and the apostrophe in proportions that were derived 
from a statistical analysis of the third act of Hamlet — creating a higher probability of certain letters being 
chosen more often than others, as in the play itself, where the four more common letters are e, o, t, and a, 
and the four least common letters are j, n, q, and z. The simulated monkeys still wrote gibberish, but their 
output already displayed a slight hint of structure:
NCRDEERH HMFIOMRETW OVRCA OSRIE IEOBOTOGIM NUDSEEWU …
Adding to these initial rules a further set of instructions coding the statistical likelihood of certain pairs 
of letters being formed and how likely each letter is to appear at the start and end of a word (or what is the 
likelihood of any given letter being paired with the space) improved the output, although it still mainly 
consisted of gibberish:
ANED AVECA AMEREND TIN NF MEP FOR’T SESILORK TITIPOFELON HERIOSHIT MY ACT …
Bennett then programmed the statistical likelihood of triplets of letters, leading to outputs where half 
of the words were correct English words, although many of them were one-syllable obscenities (which 
led him to suspect that these are among the most probable sequences of letters used in normal language 
and that as such, swearing has a low information content!). Introducing four-letter sequences into the 
program led the number of gibberish words to drop to a mere 10% and to the production of one sentence 
(after only one night of production) with a curious resemblance to Hamlet’s soliloquy:
TO DEA NOW NAT TO BE WILL AND THEM BE DOES DOESORNS CALAWROUTOULD.
The successive steps of adding more and more statistical probabilities to constrain the random genera-
tion of the output were adding redundancy to the source of the messages, a redundancy that lowered the 
entropy of the message source at each stage, but always in different ways. When the simulated monkeys 
typed freely, the entropy (or in this context, the freedom of choice) was at a maximum, and so was the 
uncertainty of the reader, since she was unable to predict which letter would follow in the sentence. As the 
complexity of the programs rose, the freedom of choice became increasingly restricted.
Bennett did not proceed to consider the statistics for five-letter groups but as seen from the examples 
produced up to this point, the outputs acquired more structure and looked more familiar, even when the 
words themselves made no sense. They became more redundant and easier to predict, but the simulated 
monkeys still had a considerable freedom of choice in the keys they would select, although they did not 
have absolute freedom, as the program shifted the probabilities.
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random element is called entropy, the agent of chaos, which tends to mix up the 
unmixed, to destroy meaning. The nonrandom element is information, which ex-
ploits the uncertainty inherent in the entropy principle to generate new structures, 
to inform the world in novel ways.” (1982, 11) We thus find how constraints are an 
essential part of any process in which order is of value, how for example thermody-
namic systems are unable to do anything useful if all their parts are free to arrange 
themselves in any way whatsoever, because their entropy will be at a maximum and 
their energy inaccessible. In order to be able to do any work, the entropy of the sys-
tem must be reduced, which means that the number of permitted arrangements of 
its parts will also be limited (174). We also find that random genetic mutations play 
an essential part in the evolution of species or in speciation (Boden 2004, 234), how 
living organisms share with Chomskyan language structures the property of not be-
ing able to assume any and every form. Rules encoded in the information system of 
the DNA are the grammar of the genetic language, but they are constrained by other 
rules at higher logical levels. 277 The grammar must always generate legitimate forms 
of life, at the risk of not succeeding in its main goal of replicating and perpetuating 
the genetic information (Campbell 1982, 174). This is what Bateson, when describing 
evolution, called a ‘stochastic system’, a system with two components — a random 
component and a process of selection working on its products or constraining its 
action (1979, 176) — or, elaborating, a combination of design, choice and chance 
(Kinder 2008, 60). 
The ‘design’ to which Bateson alludes won’t necessarily be a set of constraints that 
are defined externally to the process by an external creator or machine (regard-
less of its intelligence) but rather the set of constraints that acts as a framework for 
choice and chance, as the possibility space. These constraints can either be laid out 
externally or they can evolve with the system, without such a thing as a creator in 
an ontological sense. Randomness acts within these constraints, and choice is also 
277 One “could measure not only how small the system could be compressed (more compression = less 
complexity), but how long the compression would take to unpack (longer = more complexity). So while all 
the complicated variations, and unpredictable arrangements of atoms that make up a blue whale can be 
compressed into a very tiny sliver of DNA code (high compression = low complexity), it takes a lot of time 
and effort to ‘run’ out this code (high complexity). A whale therefore is said to have great ‘logical depth.’ 
The higher complexity ranking of a random number is shallow compared to the deeper logical complexity 
of a complicated structure in between crystalline order and messy chaos.” (Kelly 2009a) ‘Running’ the 
code in the DNA of a whale implies developing the entire cycle of insemination, gestation and birth of a 
new whale, and its growth, development until adulthood, its reproduction and ultimately also its death. 
The entire process would therefore last at least a few decades.
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dependent on them. According to Boden, in these contexts, the various meanings of 
randomness that she mapped do not clearly divide between anti- and pro-creative 
randomness, as they can all be used creatively. When considering the example of ge-
netic mutations, some mutations of single genes are clearly not A/E-random, as they 
are caused by chemical processes that affect the gene in accordance with known 
biochemical laws. Other mutations, however, can be considered to be totally or par-
tially A/E-random: “If, as quantum physics implies, the emission of an individual 
X-ray is A/E-random, then mutations caused by X-rays are in part A/E-random too. 
If not, then they may be wholly deterministic.” (2004, 240) From the point of view 
of evolutionary biologists, and considering their interest in the creative potential 
of genetic mutations, it is not necessary to determine which of these is true. The 
important thing is that the mutations are R-random with respect to their adaptive 
potential — that is, a mutation is not caused by its hypothetical survival value (in an 
almost Lamarckian sense) but it is always caused in some other way, which may or 
may not be A/E-random (240).
When Wolfram notes that many systems, when initialized from totally random con-
ditions, tend to spontaneously organize themselves and to produce behavior that 
has many features that are not at all random (2002, 223), we can find that this phe-
nomenon happens when the system is embedded with a series of constraints that 
narrow the possibility space and that contain the initial randomness to a charac-
teristic pattern or set of patterns. Ultimately, with class 1 or class 2 computational 
processes, the constraints are so strong, and the space of possibilities so narrow 
that a singular fixed state or a very regular pattern always emerges of the process, 
effectively erasing all the information that the random input injected in it. Class 3 
computations would insert more randomness into the already random output and 
would therefore wipe out any information, replacing it with new information that is 
generated by the computation. In class 4 systems, the constraints enable far broader 
variation, allowing information from the initial conditions to be preserved, but nev-
ertheless acting on it.
If the initial conditions can affect the development of the system, having some of 
its information preserved but also effectively intertwined with the information that 
is generated internally, then we can maybe consider a more reasonable (and maybe 
realistic) version of the infinite monkey theorem: not assuming that the monkey-
produced randomness is present everywhere, at all levels of a system and at all times, 
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but rather that randomness can be injected into the systems at the initial conditions 
or through interactions during its development, thus affecting its outputs in both 
the short term and in the long run. Lloyd (2006, 179) proposes a more plausible 
explanation for the origins of complexity that can simultaneously provide us with 
some clues regarding the part of randomness in artificial creativity. He proposes 
that instead of having the hypothetical monkeys in typewriters, we would have 
them typing in computer terminals, so that their inputs would not be interpreted as 
alphabetic text — human language — but rather as code written in any given pro-
gramming language. As when typing away randomly in typewriters, the monkeys 
would most likely produce gibberish and consequently the computers would pro-
duce error messages. But occasionally one of them would produce something more 
interesting. As when operating typewriters, the probability that any given monkey 
will produce interesting output, in this case, any given functional program, will 
decrease very rapidly with its length, as every single keystroke may undo what oth-
erwise could be shaping up interestingly. But as Wolfram showed and Lloyd reiter-
ates, short programs can produce a wide variety of interesting outputs, so a short 
sequence of characters, interpreted as executable code will have a much higher prob-
ability of producing functional and even interesting output than if we interpret it as 
any human language (180).
1.5.8 Algorithmic Information Content
The study of how likely it may be for a randomly programmed computer to produce 
interesting outputs started to be developed in the 1960s, and it is based on the idea 
of algorithmic information, a measure of how hard it is to represent a text bit or a 
string using a computer. The algorithmic information content of a text or a bit string 
is equal to the length, in bits, of the shortest computer program that produces that 
text or bit string as an output (2006, 180). For any number, the algorithmic infor-
mation content is defined as the length in bits of the shortest computer program 
enabling the computer to print out that number as it will be (with variations) for any 
other output regardless of its type. In the beginning of the 1960s, Ray Solomonoff, 
Andrei Nikolaevich Kolmogorov, 278 and Gregory Chaitin independently discovered 
algorithmic information content, noting that in some ways it provided a more sat-
278 1903-1987.
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isfying measure of information than the length of a number in bits 279 because algo-
rithmic information respects the intrinsic mathematical regularities of a number in 
a way that is impossible to grasp with the simple bit length (Lloyd 2006, 181).
The probability that a monkey, or any other random source of input, creates a pro-
gram that would lead a computer to print out the first million digits of π is then 
called the ‘algorithmic probability’ of π, and as long programs are much less likely 
to be correctly produced than short ones, the shortest programs — however difficult 
they may be to produce by humans or by systems possessing any degree of intel-
ligence — have the highest algorithmic probability. The shortest program that can 
output any particular number or result is therefore the most plausible explanation 
for how such result could have been produced. One of the immediate consequences 
of this, is that those numbers or other results that are produced by shorter programs, 
are more likely to appear as the outputs of random inputs than those results that can 
only be produced by longer programs (184). 
Many beautiful and intricate mathematical patterns — regular geometric 
shapes fractal patterns, the laws of quantum mechanics, elementary particles, 
the laws of chemistry — can be produced by short computer programs. Believe 
it or not, a monkey has a good shot at producing everything we see. (184) 
We can therefore very well be surrounded by algorithmically probable things, those 
that exhibit large amounts of regularity, structure, and order. If the typewriter mon-
keys would produce a universe of gibberish, the computer monkeys would, along 
with an inevitable amount of garbage, produce some interesting features (185) — and 
these, unlike nonsensical output, would maybe be able to perdure, as class 1, 2, 3 or 
4 computations. 280
279 The length of a number (or any other output) in bits is an alternative way to describe the output’s 
information content. Although apparently the simplest way to do so, in many cases it leads to unnecessar-
ily long descriptions (and in some cases to infinite descriptions). A rational number can be described as a 
quotient of two integers, but, having an infinite decimal expansion (of repeating numbers), it can only be 
adequately described as this quotient, itself a process.
280 When further debating this proposal, Lloyd leans towards a pancomputationalist philosophy: “What 
is required to make this explanation testable? For the computational explanation of complexity to work, 
two ingredients are necessary: (a) a computer, and (b) monkeys. The laws of quantum mechanics them-
selves supply our computer. But where are the monkeys? What physical mechanism is injecting informa-
tion into our universe, programming it with a string of random bits? We need, again, look no further than 
the laws of quantum mechanics, which are constantly injecting new information into the universe in the 
form of quantum fluctuations. In the early universe, for example, galaxies formed around seeds — places 
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An even more plausible and simpler scenario can be imagined if the monkeys (or 
whatever the source of randomness is) are not required to type code (formed by 
some thirty or so discrete symbols) but are rather allowed to act inside a computa-
tion that is simpler than an interpreter of a programming language, like a two or 
three dimensional cellular automaton, randomly creating structures that are then 
developed according to the rules of the automaton.
1.5.9 Randomly Programming a Cellular Automaton
Programming a cellular automaton 281 is tantamount to changing the state of a cell or 
group of cells in the universe of the cellular automaton, therefore creating structures 
that may or may not affect other already existing structures, that may or may not 
survive or create new structures in the pool.
As with more conventional, text-based programming, random inputs will mostly 
generate gibberish, but in a cellular automaton this garbage will almost certainly die 
out and disappear in the space of a few generations or will create ‘still lifes’ 282 that in 
the can future be affected by other patterns but that will otherwise remain static. If 
we use Conway’s Game of Life 283 as an example, most inputs that would create one, 
two or three cells in isolation would die within one generation, with the exception 
of the two cases in which three cells would either create a small period 2 oscillator 
where the density of matter was a tiny bit higher than elsewhere. The seeds of galaxy formation were 
provided by quantum fluctuations: the average density of matter was everywhere the same, but quantum 
mechanics added random fluctuations that allowed galaxies to coalesce.
Quantum fluctuations are ubiquitous, and they tend to insert themselves at the points where the uni-
verse is most sensitive. Take biology, for instance. You get DNA from your mother and father, but your ex-
act sequence of DNA is produced by a process of recombination after the sperm enters the egg and deposits 
its genetic material. Just which genes from your mother get combined with which genes from your father 
depends sensitively on chemical and thermal fluctuations during the recombination process, and these 
chemical and thermal fluctuations can be traced back to quantum mechanics.
Randomness arises in the computational universe because the initial state of the universe is a super-
position of different program states, each one of which sets the universe down a different computational 
path and some of which result in complex and interesting behavior.” (Lloyd 2006, 185-86)
281 Not programming the rules of the automaton but rather creating programs that are run by the au-
tomaton.
282 A still life is a pattern that does not change from one generation to the next.
283 The Game of Life is not only one of the classic examples of cellular automata as it is among the most 
studied and well documented, since its creation in the late 1960s and especially after Gardner discussed it 
in several of his articles in the Scientific American magazine (1983), garnering a much wider audience of 
scientists, amateurs and enthusiasts.
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— commonly known as a blinker — or an L-shaped structure known as a pre-block 
that evolves to a block in the immediate generation. 
 
Fig. 52: Two stages of the three-cell blinker, an oscillating pattern of period 2.
Fig. 53: Three-cell pre-block, a pattern that evolves to a block in one generation.
A four-cell random input would also in some cases create unstable patterns that 
would quickly die out or it could create static patterns such as the block or the tub, 
as well as patterns such as the T-tetromino, the tail or the grin that go through spon-
taneous transformations and become other static (or oscillating) patterns.
 
Fig. 54: Block and tub, two four-cell still lifes.
  
Fig. 55: Grin, T-tetromino and tail, two four-cell patterns that naturally evolve to other patterns. The 
grin becomes a block after a single generation, the tail evolves to a six-cell beehive (a still life) after three 
generations and the T-tetromino goes through a more complex nine-step transformation that results in a 
traffic light, a stable arrangement of four blinkers.
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All of the patterns above are stable, able to indefinitely persist to the iterations of the 
environment if they are left undisturbed, that is, if no other patterns interact with 
them. They are also local, that is, unable to grow in area or to move around in the 
universe so as they can affect other areas of the automaton beyond the limited space 
where they are created. However, if the source of randomness generates patterns of 
five cells, it will only generate three possible types of stable patterns, from which one 
is a still life — the boat — but the other two — the glider and the R-pentomino — 
are very interesting examples of (far) more complex behavior.
Fig. 56: The boat, a five-cell still life.
    
Fig. 57: Five generations of a five-cell glider.
The glider is the smallest pattern that travels through the Game of Life grid, 284 with 
a speed of c/4, 285 and that unless disturbed travels forever. Gliders can collide with 
other patterns to form more complex patterns (or to destroy them, depending on the 
collisions) or can be collided with other gliders to produce new patterns, through a 
process called ‘glider synthesis’. They can also be used to transmit information over 
long distances.
284 These traveling patterns are commonly referred to as ‘spaceships’, regardless of their dimensions, 
period or speed.
285 In the Game of Life the speed of a pattern is a measure of the number of generations that it takes for 
a given pattern or effect to travel some given distance. Speeds are commonly measured as a ratio to the 
‘speed of light’ c, which is of one cell per generation and is the fastest speed at which anything can move 
inside the universe of the Game of Life. The glider moves one cell in the horizontal direction and one cell 
in the vertical direction after a full cycle of 4 generations, therefore its speed is measured as c/4 (speed 
measurements use the maximum displacement in either the horizontal or vertical axis, not an average or 
the total of both). Conway has demonstrated that the horizontal or vertical movement of a finite pattern 
into empty space cannot exceed half the speed of light, or c/2 (Gardner 1983, 220).
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If just two of the five cells are placed in different locations, the random source can 
then generate the very interesting R-pentomino pattern, the first so far that does not 
develop a class 1 (as still lifes) or class 2 computation (as oscillators or gliders) but 
that, before stabilizing as a class 2 cycle of 25 different patterns, goes through what 
can be described as a class 4 stage during 1,103 generations. 286 During this lifespan 
the R-pentomino generates six gliders (starting at generation 69) that are released 
into three different directions, and several other patterns that interact with each 
other but that settle (when the stable form is reached) into 116 cells: 8 blocks, 6 glid-
ers, 4 beehives, 4 blinkers, 1 boat, 1 loaf and 1 ship.
Fig. 58: The R-pentomino in the first generation, with the original five cells. 
286 Patterns such as the R-pentomino, that take a long number of generations to stabilize — what is 
commonly called the pattern’s lifespan — are also called ‘methuselahs’. Gliders and other spaceships 
never stabilize, although they are class 2 in the sense that they develop a closed cycle, they travel through 
space so they are commonly referred to as being unstable patterns. The definition of methuselah is not 
completely agreed upon, but it is usually consensual that it should not be applied to patterns that grow 
forever (the growth of a pattern always refers to the number of cells in it, not to its area) or to patterns that 
start with a large number of cells. Gardner (1983, 246) defines methuselahs as patterns of fewer than ten 
cells that take more than 50 generations to stabilize, and the one with the longest lifespan under 10 cells is 
bunnies 10, that evolves for 17,423 generations, reaching a total of 1,749 cells. Lidka, starting with 13 cells, 
lives for 29,055 generations and breeds 1,623 cells: 135 blinkers, 102 blocks, 28 gliders, 18 loaves, 15 boats, 6 
ships, 5 ponds, 2 tubs, 2 ship-ties, 1 toad, 1 beacon and 1 long boat.
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Fig. 59: The stable pattern that emerges from the R-pentomino after 1,103 generations, the 6 gliders released 
earlier are at this stage quite distant and are not shown on this grid.
These two patterns are capable of affecting other patterns in the most remote regions 
of the Life universe and through processes of glider synthesis are capable of produc-
ing many different structures ranging from other R-pentominos — that only re-
quire 3 gliders to meet at a precise angle and in their turn will produce six new glid-
ers each — to far more complex structures. A single glider can have no noticeable 
effect on a structure, being destroyed upon collision, but it can disturb structures, 
interfering with them, breaking them down or destroying them, or transforming 
them in more complex structures, much in the same way (if the analogy is not too 
far fetched) as an individual X-ray can create a mutation in a strand of DNA. And as 
with DNA, these effects are not necessarily immediate, as they can evolve for thou-
sands of generations.
Although the cells are the fundamental particles in the Life universe, the glider is the 
minimum unit of communicable information and, unlike Hamlet’s verses, it is sur-
prisingly easy to create randomly. The glider exists in a bounding box of 3 × 3 cells 
that, if randomly set, have a very high algorithmic probability of 1 / 32 of generating 
a glider. 287 The same matrix of 3 × 3 cells has an algorithmic probability of 1 / 64 of 
287 (1 / (29)) × 16 = 16 / 512 = 1 / 32, as each of the nine cells has two possible states and within the 3 × 3 grid 
there are sixteen possible layouts that can generate a glider.
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randomly generating a R-pentomino 288 that in its turn, if undisturbed during its 
somewhat long evolution will generate six more gliders.
A thorough study of the evolution of random initial conditions 289 in the Game of 
Life (Flammenkamp 2004) did a census of the results of almost two million random 
seeds with an initial density of 0.375, finding more than 50 billion objects 290 and 
ranking them according to their frequency. This study found that blinkers, blocks 
and beehives were by far the most common patterns to emerge, with frequencies of 
1/3.038, 1/3.094 and 1/5.230 respectively. As random initial conditions evolve, the uni-
verse tends to be dominated by blocks and blinkers in a ratio of approximately 2:1 and 
much later to develop simple infinite growth patterns 291 that eventually overtake the 
landscape. It is speculated that in the long run the Life universe can be dominated by 
self-reproducing patterns and eventually even universal constructors, 292 particularly 
if it is initialized from very low density soups. 293 The study only accounted for still 
lifes and oscillating patterns, giving us no statistics as to how may gliders or other 
unstable objects with interesting behaviors were initially generated.
We may then conclude that the random creation of ‘functioning programs’ in a cel-
lular automaton like the Game of Life is not only possible, as it is relatively easy. We 
started from the hypothetical monkeys in typewriters, or the golden letters of Bal-
bus, having to generate text that would be readable to humans. We then increased 
the odds by having the monkeys generate not human-readable text but rather com-
288 (1 / (29)) × 8 =  8 / 512 = 1 / 64, as a R-pentomino has 5 cells in the first generation and 6 cells in the sec-
ond generation, each with 4 possible arrangements in the 3 × 3 grid. The probabilities are actually higher, 
as there are three 5-cell grandparents to the R-pentomino, that is, three patterns that will evolve to the 
R-pentomino in two generations, existing in matrices of 3 × 4 and 4 × 4 cells, and three 6-cell predecessors 
that evolve to the R-pentomino in five generations (and that exist in matrices of 6 × 3 cells).
289 A random initial pattern ideally covering all the surface of the universe of Life is commonly called 
of ‘soup’ or ‘broth’.
290 1,829,196 soups, 50,158,095,316 objects, classified into 3,798 distinct objects, of which 97.5% (3,703) 
were still lifes (Flammenkamp 2004).
291 Infinite growth patterns are those whose population is unbounded, that is, where for any given num-
ber N, there exists a generation n such as the population in generation n is greater than N. The growth rate 
of infinite growth patterns is usually linear but several patterns exhibiting growth rates such as quadratic 
or logarithmic, were already discovered. The fastest possible growing rate of any life pattern is quadratic.
292 Universal constructors are patterns that are able to build any other pattern that is constructible 
through glider synthesis, including, presumably, themselves. Universal constructors were never built but 
they were suggested by Conway, and he outlined the proof of their existence in Winning Ways for Your 
Mathematical Plays (Berlekamp 2001).
293 Also known as ‘sparse soups’.
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puter-executable code, typing small programs in C, Java, LISP or any other pro-
gramming language. But we can increase them even more if our monkeys are led to 
program by interacting with a Life universe, not by manipulating twenty or thirty 
discrete symbols but simply by flipping bits in the matrix, turning dead cells into 
living or living into dead, zeros into ones or ones into zeros. Our happy hypotheti-
cal monkeys will have a much simpler task in hands and simultaneously they will 
have a much higher probability of achieving something other than gibberish with 
their efforts. They will be able to create (or to contribute to the creation of) bigger 
structures and to make their influence reach the far ends of the universe, regardless 
of where they are located.
1.5.10 Zooming Out
With all the examples given so far we focused on very small, rather ‘microscopic’ 
patterns in Life. If we assume a macroscopic overview of the Life universe, a five-cell 
pattern as a glider will be seemingly insignificant. There are several known patterns 
constituted by thousands of cells, such as the Turing machine, with 36,549 cells, 294 
the spartan universal computer-constructor, with 481,672 cells, 295 or the caterpillar, 
with 11,880,063 cells. 296
294 Created by Paul Rendell in 2000. The possibility of constructing a simulation of a Turing machine 
in Life was first raised by Conway himself, after the discovery of the glider gun, the first infinite growth 
pattern. The principle was based on using gliders as unit pulses for storing and transmitting information 
and to perform the required logical operations (Gardner 1983, 235).
295 Created by Adam P. Goucher (2009).
296 Created by David Bell, Jason Summers and Gabriel Nivasch in 2004 (Nivasch 2005).
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Fig. 60: The Turing machine pattern in Life. This pattern is capable of Turing-complete computation and is 
infinite, as it requires an infinite length of tape to perform arbitrary computations.
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Fig. 61: The spartan universal computer-constructor, an implementation of a universal computer, a Life 
pattern that can be programmed to perform arbitrary calculations and optionally to construct patterns 
according to the results of those calculations.
Although gliders and other small patterns exist in these macroscopic patterns, their 
sizes are so small when compared with the total size of the pattern that when zoom-
ing out so that it becomes possible to see the macrostructure, one effectively ceases 
to see the cells and the small scale patterns by themselves — they merge into a big-
ger gestalt, much like particles merge into atoms and these merge into macroscopic 
matter.
Both the spartan universal computer-constructor and the Turing machine are mac-
ro patterns that are still intimately related to the smaller patterns, not only because 
smaller patterns are their building blocks (in much the same sense as the Life cells 
are the building blocks of the elementary patterns), as they are in one case dedicated 
to generating them while on the other they use them as inputs, outputs and registers. 
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Their forms are dependent of and oriented towards the smaller scale elementary 
particles.
In other cases we can find patterns whose form seems to exist at a fundamentally 
different layer than that of the cells and the elementary patterns. These are patterns 
whose development goes through very long and convoluted evolutive processes, pat-
terns that are so complex that at magnification levels where the cells or any of the 
smaller structures are visible, no part of the overall structure of the macro pattern 
can be understood. An example of such a pattern can be seen in one Dean Hick-
erson’s cloud constructions (Koenig and Greene 2009), a pattern that grows to a 
population that is orders of magnitude higher than any of the patterns discussed so 
far and that, growing continuously, starts to reveal itself only after a few hundred 
thousand generations. The macroscopic view of the Hickerson cloud reveals a geo-
metric and nested arrangement of parts, with two very clear axis of symmetry.
Fig. 62: Overview of generation 1,984,750 of a cloud pattern constructed by Dean Hickerson in 2006. In this 
image the scale is 211:1 and the population is of 5.83077 × 109.
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Fig. 63: Scale 29:1, scale 27:1.
 
Fig. 64: Scale 25:1, scale 22:1.
 
Fig. 65: Scale 1:1, scale 1:2.
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Fig. 66: The seed for the Hickerson cloud at scale 1:2. The initial population is of 3,708 cells.
As one zooms in on the structure, this apparent regularity starts to reveal some jag-
ged edges and patterns that have a ‘furry’ quality and that, wasn’t it for the two axis 
that split the pattern, would otherwise look very organic. These symmetries along 
the vertical and horizontal axis are nearly perfect — due to the high complexity of 
the pattern, one is led to doubt whether the symmetry is total or simply apparent. 
Only after zooming in several more times will we find the gliders, reflectors and 
still lifes that are the basic structure of the cloud, at a level where, as we have seen, 
none of the macrostructure of the pattern is visible. This cloud can be read at three 
discrete levels of scale: a macro scale of 211:1 or higher, depending on the number of 
generations that the pattern has so far grown; a micro scale of 1:1 that allows the 
individual cells and small patterns to be seen; and a meso scale that in this case is 
in the vicinity of 25:1, where the really interesting structures are perceived. Com-
pared with the magnitude of scales in the physical universe, this range of values is 
still somewhat limited: at 10-14 meters we have the nucleus of a carbon atom, or the 
quarks within it at 10-15, while the earth sits roughly at 107 meters, the solar system at 
1013 and our galaxy at 1021 meters. Nevertheless, we can make a rough analogy with 
these scalar levels, and the previously mentioned human perceptual levels of scale in 
the physical universe, noticing how easily we can find a similar diversity and com-
plexity in such an apparently simple system as the Game of Life is.
The macro and meso structures are moving and growing, although at a slow pace, if 
compared with the speed of light or with the speeds of the small patters. The struc-
tures that are perceived at the higher levels are traceable back to the behavior of the 
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small patterns, and these are obviously traceable to the rules of life itself 297 but, un-
able as we are to follow all the details of the process, we perceive it as emerging 298 
from the original 3,7108-cell pattern, that can be seen as an autopoietic system.
If, with the exception of a few examples, the distinction between creativity and ran-
domness had little relevance before the computational age, because random and 
creative behaviors seemed so distinct as to belong to totally different realms (Cope 
2005, 51), we are now finding that, as the English pioneer in cybernetics Ross Ash-
by 299 pointed, no system (neither computer or organism) can produce anything new 
unless it contains some source of randomness or, as Bateson put it, “all innovative, 
creative systems are (…) divergent; conversely, sequences of events that are predict-
able are, ipso facto, convergent.” (1979, 174)
The examples of Life allow us to demonstrate how sources of randomness can create 
meaningful and operational outcomes inside of a computational system by acting 
at the micro level, with much more ease than they would otherwise if acting at the 
meso level, where traditionally (and intuitively) we imagined them to act. Random 
inputs will most certainly result in gibberish that will either be unstable and die out 
on its own or be stable and static, waiting in place to eventually be affected by other 
patterns sometime in the future, or to be incorporated in macro patterns. We can 
even conjecture that the computations of the Life universe exist in the micro level, 
the level of the cells and of the small patterns but that they may cease to exist, or 
to have such a strong effect at the meso and macro levels, much in the same way as 
particle interactions in the physical universe. We may speculate an analogy between 
the rules of Life and the fundamental physical laws, where two of the four forces act 
297 Gardner notes that Conway chose the rules carefully, after a long period of experimentation, so that 
they would comply to three main criteria: 1) There should be no initial pattern for which there is a simple 
proof that the population can grown without limit; 2) there should be initial patterns that apparently do 
grow without limit; and 3) there should be simple initial patterns that grow and change for a considerable 
period of time before coming to an end in three possible ways: fading away completely (from overcrowd-
ing or from becoming too sparse), settling into a stable configuration that remains unchanged thereafter, 
or entering an oscillating phase in which they repeat an endless cycle of two or more periods (1983, 215).
298 ‘Emergent’ in the sense proposed by John H. Holland, one of the first proposers of genetic algo-
rithms: “when the activities of the parts do not simply seem to give the activity of the whole. For emer-
gence, the whole is indeed more than the sum of the parts.” (2000, 14)
299 1903-1972.
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only at the microscopic level, and new forces emerge with the scale and with the 
countless interactions between particles. 300
Mozart did not compose his Musikalisches Würfelspiel im C by injecting random-
ness at every level of the composition, but had he chosen to do so, that wouldn’t 
necessarily mean using randomness to directly define the pitches and durations 
of the notes in the composition as Boden suggested. Randomness could have been 
constrained by probabilities 301 so that it could influence the development of the com-
position, not merely the final order of the bars. Xenakis, perhaps the most famous 
of the computer music composers in the twentieth century, used similar systems in 
several of his compositions, for both electronic or acoustic instruments, developing 
what he called ‘stochastic’ music.
We tend to think of aesthetic objects as fundamentally being static entities, much 
like a painting, a sculpture and a photograph are after they are produced. The pro-
duction itself is thought of as a process. This extends to time-based aesthetic arti-
facts, such as music, film, video and theatre, conceiving of every instance when hu-
mans are directly involved as a process, and all others (especially when they involve 
mechanical fixation or reproduction, whether analog or digital) as static entities. 
What we can discover through the Game of Life example, and if we generalize, from 
computational artifacts and the physical universe (regardless of how valid we think 
that the pancomputationalist hypothesis is), is that static objects are perhaps an ex-
ception, not the rule, and that they are perceived to be static 302 but are actually very 
300 Conway speculated that in a sufficiently large randomly initialized universe, one could expect that 
by pure chance some self-replicating patterns could arise (either directly in the soup or evolving from 
this) and that those who would be best adapted to survive would live longer than the others (and, we may 
imagine, survive interactions with other patterns). As in organic evolution in the physical world, Conway 
imagines that most mutations would either be neutral to the pattern or harmful, but that the odd muta-
tion would have some survival value. Conway then conjectures that “given a large enough ‘Life’ space, 
initially in a random state, that after a long time, intelligent self-reproducing animals will emerge and 
populate some parts of the space.” (qtd. in Gardner 1983, 254) Lloyd also speculates that in a computa-
tional universe, the primary consequence would the be spontaneous generation of complex systems, such 
as life: “Although the basic laws of physics are comparatively simple in form, they give rise, because they 
are computationally universal, to systems of enormous complexity. Besides encompassing the Standard 
Model of elementary particles and leading at least part of the way to a theory of quantum gravity, the 
computational universe provides an explanation for one of the most important features of the universe: 
its complexity. In the beginning, the universe was simple. Now it isn’t. So what happened?” (2006, 176)
301 Had Mozart had access to the computational resources and literacy to do so, something of an impos-
sibility at his time.
302 Much like the Hickerson cloud at the 211:1 scale.
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active processes at the microscopic levels. 303 All objects are processes, regardless of 
whether they are perceivable as such by humans.
1.5.11 The Lovelace Questions
Critical common sense would find the idea of an alien, machinic intelligence 
not only rebarbative but contradictory. Because humans program machines, 
machines must in principle be under the control of humans. The tacit assump-
tion here is that it is impossible to make something autonomous. To think 
otherwise would be fetishism or reification and, in the case of computing, to 
subscribe to the dehumanizing effects of instrumental rationality. (Goffey 
2008b, 135)
Although science fiction and even a certain common sense have for a long time 
populated the future of humanity with thinking machines, very often in the form of 
talkative quasi-human robots, and in spite of the Eliza effect, when considering the 
issue, most people tend to think of creativity and intelligence as being exclusively 
human attributes. Although we can regard creativity as a subset of intelligence, be-
cause of the value that historically and culturally we confer to creativity and creative 
people, we may often imagine that an intelligent computer or robot could exist, but 
we may think that an intelligent and creative computer or robot would be a much 
more difficult thing to create. If we can for example identify some degree of intel-
ligence in some higher animals, we certainly do not imagine them as ever being 
creative or artistic, 304 as these are capabilities that we have learned to identify as 
being exclusively human.
Very often then, the idea that computers can create is regarded as being intrinsically 
absurd: computers can only do whatever they were programmed to do and in doing 
so they produce results that are inevitably determinist, therefore they cannot cre-
ate (Boden 2004, 16). Much in the same way that cartesian dualism proposes a split 
303 Or nanoscopic, picoscopic, femtoscopic, etc. Within the very broad range of scales of the physical 
universe, one needs to think about more than merely three discrete levels of scale.
304 Both creativity and artistic expressiveness have long been studied in animals, especially in mammals 
and within those in the great apes. One of the most famous studies, by the British zoologist and ethologist 
Desmond Morris, was published in his book The Biology of Art (1962). There are also several documented 
examples of the usage, invention or discovery of tools by animals, from birds using stones to raise the 
water in narrow tubes, to primates using sticks or stones as tools to reach otherwise inaccessible food.
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between non-physical mental phenomena and the material body that is ‘animated’ 
by them, there is a generalized tendency to view machine intelligence or creativity as 
always being inherited from the human creator. Mark Halpern gives us an example 
of how this view is usually supported: “Machine intelligence is really in the past; 
when a machine does something ‘intelligent,’ it is because some extraordinarily bril-
liant person or persons, sometime in the past, found a way to preserve some frag-
ment of intelligent action in the form of an artifact. Computers are general-purpose 
algorithm executors, and their apparent intelligent activity is simply an illusion suf-
fered by those who do not fully appreciate the way in which algorithms capture and 
preserve not intelligence itself but the fruits of intelligence.” 305 (Halpern 2006)
According to Boden (2004, 16), the first person to publish this argument was Au-
gusta Ada King, 306 Countess of Lovelace, commonly known as Ada Byron 307 or as 
Lady Lovelace. Lovelace was a friend of Babbage and she developed a keen interest 
in his project for the Analytical Engine. During the years of 1842-43, she translated 
a memoir from the Italian mathematician Luigi Menabrea 308 on Babbage’s Analyti-
cal Engine, a text to which she appended a set of notes that was longer than the 
original text itself. These included, in complete detail, a method for the calculation 
of a sequence of Bernoulli numbers that was later verified as having correctly run 
had the Analytical Engine ever been built. Due to this work, Lovelace is nowadays 
commonly credited with being the first computer programmer, and her published 
method as being the first ever published computer program. She is also said to have 
305 In some sense this reminds us of Wolfgang von Kempelen’s (1734-1804) chess playing machine from 
the late 18th century, commonly known as the Turk or the Mechanical Turk. This machine was built to the 
Empress Maria Theresa of Austria as an automaton that was capable of playing chess games against hu-
man opponents, but was many years later exposed as a hoax. The Turk consisted of a large base with three 
doors and a life-sized model of a human head and torso (dressed in oriental attire) facing a chessboard. 
The model could play chess games against humans and, according to accounts it outplayed the average 
chess-player, winning many of the games where it was presented. Three doors in the front of the base re-
vealed all kinds of dummy very complex machinery that in reality hid a ‘director’ sitting inside the back 
two-thirds of the base that had a physical connection with the tray and controlled all the movements of 
the model, thus playing the game. Von Kempelen’s Turk convinced many of its observers of the possibility 
of machine autonomy and intelligence — although today, especially after Deep Blue, we don’t consider 
that intelligence (or at least a strong and general intelligence) is in any way necessary to be able to defeat a 
human in a game of chess — but its demise was perhaps the first of many demystifications of mechanical 
intelligence. Had it been conceived a few decades earlier, maybe the Turk wouldn’t have been presented 
as a mechanical automaton brought to live and reasoning through engineering and craft but perhaps it 
would rather be presented in a magical or mystical context.
306 1815-1852.
307 Her maiden name, from her father, the English poet Lord Byron.
308 1809-1896.
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published remarks where she foresaw the capability of computers to go beyond mere 
calculating functions, at a time when most people, including Babbage himself, fo-
cused exclusively on these capabilities.
Lovelace was convinced that the Analytical Engine was in principle able to “com-
pose elaborate and scientific pieces of music of any degree of complexity or extent” 
(17). She however declared that the Analytical Engine had no pretensions to originate 
anything and that it could do only “whatever we know how to order it to perform”. 
It is not clear whether Lovelace merely intended to point that a computer’s actions 
are strictly dependent on its input and programmed code — an important remark 
on itself and especially at the time — or whether these words were intended as an 
argument denying any possibility for artificial creativity, in a precedent to the ‘intel-
ligence in the past’ argument and Halpern’s position. The simplicity of the argument, 
if indeed this is an argument against artificial creativity, leads Boden to present four 
distinct questions, that are often confused with each other, and to which she calls 
the ‘Lovelace-questions’, because they address the possibility of artificial creativity 
and because many people would probably answer them with a dismissive ‘No!’ by 
using Lady Lovelace’s argument (17).
The first Lovelace-question is whether computational ideas can help us under-
stand how human creativity is possible. The second is whether computers (now 
or in the future) could ever do things which at least appear to be creative. The 
third is whether a computer could ever appear to recognize creativity — in 
poems written by human poets, for instance. And the fourth is whether com-
puters themselves could ever really be creative (as opposed to merely producing 
apparently creative performance whose originality is wholly due to the human 
programmer). (17)
Boden then proceeds to try to answer the four questions. Her answers to the first 
two questions are positive, for reasons we have also already discussed. 309 Boden’s 
answer to the third question is not so simple, as the question implies that in order 
to appreciate originality one needs at least some of the abilities that are required for 
creativity itself. Being creative requires a capacity for critical evaluation so it would 
seem that question three could only be answered after question four, but consider-
309 She underlines that there are computer programs that arguably appear to be creative but that there 
are still no examples of programs that unarguably appear to be creative (Boden 2004, 17).
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ing that the question does not concern “the practicality of computer-criticism, but 
its possibility in principle”, Boden also replies positively (20).
The first three Lovelace-questions concern scientific fact and theory, and they 
are closely interrelated. One cannot decide whether a computer could appear to 
be creative, or to evaluate creativity, unless one has some psychological theory 
of what creative thinking is. So someone who is interested in the first question 
(…) will probably be interested in the other two, as well.
The fourth Lovelace-question — whether computers can really be creative — is 
very different (and, for our purposes, less interesting). It involves controversial 
debate about metaphysics and morals.
It raises the problem, for instance, of whether, having admitted that we were 
faced with computers satisfying all the scientific criteria for creative intelli-
gence (whatever those may be), we would in addition choose to take a certain 
moral/political decision. This decision amounts to dignifying the computer: 
allowing it a moral and intellectual respect comparable with the respect we feel 
for fellow human beings. (21)
As a consequence, Boden does not reply the fourth question, summing up that 
whether or not computers can be really creative, they can nevertheless do things 
that appear to be creative — and more to the point in the context of Boden’s research, 
we can better understand how creativity happens in humans by studying how it can 
be developed in computers (21). In the context of this work, however, an answer to 
the fourth question would be more important, given that we are not trying to study 
human creativity but rather the creative use of computers. Cope contends that com-
puter programs can indeed create, defending the hypothesis that those who do not 
believe this may have probably defined creativity so narrowly that eventually even 
humans could not be said to create (2005, vii-viii).
1.5.12 The Lovelace Test
An example of how creativity is defined as a “special epistemic relationship” (Ariza 
2009, 53) between creator, her creation and its creations, is the Lovelace test, pro-
posed by Selmer Brigsjord, Paul Bello and David Ferrucci (2001). This test requires 
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a machine to be creative, defining the term in a highly restrictive sense, and trying 
to find evidence of creativity when a machine produces an artifact through a proce-
dure that cannot be explained by the creator of the machine and when that artifact 
stands to the machine as this stands to its creator. Brigsjord, Bello and Ferrucci 
propose the following “rough-and-ready definition”:
Artificial agent A, designed by H, passes LT if and only if:
1) A outputs o; 
2) A’s outputting o is not the result of a fluke hardware error, but rather the 
result of processes A can repeat;
3) H (or someone who knows what H knows, and has H’s resources) cannot 
explain how A produced o. (8)
Naturally, H is permitted time to provide an explanation, and is allowed to investi-
gate and study the system in any way they find necessary, including to analyze the 
learned or developed states of a dynamic system within A, backtracking the process 
of creation. The Lovelace test is thus designed to suggest that “the notion of creativity 
requires autonomy” and that “there may simply not be a way for a mere information-
processing artifact to pass LT” (25). It is safe to say that no known contemporary sys-
tem has (yet) reached such a level of autonomy and that aesthetic artifacts produced 
by computers will continue to be seen as being fundamentally human works, or, if 
the role of the system exceeds that of a conventional tool, as human-machine col-
laborations, where nevertheless machine autonomy is not required (Ariza 2009, 64).
That is not synonymous with saying that computational systems cannot be made 
to act creatively within narrower fields of operation, or that a significant creative 
capability cannot be programmed in the context of a given artistic piece or design 
project.
1.5.13 Creative Systems
Trying to find a model for creativity that does not define it in such a narrow way as 
to make it actually (nearly) impossible to achieve, and not generalizing into a strong 
general artificial creativity but rather trying to understand its existence in aesthetic 
systems, Cope proposes an operational definition of creativity based in twelve prin-
ciples:
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1) Creativity relies on connecting differing but viable ideas in unique and unex-
pected ways. 
2) Creativity does not depend exclusively on human inspiration, but can origi-
nate from other sources, such as machine programs. 
3) Creativity should not be confused with novelty or comtivity. 
4) Creativity does not originate from a vacuum, but rather synthesizes the work 
of others, no matter how original the results may seem. 
5) Creativity relies in part on the juxtaposition of allusions to the work of others. 
6) Creativity requires learning and knowledge in order to produce useful rather 
than arbitrary results. 
7) Creativity occurs at every structural level. 310
8) Creativity develops within enfolding and influencing contexts, and not in 
isolation. 
9) In order for computer programs to create, they must themselves develop and 
extend rules, and not simply follow instructions provided for programmers. 
10) Aesthetic creativity relies on creators, performers and audiences associating 
their experiences across a broad landscape of artistic and cultural tradition. 311
11) Creativity depends on the integration of its various characteristics into a 
unified whole in which the sum is greater than the total of the individual parts. 
12) Creativity depends on aesthetic values than themselves depend, at least in 
part, on the acceptance or rejection of others. (Cope 2005, 368)
To these we may add a set of five properties summarized by Dorin (2008, 294) in an 
attempt to evaluate the potential of the computer as a generator of patterns or signs 
that we may associate with art and on how to engineer programs that allow it to 
exhibit a creative ability. For Dorin, such a system must exhibit:
1) Coherence and unity, so as to maintain its identity over time, despite occasional 
perturbations (from within the system, the context where it is instantiated or its us-
ers). This property is useful to define the unique character of an art piece or aesthetic 
object, and it can be operationalized by setting a series of constraints or attractors 
that not only shape the object as, in a certain way, are the object. According to Dorin, 
310 Originally: “Creativity is not limited to note-to-note motions, but occurs at every structural level” 
(Cope 2005, 368). Cope’s book is dedicated to musical creativity in composition and performance, hence 
the detail in the formulation of the principle.
311 Originally: “Musical creativity relies on composers, performers, and listeners associating their expe-
riences across a broad landscape of music tradition.” (Cope 2005, 368)
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for an artwork to be coherent, its components must be integrated in a way that is 
somehow natural or fitting, so that the artifact or artifacts that are produced can be 
identifiable as a unit (298). If there is some way of viewing even a complex or com-
posite entity that results in an experience of a ‘whole’, of a ‘unity’ or what Alexander 
might have described as a ‘center’ (2002a), then the arrangement of the outcome 
of the process may be labeled as being coherent. Form, color, rhythm, behaviors 
or many other factors can either contribute to the coherence or to its lack, and the 
search for this balance can be developed through all of these (and more) variables.
2) Multi-scaled temporal complexity, so as to demonstrate complex dynamics over 
fine and coarse timescales. In a sense, any computational artifact is always a time-
based object, regardless of whether it is conceived to produce signs that should be 
read temporally. Static images (photographic or otherwise) are in a certain sense 
exceptional outputs of computational systems, because they demand the ‘freezing’ 
of time and the (at least apparent) halting of the computation, something that unless 
it is the result of the ‘natural’ halting of a class 1 or class 2 computation must in prin-
ciple be forced externally. A static image is also always the outcome of a temporal 
process and as such may reveal the process’s temporal complexity. With some pieces 
the question is not whether time is frozen but rather that the temporal dimension of 
the output is unlimited a priori and the system is designed to run continuously, pro-
ducing outputs that are read for a length of time that is defined by the reader, with a 
rhythm that is independent from that of the reader but that must be adjusted to its 
perception and to the context and constraints of communication.
3) Autonomous production of novelty, so as to explore large design spaces indepen-
dently of human input or cooperation, but not necessarily independently of links to 
the external world. According to Dorin, a system that is capable of exploring novelty 
without human intervention must have a ‘problem space’ (or a conceptual space, if 
we follow Wiggins’s terminology) within which humans are able to recognize the 
occurrence of original and creative outcomes (2008, 302). Within the range of pos-
sibilities in the parametrization of an aesthetic system, a very large (or, if we place it 
in the human scale, almost infinite) variety of outputs can be composed. However, 
the vast majority of these possible outputs, for a human viewer, will probably not be 
very interesting in themselves or not significantly different from the other possible 
outputs in the set. Within its conceptual space, the system needs to search for solu-
tions that lead to sufficiently varied outputs, so as to create dynamic outputs. Dorin 
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points to nature’s ability to generate an apparently open-ended variety of designs 
that may share certain characteristics but still differ sufficiently from one another 
so that humans can classify them as different things and different classes of things 
(303). Within a class of things 312 there is a diversity that is balanced by coherence and 
unity that interests and fascinates humans, there is a pattern and a rich set of varia-
tions within it that makes even new and never before seen variations feel familiar 
while innovative. It follows that the conceptual space must be broad enough for the 
system to successfully develop exploratory creativity: “[t]he key is in the choice of 
representation scheme, the subtlety of the outcomes it is capable of generating and 
in the ease with which this space may be navigated [by the system] from one inter-
esting phenomenon to another whilst minimizing the occurrence of uninteresting 
outcomes” (303). There must therefore be at least an implicit measure of interesting-
ness programmed in the system, something that has not been forthcoming, and 
the designer must also consider that if the system is able to generate too interesting 
results too fast then its experience may feel somewhat noisy or overwhelming to hu-
mans. One needs to establish a degree of familiarity with the user, using resources 
as repetition to reinforce, or even to define the idea of novelty (303). Dorin’s remarks 
raise questions as to whether it may be desirable to endow aesthetic systems with 
transformational creativity, or if this — unlike conscientious exploratory creativity 
developed in the conceptual space (or problem space) of the piece — will contrib-
ute to a potential lack of coherence in the output of the piece. There is certainly no 
definite answer to this issue, because in many ways it would depend not only on 
contextual but also on conceptual considerations for every system or artist.
4) Responsiveness to perturbation, so that external events can influence its behavior 
in either deep or slight ways. Dorin identifies two desirable and inter-dependent 
properties of artistic systems, each of them relating closely to the role of the human 
interactor, depending on whether this may be an artist constructing a work or a user 
of the work that wishes to explore it (305). In either case the interactors will have 
some expectations that should be met or that the artist (or the system) may prefer to 
shatter. In the later scenario, the user will typically expect an interactive aesthetic 
object to have its output influenced in some perceptible way by the interaction, for 
the most part expecting a direct and immediate feedback, even if a complete direct 
control of the system is not possible and if some of the influences are differed in time, 
only manifesting some time after the interaction. As with property 2, or rather, as 
312 Say shells, leaves, jellyfish, or, perhaps as the ultimate example of diversity, snowflakes.
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part of it, the effects of the interaction can be distributed temporally, permitting a 
combination of influences in the system, where both an immediate impact and long-
lasting effects that outlive the user’s contact with the system can coexist (306). The 
former scenario is addresses by a fifth property that is added to the list, thinking not 
so much about autonomous machines that exhibit creativity but rather in creative 
computational helpers to human artistic production.
5) Susceptibility to external control, so as to permit the definition of further con-
straints on the behavior of the machine by the artist operating it. If implemented, 
this property would have effects at all other levels, allowing the creation of a number 
of variations of a system that could nevertheless have their own, and idiosyncratic, 
unity.
1.5.14 Creative Human-Machine Collaboration
Considering the four essential properties of digital environments that Murray enun-
ciated, one can ask if and how they can be creatively explored in aesthetic systems, 
or rather, if they can per se generate creative outputs in or from a system, or if, on 
the other hand, they always work in articulation, contributing to the creative behav-
ior but not independently causing it. 
We can also try to infer to what extent authorship and creativity are associated or 
indissociable in the context of aesthetic computational systems, to what extent the 
nature of the media affects our perception of authorship, as it was historically de-
fined and understood in print and in traditional aesthetic media.
For Murray, what we discover in digital media is a procedural authorship (1997, 152), 
which she defines as the writing of the texts themselves, as in traditional media, as 
well as the writing of the rules by which the texts appear or make themselves be ac-
cessible to the reader (153), therefore, also as the writing of the rules for the interac-
tor’s involvement. This means that the author needs to establish “the properties of 
the objects and potential objects in the virtual world and the formulas for how they 
will relate to one another”, creating “not just a set of scenes but a world of narrative 
possibilities”. Murray compares the procedural author to a choreographer that sup-
plies rhythm, context, and the set of steps that will be performed, leaving it then 
to the system or the interactor to make “use of this repertoire of possible steps and 
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rhythms to improvise a particular dance among the many, many possible dances 
the author has enabled” (153).
As Murray notes, when mentioning interaction, we cannot discuss aesthetic com-
putational systems without considering participatory properties. As previously 
discussed, interaction usually denotes the articulation of the first two of the four 
properties: being procedural and participatory, and, even in those cases where the 
systems are clearly not directly interactive with their viewers, readers or users, the 
issue must nevertheless be considered because of direct or indirect interactions with 
other systems or between parts of the system.
In Cybertext (1997), Aarseth discusses how ‘interactive’, much as ‘computer generat-
ed’ are two concepts that are too unfocused to be useful as critical concepts (132). He 
states that what we usually call ‘computer literature’ (and by extension, what we call 
computer art, computer design, computer music) should more accurately be called 
‘cyborg literature’ (or cyborg art, design, music), in Haraway’s sense (2004), because 
it merges artificial and biological intelligences (Rosenberg 1994, 268), processes, and 
creative forces. Cyborg literature (or cyborg art, design, music, or aesthetics) can 
then be tentatively defined as the creation of aesthetic products through “a combina-
tion of human and mechanical activities” (Aarseth 1997, 134). Consequently, Aarseth 
outlines the three main positions of human-machine collaboration, given any ma-
chine that produces text or any other aesthetic output. 
Preprocessing, the first regime of collaboration implies the construction, program-
ming, configuration or loading of the machine by humans, presumably leaving it 
then to run autonomously, without any further human intervention. The second 
position, coprocessing, implies the effective real-time collaboration of the machine 
and the human, producing outputs in tandem. This is the regime of a tool or an in-
strument, or of what can be called a fully interactive system like a computer game. 
Finally, with postprocessing, the human operator selects some of the machine’s out-
puts, while excluding others, effectively acting as a filter to the machine or mak-
ing this act as a generator of elements to be composed. These three positions often 
operate together (pre- and co-, pre- and post-, or all of the three) although the hu-
man operator does not need to be the same in different positions (135). Based on an 
analysis of several cybertexts, Aarseth concludes that preprocessing is always pres-
ent — there must always be an initial act of programming — but that coprocessing 
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and postprocessing seem to be almost mutually exclusive, what seems to suggest 
that systems that use coprocessing are usually found in different contexts and are 
used to different purposes than those that use postprocessing (135). In other cyber-
arts it is not difficult to imagine that the three modes of processing can be present in 
the realization of the same output or piece, although at different moments. Taking 
music as an example, preprocessing can be developed during the programming of a 
system, coprocessing is developed while it is used for performance, and postprocess-
ing happens when the outputs of said performance are selected and manipulated 
to achieve a linear (recorded) composition, when they are fed through the original 
system, being further transformed or even when they are worked on in a live, real-
time context.
In the video works of the Austrian artist Lia, we can find that the three regimes of 
collaboration are developed in articulation for the production of the final pieces. 
Preprocessing takes place during the programming stage, where the system is devel-
oped for the generation of visual outputs, reacting to the musical input and to the 
performer’s interaction. 313 In the next stage she uses the system to generate several 
video streams by repeatedly performing it in real time and recording the results 
of these performances as linear videos. Finally, all the outputs gathered from the 
performances are used as takes for the final editing of the audiovisual piece, a fairly 
standard process, not much different from the editing process of most audiovisual 
productions: mixing, cutting and overlaying different takes from the coprocessing 
stage. If the aim of the first two stages is the production of original moving im-
ages from the code, the preexisting music and the interaction, in the third stage the 
goal is to compose these images into the best possible temporal composition, not so 
much their transformation, or the creation of new images.
313 Lia usually programs in Director, Processing or openFrameworks, but the operation principle is in-
dependent from the particular programming language or platform used, and, despite some changes over 
the years, has been very consistent since the late 1990s, when she produced her first video works.
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Fig. 67: Construction 76 (Lia 2008a).
When performing live, only the first two stages are present in Lia’s work. From pre-
processed code that runs feeding on both the musical input and Lia’s interaction, 
live video streams are generated.
 
Fig. 68: Lia performing with @c at the European Media Arts Festival 2008 in Osnabrück.
In Aarseth’s collaboration regimes, the human operators are always only partially 
in control, either because they can only operate in one of the regimes at any given 
time 314 or because even while operating the machine, some degree of control is in-
tentionally removed from the human operator and passed on to the machine opera-
tor. Commenting on the new roles that computers started to serve in arts, Christo-
pher William Tyler noted in 1976 that a possible definition of computer art would 
be that of art that is produced by the computer and that is also essentially out of 
314 We can of course consider that there may be exceptions to this mutual exclusivity of collaboration 
regimes, as for example in live coding or in any other systems or contexts in which pre- and coprocessing 
can be developed simultaneously, but generally speaking we may agree with a principle of mutual exclu-
sivity as proposed by Aarseth. Even in live coding we may speculate whether the pre- and coprocessing 
regimes are actually developed simultaneously or if on the other hand they are simply developed alter-
natively, given that programming is always a preprocessing act whereas interacting is a coprocessing act. 
When interacting through programming the artist is not really interacting with the running code but she 
is in reality changing the code that is or will be run, therefore she is developing an act of preprocessing.
Computation, Media and Creativity224
control of its operator (1976). Art that uses the computer as a canvas, an environ-
ment and a tool, but also — and more importantly — as a cocreator or a coauthor of 
the artistic artifacts. Although the first three are without a doubt important factors 
to be considered, there’s much more to be offered by the computer to art, when it is 
allowed to act with or as the creator, author or artist, both of the sensible pieces but 
also eventually of the program itself.
The computer can itself act as the creator by the ability to generate random (or 
pseudorandom) sequences of numbers. On a low level this can operate merely 
to produce the arrangement of patterns or the selection of elements for a de-
sign, and many computer artists have utilized this process to great effect. But 
in principle the random process can be used in the generation of the program 
itself; a metarandom organization of the generative process. In practice this is 
likely to lead to many programs which are inexecutable on a given computer 
system, but an analogous process operates in human creativity. Many false 
starts and abortive attempts may be made before a workable design is pro-
duced. (Tyler 1976)
Already in 1964, in an essay titled Strauss and the Electronic Future (1984b), Gould 
addresses the idea of multiple authorship as a result of the overlapping of the func-
tions of the composer, the performer and the consumer or reader. Two years later, 
in The Prospects of Recording 315 he expands: “because so many different levels of 
participation will, in fact, be merged in the final result, the individualized informa-
tion concepts which define the nature of identity and authorship will become very 
much less imposing” (1984a, 352). Gould recognizes how at the center of the techno-
logical debate of the time he found a new kind of listener, a listener that was more 
participant in the musical experience. 316 This new listener was no longer passively 
analytical, but was an associate of the composer, an associate “whose tastes, pref-
erences, and inclinations even now alter peripherally the experiences to which he 
gives his attention, and upon whose fuller participation the future of the art of mu-
sic waits.” (347) If “[f]orty years ago the listener had the option of flicking a switch 
inscribed ‘on’ and ‘off ’ and, with an up-to-date machine, perhaps modulating the 
315 A text that dealt more directly with the evolution of the recording studio to an instrument, and of 
recorded music as an art form.
316 According to Gould, the listener as participant was the single greatest achievement of the twentieth-
century recording industry, that ultimately may have done more to transform the listeners than the artists 
or the music they have produced.
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volume just a bit”, today, and due to the increasing variety of controls, one requires 
something more from the listener: analytical judgment (347). Recognizing that at 
the time those controls were still very primitive, Gould nevertheless believed that 
more advanced devices would in the future create a broader margin of intervention 
for the listener, thus diluting or sharing the responsibility in the final artistic artifact 
they enjoyed. At a point Gould referred to this new listener as a “threat, a potential 
usurper of power, an uninvited guest at the banquet of the arts, one whose presence 
threatens the familiar hierarchical setting of the music establishment” (347), but the 
tone of the article is nevertheless of enthusiasm, when thinking about the “evolution 
of the listener-consumer-participant” (350). Gould anticipated that the “venerable 
distinctions about the class structure within the musical hierarchy — distinctions 
that separated composer and performer and listener — will become outmoded” 
(351-52), although he didn’t think that this would necessarily contradict the grow-
ing specialization that took place since the Renaissance, leading to a return to the 
medieval status of the musician, “one who created and performed for the sake of his 
own enjoyment” (352).
This overlapping of professional and lay responsibility in the creative process 
does tend to produce a set of circumstances that superficially suggests the 
largely unilateral participation of the pre-Renaissance world. In fact, it is de-
ceptively easy to draw such parallels, to assume that the entire adventure of the 
Renaissance and of the world which it created was a gigantic historical error. 
But we are not returning to a medieval culture. It is a dangerous oversimplifi-
cation to suggest that under the influence of electronic media we could retro-
grade to some condition reminiscent of the pre-Renaissance cultural monolith. 
The technology of electronic forms makes it highly improbable that we will 
move in any direction but one of even greater intensity and complexity; and 
the fact that a participational overlapping becomes unashamedly involved with 
the creative process should not suggest a waning of the necessity for specialized 
techniques. (…) What will happen, rather, is that new participation areas will 
proliferate and that many more hands will be required to achieve the execution 
of a particular environmental experience. (…) The most hopeful thing about 
this process — about the inevitable disregard for the identity factor in the 
creative situation — is that it will permit a climate in which biographical data 
and chronological assumption can no longer be the cornerstone for judgments 
about art as it relates to environment. In fact, this whole question of individu-
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ality in the creative situation — the process through which the creative act 
results from, absorbs, and re-forms individual opinion — will be subjected to a 
radical reconsideration. (352)
Gould was discovering the implications of coprocessing in aesthetic systems, 317 al-
though the examples with which he interacted were certainly still a far cry from the 
procedural and the interactive systems that we are nowadays able to deploy. In the 
late 1960s, although interactive systems could be set and exhibited, the necessary 
resources for the creation and mass distribution of even the simplest interactive sys-
tems were still not available. He concludes the text with an optimistic note:
In the best of all possible worlds, art would be unnecessary. (…) The profes-
sional specialization involved in its making would be presumption. The gener-
alities of its applicability would be an affront. The audience would be the artist 
and their life would be art. (353)
Of course that musical work, either live or recorded, was already, as Moles wrote, a 
“systematically collective” (1966, 138) endeavor. Music has “at least two authors who 
participate nearly equally: the composer, who furnishes the operating scheme, and 
the performer, who ‘realizes’ the scheme” (138). Only in a few special cases could one 
attribute a work to a single author, and more often than not, in the complex hierar-
chy of classical composition, or in the growing field of studio productions of popular 
music, authorship would be diluted by multiple participants. Studio composition 
would however allow the composer himself to manipulate the sound on magnetic 
tape, allowing him to dispense with score, conductor or interpreter, directly creat-
ing the final recorded (and reproducible) sound. But with the exception of live diffu-
sions of these pieces, where the composer would also have a high degree of control 
over the acoustic qualities 318 of the space, the technological resources employed for 
the reproduction and amplification of the tape and the volume level of the playback, 
the actual instantiation of the piece — when for example reproduced in a home hi-fi 
equipment — would depend so much on the listener’s setup to make the listener an 
317 And also pointing to what years later Lessig would name the ‘Read/Write’ culture that digital cul-
tural tokens make possible (2008, 28) and that existed for a long time before music recording and other 
twentieth century’s electric media created and enforced a ‘Read/Only’, simple consumption culture.
318 Or the ‘ambient’, as Gould defines it.
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actual part of the process and the equipment or setup an instrument as important 
as any other.
Therefore, as Joyce defends, interaction, whether as simple as through the setting 
up and controlling of the diffusion conditions for musical recorded works, or as 
elaborate and complex as in Aarseth’s coprocessing, breeds coauthorship (1995, 193). 
Under the light of the traditional authorship, that of the Renaissance, of the printed 
text, of the Baroque and Romanticism, coprocessing and procedurality may even 
seem to altogether remove the author from the equation, to ‘kill’ it — in Michel Fou-
cault’s or in Roland Barthes’s sense (Sack 1996). 319 But as Murray (1997) shows, this 
question of authorship in formulaic media is not exclusive to computational media.
1.5.15 Procedural Authorship
In the 1930s, Greek scholars were distressed when literary analysis revealed 
that Homer (and other epic preliterate poets) created through a process that 
involved fitting stock phrases and formulaic narrative units together. Critics at 
that time resisted the thought that the great artist Homer was not original in 
the same way that modern print-based writers are expected to be. Now, with 
the advent of computer-based authorship, we are experiencing the opposite 
confusion. Contemporary critics are attributing authorship to interactors 
because they do not understand the procedural basis of electronic composition. 
The interactor is not the author of the digital narrative, although the interactor 
can experience one of the most exciting aspects of artistic creation — the thrill 
of exerting power over enticing and plastic materials. This is not authorship but 
agency. (Murray 1997, 153)
The idea of authorship was born from the written word and, more specifically, from 
print. If writing separates the word from the speaker, removing “the authority of its 
319 This issue was for example discussed by Pierre Boulez, in Alea (1991), a very critical text in which 
he concluded that the long term effects of the use of randomness or stochastic processes in composition 
would lead to the death of the artist or of the author. Boulez saw chance and randomness as a threat to 
structure, defending the author’s choice over the handing of choice to the system, and apparently not un-
derstanding that chance and randomness and the development of stochastic processes imply a far more 
difficult choice and creative act, not the simple choice but rather the definition of the space of possibilities 
that will frame the choice, and the context in which this will operate. He asserts that chance “is fun to 
begin with, but one soon wearies of it, all the more quickly for its being condemned never to renew itself” 
(27), making us wonder whether his definition of chance in this context wasn’t somewhat simplistic.
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author, erasing the line of its paternity” and “making of it an orphan” (Wark 2007, 
219), print removes knowledge from temporality, abstracts it and interiorizes the 
idea of authorship, of hierarchy and of authority (Joyce 1995, 93). 
Under manuscript conditions the role of being an author was a vague and 
uncertain one, like that of a minstrel. Hence, self-expression was of little inter-
est. Typography, however, created a medium in which it was possible to speak 
out loud and bold to the word itself, just as it was possible to circumnavigate 
the world of books previously locked upon a pluralistic world of monastic cells. 
Boldness of type created boldness of expression. (McLuhan 1964, 193-4)
Print encouraged a sense of closure, a sense that what is found in any printed text 
had been finalized, has been developed to a state of completion. According to Ong, 
this sense affects literary creations, as well as analytical philosophical or scientific 
works (1982, 129). It also affects other media, developed after print and the printed 
book: cinema and recorded music, to name just two, are linear media from which 
we have come to expect the same completion, the same sense of closure, the same 
representation of “the words of an author in definitive or ‘final’ form” (130). The book 
is authoritative, complete, immutable, untranslatable even, because translation is 
an act of transformation and as such it is an interference with the authorial voice. 
Evolved from mechanical reproduction, books are analog tokens, sharing limita-
tions that were common to all analog tokens, limitations that prevented copying and 
manipulation of their contents. 320 As Lessig so well puts it, (2004; 2006; 2008) the 
code of these analog tokens constrained the ways in which they could be accessed 
and or manipulated. All analog media shared these limitations in some way, and 
all of them, in some way, inherited from the printed book the role and hierarchical 
stand of the author. The introduction of digital technologies and media, however, 
brought us to what Bolter called the ‘late age of print’, when books and analog to-
kens slowly started to give way to fundamentally different digital tokens and to be 
effectively phased out by these.
320 “For most of the twentieth century, these tokens were analog. They all therefore shared certain limi-
tations: first, any (consumer-generated) copy was inferior to the original; and second, the technologies 
to enable a consumer to copy an RO token were extremely rare. No doubt there were recording studios 
aplenty in Nashville and Motown. But for the ordinary, R[ead]O[nly] tokens were to be played, not ma-
nipulated. And while they might legally be shared, every lending meant at least a temporary loss for the 
lender. If you borrowed my LPs, I didn’t have them. If you used my record player to play Bach, I couldn’t 
listen to Mozart.” (Lessig 2008, 37)
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In this late age, print (and all the print-like analog cultural tokens) remains indis-
pensable, but, according to Bolter, it “no longer seems indispensable” (2001, 2), some-
thing that places these media in a very strange condition. Books 321 become obscure 
pleasures whose time has passed (Joyce 1995, 97), they do not loose their intrinsic 
value but cease to be the role models or examples for the media to come. Simulta-
neously, almost conversely, they are the structural models or the foundations over 
which the new media incunabula 322 are being developed. Printed books and media 
are still providing much of the raw materials and the stylistics for what are still 
the first stages of hypertext publishing (Landow 1994, 23), much in the same sense 
as physical, analog, sound recordings are providing them for digitally created and 
distributed music, cinema, television and video to digitally created animated images 
or audiovisuals, and plastic arts to many digitally created artworks. All of them are 
providing the idea of the author, even when this single top-down creator is perhaps 
not much more than a very relative notion at best, or a fiction, 323 in the worst case. 324
321 And by extension, analog tokens of any sort, like printed matter, vinyl discs, magnetic tapes, most 
broadcasts except in a few scenarios live broadcasts, etc. As Joyce so elegantly puts it, “We live, you and I 
and our students, in (…) the late age of print. [Where] we are washed first with the four a.m. or fin de siècle 
sense of lateness, but then, belatedly, comes the undertow, the departed sense of the late, dead, lamented; 
what we do not want to see go and yet value all the more in the parting. In the late age of print, printed 
books flash through the culture, disappearing into the ether with the speed of electrons.” (Joyce 1995, 93)
322 “In 1455, Gutenberg invented the printing press — but not the book as we know it. Books printed 
before 1501 are called incunabula; the word is derived from Latin for swaddling clothes and is used to indi-
cate that these books are the work of a technology still in its infancy. It took fifty years of experimentation 
and more to establish such conventions as legible typefaces and proof sheet corrections; page numbering 
and paragraphing; and title pages, prefaces, and chapter divisions, which together made the published 
book a coherent means of communication. The garish videogames and tangled Web sites of the current 
digital environment are part of a similar period of technical evolution, part of a similar struggle for the 
conventions of coherent communication.” (Murray 1997, 28).
323 Highly collaborative media like cinema or videogames, or crossmedia enterprises like media fran-
chises, developing across cinema, recorded music, literature, videogames, comics, television, World Wide 
Web and whatever other media they can spread to, can hardly be considered to be individual creations, 
or even as the creations of a small group of authors working cooperatively. There are certainly producers, 
directors, writers, actors, cinematographers, sound designers, composers, performers, set designers, art 
directors, creative consultants, and several other specialists that provide creative inputs along the process, 
but the totality of the output or outputs of such endeavors cannot be attributed to the authorship of a 
single individual or identifiable group of individuals, rather it should be seen as the outcome of modes 
of production that in some ways can be described as being corporate enterprises but in some others can 
perhaps be best described as creative societies (regardless of whether or not there are corporate interests 
involved).
324 Analog media are also somehow expected to provide the economic and legal models for the new and 
emerging digital media, although as it would be expected, these haven’t always proved to be adequate, as 
was discussed, among others, by Barabási (2003), Lessig (2001; 2006; 2008) and Anderson (2009).
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In the late age of print, as we discover an era of collective intelligence, we start wit-
nessing several changes in the traditional roles of cultural, artistic and media pro-
duction. These are changes in the relations that are established between the authors 
and the readers, the producers and the spectators, the creators and the interpret-
ers. All these roles are fusing into a circuit of expression, what Lévy calls a ‘cultural 
attractor’ in cyberspace (1997, 121), that can be summarized as follows: 1) Messages 
now revolve around the individual receiver — the opposite of the situation of the 
previous mass media — regardless of their typology and orchestration; 2) Roles 
blend into a reading-writing continuum, extending from machine and network de-
signers to the ultimate recipients, each helping to sustain the activity of others, thus 
diluting the signature or the authorship; 3) The distinction between the message and 
the work of art fades. What was previously envisaged as a micro territory attributed 
to an author is now subject to sampling, mixing and reutilization (121) under a Read/
Write logic of operation. 325 Changes also happen at the level of the traditional divi-
sion of art into genres, which, one could argue, is becoming progressively pointless 
in cyberspace. “Through transmitting onto the internet, everything is sampled into 
a digital version, which accentuates some of its attributes and other (traditional) lose 
significance. Hypertext, net-art and new forms of art, the process of cut, paste, rip 
and remix are natural information patterns of behaviour. Freedom of interconnec-
tion of anything crashes linear ways of expression and thinking. Interactivity wipes 
out and reverses the roles of author/audience.” (oRx-qX 2008, 43) Robert Milthorp 
notes that in the cyberspace of the foreseeable future, both the notions of what we 
recognize as originality and authorship are problematic. They are not only subject 
to the nature of ownership of the technologies, the networks or other applications 
but, in a culture that is characterized by the proliferation of images, the attachment 
to the blank page as a symbol of imagination and creativity that was the heritage of 
nineteenth-century art, the creation ex nihilo, has started to be abandoned by con-
temporary creators. As he sees it, both in life and in art, image-making (and creation 
in general) is now “characterized by pastiche, construction and deconstruction, ap-
propriation and alteration of existing images”, and the “romantic notion of author-
ship is now mediated by the demands of a culture in which images, like information, 
are currency.” (Milthorp 1996, 144)
325 “Depending on the emerging pragmatics of creation and communication, a nomadic distribution 
of information will fluctuate around an immense deterritorialized semiotic plane. It is therefore natural 
that creative effort be shifted from the message itself to the means, processes, languages, dynamic archi-
tectures, and environments used for its implementation.” (Lévy 1997, 121)
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Lévy also points to how some of the questions that have been asked by artists since 
the end of the nineteenth century will become even more urgent in this late age of 
print, with the emergence of digital technologies and cyberspace. These are ques-
tions that are directly concerned with the question of the frame of the work (and 
therefore also of the artist’s or author’s work): “the limits of a work, its exhibition, re-
ception, reproduction, distribution, interpretation, and the various forms of separa-
tion they imply” (1997, 122). He thinks that under the circumstances of the ongoing 
shift, an extreme form of deterritorialization cannot be contained and that a leap 
into a fundamentally new space will be required. Under the light of the mutations 
in the socio-technical environment in which works of art and aesthetic artifacts are 
produced and distributed, will it still be reasonable to even speak of a work of art in 
the new context?
For the past several centuries in the West, artistic phenomena have been pre-
sented roughly as follows: a person (artist) signs an object or individual mes-
sage (the work), which other persons (recipients, the public, critics) perceive, 
appreciate, read, interpret, evaluate. Regardless of the function of the work 
(religious, decorative, subversive, etc.) or its capacity to transcend function 
in search of the core of enigma and emotion that inhabits us, it is inscribed 
within a conventional pattern of communication. Transmitter and receiver are 
clearly differentiated and their roles uniquely assigned. The emerging techno-
cultural environment, however, will encourage the development of new kinds 
of art, ignoring the separation between transmission and reception, composi-
tion and interpretation. Nevertheless, the ongoing mutation creates a realm of 
the possible that may never be realized or only incompletely. Our primary goal 
should be to prevent closure from occurring too quickly, before the possible 
has an opportunity to deploy the variety of its richness. With the disappear-
ance of a traditional public, this new form of art will experiment with different 
modalities of communication and creation. (122)
Rather than using the computer as a remediator, a mere simulator or a playback 
device for traditional media assets like sounds, moving or still images, artists and 
designers are starting to discover the computer’s use to create native computational 
forms, such as hypertexts, games or other procedural artifacts (Mateas 2005). Rather 
than distributing a message to recipients that are outside the process of creation 
and that are invited to give meaning to a work of art or aesthetic message only 
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belatedly, artists and designers now attempt to construct environments, systems of 
communication and production, collective events that imply their receivers and that 
transform interpreters into actors (Lévy 1997, 123). Umberto Eco’s ‘open work’ (1962) 
prefigures such an arrangement, where the recipients are invited, even required, to 
fill in the blanks, to choose among possible meanings, to confront the divergences 
among their interpretations, magnifying and exploring the possibilities of the un-
finished work. But according to Lévy, “art of implication doesn’t constitute a work 
of art at all, even one that is open or indefinite”, it rather brings forth a process 
and places us, the readers, receivers, spectators, interactors, wreaders, within the 
creative cycle, a “living environment of which we are always already the coauthors” 
(1997, 123).
1.5.16 Open Works
In the Opera Aperta, Eco argues that literary texts are fields of meaning, rather than 
strings of meaning, and that they should be understood as being open, internally 
dynamic, and psychologically engaged. Once that words do not have simple lexical 
meanings but rather operate in the context of utterance, the most lively and more 
rewarding texts are those that are open and most active between mind and society 
and life, rather than the closed texts that limit their potential understanding to a 
single, unequivocal line. Eco saw every fruition of a work as a simultaneous inter-
pretation and execution, because every reenactment, reading or experiencing of the 
work relives it in an original perspective (1962, 68), but he also noted how works as 
Berio’s or Stockhausen’s are ‘open’ in a less metaphorical and far more tangible sense, 
because they are to some extent, unfinished pieces (68). This implies a fundamen-
tal understanding (and empowering) of the performer and her role but also of the 
audience of the work and their role as readers and interpreters. Artists from past 
historical periods were certainly far from being creatively conscious of this reality, 
while contemporary artists, on the other hand, not only embrace this openness as an 
inevitable fact as they also choose it as a productive program and present it in ways 
that actually maximize it (69).
Creators present their audiences with works that are waiting to be finished. Works 
that demand to be finished, but that are designed to prevent closure from occurring 
too quickly (Jenkins 2006, 97). The creators do not know how the work will be fin-
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ished but according to Eco (and Murray) they know that once the work is finished, 326 
however it is finished, it will always be their own work, not another work. In the end 
of the interpretative dialogue, the form that is built is the creator’s form, although 
it is organized in a way that the creator could not have predicted, because it was the 
creator that proposed the possibilities, organizing them, orienting them and endow-
ing them with the organic capabilities of development (Eco 1962, 90).
Eco defines open works in movement as characterized by the invitation to execute 
the work with the author — an invitation to “active design”, according to Joyce, to 
the participation in en evolving narrative that is written whether by reader or writer 
(1995, 193). There are works that although physically concluded, nevertheless remain 
open to a continuous germination of internal relations that the audience must dis-
cover and choose in the act of perceiving the totality of the perceivable stimuli, and 
every work of art, even if produced according to an explicit or implicit poetics of 
necessity is substantially open to a virtually endless series of possible readings, each 
of them leading the work to be relived according to a perspective, a taste, a personal 
execution (Eco 1962, 91-92).
Open works are works in progress. And they are certainly works where, as Lévy 
notes, the accent has shifted to progress (1997, 123). Works whose embodiment is 
manifested in movements, places, collective dynamics, but no longer in individu-
als. They are “art without a signature” or art with multiple signatures. They are, we 
could add, works in process, where the accent has shifted to the process. According 
to Lévy, the classic work of art is a gamble, and the more it “transmutes the language 
on which it rides, be it musical, plastic, verbal, or other, the more its author runs the 
risk of incomprehension and obscurity”. The larger is the degree of change or fusion 
to which its language is subjected, the larger the stake, the greater is the potential 
gain: “the creation of an event in the history of a culture” (123). However, a work is 
open as long as it is a work, as long as the boundaries of the possibility space are de-
fined and recognizable, as Eco underlines. Beyond this limit, the openness is noise 
(Eco 1962, 194).
326 Or deliberately left open by the audience, something that is in itself also a closure and conclusion, 
when the reader decides to terminate the reading experience by halting it at a given point, regardless of 
whether the author would find this to be an adequate point of conclusion. But closure is also, in a sense, 
determined by the design. Not by the design of the artwork but by the mechanics of the medium, that may 
or may not allow the interruption of the experience at the user’s discretion.
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1.5.17 Process Intensity
Trying to describe the relationship between computation and media assets, Chris 
Crawford introduced the term ‘process intensity’, described as the ratio of computa-
tion to the size of the media assets that the system manipulates (Mateas 2005) or the 
degree to which a program emphasizes processes instead of data. Higher process 
intensity — or as Crawford puts it, a higher “crunch per bit ratio” — suggests that 
a program has greater potential for meaningful expression (Bogost 2008, 122). If a 
computational aesthetic artifact primarily triggers media playback in response to 
interaction, it has a low process intensity, as the code is doing relatively little work, 
transferring existing information from the hard drive or server to the visual or au-
dial interfaces with the user. As the artifact manipulates and combines these media 
assets, its process intensity increases, all the way until the artifact algorithmically 
generating images and sound that make no use of assets produced offline, when we 
can say that the process intensity is at a maximum. According to Crawford, process 
intensity is directly related to the richness of interactivity, and as it decreases, the 
author must provide a greater number of offline assets to respond to the different 
possible interactions (Mateas 2005). As the author puts the computational system 
in charge of producing (or dynamically selecting) the media assets to be used, the 
process intensity will increase, resulting in a richer experience. We may consider 
that in doing so, the designer will effectively be empowering the system, promoting 
it (at least partially) to a coauthor of the work, at times more so than the coprocess-
ing interactor or wreader.
But only part of the creative process can be passed on to the computational process, 
at least while this doesn’t have a sufficient autonomy to pass the Lovelace test (Ariza 
2009, 64). Up to this date, no system has yet been developed to such a level of au-
tonomy, therefore those works that we call computational, procedural or generative, 
will at least for now continue to be seen as human works. They can be regarded as 
collaborations between the human author and the machine, between these and the 
users, but not yet as pure computational creations. Collaboration, in this sense (or in 
Aarseth’s sense), does not require machine autonomy.
The work of art is not a checklist or the sum of individual techniques or experiments 
but, according to Pierre Francastel 327 it is rather the creation of a model. Like all im-
327 1900-1970.
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ages, texts or sounds, a work of art incorporates different qualities, while also sug-
gesting new paths, therefore “it possesses, by definition, qualities that stimulate the 
imagination of its author and its viewers” (2000, 328).
1.5.18 Ergodic Literature
ergodic adjective Mathematics relating to or denoting systems or processes 
with the property that, given sufficient time, they include or impinge on all 
points in a given space and can be represented statistically by a reasonably 
large selection of points.
Aarseth defines cybertexts (and by extension cyberarts) as all those where the au-
thor, the process and/or the aesthetic artifact (or work) focuses on the mechanic 
organization of parts, by positing the intricacies of the medium as an integral part 
of the artistic exchange (1997, 1). This designation is rooted in Wiener’s Cybernetics 
(1948) and is applied to artifacts that are particularly centered on their consumer, 
user, reader or interpreter. While with traditional media the performance of the 
audience may be seen as taking place solely in their heads, as an interpretative and 
subtextual effort, the audience of cyber arts may also perform in an “extranoematic 
sense” (Aarseth 1997, 1), contributing to the development of a process where the user 
will effectuate a semiotic sequence through a selective movement that is a “work 
of physical construction that the various concepts of ‘reading’ do not account for” 
(1). Aarseth defines this phenomenon as ‘ergodic’, “using a term appropriated from 
physics that derives from the Greek words ergon and hodos, meaning ‘work’ and 
‘path’”, describing texts (or artworks) where “nontrivial effort is required to allow 
the reader to traverse” them (1). It is this ‘work’ that qualifies as ergodic (Bogost 
2006, 130), the added layer of difficulty that it creates, the challenge it poses but also 
the rewards and gratifications that it gives the user.
The focus of Aarseth’s study are texts. With a background in comparative literature, 
he unsurprisingly develops his work through a comparative approach, extending 
the definition of both cybertext and ergodic literature to a broader domain than 
that of the digital media, by including configurative analog texts such as the I Ching 
and Queneau’s Cent mille milliards de poèmes, works where we can identify a soft-
ware layer or a procedural nature, despite their implementation in analogue media. 
Beyond this, we also believe that many of his conclusions can safely be extrapolated 
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to other media, as long as one can identify a procedural or ergodic quality in them. 
Cybertexts such as “hypertexts, adventure games, and so forth are not texts the way 
the average literary work is a text” (Aarseth 1997, 2), they produce verbal structures, 
which makes them similar to other literary phenomena, but they are much more 
than this, because they also exist in a paraverbal dimension that sometimes is not 
clearly visible. Each cybertext is a “machine for the production of variety of expres-
sion” (3). Reduced to this bare minimum, the definition undoubtedly serves other 
cyberarts well, regardless of whether the expressions produced are in the form of 
verbal structures, images still or moving, or audial phenomena.
Any work demands an interpretative effort (however small) from its reader. This 
interpretative function is one of four user functions that Aarseth lists in his model 
for a typology of textual communication developed in Cybertext. 328 If the interpreta-
tive function is present in any text, 329 Aarseth defines ergodic texts as those where 
besides this we can also find at least one of the other three functions: explorative, 
configurative, or textonic. The explorative function is that in which the user must 
decide which path or paths to follow along the reading of a text, being constrained 
or not by the system. This is the case with Joyce’s Afternoon, a Story (1990), or Milo-
rad Pavić’s 330 Damascene, a Tale for Computer and Compasses (1998), hypertext fic-
tions with a fixed number of scriptons 331 (Aarseth 1997, 62) through which the user is 
invited to travel, building her narrative along the path that is traversed. Much like 
with the I Ching or a game of landscapes, all the user can do is to reconfigure the 
multiple possible arrangements of the parts of the system. As a consequence of this 
rearrangement, different parts of the narrative are discovered or missed, different 
events take place or do not happen, or take place at alternative chronological points 
in the story as it is read by the user. According to Bolter, in texts like Afternoon, one 
does not get lost in the story, but it is rather the experience of moving through the 
story on a trajectory partly determined by her own choices that captures the user 
(2001, 44). One is not involved in the story world, as it so often happens with tradi-
tional texts, but is involved by the network of connections that is laid by the text’s 
328 We will delve into all of the seven variables and its possible values in Aarseth’s model in chapter 
three of this work.
329 “If all the decisions a reader makes about a text concern its meaning, then there is only one user func-
tion involved, here called interpretation.” (Aarseth 1997, 64)
330 1929-2009.
331 Scriptons are the unbroken series of one or more textons as they are projected by the text and, ideally, 
read by the reader, although this is not always the case.
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system (which is the text itself). The user generates different narrative strands while 
following the links that are suggested by the text. 332
Fig. 69: Splash screen from Afternoon, a Story (Joyce 1990).
Fig. 70: Map of Victory Garden (Moulthrop 1992).
The configurative function is that in which scriptons can be chosen or created by the 
user. This is not what happens in hypertext fictions like Afternoon or Victory Garden, 
because by navigating through discrete and precomposed pages, the user merely 
explores a structure of fixed and immutable scriptons — the contents of each page 
are fixed and inalterable, what is open to the user’s manipulation is the path between 
332 These links can be implicit or explicit, static or dynamic, as we will later see.
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pages, the relations and connections, regardless if these are fixed within the system 
or if they are dynamic, as they are nevertheless out of the user’s control. In a work as 
Cent mille milliards de poèmes, one may create new scriptons from the 140 textons 333 
contained in the book, and by doing so, one effectively composes new pages in the 
book. In Cent mille milliards de poèmes, the sonnets are the scriptons and the user’s 
goal in manipulating the book (or traversing it, to use Aarseth’s terminology) is to 
compose one or several of the 1014 different possible pages. The same function would 
be in operation in Mozart’s Musikalisches Würfelspiel im C or in Kircher’s Arca 
Musarithmica, where the textons (or their musical equivalents) 334 were recombined 
to form new scriptons.
Fig. 71: Cent mille milliards de poèmes (Queneau 1961).
In an adventure game 335 such as Colossal Cave Adventure (Crowther 1976), the user 
will typically play in a world that is built from a fixed number of textons, from where 
a variable number of scriptons are created depending on the progress of the play. 
333 Textons are the basic elements of textuality, “best conceived as an arbitrarily long string of graph-
emes” and “identified by its relation to the other units as constrained and separated by the conventions or 
mechanisms of their mother text” (Aarseth 1997, 64).
334 In these cases, although the end-purpose of the systems was the production of music, the systems 
themselves worked not with sound but with musical notation, therefore with printed matter, or text. In 
this context we can describe Mozart’s or Kircher’s scores as textons, that were combined by the users to 
form longer (and complete) scores that we can describe as scriptons.
335 This type of video game is named after the first game that explored this style of gameplay: Colos-
sal Cave Adventure, also known as ADVENT, Colossal Cave or simply Adventure. The term describes the 
gameplay style and not the kind of story or plot being developed — Adventure was a fantasy game, draw-
ing elements from reality but also from fantasy novels like the works of Tolkien. In adventure games, the 
protagonist’s role is assumed by the player, that enters an interactive history that is narrated while it is de-
veloped. In the late 1970s and early 1980s most of the games in the genre, including the original Adventure 
were text based, describing scenes, characters and actions through text and accepting user commands 
through text. In the early 1980s the first graphical adventure games were released, originally relying on 
images to describe ambient and location more than action, and still requiring the player to use text to 
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In some adventure games, the same player actions will always produce the same 
response from the system, while on other games pseudorandom functions may lead 
the system’s response to change the response but, regardless of these random varia-
tions, the ultimate cause of the ongoing generation of scriptons by the system can be 
traced to the user’s actions within it. 
Fig. 72: Colossal Cave Adventure (Crowther 1976).
Finally, the textonic function is that where either the textons or the traversal func-
tion can be permanently added to the text, remaining available for further read-
ers beyond the one that adds them or to this at later readings — as is the case, for 
example, with multi-user dungeons, with MMORPGs 336 or with other systems that 
receive and preserve user-generated tokens. In an ergodic text there is a cybernetic 
feedback loop between the text (and the system that generates the text) and the user, 
with information flowing from text to user, through the interpretative function, and 
back again, through one or more of the other functions (Aarseth 1997, 65).
Something that must not be overlooked in Aarseth’s definition of ergodic literature 
is that the variable expression of these works does not necessarily mean that they 
have an ambiguous meaning. When studying a forking text as a hypertext, many 
literary theorists may tend to claim that all texts are produced as a linear sequence 
during reading, and as such, the reader would always be reading the same text, al-
though choosing from different sections of the text while doing so. Aarseth’s study 
focuses not so much on what is being read but “on what was being read from” (1997, 
3). In a cybertext this is a crucial distinction to make, and a rather different distinc-
interact with the system. Over the years many variations on the genre were developed, ranging from the 
pure-text versions to very complex audiovisual interactive platforms.
336 Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games.
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tion from that that we can find in other media, where we can identify a script or 
play and varying performances that originate from it. 337 When a Cybertext is read 
(or, we could alternatively say, when it is executed or performed) one is “constantly 
reminded of inaccessible strategies and paths not taken, voices not heard” (3). Each 
decision of the user will affect the accessibility of different potential or real parts of 
the text, and the user may never know the exact consequences of her choices, that 
is, exactly what she missed. “This is very different from the ambiguities of a linear 
text. And inaccessibility, it must be noted, does not imply ambiguity but, rather, an 
absence of possibility — an aporia.” (3)
This aporia, however, is significantly different from those one may experience in 
codex, or non-ergodic literature. In non-ergodic texts one may be unable to make 
sense of a particular part of the text even though one has access to the entire text. In 
ergodic literature, the aporia prevents one from making sense of the whole because 
one may not have access to a particular part of the text that becomes central to the 
text’s understanding. “Aporia here becomes a trope, an absent pièce de résistance 
rather than the usual transcendental resistance of the (absent) meaning of a difficult 
passage.” (91)
Aarseth finds a poetics of conflict that develops from the complementarity of anoth-
er trope, that of epiphany. “This is the sudden revelation that replaces the aporia, a 
seeming detail with an unexpected, salvaging effect: the link out.” (91) The epiphany 
is the resolution of the aporia, it is immanent, a planned construct rather than an 
unplanned contingency, but it is not always necessarily programmed by the designer, 
rather it is often structurally indissociable from the medium, part of the medium’s 
nature and of the nature of the ergodic experience that is developed in it. This pair of 
master tropes, aporia and epiphany “constitutes the dynamic of hypertext discourse: 
the dialectic between searching and finding typical of games in general”, the pair is 
not “a narrative structure but constitutes a more fundamental layer of human expe-
rience, from which narratives are spun” (92).
337 These are hierarchical and explicit relationships, so the distinction between the play and the perfor-
mance, between the script and the film, between the score and the music that is executed is so big as to 
effectively turn the distinction trivial (Aarseth 1997, 3) and the two parts into almost different works, with 
different authorship attributions in many cases.
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The difference between narratives, games, and hypertexts is conceptualized by Aars-
eth from ergodics, description and narration. Whereas a game exists only at the er-
godic level, there is action and the paths that result from the actions, in a video game 
one can find a description (developed at the semiotic level in the interface, as screen 
icons, sounds, text, etc) and ergodics (the succession of events) but one doesn’t find 
narration. 338 In hypertexts one can find all three levels occurring simultaneously: 
description, narration and ergodics, the first two in the text itself, the later in the 
reader’s choices (95). 
There are (…) two main problems in contemporary computer-generated poet-
ics. One is the use of traditional literary genres and formats as ideals of the 
new literature, thus setting up unrealistic (and irrelevant) goals. The other is 
the uncritical use of traditional literary theory in the criticism of participatory 
literature, thus hindering an investigation of these new ergodic forms that will 
emphasize how they differ from narrative media. Unlike the textual aporias of 
hypertexts and adventure games, the aporias of computer-generated literature 
can be located in the programers’ ideological attachment to narrative ideals. 
I suspect the epiphany of poetologists of the computer-generated school will 
come only when they see this as a problem.
To achieve interesting and worthwhile computer-generated literature, it is 
necessary to dispose of the poetics of narrative literature and to use the com-
puter’s potential for combination and world simulation in order to develop new 
genres that can be valued and used on their own terms. Instead of trying to 
create a surrogate author, efforts in computer-generated literature should focus 
on the computer as a literary instrument: a machine for cybertext and ergodic 
literature. (…) the computer as literary agent ultimately points beyond narra-
338 According to Aarseth, the game may of course be narrated in a number of ways, “but like football, 
narration is not part of the game”, it is external to it (1997, 95). As in some sport simulators, narration can 
be included in the game, but this narration (as voice-over or audio commentary) will not constitute a nar-
rative layer, because it will not be relating the events after the fact but rather will present a synchronous 
description of the events as they occur. In some cases one can find a true narrative layer included in com-
puter games, when sports simulations or action games allow the playback and review of previous games 
— offering access to the entire duration of the game play or to selected excerpts. In these cases, however, 
one is temporarily removed from the video game experience, characterized as it is by the description and 
the ergodics, and is led to a narrative experience, where descriptive and narrative elements alone exist, 
and where generally speaking, there is no ergodic level (and one is presented with a linear experience of 
the narration of the facts after their experience).
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tive and toward ergodic modes — dialogic forms of improvisation and free play 
between the cyborgs that today’s literate computer users (and their programs) 
have become. What we need in order to achieve this is not an automated 
playwright or narrator but simulated worlds with emergent intrigants, interest-
ing enough to make real people want to spend time and creative energy there. 
(Aarseth 1997, 141)
1.5.19 Ergodic Media
Can we possibly extrapolate from Aarseth’s analysis in order to study other media 
besides those that develop and communicate through textual structures? Aarseth’s 
definition of a text is of an object whose primary function is to relay verbal informa-
tion (1997, 62). From this definition two observations immediately follow: “1) a text 
cannot operate independently of some material medium, and this influences its be-
havior, and 2) a text is not equal to the information it transmits” (62). In this context, 
‘information’ is understood as a series of signs which may or may not make sense to 
a particular observer.
The text consists of the textual structures and of their traversal function, the mecha-
nism through which the signs are presented to the user. If transcoded to an electron-
ic medium, a codex text retains most (or all) of its characteristics if analyzed under 
this definition. In terms of script, a paper copy of Don Quixote or an electronic 
copy that is read on screen are the same, although Aarseth concedes that “the ink-
cellulose relationship promotes and impedes different rituals of use than does the 
electron-phosphor relationship” (1994, 58). The speed of access is certainly altered, as 
well as some of the environmental factors that affect the experience of reading, but 
the script, the sequence of signs that are offered to the user — the text itself — is not 
fundamentally altered in any way.
Much the same happens with the transcoding of audiovisuals from analog to digital 
formats: videos or film transcoded to DVD, analog television transcoded to digital, 
sound recordings transcoded from magnetic tape or vinyl to CD or other digital 
formats, etc. In most (or all) of these cases the sequences of signs, the information 
that is presented to the user is not fundamentally altered, although the rituals and 
contexts of use can be changed. Considering particular transcodings we can find 
that sometimes elements of random access that were not present in the original me-
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dia are added, like chapter marks in DVD versions of cinema pieces, but again, these 
do not fundamentally alter the nature of the information being communicated or 
the essence of the aesthetic artifact. Generally speaking, both the information struc-
tures and the traversal functions remain unaltered.
Returning to Aarseth’s definition of text, we could broaden it to define an aesthetic 
artifact as an object (or system of objects that is read as a unified whole) whose 
primary function is to relay information. An aesthetic artifact cannot operate in-
dependently from some material technology 339 that influences its behavior and the 
sequence of signals that are conveyed by this technology are not equal to the infor-
mation it transmits.
Any medium consists of its information structures — textual, visual, audial or multi 
modal — and of their traversal functions. If the user function is merely interpreta-
tive the medium can be considered to be linear (although the particular narrative 
structures that are developed within it may not be linear at all) or non-ergodic, oth-
erwise we may consider it to be ergodic, as it forces the user to a nontrivial effort in 
its experimentation.
This however, is not enough to fully describe the medium or the artwork, because 
the ergodic experience is not necessarily a nonlinear or nonsequential 340 experience. 
339 Or ‘medium’, the term Aarseth uses and that we will try to avoid in this context, as we find it almost 
synonymous or downright equivalent to ‘aesthetic artifact’. The reasons why we chose to use the latter 
term over the previous are related to 1) emphasizing a particular context or purpose of the communica-
tion media and the uniqueness of being carriers of aesthetic information or of carrying the information 
through aesthetics; and 2) marking a clearer distinction between ‘medium’ as previously used by Aarseth 
and the meaning we would like it to have in this work. By ‘material’ we do not mean physical or in any 
way necessarily tangible, we simply mean perceivable to the human senses.
340 These terms were originally used by Nelson in his discussions of hypertext. They have since been 
criticized and even rejected by other hypertext theorists, that suggested the alternative use of the terms 
‘multilinear’ and ‘multisequential’ (Landow 2006). Aarseth defends the use of Nelson’s terms: “But if the 
paths fork, with at most one direct path between any two nodes, as is usually the case in hypermedia, we 
can no longer talk about paths in any other sense than as a potential path, a course or itinerary. The lines 
of such a net are not identical to the possible courses, since the same line can occur at different positions in 
a single course. So, should we decide to use the term multilinear, what lines are we referring to, the lines of 
the net or the lines of the courses? If we refer to the individual lines of the net, the term multilinear makes 
only trivial sense and could, in fact, be wrong, if the whole net can be subsumed under only one line. If we 
refer to the courses, multicursal would be a much more accurate term than multilinear, indicating that the 
lines are produced by movement rather than drawn in advance. But is nonlinear better? Can a structure 
consisting of lines be nonlinear? On the (trivial) level of the line, no; but on the level of the structure as 
a whole, yes. The sign + is made of two lines, but its form is not linear, as opposed to the signs <, |, or O. 
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The ergodic experience can happen with strictly linear experiences, from which one 
of the purest examples can be found in William Gibson’s Agrippa (a Book of the 
Dead) (1992), a book published as a writable computer diskette. This was a strictly 
linear text, written and designed to be read in a single seating, in the most linear of 
ways. Agrippa conditioned the reader to read linearly, by presenting itself as black 
text on white background, scrolling automatically from the bottom to the top of the 
screen, and not allowing the reader to control any aspect of the reading experience, 
from speed to direction, etc. This conditioning of linear reading was much stronger 
than it would be possible in a traditional book format, where the linearity of the 
reading would be left to the reader and not to the system. 341 Furthermore, besides 
forcing this linear (and timed, at around 20 minutes) reading, the system of Agrippa 
also ensured that the reading could not be repeated, by using a custom-built RSA 342 
encryption algorithm that would effectively destroy the information of the text after 
it had been displayed one single time. Agrippa displays an unusual combination 
of characteristics that make it become a one of a kind text, incomparable to other 
cybertexts.
If topological shapes are either linear or nonlinear, then hypermedia works, as opposed to hypermedia 
itineraries, must be topologically nonlinear.
The discrepancy between Nelson and his critics, therefore, can easily be explained: while he is talk-
ing of text and writings (as constructed objects), they are talking of readings and writing (as temporal 
process) — or at least they are not taking that distinction into account. Yet this is a distinction that must 
be made.” (Aarseth 1997, 44) Concluding with “In other words, a piece of writing on paper or a computer 
screen should not be confused with the act of reading it. To say that hypertext readings must be linear is 
just another way of saying that they are temporal, which again simply refers to the temporality of our ex-
istence. It is therefore not valid as an argument against the term nonlinearity as used in this context, just 
as the structure of nonlinearity or multilinearity is not an argument for liberation, as Rosenberg (1994) 
points out.” (46)
341 The book is not an intrinsically linear (or nonlinear) format. It is, more exactly, a random access 
format that is “well suited to linear discourse but is just as accommodating toward nonlinear discourse, as 
an encyclopedia or a forking-path story” (Aarseth 1997, 46). If it is true that in general the nonlinear text 
types perform better in a computational system than in paper, Agrippa shows that those texts whose lin-
ear integrity cannot be compromised also perform better in these media. “Even hypertext can be a much 
stronger linear medium than the codex, should its author decide so (…) [a] hypertext path with only one 
(unidirectional) link between text chunks is much more authoritarian and limiting than (say) a detective 
novel, in which the reader is free to read the ending at any time” (47).
342 Rivest, Shamir and Adleman public-key cryptography.
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Fig. 73: Start screen and “I hesitated…”, the beginning of poem as it scrolls up screen (Gibson 1992).
 
Fig. 74: “laughing, in the mechanism” (the end) and the encrypted text appearing after end of poem (1992).
Fig. 75: Instructions provided with Agrippa. “Agrippa has no commands that can be executed. When it is 
over it will quit itself. (…) Agrippa is intended to rewrite portions of itself, if you attempt to prevent this 
from happening, the program will not execute. (…) Agrippa is not a virus, not does the disk it comes on 
contain a virus. It does not permanently alter your computer’s memory, either physical or RAM (…)”
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The effort of reading Agrippa is certainly nontrivial, although no other action is 
expected (or even required) from the user besides a somewhat traditional reading 
of the text in a very linear fashion, the time constraint that is imposed on the user 
and the irreversibility of the process transform it into a completely different liter-
ary event. All literary experiences are unarguably time-based experiences, but this 
is one where the timing and the finitude of time rests at the core of the experience. 
One may question whether two consecutive readings of Agrippa will not, in fact, 
present the user with the same experience. They certainly will, and although the 
scripts presented in both readings will be identical, both experiences will also share 
the temporal limitation and the demand to the user to conform with the pace of the 
scroll.
After studying Agrippa, a “new text type” that had not previously been developed, 
Aarseth proposed four programatic categories, or degrees, of linearity in cybertexts: 
“1) the simple nonlinear text, whose textons are totally static, open and explorable 
by the user; 2) the discontinuous nonlinear text, or hypertext, which may be tra-
versed by ‘jumps’ (explicit links) between textons; 3) the determinate ‘cybertext,’ in 
which the behavior of textons is predictable but conditional and with the element of 
role-playing; and 4) the indeterminate cybertext in which textons are dynamic and 
unpredictable.” (Aarseth 1994, 63) We can safely assume that Agrippa falls under the 
third category, being determinate and predictable, and forcing the user to develop 
some role-playing, even if the action is limited to chasing after the text. The user 
function is mostly interpretative, but it is slightly more than just that because the 
user is not free to read at her own pace and is carried along a determinate traversal 
function by the software. The reader is not simply placed at the end of the text’s pro-
duction line — after writer, editor, printer, publisher, distributor, seller — but is in a 
way taken inside the production process, witnessing the text’s formation, existence, 
and demise. Agrippa is then an ergodic experience.
Other time-based processes, that could be classified in between the third and the 
fourth categories, present the user with similar ergodic experiences. Two examples 
are Gescom’s Minidisc (1998) and the Farmers Manual’s Explorers_We (1998), works 
that present similar strategies of composition, although in different (but not totally 
dissimilar) media. Minidisc comprises 45 tracks indexed in 88 total parts, 343 rang-
ing from a minimum of four seconds to a maximum of four minutes and fifteen 
343 A later CD edition was published with 88 discrete indexes, thus with 88 independent parts.
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seconds, while Explorers_We comprises 60 one-minute tracks. Both works were de-
signed to be played randomly, employing the ‘shuffle’ functions available on CD and 
MiniDisc players, and therefore using the systems to create random sequences with 
the possible permutations of the base tracks parts. The principle of composition in 
these two pieces (considering the full-length CD or MD as the compositions, not their 
independent parts) is similar to what we can find in a game of landscapes or in Bé-
nabou’s poem Several Tens of Tens, 344 where the reader was encouraged to form any 
possible 10-verse stanza through the permutation of the ten verses that the author 
provided:
Several Tens of Tens (translated from the French by Harry Mathews)
All is dream life and love and death 
We smilingly enter the cradle of shadow 
At night what corpse does not resume its flight 
To find the child that has survived the wreckage 
Sometimes I arrive in my deserted town 
The sky’s light was then abruptly extinguished 
Still enveloped in the guiles of springtime 
Above the chalk that dusts the green flowers 
The unspeaking streets look at me unseeing 
Life has taken refuge in the depths of mirrors (Mathews and Brotchie 2005, 61)
Bénabou’s poem allows 10! = 3,628,800 permutations. Presented as a text, with static 
textons that the user must explore and recombine, Several Tens of Tens is classi-
fied in the first category, much like the Cent mille milliards de poèmes. However, if 
in any of these texts we manage to automate the permutations, thus removing the 
freedom of the user’s exploration and presenting her diverse outputs as preformed 
scriptons, we will transform the experience of reading these pieces and turn it into 
something similar to what is experienced when listening to Explorers_We or Mini-
disc. This has (maybe unwillingly) been done in several adaptations of Queneau’s 
work to the World Wide Web that, instead of allowing the user to manually select 
each of the 10 alternative verses for each position in the sonnet, randomly compose 
344 Bénabou was an Oulipian and the title of this poem directly alludes to the Cent mille milliards de 
poèmes, to which author it was presented as something of an homage in the fourth number of the La Bib-
liothèque Oulipienne, published in 1977 shortly after Queneau’s death.
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the entire poem out of the 140 available textons, and present the complete output 
to the user. 345 This transforms the traversal function into something akin to that of 
traditional texts, minus the random-access and, more importantly, denying the pos-
sibility of return to the particular articulation of the piece (or the particular output 
one has read or heard) once a new articulation has been generated. Each articulation 
of Several Tens of Tens is always 10-verse long, each articulation of Explorers_We is 
always 60 minutes long 346 but regardless of this regularity, each of the articulations 
is virtually unique and unrepeatable. The enormous number of possible permuta-
tions almost guarantees it. If Several Tens of Tens allows over three and a half mil-
lion permutations to be created, Explorers_We dramatically increases that number 
to a magnitude of 60!, such a large number that is almost impossible to grasp, 347 
and Minidisc increases that number to 88!. 348 It is of course possible that the same 
permutation can be repeated to a single user, but the probabilities of that happening 
are very low. 349
345 Magnus Bodin’s implementation is one such example, presenting the original version, an English 
translation by Stanley Chapman (from 1998) and a Swedish translation by Lars Hagström (from 1992). The 
first digital implementation of Cent mille milliards de poèmes was programmed in 1975 by Paul Braffort. 
This version created the poems by using the reader’s name and the time it took her to input it to control the 
selection of the verses. It was Paul Braffort that in 1980, with Roubaud, proposed the creation of a group 
dedicated to the computer-oriented Oulipian research, the ALAMO, the Atelier de Littérature Assistée par 
la Mathematique et les Ordinateurs.
346 Plus the variable delay between each of the tracks, depending on the time that is necessary for the 
mechanical movement of the CD lens between tracks.
347 8.32098 × 181 or 8,320,987,112,741,390,144,276,341,183,223,364,380,754,172,606,361,245,952,449,277,696,
409,600,000,000,000,000 possible permutations, far, far more than the number of atoms in the visible 
universe.
348 1.85482 × 10134 or 185,482,642,257,398,439,114,796,845,645,546,284,380,220,968,949,399,346,684,421,580,
986,889,562,184,028,199,319,100,141,244,804,501,828,416,633,516,851,200,000,000,000,000,000,000.
349 There is however one particular permutation that is likely to be repeated over and over again. That 
is the sequence of tracks as organized in the index of the CD, the default playing sequence if the user does 
not manually activate the shuffle (or random) function of the CD player. Unlike DVDs, where one can use a 
virtual machine implemented by the DVD player to run bytecode contained on the DVD, thus disposing of 
a moderately flexible programming environment, Compact Discs cannot be programed to play randomly 
and must rely on instructions passed on to the user (with a varying degree of efficacy) to ensure that the 
program of the work is correctly executed — that is, that the tracks in the disc are played randomly and 
not in the default index order. If the user does not follow the instructions and plays the disc in the default 
mode, the reproduction order will be that of the index, the first among all of the possible permutations. 
Maybe because of this, in Explorers_We the first few tracks in the index of the disc consist of nothing but 
silence (not digital silence — no signal — but rather recordings of silence), almost as if to signal the user 
that the intended playing system is not being followed. It should be noted that what is requested of the 
user is simply to operate one switch in the CD or MD player, not to in any way determine the permutation 
of tracks to be reproduced but to delegate that to the shuffle algorithm of the player.
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The nontrivial effort that is demanded of users in the context of these pieces, is 
then not that of traversing the work facing whatever difficulties, aporias or epipha-
nies this may present them, but rather that of knowing that whatever particular 
articulation happens to be read, seen or heard, most likely will never be presented 
again and, although remaining forever as a potential articulation of the parts of 
the system, will never more be brought to existence as a fully formed gestalt. This 
tension is similar to the one that is experienced while reading Agrippa, but two dif-
ferences can be pointed: 1) in Agrippa one knows that the text in the diskette will 
be forever lost after its display, but one also knows that Agrippa is a mechanically 
duplicated artifact, and that any two copies of the diskette will carry the same data 
and will present it in an analogous fashion, thus, although difficult, the experience 
of reading Agrippa is potentially repeatable; 2) every articulation of Explorers_We, 
Minidisc or Several Tens of Tens is built from the same limited number of textons (or 
tracks) — that are in each case complex units of information and meaning — and 
will therefore repeat the presentation of the same set of modules, rebuilding some-
thing of a familiar experience to the user. The recurrence of verses or sounds will 
balance the uniqueness and the unexpectedness of the ever-new articulation with 
the intimacy created by the recognizability of the parts. This effect is reinforced by 
the continued permutation of all the parts. In a work as the Cent mille milliards de 
poèmes, where only ten percent of the textons are used in each recombination, there 
is a permanent repository of unknown or unrevealed textons to present to the reader 
in further recombinations, therefore each posterior reading will still hold the poten-
tial to reveal previously unread parts. In each permutation of Several Tens of Tens, 
on the contrary, all the textons are presented to the reader, leaving no room for later 
discoveries or surprises at this level and placing all novelty of further permutations 
simply at the level of the articulations that the system may produce. Although at a 
macroscopic level we can find that the articulations between parts differ — and is 
it at the level of these articulations that the astronomical number of possible per-
mutations is found — the experience of listening or reading each of the single parts, 
independently of their place in the sequence, will always be somewhat similar (if not 
totally identical, depending on the context).
The experience that is presented to the user can be considerably more complex if the 
parts are recombined among themselves besides being permuted or resequenced. 
The 30×1 (Carvalhais, Tudela and Lia 2005a) installation developed an audiovisual 
system that relied on permutation to generate multiple possible readings, but more 
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than simply rearranging the parts into different playback sequences, used them as 
components in a complex articulation program that also depended on shuffling (or 
on the random selection of the parts).
In 30×1 there were a total of 62 different audio compositions ranging one minute 
in length. For each of these compositions, two video interpretations were created, 
reaching a total of 124 different audiovisual pieces. These pieces were distributed 
by five groups of DVD discs, each of the discs in a group containing all the pieces 
in it. 350 The different DVDs were shown on screens or television sets of varying sizes, 
assembled through 8 rooms of the gallery, whenever possible allowing a line of sight 
between rooms and always allowing the sound from each display to mix with the 
other sounds in the room and to permeate between rooms. 351 All the DVDs were 
programmed to randomly play the tracks they contained and all of them should be 
turned on at the start of the day (without any particular care in the sequence or tim-
ing of the start) playing throughout the day. Although the DVDs were programmed 
to not allow immediate repetitions of the same track (playing the same track twice 
in a row), they were not programmed to force the entire group of tracks to play be-
fore repeating any of the tracks (thus not ensuring that any of the tracks would be 
played as often as any other). The slight variations in the length of the tracks and 
the mechanical delay that the DVD players inevitably created when moving the play 
heads from one track to the next ensured that the overlap between the outputs of 
different DVDs that were played in the same space or whose sound could be heard in 
the space would vary continuously. We can argue that this piece was ergodic at two 
different levels: 1) it created a shifting audiovisual space, controlled by the textons 
contained in the DVDs and by the randomization programmed in the DVD players; 
2) this space was, however, too vast and complex for any visitor to perceive at once, 
requiring her to physically travel through the space, hearing different parts of it 
(or the mix of the sound output of different discs) and seeing an even more limited 
part of the output at any given time. The user effectively composed her particular 
reading of the piece, determining its length, the balance between the parts and the 
350 20 videos in group zero, 34 videos in group one, 30 videos in group two, 20 videos in group three and 
20 videos in group four.
351 Televisions reproduced the sound in mono, while the projections were amplified by stereo speakers 
hanging from the ceilings.
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audiovisual relations through the path walked through the gallery 352 and through 
the interactions with other visitors. 353
The visual components of 30×1 were conceived as framed images to be presented in 
the context of the gallery, to be read in the frame of the projections or screens or as 
part of a broader view of the rooms, where two or more screens could coexist in the 
visual field of the visitors. The sonic elements were designed to overlap with each 
other and to be recomposed by the randomization and the acoustics of the space, so 
that even if particular sounds could be recognized as being repeated during any visit 
to the work, the total tracks were only rarely perceived as being repeated.
 
Fig. 76: Two views of 30×1 (Carvalhais, Tudela and Lia 2005a).
This work proposed the development of an ergodic experience, an experience from 
which the authors were not exempt, as they were not only the designers of the whole 
process but also necessarily its first test subjects. 354 Although the authors can cer-
tainly estimate some of the outputs of the process, in such complex systems as those 
described in this chapter, however accurate those estimates and the authors’ intu-
ition may be, they will almost certainly always fall short when faced with the mas-
352 In 30×1 the path is not a metaphorical description of the reading experience but rather a physical 
course that had to be travelled by the visitors along the different rooms and the audiovisual sources they 
contained.
353 Although 30×1 was not conceived as a collective experience, it was set in a space where multiple 
visitors could simultaneously experiment the installation, thus potentially intersecting their paths and 
sharing the construction of their particular readings.
354 We can mention a further ergodic aspect of the authoring process: the piece was created by three 
artists in collaboration, the three acting as authors of the overall piece but developing distinct parts of 
the audiovisual pieces: while Lia developed all the images, the remaining authors developed the sound 
components. Although working in close contact, the creative process was a continuous path of discovery, 
debate and discussion between the three.
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siveness of the number of combinations that are mathematically achievable, a num-
ber that will effectively make it impossible for any single author (or team of authors) 
to experiment, or verify and validate, the articulation of all permutations. They also 
propose that the users read them as open works, as works that resonate through the 
physical space of the installation and the time each visitor takes to observe it, but 
also through a series of related works that further expand the initial work, in this 
case a second installation, 355 two linear videos 356 and a sound recording, 357 all of 
them composed from the individual parts prepared for the installations. 358
 
Fig. 77: Int.16/54//Son01/30×1 (Lia 2005) composed from the individual parts of 30×1.
 
Fig. 78: 30×1.01 (Carvalhais, Tudela and Lia 2005b) composed from the individual parts of 30×1.
355 30×1.2 (Carvalhais, Tudela and Lia 2007).
356 Int.16/54//Son01/30×1 (Lia 2005) and 30×1.01 (Carvalhais, Tudela and Lia 2005b).
357 30×1.3 (@c, 2010).
358 It was established by the authors, since the start of the project, that these derivative works would 
be produced, not only trying to recreate certain aspects of the experience of visiting the installation in 
other media, but also trying to creatively explore the sources that were created to the installation in linear 
artifacts, creating ‘author-curated’ permutations of the parts. The first of these (however unregistered) 
was presented in the day of the opening of the installation, during a live audiovisual performance, where 
elements used in the composition of the parts of the installation were recomposed. In this case the source 
material were not the videos of the installation but rather the code used to generate the images and the 
code and digital sound files used to create the audio.
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The work thus becomes an ergodic system through which the author, the devices 
and the users must build and experience their own individual paths. The work be-
comes not the individual artifact (although it never really ceases to be the artifact 
itself) but rather the system of artifacts that are weaved in a network of relations 
that, while external to every particular piece, nevertheless links all of them and 
reverberates through them. The work becomes the repertoire of artifacts that are 
linked by causal and conceptual bonds, its experience grows to be the collection of 
experiences that are gathered by a single user or by a group of users.
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Processes and Systems
2.1 The Classification of Systems
What does a computer sound like when it sounds like a computer? What visual 
worlds of expression will we consider to be idiomatic to computers? What 
virtual realities will be idiomatic to computers? What new means of expression 
and communication will be idiomatic to computers? (Holtzman 1994, 251) 
If one surveys the broad field of computational art and design, 359 one of the first 
questions we can pose is: what characterizes these systems computationally, what 
similarities or contrasts can we find between different artifacts at the level of the 
processes developed by the systems? As we have seen, the same system can produce 
very diverse outputs at the surface level but despite potential variations, different 
implementations of the same processes may produce recognizable patterns. These 
patterns may be subtle and difficult to recognize but, if one wishes to develop a 
comparative analysis of these artifacts then one should develop some knowledge 
of the fundamental systems that are used in their creation. This chapter will try to 
map some of those systems, listing some of the strategies used in the development of 
procedural arts and design. 360
359 Regardless if one is focused on those works that we can define as being procedural, or generative to 
the core, or if one is alternatively focused in any computer-assisted or computer-mediated aesthetic arti-
fact, notwithstanding its process intensity.
360 A list that must nevertheless remain incomplete.
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Composer and music theorist Iannis Xenakis (1992), divides the methods employed 
in the production of his works in two general categories that encompass determin-
istic and nondeterministic models. These two mathematically derived categories are 
linked to the involvement of randomness in his composition process. As he explains 
in an interview: “in determinism the same cause always has the same effect. There’s 
no deviation, no exception. The opposite of this is that the effect is always different, 
the chain never repeats itself. In this case we reach absolute chance — that is, inde-
terminism” (qtd. in Tryfonidou and Gourdoukis 2008). A deterministic model does 
not include randomness and will always produce the same output if started from 
the same values, while indeterministic or stochastic processes involve randomness 
and regardless of the initialization values will always produce different outputs each 
time the process is repeated.
Although Xenakis noted this division, most of his compositions were totally de-
terminate once finished and, regardless of the methods used, once translated into 
conventional musical notation, his scores left no space for variation or improvisa-
tion during performance. “In other words the generation of the score involves ran-
domness to a great extent, but the score becomes finalized by the composer so that 
each time that it is performed it remains the same.” (Tryfonidou and Gourdoukis 
2008) The few compositions that allowed varying performances were, interestingly, 
deterministic according to his classification (i.e., they did not include randomness), 
but instead relied on well-defined rules for a game to be played between performers 
or conductors during the performance. 361
361 “An example of the last case is Duel, a composition that is based on game theory. The composition 
is performed by two orchestras guided by two conductors, and is literary a game between the two that in 
the end yields a winner. Each conductor has to select for each move, one out of seven options that are pre-
defined by the composer. A specific scoring system is established and the score of each orchestra depends 
on the choices of the two conductors. The result of this process is that each time that the composition is 
performed, the outcome is different. Therefore, a deterministic system where there are seven specific and 
predefined elements is producing a result that varies in each performance of the score. To make things 
even more complicated, the seven predefined musical elements are composed by Xenakis with the use of 
stochastic processes. To summarize the structure of Duel: Xenakis generated seven different pieces using 
stochastic processes, therefore seven pieces that include randomness. However those pieces were finalized 
by the composer into a specific form. Then those pieces are given to the conductors that are free to choose 
one for each move of the performance. The choice of each conductor however is not random: ‘… it is [not] 
a case of improvised music, ‘aleatory’, to which I am absolutely opposed, for it represents among other 
things the total surrender of the composer. The Musical Game accords a certain liberty of choice to the 
two conductors but not to the instrumentalists; but this liberty is guided by the constraints of the Rules of 
the Game, and which must permit the music notated by the score to open out in almost unlimited multi-
plication.’ So the choices of each conductor are based upon the strategy that he follows in order to win the 
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Another composer, David Cope (2005), organizes processes in six distinct groups: 
rules-based, data-driven, genetic algorithms, neural nets, fuzzy logic and mathe-
matical modeling. Such a distinction may be somewhat too complex, already pro-
posing at the top level of the hierarchy to split processes that could have been paired 
under the same group. If neural nets or genetic algorithms (as fuzzy logic and math-
ematical modeling) are sets of processes with very different characteristics, they are 
all nevertheless rule-based systems, and as such contrast with everything that may 
be classified as data-driven processes. 362 Following Crawford’s suggestion (and Bo-
gost’s interpretation) we can try to simplify this first level of the hierarchy. If process 
intensity refers to the “degree to which a program emphasizes processes instead of 
data” (Bogost 2008, 122), then we can propose to start by dividing the systems in two 
basic groups: data-driven systems and rule-based systems. If we try to merge this 
with Xenakis’s distinction between determinate and indeterminate systems, we will 
find that both rule-based and data-driven systems can produce determinate and in-
determinate outcomes, both at the moment of authorship, creation or composition 
(as one prefers to call it) as at the moment of deployment, reading or performance. 
Xenakis’s classification is understandable in the perspective of the creator, but it is 
not very useful for the posterior analysis of the creations, exactly because it says 
nothing about the processes that are developed in the piece but rather focuses on the 
processes employed by the author during the process of composition. In those cases 
where these processes are the same, we may find that Xenakis’s description will ac-
curately fit the pieces but on those where they are not — such as Duel (1958) — we 
will find that his approach will fall short of accurately describing the works. What 
characterizes Duel are not the processes that the composer used to create the score 363 
but rather the game that is developed by the conductors while ordering those same 
pieces and defining the final form of the performance. 364
Rule-based and data-driven as top hierarchies in a classification of systems allow 
us to split them in two sets that are distinguished by a fundamental characteristic: 
whether the system’s behaviors, choices and ultimately its creations are generated by 
game, and consequently upon the choices of the second conductor. Therefore the final performance of the 
score is different each time.” (Tryfonidou and Gourdoukis 2008)
362 In itself a rather broad category also, containing processes so diverse as those in the rule-based cat-
egory, and — when one considers digital media — with a very complex and rich history.
363 Although they are certainly a fundamental part of the piece and Xenakis’s score could not be arbi-
trarily replaced by any other score without compromising the work’s identity.
364 Although the form of each of the seven parts is closed and immutable.
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the system or are based on data that is external to the system. What this classifica-
tion then tries to assert is the provenance of data. 365 It should also be pointed that 
those systems that use or reproduce conventional data such as images, sound, video 
and text documents, all of which have their origins outside of the system 366 can also 
be seen as being data-driven. This is something we will explore further on.
2.2 Data-Driven
2.2.1 Data-Driven Processes
Although it may not seem to be the obvious first step, when compiling processes that 
depend on external data or are data-driven, one should perhaps start by looking at all 
those systems that integrate, or remediate, digitized images (whether moving or still), 
digitized sounds and other human-authored contents. In short, systems that inte-
grate (traditional) media. According to Cramer, these are typical examples of “non-
algorithmic program code” (2002), of code that uses the computer merely as a stor-
age device and as a mechanism for the transmission of media. 367 This describes “for 
example the difference between algorithmic composition on the one hand and audio 
CD/mp3 files on the other, between algorithmically generated text and ‘hypertext’ (a 
random access database model which, as such, doesn’t require algorithmic computa-
tion at all), or between a graphical computer ‘demo’ and a video tape.” 368 (2002)
365 Or ultimately one can even assert the provenance of the rules (or the program) themselves, and not 
simply the data. Tyler already pointed to that: “The computer can itself act as the creator by the ability 
to generate random (or pseudorandom) sequences of numbers. On a low level this can operate merely to 
produce the arrangement of patterns or the selection of elements for a design, and many computer artists 
have utilized this process to great effect. But in principle the random process can be used in the genera-
tion of the program itself; a metarandom organization of the generative process. In practice this is likely 
to lead to many programs which are inexecutable on a given computer system, but an analogous process 
operates in human creativity. Many false starts and abortive attempts may be made before a workable 
design is produced.” (1976)
366 Whether in the real world or in other systems.
367 Regardless whether these were originally created through procedural code or by other means, in-
cluding digital and analog devices.
368 Cramer emphasizes the authorship of program code, as although “one can of course use computers 
without programming them, it is impossible not to use programs at all; the question only is who pro-
grams”. One can defend that regardless of how low is the level of code that a designer uses in the creation 
of her work, she will always, and inevitably, need to interface with other code that was not created by her, 
that was preexisting in the computational tool of her choice. The software layer is naturally omnipresent, 
therefore there is “no such thing as data without programs, and hence no digital arts without the software 
layers they either take for granted, or design themselves” (2002). Somewhat more radically, Rushkoff pro-
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In a way that is not totally dissimilar to what happens in a system that uses a well-
defined mathematical series (such as prime numbers, the Fibonacci series, the deci-
mal expansion of π, etc.), 369 non-algorithmic program code reads the information of 
the image, audio, text or whatever medium or media are remediated by the system 
and reproduces it, integrating it in the output. Once the system is restarted, 370 the 
exact same behaviors, and consequently the same outputs, will be displayed. Even 
in cases where the dataset is not closed and may be updated constantly or on a regu-
lar basis, 371 although the outputs may vary, the system will always depend on the 
external data for its realization and will always act as a translator for the data fed 
into it. Ultimately we may regard this distinction as being fundamentally based on 
the amount of free-will or autonomy that a system possesses to create novelty, on 
its process intensity. When dependent on external data, a system is fundamentally 
programmed to follow or to develop a succession of events that it may not be able to 
change or to escape from, while a process intensive rule-based system may (at least 
theoretically) have in its code the choice to escape from self-repetition, or the op-
portunity to create.
If we return to Chomsky’s grammars and to the considerations that De Landa (1997, 
217-18) develops after them, we may infer that data-driven systems sample their struc-
ture from external sources and may fundamentally operate with transformational 
components. 372 With the exception of some systems that one can identify as being 
poses that in the digital age, either one programs or is programmed, either one is a programmer or one is 
being programmed. If we do not program we end up being the users, or worst even, being the used (2010).
369 “Mathematical series appear at the head of the list of alternative formalisms for quasi randomness. 
Of these mathematical series, the Fibonacci sequence (…) has earned a special place. Dividing any num-
ber of this series by its predecessor produces the so-called golden mean (golden section) of approximately 
1.62 — depending on how far the series has progressed. The golden mean (also called phi) has served as 
a paradigm for artists, architects, and composers such as Debussy, Bartók, and Stravinsky, as well as for 
many composers using computers to compose. (…) 
Having a pseudorandom number generator choose numbers indeterminately from a Fibonacci se-
quence helps to ensure that, over time and with many thousands of choices made, these numbers and the 
choices they reflect will approximate golden mean relationships.
Mathematical formulas can also provide useful quasi randomness. A particularly interesting math-
ematical formula for me, the function ƒ(x) = 1 / cos x2 produces apparently random output when the result 
of each formulaic calculation recursively becomes a new ‘x’ for squaring, cosining, and so on. The result-
ing series of numbers does not reveal patterns at any level.” (Cope 2005, 75-76)
370 Presuming that the system can be restarted, of course. Nevertheless, and for the sake of argument, 
we can assume that all systems can somehow be restarted.
371 Examples are systems that feed on real-time data for example, tracking meteorological information, 
stock markets or any other source of data that can inject variation and novelty into the system’s outputs.
372 As opposed to working with generative components.
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strictly rule-based or totally data-driven, we will naturally find that many systems 
are hybrids of both approaches, because they articulate data-driven and rule-based 
processes, developing them in tandem. 373 If we can regard any linear video or audio 
file — when reproduced by a computational system — as being a strictly data-driven 
process, we very often find works where these data-driven processes are balanced by 
other rule-based processes, enriching the system. The aforementioned 30×1 instal-
lation is such an example. If all the audiovisual components of this work are fixed 
as data to be read and reproduced, 374 their articulation is the outcome of chance 
or uncontrollable factors, 375 of the rules that control the pseudorandomness 376 and 
finally of the rules defined by the authors. 377 So we may very well classify the system 
both as being data-driven or rule-based without erring in any of the classifications. 
We would need to assert which of the two processes is more determinant in regard 
to what is communicated to or experienced by the visitors of the installation, and 
even here, the dominance would probably shift depending on the context of the visit, 
its duration, etc.
Another example can be found in the ‘soft cinema’ works of Lev Manovich and An-
dreas Kratky such as Texas (Manovich 2004b), Mission to Earth (Manovich 2004a) 
or Absences (Kratky 2004). These works intend to explore the “creative possibilities 
at the intersection of software culture, cinema, and architecture”, and to investigate 
“how the new representational techniques of soft(ware) cinema can be deployed to 
address the new dimensions of our time (…) and the effects of information tech-
373 Or, to put it in another way, complex systems are almost by definition built from many parts and 
among these we will find both data-driven as well as rule-based components, the classification being 
defined through an analysis of each component’s role in the system. Those that are able to generate data 
versus those that feed on data generated elsewhere.
374 Regardless of how they were created, and in this case most of the processes used in the develop-
ment of the audio and video components were rule-based. The audio components integrated several ‘field 
recordings’ or sampled audio, but used them in the development of rule-based compositional processes. 
The video was created through algorithms that read the mean amplitudes of the audio for small groups of 
samples (about 1,764 audio samples, or the equivalent to one frame of PAL video) and consequently used 
those values in the composition rules, affecting colors, dimensions, angles, speed of movement, and vari-
ous other transformations.
375 Chance, in this context is present in the actions of the human operator that starts all the different 
playback mechanisms at an uncontrollable pace and order, but also in the mechanical influence of the 
DVD players in the time taken to access the different tracks on disc. Besides these, the actions and the drift 
of visitors along the space is pretty much left uncontrolled.
376 The shuffling process programmed in each of the discs and read and executed by the DVD players.
377 These rules are formalized in the clustering of components in different discs and in the spatial distri-
bution of the various projections, affecting what may or may not fall into the viewer’s fields of vision and 
audition at any given point during the visit to the installation space.
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nologies on subjectivity” (Manovich 2005b). According to the authors, the research 
followed four directions: “1) following the standard convention of the human-com-
puter interface, the display area is always divided into multiple frames; 2) Using a set 
of rules (…) the soft cinema software controls both the layout of the screen (number 
and position of frames) and the sequences of media elements that appear in these 
frames; 3) The media elements (…) are selected from a large database to construct 
a potentially unlimited number of different films; 4) (…) video is used as only one 
type of representation among others: motion graphics, 3D animations, diagrams, 378 
etc.” (Manovich 2005a) These are a set of explicit rules for the creation of soft cinema 
works, but the authors also intend to explore what they present as four main con-
ceptual ideas behind the project: algorithmic cinema, macro-cinema, multimedia 
cinema and database cinema (Manovich 2005b).
 
Fig. 79: Texas (Manovich 2004b).
By algorithmic cinema, the authors understand the (semi-)automated editing of the 
media materials that are used in each work. By tagging each asset in the database 
with keywords that “describe both the ‘content’ of a clip (geographical location, 
presence of people in the scene, etc.) and its ‘formal’ properties (dominant color, 
dominant line orientation, contrast, camera movement, etc.)” 379 (Manovich 2005b), 
the soft cinema software assembles the video track by selecting several of the assets 
sequentially or in parallel using the system rules and the descriptions in the tags. 
“Different systems of rules are possible: for instance, selecting a clip which is closest 
378 By ‘video’ the authors seem to be referring to live-action captured to digital video, not to the medium 
in which the images are stored. According to the documentation in the website (Manovich 2005b) and 
in the catalogue edition (Manovich and Kratky 2005), most or all of the data in these pieces seems to be 
stored as compressed digital video.
379 Some of which are generated automatically through the analysis of the assets by image processing 
software, while the others are assigned manually by the authors or their collaborators.
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in color or type of motion to the previous one; selecting a clip which matches the 
previous one partially in content and partially in color, replacing only every other 
clip to create a kind of parallel montage sequence, and so on.” (2005b)
This process aims at the creation of what Manovich calls database narrative, that is, 
a narrative that is not originated by a script from which media elements are created 
but rather a working process that is started from a large database of assets from 
where several narratives are created. “In Soft Cinema, the media elements are select-
ed from a database of a few hundred video clips to construct a potentially unlimited 
number of different short films.” (2005b)
Thirdly, we can witness the authors’ attempt to develop what they call macro-cin-
ema. This designation is not so much related to the rule-based aspects of the pro-
cesses that the system develops but rather to the way a visual composition is broken 
down into diverse areas where different assets are composed. As Manovich states, 
“[w]hile filmmakers such as Peter Greenaway and Mike Figgis have already used a 
multi-screen format for fiction films, 380 thinking about the visual conventions of 
Graphical User Interface as used in computer culture gives us a different way to do 
macro-cinema. If a computer user employs windows of different proportions and 
sizes, why not adopt the similar aesthetics for cinema? In Soft Cinema, the genera-
tion of each video begins with the computer program semi-randomly breaking the 
screen into a number of square regions of different dimensions. During the playback 
different clips are assigned to different regions. In this way, software determines 
both temporal and spatial organization of a work, i.e. both sequencing of clips and 
their composition.” (2005b)
Finally, these three aspects revert in the creation of what Manovich calls “multime-
dia cinema”, a cinema that is not only built upon film or video but that uses these 
as “just one type of representation among others: 2D animation, motion graphics 
(i.e. animated text), stills, 3D scenes (as in computer games), diagrams, etc.” (2005b) 
Although this supplementation of the normal video image with other types of im-
agery, analog or digital in source, is nothing new, the authors try to use it for more 
380 There are much earlier examples of this process. The final reel of Abel Gance’s (1889-1981) Napoléon 
(1927) was conceived as a triptych, to be projected simultaneously in three parallel screens, arrayed in a 
horizontal row with a total aspect ratio of four to one, in a process that Gance called ‘polyvision’.
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than just achieving a purely visual effect and to investigate “the possibilities of using 
them together for fictional narration” (2005b).
We may conclude that soft cinema is a hybrid between data-driven and rule-based 
processes, but that it is however, both at a sensorial as at a narrative level, biased 
towards the data-driven. 381
A third and final example can be found in installations authored by Canadian artist 
David Rokeby: San Marco Flow (2005a), Gathering (2004b), Sorting Daemon (2003b), 
Taken and Seen (2002d; 2002b). In these works, Rokeby uses live video captures, 
usually with hidden or surveillance cameras that are further processed by the instal-
lations’ systems. San Marco Flow, Taken and Seen are perhaps the pieces that devel-
op the simplest processes, composing their outputs directly from the camera inputs, 
with little manipulation of the sources, or no individual transformation of these. 382 
Seen and San Marco Flow both work, three years apart from each other, with live ob-
servations of the same space, the Piazza San Marco, in Venice, 383 and both develop a 
similar process, first developed in Watch (1995). The video feed is transformed into 
381 We must also note that the DVD version and the installation versions of the ‘soft films’ differ substan-
tially because the processes at their core are highly contrasting. Where the installation (or projection) 
versions are composed and edited in real time, the DVD version lives from prerecorded fixed sequences 
that are later shuffled by the DVD player.
382 That is, once the transformation process is defined, it is applied to all the sources, regardless of their 
individual characteristics. The other two pieces, Gathering and Sorting Daemon do not use the sources 
in such a linear way.
383 In Seen, due to technical constraints, the video feed is not captured live but rather recorded in a DVD 
and played back in the space of the installation. As the prerecorded loop is rather long and there was a 
considerable physical distance between the space that was watched and the space where the projection 
occurred, this comprehensibly seemed to be a good solution both for the artist and the curators. Fur-
thermore, this concession is not fundamentally compromising the mechanics of the piece, because either 
live or prerecorded, the system will always be non-interactive (the audience of the piece was in a position 
where it wouldn’t be able to influence the output) and data-driven. We can however consider that the pro-
cess intensity of the system was considerably lowered when the live capture was discarded. Even if minute, 
we could expect variations (both minor, caused by the varying flows of people and animals throughout 
the day, as major, caused by weather and luminosity changes) and a certain degree of unpredictability in 
the outputs of the system — something that the other pieces that we discuss here always present. With 
the prerecorded loop Rokeby offers only a simple, repeating and closed, thirty-minute sequence of events 
where nothing new ever happens, something that we can consider to be not his system but perhaps only, 
and simply, a simulation of his system. By turning the mutable into the immutable (although keeping 
it temporally dynamic, but still closed), Rokeby removes life from the system, by removing change. Al-
though keeping motion, its ongoing closed and rhythmic repetition transfixes time (to use a phrase from 
René Magritte (1898-1967) (qtd. in Shlain 1991)).
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an evolving image where only the moving parts of the source 384 are displayed, creat-
ing a ‘movement portrait’ of the Piazza. In Seen the first and fourth projections in 
the installation are color version of Watch, while the second and third projections 
offer different perspectives on the patterns of flow.
Fig. 80: Seen (Rokeby 2002b).
In San Marco Flow Rokeby revisits the Piazza San Marco, layering all the actions 
that are perceived through the camera into a pair of evolving images that represent 
two parallel views of the history of the events that happened there. 
The images are, in effect, lit by animate presence; things that are not moving 
are invisible. Walking pigeons leave worm-like traces. Gathered people abstract 
themselves through their shifting motions. Tour groups flow across the image 
like a river. The left side accumulates the activities into a very long exposure 
image that develops visibly over the course of several minutes. This image has 
layer upon layer of traces building into a rich and complex image that is very 
painterly and find many resonances with the history of Art and the history 
of the piazza itself. In the projection on the right, the past fades more quickly 
resulting in a gently dynamic flow. The evolving images (…) are different read-
ings of the same unfolding source material providing a kind of stereoscopy 
into the dimension of time. (Rokeby 2005b)
384 Those parts of the image that significantly change from frame to frame are displayed, usually people, 
birds and vehicles. Small changes like variations in lighting from passing clouds are usually filtered out. 
“In this case, what was moving were the people milling about the piazza and the famous San Marco pi-
geons. What was still was the architecture of the piazza, and the kiosks selling souvenirs and corn with 
which to feed the pigeons. (…) The processing was performed at full video resolution, meaning that every 
pedestrian and pigeon on Piazza San Marco left a trace. Flying pigeons drew the arc of their flight, run-
ning pedestrians left trails showing their dodges and turns as they wended their way through the crowds. 
The walking pigeons produced patterns looking rather like arabic lettering as they chased after the scat-
tered corn.” (Rokeby 2002a)
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Fig. 81: San Marco Flow (Rokeby 2005a).
Taken presents a more elaborate process, but still one that is fundamentally depen-
dent on the captured data, in this case the motions and faces of the installation’s 
visitors. Unlike the previous examples, in Taken we can witness the development of 
the process while participating in it, thus interacting with the system. The double 
projection of Taken extracts visitors from surveillance cameras that watch the gal-
lery space where the system is presented, looping them back onto themselves in 
regular intervals. “The result is that every action that has taken place in the gallery 
since the computer was turned on occurs together on the screen, repeating every 20 
seconds. The image stream, provides a kind of seething chaos of activity that can 
be read both as a statistical plot of gallery activities (where do most people stand to 
regard the piece? Do they move around?) and as a record of each act of each visitor. 
The image is densely social, deeply layered and chaotic.” (Rokeby 2002c) On the op-
posite projection Rokeby progressively assembles a catalogue of the visitors, track-
ing individual faces that are detected in the space and zooming on the heads. “These 
individual head shots are collected as a set of the last 200 visitors and presented as 
a matrix of 100 or occasionally all 200 shots, moving in slow motion. This side is 
analytical and highly ordered and rather threatening.” (2002c)
Fig. 82: Taken (Rokeby 2002d).
While not completely stepping away from the ideas put to practice in these works, in 
the later pieces Sorting Daemon and Gathering, we can find an increase of the im-
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portance that rule-based processes play. Both pieces work by appropriating images 
of people, surveying both the environment where they are exhibited or its surround-
ings (namely the exterior, thus appropriating people that are not necessarily aware 
of the systems). The pieces try to understand what in the images that they have ac-
cess to can be people, removing them from the background spaces and recomposing 
their images in the screens. On Sorting Daemon the images of extracted persons 
are “divided up according to areas of similar colour” and the “resulting swatches of 
colour are then placed within the arbitrary context of the composite image [that is] 
projected”. “On the left side of the composite, flesh-coloured patches are sorted by 
hue (olive on the left, pink on the right) and size (largest on the bottom and small-
est on the top). The right side accumulates all the other coloured patches, sorted by 
hue horizontally and saturation vertically (with most saturated at the bottom). (…) 
The extracted person first appears ‘whole’ at the bottom of the composite and then 
slowly separates into coloured regions which each move to their appropriate loca-
tion in the composite.” (Rokeby 2003a) In the artist statement about Sorting Dae-
mon, Rokeby explicitly acknowledges the importance of not knowing what will the 
exact results of the process be, an uncertainty that is not only fed by the data that is 
gathered but also by the processes, that although programmed by the author, act in 
ways that are uncontrollable. “I have defined the processes, but that is very different 
from defining the actual resulting output. The painterly look of the composite is an 
accidental byproduct of the ordering process. The composite seems chaotic, but is 
actually a completely rational and ordered process.” 385 (2003a)
385 To this Rokeby adds an interesting remark: “One of my deepest interests is to try to understand how 
computers and humans are different. On the surface, it seems relatively easy to differentiate between the 
two, but as computers become more powerful, many of the capabilities that were clearly displayed only 
by human beings, are now apparently shared by computers. There are many who are now claiming that 
computers will soon be able to match human intelligence. I find this a startling claim that need intense 
examination. Many of my works have been, in part, an investigation of this question and a critic of the 
assumptions that are being made in this regard.
A second stream of my work over the past 10 years has examined vision, and by extension ‘surveillance’. 
I have created many systems that ‘see’ in various ways. These endeavors have left me greatly impressed 
with our own human vision. It is extraordinarily hard to create computer systems that can do the simplest 
things that we do with our eyes and brain and take wholly for granted. I am astonished at how willingly 
and easily we underestimate the complexity and subtlety of our own human faculties. If we underestimate 
ourselves, then we will be in danger of putting machines to work in situations where these undervalued 
human faculties are actually essential elements.” (2003a)
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Fig. 83: Sorting Daemon (Rokeby 2003b).
Gathering expands some of the ideas initially developed in Sorting Daemon to a 
large immersive video installation that “gathers moving images of people from out-
side the building” and “separates these images into moving fragments of coherent 
color which are then arranged and sorted according to a shifting set of rules across 
8 video screens” (2004a). Images are arranged according to overall hues as in the 
previous system 386 but unlike in it, the projections are not arranged side by side but 
rather in a circle of eight projections, tilted up at one of its sides to allow visitors to 
enter the space. 
Fig. 84: Gathering (Rokeby 2004b).
386 “First, moving people are located by a camera that can pan around the area. They are separated from 
the background, and then analyzed for colour content. Flesh toned areas are separated from clothing and 
the clothing is divided into areas of like colour. These moving patches of colour (…) are then sorted across 
the screens. The patches are organized by 3 different sets of rules at different times. In one set of rules, 
they are sorted by hue along the horizontal and by saturation (…) along the vertical. In another they are 
sorted in order of height. In a third, they are positioned according to the spatial location at which they 
were captured, returning heads to bodies, t-shirts to jeans, etc., spatially reintegrating the fragments, but 
producing a densely layered crowd.” (Rokeby 2004a)
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2.2.2 Visualization
Every remediation of prerecorded images or sounds or of non-algorithmic pro-
gram code is in a sense a visualization of data or code. Visualization, in this con-
text should be understood not so much as the process of turning something visible, 
but as the process of translating computer data into human-perceivable forms. As 
Richard Wright puts it, visualization is conventionally “understood as a mapping of 
digital data onto a visual image”, 387 a process that is developed to take advantage of 
the flexibility and immense power of human vision to “perceive emergent properties 
such as subtle patterns and structures” (2008, 78-79). 
Although a similar repertoire of tools and processes can be used to diverse ends, 388 
they are used for analytical purposes in engineering or design — to tell us some-
thing new about the data, or to allow us to discover what is new and unique in the 
mapped structures — whereas in art and science they are very often used to me-
thodically tinker and to create new aesthetic or scientific artifacts, that will express 
something new and unique 389 (Sterling 2008). American artist Charles Csuri, one of 
the pioneers of computer arts, states that computer graphics offer direct modes of 
interaction with information, making data become more communicative because 
the user is able to “interact with mathematical models that simulate social systems 
or abstract processes or even aesthetic objects. Through computer animation/graph-
ics, the user is given dynamic and pictorial means to view the process of change that 
is a consequence of his intervention. This enables the user to better understand the 
complex relationships that produce the results for which his intervention is respon-
sible.” (1976)
387 Wright adds that the “need for visualization was first recognized in the sciences during the late 1980s 
as the increasing power of computing and the decreasing cost of digital storage created a surge in the 
amount and complexity of data needing to be managed, processed, and understood.” (2008, 78)
388 The various fields are often difficult to distinguish, as at least since the early 20th century (if not from 
the onset of human history) we can find a slew of crossed influences, as Leonard Shlain maps in his book 
Art & Physics (1991). We can also find that artistic tools have proven to be able to provide new insights and 
knowledge, by creating connections among different disciplines, modalities and “their means of percep-
tion” that may result in what Wright calls “a new cultural practice, a ‘poetics of knowledge’” (1997, 31).
389 Sidestepping momentarily, it is interesting to note that whereas we can align with common sense 
and suggest the existence of two opposite fields between science and engineering on one side and art and 
design on the other, we may (and perhaps should) pair them differently when it comes to the use that is 
made of visualization tools (as well as, one can speculate, although that discussion surpasses this work, to 
their working methods and goals).
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Regardless of the field in which they are used, visualizations can be divided in two 
big classes according to the data that they map, the first of these corresponding to 
what Wright calls “data visualization” and the second what he terms of the “more 
general category of computer generated visualizations” 390 (2008, 84). These two 
classes loosely correspond to what Vilém Flusser 391 called the ‘images of the world’ 
and the ‘images of equations’ (82). One approach catalogues data (from the world, 
presumably, or from sources that are external to the system) and constructs the 
outputs from it, while the other appropriates mathematical expressions or formu-
las from where the data is generated. Both are data-driven in the sense previously 
described, they are fundamentally fed by the data and create whatever outputs they 
produce from it, without developing more complex rule-based processes to select, 
organize, or interpret such data, leaving that to the human reader. If the data chang-
es the outputs are modified but, if the data remains unaltered, so do the outputs — 
regardless of the transformations that are operated by the system, there is always a 
direct mapping 392 between the data and the output. 393 In a data-driven system, as for 
390 “Scientific representations function (…) on at least two levels: as didactic devices, and as the record 
and recognition of a ‘state of human understanding’; or, more specifically, as a ‘statement of the state of 
human awareness’. In addition to their more obvious function of disseminating information, or perhaps 
because of this function, scientific representations stimulate the imagination. More often than not, they 
tend to function simultaneously in these two modes according to the needs of their audience, specialists 
or members of a wider public alike.” (Tomas 2004, 48)
391 1920-1991.
392 It may not be too clear, or linear, but we can consider it to be direct in any case. As Wilden reminds 
us, a mapping is not necessarily a means of visual representation, as it is a way of structuring information. 
“A map is a translation from code to code — a translation of selected features of a ‘territory’ into another 
medium or another code of representation, or the translation of one kind or level of mapping into another 
kind. Mapping at one or several levels — which is taken to include reconnaissance — is one of the most 
important activities of systems dependent on information. These include (in order of increasing diversity 
and complexity) cybernetic machines (including robots, with feedback), computers, organisms, persons, 
corporations, armies, and societies. Mapping varies from the simplest of mechanical simplicities in the 
mapping of temperature by a household thermostat, to the relative simplicity of the mapping of patterns 
of numbers in a computer, to the more complex mapping of the immediate environment (…) by a microbe 
or a cell, to the high complexity of the many maps of many territories at many levels characteristic of hu-
man beings.” (1987, 109)
393 The output will always stand in an analogical relationship with the data that is used in its creation, 
something that in a sense will challenge the digital essence of the system, making in more akin to an 
analog system, as we can infer from Robinson (2008, 21). Which output is produced from the data is also 
a question of choice from the author, or something that can contingently be determined by the context to 
which a given system is produced. Franke points to that idea, acknowledging the metamorphic properties 
(and the fluidity) of digital information: “The means of expression of an artist are adapted to the faculties 
of human perception. Complex patterns are perceptible only via the eye or the ear, thus making music, 
poetry and the visual arts in all their combinations and variations the most sophisticated areas of artistic 
activity. It is interesting to note that the arts, despite highly different results, have one common origin in 
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example Tobias Frere-Jones’s composition F-Hz (#190736, 1996) (2000), the output is 
unchanged provided the data remains static. 394 In this piece the high and low tem-
perature measurements for each day of the year in 1996 395 are converted to audible 
form by switching the original unit of measure from Fahrenheit degrees to Hertz, 
thus producing sine waves and arbitrarily establishing their duration as one-tenth 
of a second for each reading. Should the 732 discrete numbers always reflect the data 
gathered from the world during the course of that year, 396 (and if the parameters of 
the transformation are kept) then the final sonic output will always be similar. In a 
rule-based system, where the values could be generated by a pseudorandom number 
generator or any other (equivalent or more complex) system, then the outputs would 
become as dynamic and variable as the numbers produced by the rules. In the first 
case the composer’s work consists of defining the mechanics of the transformation 
and in selecting the source of data to be fed in the system, while in the other it con-
sists not only of defining the mechanics of the transformations but also those of the 
generation of the data that will be created by the system for its own use.
Data-driven processes place the control of the data outside of the system, either in 
information that is gathered from the world or from mathematical structures that 
generate it, something akin to what happens in interactive systems, where the con-
trol of the output is shared with one or several users. Either strategy will endow the 
system with sources of unpredictability, or enable it to, following Dorin (2008) and 
Scott Turner (qtd. in Cope 2005, 10), produce novelty. Going even further, when stat-
ing the basic properties of generative art systems, Dorin is careful to describe the 
the imagination of the artists: chemo-electrical engrams in the artist’s brain. It is only the choice of the 
specific means of expression — language, music, images — that leads to outwardly different results. The 
functioning of a computer suggests an interesting analogy: during processing, the data are encoded in 
electronic impulses; it is up to the programmer to choose the output device — printer, sound generator, 
plotter. Not only is this analogy remarkable from the viewpoint of history, it also entails practical conse-
quences. The use of computers in art leads to a compatibility of the instrumentarium — to a closer link 
between the different art forms which, owing to the different classical methods and instruments, have 
been separated and taught in different institutions. It is one of the decisive aspects of the new situation 
brought about by the introduction of the computer that there is no longer a reason for dividing art into 
different forms, be they classical or modern.” (1976)
394 In his notes Frere-Jones discusses how it is impossible for any format to convey all aspects of the 
meaning of information. “Format is not inherent in any piece of information. Format is applied later, and 
thus can be changed.”
395 As recorded at the Blue Hill Meteorological Observatory in Milton, Massachusetts, USA.
396 Also in his notes, the composer notes that the piece “recounts an entire year of climate in a sequence 
of sine waves. Asides from the one-tenth second interval, every aspect of the composition is ‘found’, writ-
ten by the natural world.”
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production of novelty as being autonomous, that is, emergent or epigenetic. Data-
driven or interactive processes rely on exogenous sources of novelty and, although 
the information garnered can be interpreted and from it new information can even-
tually be created by the system, therefore producing endogenous novelty, we are 
focusing here in processes where that does not happen and the system simply (or lit-
erally) maps the information more or less directly to its output. This is what happens 
in Merce’s Isosurface (Levin 2009), All Streets 397 (Fry 2008b) or in the White Glove 
Tracking (Roth and Engebreth 2007) projects, works that although in some cases are 
temporally dynamic, nevertheless remain static in the sense that they introduce no 
novelty between repeated viewings.
 
Fig. 85: All Streets (Fry 2008b), general map and Kansas City detail.
In the pieces contributed to the White Glove Tracking project we can witness a simi-
lar phenomenon, as we are able to identify strong structural similarities between dif-
ferent mappings of the same data (i.e., different pieces), regardless of the transforma-
tions that each author developed and of the particular visual resources used. 398 The 
recurrences between different pieces are so strong that, perhaps due to the power of 
(audiovisual) magnetization and synchresis (Chion 1994), one soon starts wonder-
ing whether there is a real synchronism between the visual and the audial layers. 399 
397 All Streets is an image of 26 million individual road segments in the lower 48 states of the USA. Ac-
cording to the author, no other features, such as outlines or geographical elements were mapped in the 
image, although they naturally emerge as roads avoid mountains, and sparse areas convey low population 
(Fry 2008a).
398 This project proposed different artists and designers to create works from the data collected from 
Michael Jackson’s televised performance of Billy Jean on March 25, 1983. The approximate location and 
size (proportionally to the video frame) of Jackson’s famous white glove was compiled for all the 10,060 
frames of the performance. The data was collected through crowd-sourcing and the resulting data file was 
made freely available online for anyone to “download and use as an input into any digital system” (Roth 
and Engebreth 2007).
399 The sound of all the pieces contributed to this project is that of the original video. Naturally, there is 
a strong relation between the music and the glove’s position in each frame, connected as they are to Jack-
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Fig. 86: White Glove MHI (Roth 2007) from the White Glove Tracking project.
Fig. 87: Flocking Gloves (Wicks 2008) from the White Glove Tracking project.
 
Fig. 88: Slinky (Seo 2007) from the White Glove Tracking project.
son’s movements. Sudden movements of the glove can happen in close sync to faster rhythms or breaks 
in the music, while slower movements may be linked to slower passages, etc. We can almost consider the 
existence of a second-order mapping from music to image through the glove’s position (and framing and 
montage options, something that clearly has a predominant influence in this data set).
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If one thinks about works that visualize music, many of the same questions turn out 
to be equivalent to those we discern in data visualization or in the usage of math-
ematical models or series. Music is encoded information and its visualization is usu-
ally based in strictly numerical parameters such as loudness (or volume), pitches 
and duration (temporal quantities) that can either be read from the sound itself 
(using various processes of analog to digital conversion) or are, sometimes, gathered 
directly from MIDI 400 or OSC 401 data received from the devices that generate or play 
the music. In the later cases the link that the system builds is not with the music it-
self — that is, with physical sound matter — but rather with the control layer of the 
system that is producing the music, and therefore, we are faced with a system that 
produces both audial and visual outputs from the same data source and not visual 
outputs from an audial source. If the music visualization system is mainly driven by 
the data gathered from the music and does not include dominant rule-based process 
or processes that strongly influence the way in which that data is transformed, then 
we can safely regard it as being part of a broader class of data-driven processes. 402
2.2.3 Data-Driven Conclusion
Data and action-rules together comprise a generative system, with the potential 
(in principle) to generate every location within the conceptual space. The num-
ber of these locations may be very large, even infinite. (Boden 2004, 90)
There is a further point to be made about data-driven systems and their differences 
when compared with rule-based systems. 403 We have already seen how data-driven 
systems externalize the control, while rule-based systems internalize the control. 
Even if and when using data, they generate it from within. There is always data, 
and there are always transformations operated on the data in order to produce the 
multiple outputs, regardless of the nature of the system one builds, experiments 
400 Musical Instrument Digital Interface.
401 Open Sound Control.
402 In many contexts music visualization processes will need to operate in real time, but on one hand 
that will not happen in all situations, as on the other, real time operation is nowadays much less of a tech-
nical problem than it used to be in the not so distant past.
403 To be precise we should once again underline that we are not simply discussing systems that are 
exclusively data-driven or exclusively rule-based but also those systems that, although combining both 
approaches, can be seen as being primarily data-driven or rule-based. Our hypothesis is that any system, 
regardless of its complexity, will behave in ways that characterize it as being dominated by one of the two 
groups of processes.
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with or studies. In this sense, every system is of course, and inevitably, data-driven, 
therefore this designation may seem somewhat redundant and unfocused. By using 
it, what we wish to emphasize is how the particular data that is transformed by a 
system comes to be, whether it is appropriated externally — from the world, from 
mathematical expressions or models, from the interaction with human beings or 
other procedural systems — or whether it is created internally. In the former case 
a system may be said to be acting transformationally, while on the later the system 
may be said to be acting generatively.
In this sense we can bring to the discussion two terms that are nowadays very often 
used in music: sampling and synthesis. When considering the sound matter used in 
music and how this exists in digital instruments, one can generally split all the exist-
ing techniques into sample-based or synthesis-based approaches. 404 Sample-based 
approaches take the sounds from the external world (from physical phenomena, 
instruments or other sound producing contraptions) and offer tools to repurpose 
those sounds in new contexts. They may be seen as top-down approaches, starting 
as they do from a complete sound and shaping it to other forms, or deconstructing it 
into simpler (and shorter) units. 405 Synthesis-based approaches intend to produce all 
the sounds from the ground-up, by using very simple and fundamental generators 
— sine waves, pulses, etc. 406 — and subsequently combining and transforming them 
404 Granted, this may seem to be a very reductionist approach but, as with data-driven and rule-based 
processes, we believe that there are merits in this extreme contrasting, making the differences stand out 
in ways that would otherwise be more difficult to grasp.
405 Although related to musical practices such as what is commonly referred to as musique concrète, 
the principles in operation are somewhat different. Musique concrète refers to a composition technique 
“concerned itself with the reorganizing of ‘found sound’ (…) recorded in the home, the factory, the street, 
etc., and was in many respects reminiscent of its stylistic antecedent, Dada” (Deutsch 2003, 29), “where 
the essential problem is to assemble sonic objects in a sequence sufficiently ordered to be intelligible” 
(Moles 1966, 169), while sampling refers only (and simply) to a technical process in the construction of 
sounds, that may or may not be used in the production of musique concrète. In particular cases where the 
sampling is not only used as a technical sound-creation resource but as a conceptual framework for the 
composition, different designations have been created, trying to emphasize exactly that — John Oswald’s 
Plunderphonics (1988) being perhaps the better known of these.
406 To be strict, in current digital sound synthesis these generators are very often operating from sam-
ples, that is, they are not, as in analog synthesizers, physical sound generators but are rather reconstruct-
ing those simple sounds from their mathematical descriptions. So, although we cannot say that any par-
ticular sine wave was sampled to produce the sound that the system outputs when synthesizing a sine 
frequency at any given rate, we can nevertheless identify the principle of sampling in operation, as the 
wave was produced from external data. We are however interested in discussing these principles in the 
creation of more complex sounds so, we may disregard the fact that the basic components are themselves 
not synthesized, provided the process of the sound creation adheres to the overall principles of sound syn-
2752.2 Data-Driven
through more or less complex processes to produce the final sound. 407 Many musi-
cians place a very high subjective value on this aspect of the music making process. 
Stephen Deutsch refers the way how postwar electronic music quickly split in two 
camps, musique concrète and electronische musik, largely defined by the contrast-
ing approaches to sound production and the composition processes that derived 
from those (2003, 30), 408 and points as to how these two camps were, by themselves, 
perhaps analogous to the “initial schism” in film between the camp of the Realists — 
represented primarily by the Lumière brothers — and that of the Conjurers — from 
which Georges Méliès, 409 the ‘cinemagician’, is nowadays the most well-known fig-
ure (2003, 29).
Regardless of what we call it then, data-driven, sampled, concrète or realist on one 
hand, rule-based, synthesized or conjured on the other, one may find that the first 
systems are in a sense closed, limited by the inputs they receive, 410 while the later, 
while still limited by the scope of possibilities — or locations within the conceptual 
space — generated by their internal rules, can be seen as more open, pregnant with 
novelty and creative potential. 
thesis, that is, of building the sound from transformations of basic audial units and not from a complex 
external description.
407 This is, of course, a broad and crude overview of the processes. Sound synthesis, whether digital 
or analogue is a complex field, and there is a large number of alternative processes that can be used to 
achieve sometimes similar end results, such as subtractive synthesis, sample and synthesis, physical mod-
eling, frequency modulation, harmonic synthesis, formant wave functions, granular synthesis and many, 
many others (Russ 2009; Roads 1996).
408 According to Deutsch, electronische musik “based upon the notion of technologically-led art with a 
technological aesthetic, held sway intellectually and politically, and was a dominant form of avant-garde 
music during the period 1950-75. To make such music, these practitioners needed to be totally au fait with 
the technology, which initially consisted of oscillators, filters, ring modulators, reverb units and tape re-
corders. Both technologically and aesthetically, electronische musik was predisposed away from tonality 
and harmony. It was directed towards structuralistic and colouristic systems of composition…” (2003, 30).
409 1861-1938.
410 “Without doubt very interesting results can appear which have never been seen before. For long-
term artistic interest however, the resulting aesthetical information of a mathematical formula is in itself 
limited and therefore a closed system. The research to find or invent individual rules as a means of artistic 
expression. The individual impact of human behaviour, filtered and reformed through the inherent pe-
culiarities of a computer, will lead directly to an interesting and overall coherent open system. Of course 
mathematics are used, but in this case only as a technical help, and not as the sole purpose.” (Mohr 1976)
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2.3 Algorithmic / Rule-Based
2.3.1 Rule-Based Processes
Rules are information about information, stored information that is remem-
bered and expressed every time a rule is used. They are informational con-
straints that goalseeking adaptative systems observe in the creation of struc-
ture: organization, complexity, meaning.
Every system of rules depends on rules about rules, including the very idea of 
rule itself. The following might be called the Rules Rules:
— No rule without exceptions. 
— Rules are made to be broken. 
— The exception tests the rule. 
— A rule to which there are no actual or imaginable exceptions ceases by that 
fact to be a rule (after Benjamin Lee Whorf).
By recognizing that rules may be broken, we recognize that rule-governed sys-
tems are open to innovation. (Wilden 1987, 103)
If a system feeds on information that is provided externally, it may be regarded as 
not delivering more than a set of more or less complex transformations that are 
operated on that data. To a point, the system may be interpreting that data, but 
whatever interpretation is made, it will be, for the most part, neutral. Naturally it is 
granted that whatever input a system receives will need to conform to that system’s 
capacity to detect and read it — a system may have upper or lower limits on the reso-
lution of the data it transforms, much in the same way as it will have a more or less 
predefined scope of possible outputs for those transformations 411 — so a system will 
not be able to operate on any data that falls outside of its detection limits, as much as 
411 Simple examples: a system that samples its input once a second will fail to detect variations in the 
input that fall in between different samplings, say, every tenth of a second or faster; A system that reads 
light in the human visible range, much like humans, will fail to detect light sources in the infrared range; 
A system that inputs integer numbers will fail to see most differences between float numbers, depending 
on the way it may round or truncate them.
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it will not be able to output any such data. 412 But in regard to that data it may oper-
ate into, the system will (in principle) not discriminate, it will be neutral, unbiased 
and ultimately uncreative. The data that is fed in the system may provide it with 
structures that are complex enough as to give us the impression, once we analyze its 
output alone, that the system is producing novelty, a structurally coherent or even 
an unpredictable set of outputs, but we must understand that the root for these phe-
nomena is in the data and not in the system itself. In these cases it may be said that 
the system demonstrates the capacity to transform the inputs in meaningful (or even 
elaborate) manners, but that its potential for artificial creativity is low or even nil.
If on the other hand, we wish to devise systems that can operate independently from 
external inputs by producing novelty, surprise and ultimately acting creatively, we 
will need to resort to rule-based processes. In these the data is not only acquired and 
transformed by a system but may also be effectively produced by itself prior to what-
ever transformations may also take place and to its conversion to sensorial outputs.
We should firstly try to define more clearly what, in the context of this work, we 
understand by rule-based processes. In Generative Art and Rules-Based Art (2006), 
Galanter tries to expand his original definition for generative art, 413 distinguishing 
in a first moment generative art from computer programming, or from computer-
programmed art. According to Galanter, interpreting both as being synonymous 
is a mistake, because “generative art long preceded computers” and “can include 
a chemical reaction, the use of living plants, condensation and crystallization pro-
cesses, melting substances, or any other physical process that can take place autono-
mously.” He defends that generative art happens every time that the artist chooses to 
“to cede some degree of control to an external system, and the artwork thus results 
from more than just the moment-to-moment intuitive decisions of the artist”. 414 He 
412 Which is not to say that a system will not be able to output information that is then unable to read, 
because that can also happen. Much in the same way that humans emit infrared energy that are not able 
to detect unaided, a system may produce physical outputs (electromagnetic, thermic, audial, etc.) that it 
may be unable to detect without the help of specific, and specialized, transducers.
413 “Generative art refers to any art practice where the artist uses a system, such as a set of natural 
language rules, a computer program, a machine, or other procedural invention, which is set into motion 
with some degree of autonomy contributing to or resulting in a completed work of art.” (Galanter 2003) 
In various successively refined versions, this has been taken by other authors and artists as a good, if not 
as the finest, definition for generative art (Watz 2006).
414 In the context of this work we might even slightly rephrase this definition, pointing not to an ex-
ternal system but to the system that the artist builds. Therefore the source of control to whom the artist 
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states that the terms generative art and rules-based art are sometimes used inter-
changeably and tries to “add clarity to the language, [to] show that the terms are 
indeed usefully different”. Safeguarding that a “full exploration of the historical re-
lationships between rule-based art and generative art and the related art movements 
could fill a book or even a career”, he proceeds to develop a brief overview of what 
he considers to be the fundamental distinctions, enumerating a few rule types and 
indicating which can be considered to constitute generative methods.
Galanter starts by quoting the opening statement of American curator Marc Glim-
cher in the catalogue for Logical Conclusions, 40 Years of Rules-Based Art an exhi-
bition at the Pace Wildenstein gallery in New York. 415 In his essay, Glimcher offers 
his definition of rule-based art: “For purposes of this investigation, rule-based art 
will be defined as art created utilizing one or more logic-based systems to direct the 
design and creation of the object. Their foundation may be mathematical, such as 
those based on geometric and number theories. Or, they may be founded in logic: 
for example solipsism and other tautological constructs. And finally, there are ap-
plications of game theory, in which the artist forces the art to conform to certain 
arbitrary (if personally meaningful) rules.” (Glimcher and Rose 2005) This defini-
tion implies an overlap between rule-based and generative arts but, according to 
Galanter is also unfortunately problematic, over-inflated and yet not inclusive of all 
the works on display, that were “either well outside of this definition, or sometimes 
within the definition in ways that are trivially reductionist” 416 (2006). Galanter com-
plements the short analysis on Logical Conclusions with a similar exercise about Be-
yond Geometry, Experiments in Form, 1940’s-70’s, shown at the Los Angeles County 
Museum of Art 417 and curated by Lynn Zelevansky. The conclusion of the second 
analysis reinforces that of the first, in which even if both exhibitions come very close 
cedes the decisions is internal to that system, not external to it, although it will be in either case external 
to the artist herself.
415 February 18 to March 26, 2005.
416 “‘Mathematical systems’ are typically systems of axioms and deduced propositions. Such activities 
are not evident in the works cited, but there are pieces that are based on simple arithmetic. While solip-
sism and tautological constructs are part of ‘logic,’ they are deflated aspects devoid of the long chains of 
reason logical systems would usually connote. The invocation of ‘game theory’ is simply mistaken in that 
game theory as a discipline is the mathematical analysis of economic situations where multiple agents 
attempt to optimize a series of interactions to their own benefit. Some of the artistic processes exhibited 
are vaguely game like, but they are single player games devoid of any competitive or economic aspect. In 
other words, they may be games in the common sense, but they are not subject to game theory as such.” 
(Galanter 2006)
417 June 13 to October 3, 2004.
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to make the argument that Galanter is defending, to underline “how interwoven 
generative art already is with traditional art”, they nevertheless fail to do so, and 
“the mainstream art world remains blind to generative art as the sweeping inclusive 
tendency it is.”
Galanter then moves to expose the differences between rule-based and generative 
art, again defining them as “independent realms with an area of overlap” and stat-
ing that “a number of generative systems are not rule-based at all”. Galanter’s defi-
nition of rule-based seems to be clearly different from the one developed in this 
work (and thus far described not as rule-based art but rather as art developed by 
rule-based processes). We will further develop this, but let us first see what else 
Galanter presents as part of his definition: generative systems “can include vari-
ous forms of mechanical painting and drawing machines, chemical reactions, the 
use of living plants, condensation and crystallization processes, certain forms of 
kinetic sculpture, and so on”, while “rule systems which are not generative lack the 
specificity and autonomy to create results ‘on their own’”. We may therefore agree 
with Galanter’s underlining of the necessity to create results (or novelty) “on their 
own”, from within, endogenously or autonomously, rather than relying on outside 
sources of novelty, be it data, users, or the artist herself. If we remember the Prin-
ciple of Computational Equivalence, that states that “almost all processes that are 
not obviously simple can be viewed as computations of equivalent sophistication” 
(Wolfram 2002, 716), we may easily regard the systems presented by Galanter as 
being computational at their core, regardless of whether they are natural (chemical 
reactions, the use of living plants, condensation and crystallization processes) or 
artificial (mechanical painting and drawing machines, kinetic sculpture), if they 
are contemporary and developed with computers or if they can be found in ex-
amples from the history of art, developed manually or mechanically. In any case, 
once appropriated as part of an artwork or other aesthetic artifact, all processes, 
regardless of their root, become part of the artificial process that is the artwork. 
We may also discover several other rule systems with serious creative potential in a 
list of rule systems which are not generative that is presented by Galanter. This list 
includes constraint rules, rules which present abstract scores for free interpretation, 
inspirational rules, rules as frozen plans for installation or fabrication, rules dictat-
ing thematic manual creation, the rule as performance script or ritual and manual 
interpretation of non-autonomous rules. On the other hand, Galanter’s list of rule 
systems which are generative systems includes rules as algorithms, rules as recipes 
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for autonomous processes, rules as a well-defined widely applicable process, com-
binatorial rules, numerical sequences as rules, line composition or drawing rules, 
the rule of serial generation, tiling and other symmetric composition rules, chance 
operation rules, clustering rules that create composition, mapping from one domain 
to another and finally, rules which create cycles and phase interactions. We will now 
analyze these systems of rules, adding some that were not contemplated by Galanter, 
in an attempt to clarify what is (also according to Galanter) a very fuzzy category.
2.3.2 Rule Systems That Are Not Generative: Constraints
The first rule system that Galanter cites as not having generative potential is that of 
sets of (artificial) constraints that limit and therefore partially define the composi-
tion space of a piece. “For example, ‘the artist will use a 4’ by 3’ canvas, and only 
cobalt blue and black paint.’ An artist might choose to use constraint rules to create 
controlled experiments (in the case of Albers), or to press an art-theory point (as 
with Manzoni), or to simply activate the creative process by reducing an infinity of 
options to a workable number (as with Zittel).” (Galanter 2006)
Although constraint rules can certainly have creative potential, we agree that in 
these examples they cannot be understood as generative (in Galanter’s sense of the 
definition) or even as rule-based processes (in our’s). Depending on the type and 
specificity of the constraints, some cases may constitute systems capable of (semi-)
automatically generating outputs, as in the previously noted case of LeWitt, where 
one can speak not so much of constraints but perhaps of (to use LeWitt’s words) “a 
plan” (1969b). LeWitt saw this as “one way of avoiding subjectivity” that also “obvi-
ates the necessity of designing each work in turn”.
The plan would design the work. Some plans would require millions of varia-
tions, and some a limited number, but both are finite. Other plans imply infin-
ity. In each case, however, the artist would select the basic form and rules that 
would govern the solution of the problem. After that the fewer decisions made 
in the course of completing the work, the better. This eliminates the arbitrary, 
the capricious, and the subjective as much as possible. This is the reason for 
using this method.
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When an artist uses a multiple modular method he usually chooses a simple 
and readily available form. The form itself is of very limited importance; it 
becomes the grammar for the total work. In fact, it is best that the basic unit 
be deliberately uninteresting so that it may more easily become an intrinsic 
part of the entire work. Using complex basic forms only disrupts the unity of 
the whole. Using a simple form repeatedly narrows the field of the work and 
concentrates the intensity to the arrangement of the form. This arrangement 
becomes the end while the form becomes the means. (1969b)
Although when exposed in this sense the system does not detail a strict process, 
whenever the constraints are too strong one may consider that whatever freedom 
the artist may have within those constraints will actually become the process. If 
one’s moves are severely limited, if the possibility spaces for the artist’s action are 
bounded by constraining rules, then that limitation can be seen as being part (or all) 
of the process.
Of course that simpler constraints such as the first cited above, determining format 
and color palette, can be regarded as too weak, not quite constraining the action 
enough to be considered as process-defining. Constraints that on the other hand 
are very strong, that specify to a great detail every action to be or not taken, will 
likely prescribe all the steps taken by the artist in the execution of a work that abides 
by them. In this case we can already speak of algorithms or effective procedures 
instead of constraints. On the other hand, we should note that whenever an effec-
tive procedure is defined and set in motion, the processes encoded in the procedure 
will generate a space of possibilities for its outputs to be created in. Not allowing any 
output to fall outside of this field will, for all purposes, set boundaries that cannot 
be breached because the system is not able to do so. Any rule-based process is then, 
in effect, a definition of constraints — but one that does not start by disallowing but 
rather by allowing things to exist. 418 We may therefore propose that for a system to 
have generative potential 419 it will need to be bound by constraints, in most cases 
very severe constraints. Therefore generative potential will not so much be a mat-
418 To be precise, many logical expressions can be interpreted as being designed to disallow possible 
states, such as when a designer explicitly filters out values that fall outside a certain scope. What we find 
fundamental is that even in cases where those expressions are used, the space of possibilities is defined 
affirmatively — by stating what will happen, or what can happen — and not negatively, by stating what 
should be excluded.
419 An expression that we prefer, and find less subjective than as Galanter proposes ‘to be generative’.
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ter of whether there are constraints — as there must be — but rather of how strong 
those constraints are in the system and how many of them can be found. 420
Extreme constraints will inevitably result in a deterministic system and, as we have 
previously seen, any computational system is by definition relentlessly deterministic 
(Rucker 2005, 11). Taken to an extreme, determinism and constraining will result 
in systems like Every Icon (Simon 1997b), where every future state can easily be pre-
dicted by an informed observer or, if we subscribe to pancomputationalism, we will 
even be able to consider that they result in any static, classical, artwork, 421 where 
every stroke, chiseling or action taken by the artist becomes a constraint. 422
2.3.3 More Rule Systems That Are Not Generative
The second type of not-generative system presented by Galanter is that of rules 
which present abstract scores for free interpretation, defined as “systems of abstract 
symbols without a intended or predefined mapping into a multidimensional qualia 
420 “Complexity is a quality based on diversity. Diversity is the combination of two or more kinds of 
variety. A system displaying only one level or kind of variety — such as the ‘organized simplicity’ of the 
planets in mechanics or the ‘unorganized variety’ of the molecules in a gas in thermodynamics — is nei-
ther complex nor diverse. Considered simply as the means of counting, for example, the positive whole 
numbers display infinite variety. But all of this variety is of the same kind and exists at the same level: the 
whole number system does not display diversity.
Systems displaying one kind of diversity (two kinds of variety) are the least complex of complex sys-
tems. If we consider the variety of the positive integers, not on the basis of counting alone but also by the 
quality of being odd and even, then the whole number system displays two kinds of variety and one kind 
of diversity.
The more levels and kinds of variety a system displays — living systems operate on many thousands 
of levels (the average cell may contain 3,000 different enzymes) — the greater is its diversity and thus its 
complexity.
Complexity and diversity are products of constraint. One kind of constraint produces one kind of 
variety. Complexity and diversity thus require the operation of more than one constraint. The more levels 
and kinds of constraint that govern (but do not determine) a system, the more levels and kinds of diversity 
it is sensitive to, and the more complex and diverse it is.” (Wilden 1987, 172).
421 Even static painting or sculpture can be seen as being, at its core, a dynamic process. If works of art 
were not transient and mutable (although with a rather slow pace) they would not be part of this world, 
they would not deteriorate or need special preservation and restoration.
422 We may also speculate that the authorial mark left in the work increases with the constraints, but 
that may not necessarily mean that the absolute authorial mark is only achieved with absolute constraints. 
An artist as Josef Albers (1888-1976), following rules that result in a static artifact can be found to have a 
small authorial imprint (if we may call it as such) in the definition of the rules, and a very strong one in 
the finished piece, that is an outcome of the rules and of his actions while abiding them, but his authorial 
mark will be left only in that one object, while in dynamic systems that may produce multiple outputs, the 
authorial imprint of the artist or designer is left across all of them.
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space. The live performer invents a mapping from the abstract symbols into a prop-
erty such as pitch, or color, or energy level, and then performs the score. Needless to 
say, some of these mappings will be more improvisational than others.” (2006) As 
an example he proposes a score by Earle Brown, 423 December 1952 (1952), from which 
the performers are supposed to “translate the abstract parameters of graphic forms 
into sound by a performing mappings of their own invention”, “the horizontal di-
mension might be pitch, and the vertical dimension loudness” but no interpretation 
or suggestion is offered by the author regarding that. Cage’s Mesostics are another 
example of these “rule systems”, 424 graphical poems intended to be performed but 
provided to the performer without any instructions whatsoever to guide the per-
formance or the mapping between graphic forms and music to be produced from 
them. 425 Although much less improvisational, Cathy Berberian’s 426 music scores 
were also designed to provide a vast amount of freedom in the interpretation, and 
were not intended to be followed with the strictness that traditional musical nota-
tion normally requires. Cardew’s Treatise (1967), a 193-page musical score written for 
no specific type of instrument, with no instruction or guidance for the performers, 
can also be regarded not so much as a rule system but as an inspirational cue that 
could be interpreted with a wide latitude by the performer or performers.
Fig. 89: Page from Treatise (Cardew 1967).
423 1926-2002.
424 At this point one feels the need to safeguard the expression by surrounding it with scare quotes, as 
not doing so would almost seem inadequate in the present context.
425 The text in the Mesostics was naturally intended to be read or sung, but always as part of a musical 
interpretation, never as a poetry declamation. Even in such a case, the Mesostics would still require the 
reader to develop a very personal and subjective interpretation.
426 1925-1983.
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Inspirational rules are the third type listed by Galanter, a definition that in his own 
words may “appear to be an oxymoron” (2006). Inspirational rules are a somewhat 
common phenomenon and some have met with considerable reputation or popu-
lar fame in recent years, such as the deck of cards produced by Brian Eno and Pe-
ter Schmidt called Oblique Strategies (1975), posteriorly updated in several versions, 
both in physical as digital supports. Oblique Strategies originated when its authors 
concluded that they “tended to keep a set of basic working principles which guided 
them through the kinds of moments of pressure” and that “the pressures of time 
tended to steer them away from the ways of thinking they found most productive 
when the pressure was off.” (Taylor 1997) The system was then devised as a way to 
“to remind themselves of those habits of thinking — to jog the mind”, as a set of 
heuristics, one could say. It was suggested that “the deck was not conceived of as a 
set of ‘fixed’ instructions, but rather a group of ideas to be added to or modified over 
time”, an idea that was reinforced by the inclusion in the deck of “4 or 5 blank cards, 
intended to be filled and used as needed.” 427 (1997) A second example presented by 
Galanter is Ad Reinhardt’s 428 Abstract Painting, Blue (1952), a work where the canvas 
is overlaid with a three-by-three grid of rectangles rendered in blue paint, with so 
subtle tonal variations between each of the squares that the painting only reveals 
its composition after prolonged and focused observation. Reinhardt’s rule for the 
427 In a 1980 interview, Eno discusses the creative process that conducted to the creation of the first 
edition of Oblique Strategies. “These cards evolved from our separate working procedures. It was one of 
the many cases during the friendship that he [Peter Schmidt] and I where we arrived at a working posi-
tion at almost exactly the same time and almost in exactly the same words. (…) The Oblique Strategies 
evolved from me being in a number of working situations when the panic of the situation — particularly 
in studios — tended to make me quickly forget that there were others ways of working and that there were 
tangential ways of attacking problems that were in many senses more interesting than the direct head-on 
approach. If you’re in a panic, you tend to take the head-on approach because it seems to be the one that’s 
going to yield the best results. Of course, that often isn’t the case — it’s just the most obvious and — ap-
parently — reliable method. The function of the Oblique Strategies was, initially, to serve as a series of 
prompts which said, ‘Don’t forget that you could adopt this attitude,’ or ‘Don’t forget you could adopt that 
attitude.’ (…) The first Oblique Strategy said ‘Honour thy error as a hidden intention.’ And, in fact, Peter’s 
first Oblique Strategy — done quite independently and before either of us had become conscious that the 
other was doing that — was …I think it was ‘Was it really a mistake?’ which was, of course, much the same 
kind of message. Well, I collected about fifteen or twenty of these and then I put them onto cards. At the 
same time, Peter had been keeping a little book of messages to himself as regards painting, and he’d kept 
those in a notebook. We were both very surprised to find the other not only using a similar system but also 
many of the messages being absolutely overlapping, you know… there was a complete correspondence 
between the messages. So subsequently we decided to try to work out a way of making that available to 
other people, which we did; we published them as a pack of cards, and they’re now used by quite a lot of 
different people, I think.” (Amirkhanian and Eno 1980)
428 1913-1967.
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creation of this work states “…one formal device, one color-monochrome, one linear 
division in each direction, one symmetry, one texture, one free-handbrushing… No 
lines or imaginings, no shapes or composings or representings, no visions or sensa-
tions or impulses… nothing that is not of the essence.” (qtd. in Galanter 2006)
Fig. 90: Abstract Painting, Blue (Reinhardt 1952).
A posteriori, one can certainly identify the correspondences between rules and fin-
ished piece but in these rules one does not discover a strong enough set of con-
straints that would dictate this particular piece among many other, and radically 
different, possible end results. One does not find detailed procedural instructions 
from which this result could emerge. As Galanter puts it, “this is not a mathematical, 
logical, or ‘game theory’ rule”, but “more of a manifesto that constrains the activity 
of the artist within a narrow range”, but not narrow enough to remove a large major-
ity of the decisions from the hand of the artist, effectively constraining his actions 
(and creativity, and will) so as to make the rules become responsible for a minimum 
of coauthorship of the end-result. Many of the works produced by Reinhardt can be 
seen as being inspired by such writings, but as this excerpt proves, such manifesto-
like inspirational approaches are usually not deterministic enough to be considered 
as rule-based systems in this context.
Rules as frozen plans for installation or fabrication are also presented as being void 
of generative potential. Galanter refers to blueprints or their information equivalent, 
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that usually constrain the results to a maximum and allow for a zero-degree of free-
dom in terms of inventing mappings at the time of execution, once that the blueprint 
needs to be strictly followed at all times. Naturally, and as a practical matter, “fabri-
cators and artisans will leave their own traces in the rendered media” but “because 
blueprints demand a predetermined fixed result they are usually not viewed as being 
generative.” (2006)
Fig. 91: Cubic Modular Piece Nº 3 (Le Witt 1968).
An example of such a system can be found in LeWitt’s Cubic Modular Piece Nº  3 
(1968), a work drawn from precise instructions for a process leading to a totally de-
terminate (and inalterable) end-result. Blueprints and similar systems do not allow 
for variation or for a degree of indeterminacy in the outcomes of the fabrication pro-
cess, therefore they can be seen as being a data-driven process and not a rule-based 
process. 429 We should also note that blueprints, unlike emergent systems, usually 
involve a one-to-one reversible mapping between the design and the outcome of the 
process (blueprint and house, or car, or computer), whereas emergent systems are 
irreversible (Dawkins 2009).
Rules dictating thematic manual creation are basic ideas or themes sometimes re-
ferred to as being generative because they inspire a family of ideas or activities as 
variations and applications. About these, Galanter states that they are “generally ex-
cluded from the notion of generative art because they depend on a human being act-
429 We can make the case that some blueprints may be generated from rule-based processes, as it is 
common in architecture or industrial design, for example, but in such instances we should, as Xenakis, 
differentiate between the act or process of designing the blueprints — a generative, rule-based, endeavor 
— and that of implementing them — a non-generative, data-driven work.
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ing as the generative system. Of course human beings are generative systems when 
viewed as objects. But taken as is, it leads to the conclusion that all art created by 
humans is generative art. At that point the term generative art loses utility and dis-
tinct meaning. Typically by generative art we mean art created with the assistance 
of non-human generative systems.” (2006) Ruscha’s Various Small Fires and Milk 
(1964) art book is cited as an example, as its operative rule is that only pictures of 
the thematic subject matters should be used. This is a process that Ruscha developed 
in other works and publications, such as Nine Swimming Pools (1968). 430 A further 
example is found in the works of Bridget Riley that although seemingly possible to 
summarize by mathematical rules, were in fact generated from intuitive processes.
Rules as performance script or ritual follow from these, and were often explored in 
conceptual art, in what Galanter refers to as “a sort of minimal performance art”, 
work that can usually be regarded as being rule-based because it is the result of per-
formance instructions. However, as no control is ever transferred to systems that are 
external to the artist or the performers, such work cannot be considered generative.
Finally, in the list of systems enunciated, we have the manual interpretation of non-
autonomous rules, found in miscellaneous rule-based artworks that share only the 
notion that a generative idea can be explored in a series of manual variations. Sev-
eral works by On Kawara can be given as examples.
430 Between 1963 and 1978 Ruscha produced a total of sixteen books using various concepts as these — 
the first of the series was titled Twenty-Six Gasoline Stations. Ruscha always stated that he thought of the 
title before taking the photographs, underlining the conceptual aspect of the works.
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Fig. 92: June 19, 1967, Oct.31,1978, 2 Juin 2000 and Sept.25,2002 (Kawara 1967; 1978; 2000; 2002).
Each of Kawara’s works must be, according to his set of rules, completed in a single 
day, show the date of creation, and include a box lined with a newspaper of the 
day attached to the back of the canvas. These rules are very specific but still they 
are unable to determine the piece autonomously, leaving once again most of the 
operational decisions to the artist. We can find a similar modus operandi in the 
works of French-born Polish painter Roman Opałka, that in the mid-1960s started 
painting by a process of counting, from one to infinity. Each of his canvas is filled 
with sequential numbers, starting in the top left-hand corner of the canvas with the 
number after the last painted in the previous painting, and finishing in the bottom 
right-hand corner. Each of the canvas is of the exact same dimension (196 × 135 cm) 
and is executed in a similar way, following an almost ritual approach that is still 
continued by the artist, more than forty years after it was started. Again, as system-
atic as this process may be, and as similar as it may be to some rule-based processes, 
we cannot define it as being generative, or as being endowed with any autonomy 
from the artist that executes it, unlike what happens in the rule systems proposed as 
exemplary of generative potential.
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2.3.4 Rule Systems That Are Generative Systems
On a fundamentally different level, not necessarily of complexity but rather of au-
tonomy, or capacity to produce novelty and to take the creative control from the art-
ist, are a series of twelve systems that Galanter presents as “rule systems which are 
generative systems” (2006). Some of these have already been discussed but we will 
nevertheless revise the list, and expand it where necessary.
The first system is that of “rules as algorithms”. Galanter does not offer his definition 
of algorithm, but it is safe to assume that he follows the somewhat standard defini-
tion we have been following, that of a complete set of instructions that are given to 
a machine (or human) in order to solve a problem or to describe the strategy for its 
resolution, an effective procedure. The example offered, from the Logical Conclu-
sions exhibition, is a work by Tom Friedman, a sculpture constructed from 36 boxes 
of S.O.S. scouring pads, that were measured, cut, incrementally offset, and then glued 
together, creating a single enlarged version of the original boxes. 431 Other works 
by Friedman use the same system, a process that after the selection of the input 
(which kind of box) and of a single variable (how many boxes to use) will autono-
mously produce outputs, leaving no choice to the human operator (be it the artist 
or an artisan). 432 In its (relative) simplicity, we find it to be an excellent example, not 
only because it is a process that most persons could imagine being able to develop 
with little more resources than common office supplies, as also in spite of rigorously 
describing a process, it does not depend on a computer or any knowledge of pro-
gramming to be executed. For these “rules as algorithms” to be valid as generative 
431 “Friedman’s working principle revolves loosely around codes of construction. (…) The SOS box is 
inflated to Warholesque proportions, but that inflation is accomplished by juxtaposing the grid-wise dis-
sected elements of (…) SOS boxes. The resulting work reveals an enlargement that shares the grainy, out-
of-focus quality of overenlarged photographs. In fact, both Warhol’s and Friedman’s manipulation of 
space as a phenomenon depends upon the mathematical principle of multiplication. In Warhol’s case the 
rule is expansive and simple. In Friedman’s it is algorithmic, efficient, and complex, but it is the essence of 
the principle of replication that the artist seeks to make visible through his experimentation.” (Glimcher 
and Rose 2005, 121)
432 Relying as it does on a human executor (one is tempted to say a human computer) this algorithm 
does not need to define all the articulations of the process. Humans are, after all, resourceful and intel-
ligent executors, unlike computers or other machinery. Much in the same sense, an algorithm written for 
execution by a computer, while needing to detail in much more detail several of the steps in the process, 
would not need to detail those operations that were already specified by the system it runs in or the 
programming language with which it is written — as an example, if arithmetic is used in the algorithm, 
the programmer will (normally) not need to specify how arithmetic operations should be computed, etc.
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systems, we need to understand them as cases in which all, or most, of the decisions 
are prescribed by the algorithm, either because the process is laid out with such a re-
duced margin for uncertainty that decisions will not be necessary or because the al-
gorithm itself provides the tools for making the choices, whenever the need arises. 433
Fig. 93: Untitled (Friedman 2004).
 
Fig. 94: Untitled (Friedman 2000) and detail.
433 A measure of indeterminacy is also contemplated by this algorithm — not only in the choice of 
input and variable (not precisely specified) as in the details of the boxes used in the construction (print-
ing errors, variations in color, texture, etc.) and in the relative inaccuracy of the manual execution of the 
construction process, revealing minute imprecisions, and other quirks.
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Under this system one can also list works by Chuck Close, large format portraits 
created from photographs that are “divided with an overlying grid made of a prede-
termined number of units. A canvas is then divided into a grid with an equal or a 
smaller number of units.” Close then “transcribes the image, block for block, from 
the photograph to the canvas. This transcription takes one of many forms”, render-
ing a new image, closely based on the original photograph but truly unique. 434 (qtd. 
in Glimcher and Rose 2005, 70)
Fig. 95: Robert / 104,072 (Close 1974).
434 “I wanted to make something that was impersonal and personal, arm’s length and intimate, minimal 
and maximal, using the least amount of paint possible but providing the greatest amount of information 
possible. Showing no display of the artist’s hand in terms of virtuoso brushmanship but employing un-
believable handwork, you know lots of labor. And I was always interested in the tension that comes from 
those dichotomies and those extremes. I always thought the best art was extreme whatever it was.” (Close, 
qtd. in Glimcher and Rose 2005)
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The second system listed starts from a “recipe” but allows for a far greater latitude in 
its implementation. Galanter calls it “rules as recipes for autonomous processes” and 
exemplifies it with Ruscha’s book Every Building on the Sunset Strip (1966). All the 
photographs in this book are printed on a single sheet, folded as an accordion, with a 
total length of over eight meters, showing each side of the sunset strip, in Los Ange-
les. According to Galanter, Ruscha “eschews typical notions of composition and the 
decisive moment in photography, and instead implements the title of the piece by 
simply capturing Every Building on the Sunset Strip in his camera” (2006) and that 
even if “the piece was manually implemented, it is generative in principle” because 
the title rule “could have been handed off to a technician or a robot for execution”.
Fig. 96: Every Building on the Sunset Strip (Ruscha 1966).
Unlike the algorithm used by Friedman, (described as an “axiomatic system” by 
Glimcher), 435 the title of Every Building on the Sunset Strip can only barely be inter-
preted as a rule in this case, because if it defines a theme and something that can be 
generally understood as a goal, it does not constrain in any way the approach that 
the artist will develop. Stated as it is, the title does not specify how the photos should 
be made, how they should be composed in the book, or how its physical structure 
435 Axiomatic systems are, according to Glimcher, working under the strictures of rules and use logical 
systems to control the creation of the work. “These artists (…) identify an axiom or universal law, such as 
thermodynamics, fractal geometry, or the unidirectionality of time, and set it up as the condition of the 
artwork’s creation. Unlike some rule-based artists who subject their vision to a system as such, artists who 
pursue axiomatic systems begin with specific propositions, experimenting with their effect in a variety of 
visual and constructive projects.” (Glimcher and Rose 2005).
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should be devised. As relevant as the portrayal of every single building on the Sun-
set Strip, the accordion folding, the pairing of the opposite sides of the street, the 
printing and even the “harsh light of high noon, making [the Sunset Strip] appear as 
dull and tacky-looking as a Midwestern Main Street” (David Bourdon qtd. in Glim-
cher and Rose 2005, 30), among other factors, all contribute to the significance (and 
the multiple levels of complexity) of this work. Of all of these, only one is specified 
by what Galanter identifies as a rule and all of the remaining were left to the artist. If 
a ‘robot’ or a technician were to be handed with the execution of the photographs (to 
say nothing about the execution of the entirety of the work), a much more complete 
and detailed set of rules would have been necessary. It is hard to understand where 
exactly Galanter is finding the differences between this work and those listed under 
his “rules dictating thematic manual creation”, so we certainly cannot find a strong 
enough justification to regard this work as generative. An interesting case can be 
made when comparing this so-called rule from Ruscha to that of Young on his Com-
position 1960 #10 (1960), “Draw a straight line and follow it.” Apparently both are 
simple instructions, straightforward to follow by any artist, technician or robot, but 
upon closer inspection it becomes clear that Young’s instruction encompasses (both 
conceptually as well as formally) all the instructions that are necessary for the re-
alization of the work. It omits supports, formats or any other formal consideration 
besides that of the line (and its straightness) and (perhaps more importantly) it is 
presented as a rule without an object (not as a rule attached to an object). As such, 
each and every time that a process is started from the rule in Composition 1960 #10, it 
will lead to a diverse implementation and a necessarily different result, with its own 
idiosyncrasies and a characteristic outcome. Every Building on the Sunset Strip, on 
the other hand, is presented as a rule with a single and already existing execution, 
a rule that seems almost as if it is not intended to be followed again, a process that 
should not be carried. Lastly, the form of the code should also be taken in consid-
eration. While Young’s rule is formulated in the imperative mood, with clear verbs 
that describe the actions to be developed, Ruscha’s uses adjectives and nouns, not 
describing what should be done but rather what has been done.
“Rules as a well defined widely applicable process” are defined as presentations of 
processes that “are so widely understood, or so commonly observed, that they be-
gin to become transparent and unnoticed” (Galanter 2006). The example offered is 
James Siena’s painting Enter the Faces (1996). This painting, along with two other 
works also presented in the Logical Conclusions catalogue were, according to Siena, 
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produced through the “division of rectangle by halves, in succession. Each volume 
divided by half results in one of the halves being divided again; only up to four times, 
when another color, or another iteration is introduced within each of the rectangles 
created by the previous procedure. The process is repeated with changing colors as 
the picture is filled with rectangles of diminishing size. (A decision is made with 
respect to the choice of direction for the division of volumes. One could look at it 
as choosing between ‘right’ or ‘left’ handedness to the iteration. I see it as going ‘to-
wards’ or ‘away from’ the previous cluster of diminishment.)” (qtd. in Glimcher and 
Rose 2005, 138). About Global Key, Second Version (Siena 2000), the artist further 
states, as an operational program: “Divide upper half of surface with volume density 
defined by line curved at corners. Divide right side of remaining half of surface the 
same way. Repeat activity for lower half of left side of the surface, then for left half 
of remaining surface, then for top half of remaining surface, then for right side of 
remaining surface, then for bottom half, then left half, then top, then bottom. Line 
volumes with alternating shades of white and color three times. Choose color with 
no logical or emotional underpinning, but let each move, or pass, occur in the same 
color. Repeat division and lining procedure inside all remaining volumes, space per-
mitting, until one quarter of surface has no space remaining.” (qtd. in Glimcher and 
Rose 2005, 142) These two statements are presented in the catalogue as the rules 
from which the paintings were executed. A quote from Siena is presented as an art-
ist’s statement, underlining their importance in the artistic process: “I don’t make 
marks. I make moves. The reality of abstraction is my primary point of engagement. 
When I make a painting, I respond to a set of parameters, like a visual algorithm. 
These structuring devices are subject to the fallibility of my hand, and my mind’s 
ability to complete the work as planned. Using proven mathematical truths (…) I 
construct pictures that, I hope, are so beyond complex that even a baby can under-
stand them. But like all artworks made by hand, they live or die the essential capa-
bilities of their aesthetic moves.” (qtd. in Glimcher and Rose 2005, 138)
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Fig. 97: Enter the Faces (Siena 1996).
Fig. 98: Global Key, Second Version (Siena 2000).
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Similar principles can be seen in action in works from other artists, either in manu-
ally executed or computer produced artifacts. Eva Schindling works inspired in the 
Belousov-Zhabotinsky 436 reactions are such an example. The works in this series 
were programmed with algorithmic descriptions of a BZ reaction and seeded with 
different initial parameters, from where the process was developed autonomously. 437
 
Fig. 99: Bz_11295_Mode1_A1.2_B1.0_C1.0 (Alpha=1.2 Beta=1.0 Gamma=1.0) (Schindling 2009a) and 
Bz_112853_Mode1_A1.2_B1.0_C1.0 (Alpha=1.2 Beta=1.0 Gamma=1.0) (Schindling 2009b).
Vera Molnár develops “very simple rules of combinatorial analysis and equally some 
very plain geometrical forms and step for step” (Molnár 2009), introducing minor 
changes in proportion or patterning. Molnár develops series of works, each of which 
she regards as a sample, a stage of a painted research, while trying to capture the 
436 “The Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction is an example of a temporally oscillating chemical reaction. An 
unusual and interesting feature of the reaction is that as it progresses on a two-dimensional plate, self-
organized spirals are formed.” (Turner 2009) It is a classical example of non-equilibrium thermodynam-
ics, that works as a chemical oscillator as it cycles through its different states in autocatalytic fashion. They 
are far from equilibrium and remain like that for a very long time. 
Boris Belousov (1893-1970) discovered this chemical reaction in the 1950s. In the early 1960s Anatol 
Zhabotinsky (1938-2008) independently discovered it but neither discovery was widely disseminated until 
the end of that decade. Besides the importance that the reaction has in the fields of chemistry, physics 
and mathematics, it has been a source of inspiration for artists and designers — as have also been other 
reaction-diffusion systems — because they mimic chemical pattern formation in nature, and to biologists, 
since Turing first suggested that they could hold the source to the understanding of biological morpho-
genesis.
437 The images presented by Schindling are captured from ongoing dynamic reactions. Each of these im-
ages is developed from several previous stages of the process and were further developed afterwards. The 
two works shown are (as can be understood by the initial values) two stages of the same process.
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phenomenon that she calls “the ‘epiphany’ of art”. 438 As a way to “genuinely system-
atize” her research, Molnár started to use a technique she called “machine imagi-
naire”, designing programs for an imaginary computer and then realizing them, 
step by step, creating series “which were completed within, meaning they did not ex-
clude a single possible combination of form” (2009). Molnár eventually replaced the 
imaginary machine with a real computer, 439 using it for composition, by running her 
programs and combining forms, in the hope that the tool would enable her to gain 
some distance from her acquired learning, cultural heritage and surroundings, “in 
brief, from the influences of civilization that define us” (2009). Either realized by a 
plotter, by silk-screening processes or manually painted on canvas, Molnár’s works 
are deeply rooted on and guided by her programs, by the algorithms that dictate her 
actions while painting. The same happens with Siena, although his rules given him 
a somewhat larger number of choices to undertake, while in Schindling’s works all 
the decisions are left to the system with the notable exceptions of the initial param-
eters and the choice of which steps of the process to crystallize (or document). 440
Fig. 100: Interruptions (Molnár 1969).
438 “The question is whether here and there, by placing them next to one another, one can produce a 
substantial change, a unique visual situation which could be called art. The underlying problem of my 
entire work is to capture this phenomenon, the ‘epiphany’ of art. Working with series of pictures is like a 
visual dialogue between the painter and what has been painted. All stages of such a series naturally form 
small works of art in the traditional sense.” (Molnár 2009)
439 “To avoid a false interpretation of my method I wish to emphasize that a large part of my work is 
designed and frequently carried out with the help of a computer; but whether these works have little value, 
if at all, is not the computer’s responsibility. This machine, as impressive as it may be, is after all merely a 
tool in the hand of the painter.” (Molnár 2009)
440 We may identify here an instance of Aarseth’s coprocessing (1997, 135).
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Fig. 101: Sorties du rang (Molnár 2003) and L’ombre prend le dessus (Molnár 2005).
The fourth place is taken by “combinatorial rules”, described (somewhat simply) as 
“systems that use a smaller set of elements to create a larger set of combinations”. Le-
Witt is cited as an example of their usage by systematically applying “a small num-
ber of marks to create a large combinatorial exploration” (Galanter 2006). We have 
previously discussed combinatorial systems, so we will not analyze them again, and 
agree with the assessment of these as having a great generative potential.
In the fifth place we have “numerical sequences as rules” including “arithmetic or 
geometric progressions, or the Fibonacci numbers, as a basis for pieces”. As we have 
seen, when integrated in algorithmic processes, these numerical sequences may ap-
propriate the creation of novelty and turn the system into a data-driven process.
The sixth system in the list, “line composition or drawing rules”, defined as “line-
oriented paintings or drawings that are determined by a set of rules or algorithms” 
comprises manually executed pieces but also “plotter art created by some of the ear-
liest computer artists” but does not define anything more than that in previous rules. 
“The rule of serial generation”, however, describes a process that is truly algorithmic 
and at the core of any computational process and modern programming language 
and nevertheless “as old as art itself”: the loop, used “to repeat a graphic gesture, or 
an object” or a complete generative process. Works of Donald Judd 441 and Warhol 
are presented as examples of this rule.
441 1928-1994.
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Fig. 102: Untitled (Judd 1989).
Fig. 103: Troy Diptych (Warhol 1962).
Both artists use simple repetition processes, Judd using a module that is translated 
in the vertical axis, Warhol creating a basic tile system with portraits of American 
actor Troy Donahue. All computer-based systems described in this work use some 
sort of looping process in their algorithms and although in many cases the loops 
may not be directly perceivable in their outputs, it is common to find works where 
serial generation produces identifiable loops or tiling patterns and may thus be said 
to be central for the visual composition strategy.
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Fig. 104: The Inability to Solve a War at a Cocktail Party (an Awkward Dance with Mr. Henri Van Zanten) 
(Hoogerbrugge 2010).
Fig. 105: Taken (Rokeby 2002d).
Serial generation leads us to the eight system in the list, “tiling and other symmetric 
composition rules”, comprising “abstract patterns that exhibit symmetry and tiling 
patterns”, something that minimalist artists explored to great effect. Since the late 
1950s Carl Andre stopped sculpting using traditional techniques and turned to the 
use of standard-size modules, either found materials, as in his early works, or in-
dustrially produced precut units that were small enough for anyone to be able to lift 
and move around manually, which he composed by following precise arithmetical 
relations. With this he sought to explore the relationships between a work of sculp-
ture and the space it occupies, pursuing a sculpture which can stand naturally in 
space without taking on an architectural function or, on the contrary, being merely 
decorative. This system can be seen as a direct consequence of the previous, as one of 
its particular outcomes, when the serial generation is taken to the extent of defining 
not only the structure of the process but also the form of its output (that can be seen 
as a multiplication of outputs, of parts that generate a whole). As Andre puts it, his 
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“constructivism is the generation of overall designs by the multiplication of the qual-
ities of the individual constituent elements.” (qtd. in Glimcher and Rose 2005, 48) 
Fig. 106: Alloy Square (Andre 1970).
The ninth system takes us from the space of apparent arithmetical precision to 
what can almost be seen as its opposite, the “chance operation rules”. Systems for 
injecting randomness and chance in the realization of a work have been popular-
ized throughout the twentieth century but they have been occasionally used in the 
creation of earlier aesthetic artifacts. The example presented by Galanter, from the 
Logical Conclusions exhibition is Felix Gonzalez-Torres’s 442 piece “Untitled” (Public 
Opinion) (1991), created from a pile of more than 300 kg of candies that are spread 
“on the floor and arranged in a rectangle within an exhibition space” or, alterna-
tively installed “as a corner spill.” (From the loan agreement form reproduced in 
Glimcher and Rose 2005, 163) Interestingly, Gonzalez-Torres defined any instance 
of the installed work as a “manifestation of the work”, although he made a point of 
not presenting it as such, listing it “on all wall texts and related texts as the piece 
and not as a manifestation of the piece”, and defined the instructions to its set up in 
a set of guidelines to ensure a consistent installation of the manifestation. In these 
guidelines he defined an “ideal installation” from where certain deviations were 
allowed 443 (2005, 162). This clearly configures “Untitled” (Public Opinion) not as an 
442 1957-1996.
443 In the loan agreement form for “Untitled” (Public Opinion) Gonzalez-Torres explains his definition 
of ideal: “In all cases, ‘ideal’ refers to the work’s original installation and the ideal manifestation of Felix 
Gonzalez-Torres’ choosing. 
Regarding the type of candy ‘ideal’ means if these exact candies are unavailable, or if (…) [the exhibi-
tor] would like to find another appropriate candy, a similar cellophane wrapped candy may be used.
Regarding the weight of candy, ‘ideal’ means that one may choose to deviate from the exact weight. 
Although this implies that the exhibitor or owner may choose to install the piece with a weight other than 
the ideal, it also refers to the fact that the weight of the piece fluctuates as individual candies are taken, 
and to the fact that the exhibitor or owner has the choice of replenishing the candies back to the piece’s 
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object but rather as a process that is developed to create a “manifestation” that is 
temporarily perceived as an object. A dynamic system without clear boundaries 
and that exists as an ongoing process that is formed by human action, chance and 
randomness (determining the precise location of each candy and consequently the 
macroscopic shape of the installation).
Fig. 107: “Untitled” (Public Opinion) (Gonzalez-Torres 1991).
ideal weight at any time over the course of the exhibition. (It is recommended that this decision be made 
in advance of the exhibition in order to order the appropriate amount of candy). If the space chosen for 
the installation cannot accommodate the ideal weight of the piece, the weight should be altered accord-
ingly so that the floor does not show through the piece and so the thickness of the layer of candies is ap-
proximately 1 inch. 
Regarding the installation, ‘ideal’ refers to pouring the candies directly on the floor in a rectangle. 
Should the exhibition space be unable to accommodate such an installation, or the exhibitor feels the 
piece should be altered from this ideal, the exhibitor may install the piece in the manner of their choice, 
which may include a corner spill, a square, etc.. Whatever the configuration, the work should reflect or re-
spond to the specifics of the exhibition space. However, the floor may not show through the piece.” (from 
the loan agreement form reproduced in Glimcher and Rose 2005, 162-63) 
Parameters for the manifestation’s maintenance are also provided. “If it is decided to replenish the 
manifestation of the work back to ideal weight or alternate chosen weight, it may be replenished periodi-
cally throughout the exhibition — it is not necessary to wait until all the candies are disseminated (taken). 
The edges of the installation should be straightened each time it is replenished; however, it is not necessary 
to straighten the edge otherwise. If the manifestation of the work is allowed to disappear completely over 
the course of the exhibition, the exhibitor can choose to either straighten the edges of the installation pe-
riodically so that it retains its original shape over the course of its existence or simply let it mutate as the 
candies are taken. Visitors should not be allowed to toss the empty wrappers back into the manifestation 
of the work. A guard may indicate this restriction to visitors, but there may not be any signage installed 
in the exhibition space referring to this. If there are empty wrappers mixed in with the wrapped candies 
they must be picked out immediately as they are noticed.” 
Still regarding the visitor’s interaction with the manifestation, it is stated that the exhibitor “agrees 
to allow visitors to take candies from the manifestation of the work. However, it is imperative that there 
be no separate referential text indicating this preference, i.e. no signage installed in the exhibition space. 
However, in order to limit the number of candies each visitor takes, a guard may indicate to visitors that 
they may take one piece (…)” (2005, 164). The system proposed for the manifestation thus controls not 
only the assembly of the object itself as well as, at least partially, the behavior of the guards of the exhibi-
tion, almost turning them into performers, whose actions are also (to a certain extent) part of the system.
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Chance operation rules can be seen, in this context, as parts of the overall process 
that allow for an indeterminacy of the actual outcomes of the system (in its whole or 
parts). In Gonzalez-Torres’s system much more is left to be molded by chance than in 
other systems where indeterminacy may be more restricted and the outputs far more 
controlled, as the previously mentioned Musikalisches Würfelspiel (Mozart 1787), 
where randomness is solely injected in the reordering of the precomposed parts.
The tenth place of the list is taken by a system that seems to stem from combinatorial 
rules, serial generation and, to a lesser extent, from tiling. Galanter calls it “cluster-
ing rules that create composition” and defines it as “layering taxonomic logic upon 
assemblage, some artists create pieces by ordering collections of found or commer-
cial objects. To the extent that this ordering principle objectively clusters the objects 
creating unexpected correspondences and relationships, such work can be consid-
ered generative” (2006).
The serial element for us resulted from our having collected so much material 
on certain topics. But our idea of showing material has much more to do with 
the 19th century, with the encyclopedic approach used in botany or zoology, 
where plants of the same variety or animals of the same species are compared 
with one another on the individual pages of the lexicon. It became more and 
more clear to us that there are definite varieties, species and subspecies of the 
structures we were photographing. That us, in effect, an old-fashioned ap-
proach. Later it was also used in conceptual art, logically enough. (Hilla Becher 
qtd. in Glimcher and Rose 2005, 68)
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Fig. 108: Cylindrical Gas Tanks (Becher and Becher 1984).
The work of Bernd 444 and Hilla Becher is presented as an example, although Galant-
er states that it is “arguable whether this particular application of clustering is truly 
generative, turning primarily on the question of whether the clustering method is 
objective and thus external, or intuitive and subjective” (2006). Clustering as a sys-
tem, however, can in our opinion be rightfully regarded as a generative system or 
at least as a relatively common consequence of generative systems that are able to 
produce multiple variations of the same forms or multiple outputs from the same 
system. Two examples of works arising from catalogues or typologies of outputs 
can be found in UBERMORGEN.COM && Nussbaumer’s 1001 Songs of eBay 445 (2009) 
and the cover design for Ozy’s Tokei (Carvalhais and Lia 2002) created from serial 
configurations of a procedural system.
444 1931-2007.
445 A project derived from The Sound of eBay (2008), an online project also by UBERMORGEN.COM and 
Nussbaumer that, by using eBay user data generates unique songs. The audio release compiles 1,001 of the 
songs that the system generated.
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Fig. 109: Cover for Tokei (Carvalhais and Lia 2002).
We can also include in this category all those systems that, as Every Icon (Simon 
1997b), Incomplete Open Cube (LeWitt 1974a) or All Single, Double, Triple, and Qua-
druple Combinations of Lines in Four Directions One-, Two-, Three- and Four-Part 
Combinations (LeWitt 1969a) present more or less long, more or less endless enu-
merations of systematically produced outputs. We may posit that in Every Icon these 
enumerations are not spatial but rather temporal, as in Kyle McDonald’s “very long 
sound composition for MP3” Only Everything Lasts Forever 446 (2010a).
Fig. 110: Variations of Incomplete Open Cubes (LeWitt 1974b).
446 This piece contains every sound we can distinguish as humans, as dictated by the MP3 specification 
in a composition with a duration of 10450 years (McDonald 2010b).
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Fig. 111: All Single, Double, Triple, and Quadruple Combinations of Lines in Four Directions One-, Two- , 
Three- and Four-Part Combinations (LeWitt 1969a).
The eleventh system, “mapping from one domain to another” alludes to transforma-
tions “from one domain to another, such as temperature into color, or stock market 
data into sounds” and is, according to Galanter, “a popular technique in contempo-
rary digital generative art (…) also found in generative art from the mainstream.” As 
we discussed, we do not consider data-driven systems as being generative. Although 
the parameters (or rules) for the transformation may have a generative potential, if 
the data-set is static, there is no possibility to bring novelty to the system. Mapping 
is however a very interesting system, allowing the creation of very curious results 
and the exploration of digital media and tools. Whitelaw’s Weather Bracelet (2009) 
is created from one year of weather data from Canberra, encoding the dataset (con-
sisting of maximum and minimum temperature plus weekly rainfall) and making it 
wearable in a circular shape. Cylinder by Andy Huntington and Drew Allan (2003) 
is a series of sculptures based on data acquired by sound analysis, 447 showing a range 
of different waveforms. The title of each piece implies the sound used in the analysis.
447 A mapping of the frequency and time domains produces cylindrical forms representing the spatial 
characteristics of the sound input. Physical versions of the digital 3D models are then 3D printed using 
stereolithography.
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Fig. 112: Weather Bracelet (Whitelaw 2009).
 
Fig. 113: Cylinder (Seahorses, left; Breath, right) (Huntington and Allan 2003).
Finally, Galanter’s list closes with “rules which create cycles and phase interactions”, 
classified as “time art” processes that are able to “generate variations by having two 
or more cyclic behaviors with differing periods. As the cycles go in and out of phase 
a combinatorial effect is played out, and at any given instant different variations will 
be apparent.” Galanter refers kinetic sculptures as an example, but one can also find 
plenty other examples in other time-based arts, as music, particularly in twentieth-
century American minimalists as Steve Reich or Young.
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2.3.5 Other Systems
Galanter’s list rounds up several of what we could call high-level strategies for pro-
cedural artistic practices. Developed as it was from two exhibitions that presented 
primarily non-computer based works, it is perhaps only normal to find that all of 
those systems that we could classify as being low-level were not listed.
We can classify as high-level systems all those that organize the macroscopic process, 
that refer to the creation of the whole system from parts or of some of those parts 
by other parts. They are often constituents of the main conceptual or operational 
principles of a system and may also be, to their observers, intrinsic to the aesthetic 
value of the system. To the execution of manually implemented processes, high-level 
systems may be all that is required, however, if the system is machine implemented, 
and especially if the machine is a computer (or a computational device) then a series 
of lower-level systems will need to be used (or devised) in order to properly imple-
ment it. 448
These systems will allow the implementation of the artifacts’ mechanics, of the sub-
processes that will build the macroscopic overall process that one identifies as the 
piece. When programming computational systems, it will not suffice to establish 
‘randomness’ or ‘chance’ as the conceptual infrastructure of a system but also to 
precisely define how such randomness will be injected, how indeterminate (or seem-
ingly indeterminate) results will be produced by the algorithm. Any pseudorandom 
function from a programming language will of course produce apparently indeter-
minate outputs, but the better the function is, the least structured will these outputs 
tend to be and more noisy will their outputs be. 449 In the scope of this work it will 
not be necessary to delve into the details of such algorithms and into the minute 
differences that make the outputs of different approaches to pseudorandomness be 
more or less ‘random’ in a strict sense. It will be enough to state that, generally 
speaking, any (or most of the) pseudorandomness algorithm will generate noisy and 
448 Any of these systems can naturally also be used as high-level systems — and have been indeed, as 
attested by several works cited along this document. Due to some lack of immediacy, however, they may 
be more difficult to follow by audiences than the more general and concrete high-level systems that were 
previously enunciated.
449 Noisy because there will be a statistical homogeneity of the outputs. Any value in the outputs will 
have the same statistical significance as any other so they will be read as being unstructured, formless.
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unstructured output from where it will be too difficult, if possible at all, to extract 
any meaning or to breed a meaningful structure. 450
In this work we do not intend to develop a detailed technical analysis of the mul-
tiple algorithmic systems 451 that can be used in the implementation of rule-based 
processes. We are rather more interested in the study of their manifestations — and 
conscious that if a thorough knowledge of computational mechanics is indeed es-
sential not only to the creation but also to the understanding and critical analysis 
of the systems (Mateas 2005), the precise details of the algorithms are often of only 
a relative relevance to the analysis we will develop). A list of such systems would 
by its very nature always be necessarily incomplete, as new systems are regularly 
devised. It would include but not be limited to processes as Markov Chains, Riley 
Waves, Wilson Grids, Mandelbrot and Julia Sets (and other fractals), Convolution, 
Autonomous Agents, Particle Systems, Network Protocols, Fourier Transformations, 
Genetic and Evolutionary Algorithms, Neural Nets, Cellular Automata (and its vari-
ous rules), Swarms, Chaotic Systems, Fuzzy Logic, and a large number of other re-
sources to create novelty (most of which can be articulated in the creation of more 
complex systems). We will not elaborate on the particulars of these systems here, 
but we will take a moment to focus on a top-level strategy that has been somewhat 
common in some procedural creation and that has been left out 452 of Galanter’s list.
2.3.6 Error / Glitch
The word glitch was first recorded in English in 1962, in the writings of astronaut 
John Glenn, during the American space program, where it was used to describe 
some of the technical problems that had to be dealt with during training and mis-
sions. At a point Glenn describes the technical sense of the word that astronauts 
adopted: “Literally, a glitch is a spike or change in voltage in an electrical current.” 453 
450 In certain cases however, this may be exactly what is necessary. Still, these are cases where pseudo-
randomness is used within more complex algorithmic processes that will, in their turn, structure the 
outputs of the source of randomness into some sort of meaningful and coherent form.
451 Or from the multiple ways through which each of these systems can be implemented, an exercise that, 
however interesting, falls outside our scope and has been studied in detail in other publications (Steeb 
2001; Reas and Fry 2007; Shiffman 2008; Terzidis 2009).
452 At least explicitly, as one can always argue that it may be described by, for example, chance operation 
or rules as recipes for autonomous processes.
453 The word probably has a German root, according to Random House’s American Slang dictionary, 
from the word glitschen (to slip) and the Yiddish word gletshn (to slide or skid).
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(qtd. in Moradi 2004) A glitch is the result of a malfunction or an error. In a theo-
retical and objective sense, it is assumed to be the unexpected result of a malfunc-
tion, a singular dysfunctional event that progressively became a distinctive part of 
the grammar of contemporary computational aesthetics, but that has its roots in 
analogue tools and media.
Strictly speaking, although it results from malfunction or error, and whilst it may be 
caused by a software bug, a glitch is not a bug, rather it may be described as a special 
outcome of a bug, as the effect of one or several bugs or of perfectly functioning code 
that is somehow led astray and that, instead of halting the process of rendering it 
otherwise inoperative or of producing a predictable error or breakdown, generates a 
potentially interesting aesthetic output. The glitch is therefore both the cause as the 
effect, it is the malfunction and the output that it produces, as well as its subsequent 
creative use. A glitch is an interpretation, not simply a sensorial artifact, 454 it is the 
aesthetic valorization of the sensorial artifact.
The ‘post-digital’ aesthetic was developed in part as a result of the immersive 
experience of working in environments suffused with digital technology: com-
puter fans whirring, laser printers churning out documents, the sonification of 
user-interfaces, and the muffled noise of hard drives. But more specifically, it is 
from the ‘failure’ of digital technology that this new work has emerged: glitches, 
bugs, application errors, system crashes, clipping, aliasing, distortion, quan-
tization noise, and even the noise floor of computer sound cards are the raw 
materials composers seek to incorporate into their music. (Cascone 2000, 12-13)
Much in the same way that digital media allow the fixation and reproduction of 
analog-generated signals, they also allow the accurate reproduction of digitally gen-
erated signals, therefore permitting the preservation and reproduction of glitches 
that could otherwise have merely been ephemeral phenomena. Through processes 
of trial and error or of reverse engineering, bugs, malfunctions or other sources of 
glitches can be discovered and the systems can be reprogrammed so that their code 
(in a broad sense) can generate what originally were glitches but then become in-
tended outputs. An interesting example of this practice in contemporary electronic 
454 ‘Artifact’ as both the discrete perceivable object and the object-error in the perception or representa-
tion of information.
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music can be found in the work of Oval, 455 that in the early 1990s started to produce 
music with damaged or skipping CDs. The damaged discs used in the first experienc-
es were found pieces or ready-mades, the result of accidents or of careless manipula-
tion. Through these fortunate mishaps and coincidences, the originally undamaged 
CDs — industrially replicated digital copies — became unique ‘damaged’ pieces, and 
started to produced sounds that were curiously different from those that were origi-
nally encoded. They were quickly followed by other discs, where Oval painted small 
images on the underside, to provoke the skips and to try to exert some degree of 
control over the errors these would produce. These images revealed a subtextual 
layer that was embedded in the compact discs (Cascone 2000, 13), and allowed the 
sampling and reuse of the glitches, that formed both an abstract layering of skitter-
ing rhythms and an interesting commentary to the then-current marketing efforts 
around the flawless quality of digital audio signals (Thomson 2004, 212). 456 
Turning a read-only medium into a creative and manipulatable tool, Japanese com-
poser Yasunao Tone developed a similar process by painting, scratching or otherwise 
defacing the readable surface of audio CDs that were then used as the prime matter 
for the production of new sounds. His ‘wounded CDs’ were furthermore played in 
CD readers that were violently shaken and distressed on stage during his very physi-
cal live performances. Whereas Oval used the discs as sound sources to be further 
manipulated through software, Tone used them as instruments that were performed 
live, avoiding overdubs or any further manipulation or processing of the sound out-
put of the player — no mixer, effects or any other resources were used live. 457
455 A project by Markus Popp, Sebastian Oschatz and Frank Metzger.
456 “I experience this as a zone entirely free of criteria, insofar as the last defining criterium of electronic 
music is the data format: MP3s or audio files are not defined as text files, but compressed with a particular 
bit rate and that’s that. For this reason (…) electronic music seems to me more like a general business 
strategy rather than the beta test of an extremely productive, all-inclusive authoring process” (Popp 2004).
457 One of Tone’s CD releases is aptly named after this process as Solo for Wounded CD (1997).
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Fig. 114: Detail of the surface of one of Tone’s ‘wounded CDs’.
In later works, Oval tried to transfer their entire work process — sound generation, 
manipulation and composition — to a software platform titled Oval Process Public 
Beta (2000a), distributed as a CD-ROM and presented as the interactive installation 
Ovalprocess Terminals (2000c). The central statement of the Ovalprocess series, soft-
ware platform, installation and CD releases (2000b; 2001) was that electronic music 
was “irrevocably characterized and limited by the software it uses” (Popp 2004) as it 
had been in earlier times characterized and limited by the instruments or the com-
positional canons. Further generalizing, Markus Popp stated that what he found 
more relevant than “every new form of musical experimentation or hacker ethics” 
was “a subjective intervening in the standards and specifications behind the work-
flow” of composition (2004).
 
Fig. 115: Oval Process Public Beta (Oval 2000a).
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Or the standards and specifications behind the medium of the work, an intervention 
that is not always necessarily motivated by the failures of technology but sometimes 
starts from them. We can find earlier examples in the works that László Moholy-
Nagy 458 or Oskar Fischinger 459 developed by the direct manipulation of the optical 
tracks of sound films or in Peter Kubelka’s short film Arnulf Rainer (1960), entirely 
composed of frames of solid black and solid white, strung together in lengths as long 
as 24 frames or as short as a single frame.
 
Fig. 116: Two projected frames from Arnulf Rainer (Kubelka 1960).
Fig. 117: The 9,216 frames from Arnulf Rainer (Kubelka 1960) exhibited at Barcelona’s CCCB in 2007.
458 1895-1946.
459 1900-1967.
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In a 1988 interview to Christian Lebrat, 460 Kubelka discusses Arnulf Rainer as “the 
film that best approximates to the essence of cinema as it exists because it uses the 
elements that constitute cinema in its most radical, purest form. There’s light and 
the absence of light, there’s sound and the absence of sound and their becoming 
in time. Just that.” There is also the use of what were typically seen as analog cin-
ema glitches: the sharp transitions between underexposed (black) and overexposed 
(white) frames and the use of the same frames to create the optical soundtrack — 
white generates (almost white) noise, while black is silent. All the dirt and scratches 
caused by the handling of the film, by the projector, by dirt in the lenses or on the 
screen are also turned to part of the film, that thus becomes an accumulation of 
glitches (both intentional or serendipitous). Another example of this approach can 
be discovered in Nam June Paik’s 461 Zen for Film (1964), a film canister containing a 
length of approximately 23 minutes of film leader, transparent tape normally used in 
the start of film reels but not intended to be projected. If Arnulf Rainer was a com-
position that welcomed glitch, Zen for Film, once projected was a blank slate that 
became a composition, as various mechanical and material glitches would set in. 462
Fig. 118: A projection of Zen for Film (Paik 1964).
In visual arts, we can find a similar approach in the execution of Warhol’s Oxidation 
Paintings (1978a; 1978b) where the materials used are prone to oxidize, to literally 
460 Qtd. at the 2007 CCCB exhibition.
461 1932-2006.
462 It is not clear whether Nam June Paik intended this to happen or if the glitches and noises that accu-
mulate in the film were seen as disturbances. We may interpret it as a film which depicts only itself and its 
own material qualities, among which are the scratches and glitches. We wouldn’t perhaps see it so much 
as a film about nothingness, or ‘silence’ in the sense proposed by Cage, which would probably be better 
expressed as a black projection.
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rust and decay over time, thus inviting the deterioration and glitch to the artwork 
and making its surface become ever changing and dynamical.
 
Fig. 119: Oxidation Paintings (Warhol 1978a; 1978b).
If the processes at work in these pieces are not artificially halted by conservation 463 
and are allowed to develop to their ultimate consequences, the pieces will eventually 
destroy themselves, either by accumulation of dirt and noise or by disintegration.
Zen for Film is more than the film leader, it is a conceptual piece of film art, an ex-
perience of the essence of film, mechanic and philosophical, but it only is all of this 
when the 23 minutes of film leader are loaded in a projector and shown in a space. 
Then, Zen for Film reclaims the entire space where it is projected, it incorporates the 
shadows of spectators moving through the projection and makes them part of the 
film, it absorbs noises from the projector, from the audience and the surroundings 
as its soundtrack and suddenly, all glitches, interruptions and interferences with 
the still whiteness of the film are no longer annoyances or perturbations, but rather 
fuse with the absolute nothingness and become part of the film. In this context it is 
impossible not to draw a parallelism with Cage’s 4’33” (1952), an even more minimal 
piece — because it did not require any technological media or even any instruments 
to be performed. 464 4’33” is a piece that builds itself by incorporating the sounds of 
the audience and the location where it is performed, by incorporating the glitches 
of the media with which it is recorded or broadcast. First and foremost, the piece 
463 A process that in a certain sense counters the procedural nature of the pieces and, it may be argued, 
destroys the pieces while preserving an arbitrary configuration of the process.
464 Although it was commonly performed using a piano, as in the 1952 premiere in August 29, when 
David Tudor performed it by not playing the piano, starting each of the three movements by closing the 
piano and ending them by opening it up once again. Over the years 4’33” has been performed with diverse 
instruments and even orchestras, as in the September 24, 2008 performance at The Barbican, in London, 
with the BBC Symphony Orchestra, conducted by Lawrence Foster.
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expresses Cage’s reflections on silence, on how it does not exist because the contexts 
for hearing are always permeable to sounds that are external to the music that is the 
center of our attention, and because, as human beings our sensory perceptions oc-
cur against the background noise of our biological systems.
There is always something to see, something to hear. In fact, try as we may to 
make a silence, we cannot. For certain engineering purposes, it is desirable to 
have as silent a situation as possible. Such a room is called an anechoic cham-
ber, its six walls made of special material, a room without echoes. I entered one 
at Harvard University several years ago and heard two sounds, one high and 
one low. When I described them to the engineer in charge, he informed me 
that the high one was my nervous system in operation, the low one my blood in 
circulation. Until I die there will be sounds. And they will continue following 
my death. One need not fear about the future of music. (Cage 1973, 8)
And the variety of noises, within or outside the human body or the system, whether 
visual or audial, seems infinite. Already in 1913 we could find the fascination that 
these exerted over artists as the Italian Futurists. In the words of Luigi Russolo, 465 if 
“today, when we have perhaps a thousand different machines, we can distinguish a 
thousand different noises, tomorrow, as new machines multiply, we will be able to 
distinguish ten, twenty, or thirty-thousand different noises, not merely in a simply 
imitative way, but to combine them according to our imagination” (1913). Russolo’s 
manifesto 466 incited artists to shift their focus from the foreground of musical notes 
to the background of incidental sound (Cascone 2000, 14) and ultimately lead to a 
questioning of the entire tradition (and culture) of western music. Along with the 
developing recording techniques, it contributed in the long run to a deep transfor-
mation of music, that ceased to be a purely abstract art (that was instantiated in 
sporadic performances) and on occasion managed to become almost as concrete as 
plastic arts.
Cage’s music was pregnant with glitch and noise, from the total openness of 4’33”, to 
the static and hum of Cartridge Music (1960), in which phono cartridges were used 
to amplify sounds that were otherwise nearly audible (but that inevitably amplified 
465 1885-1947.
466 Perhaps one of the most important and influential texts to the musical aesthetics of the twentieth 
century.
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also the unintended movements of the performers or other glitches), or Imaginary 
Landscape Nº 1 (1939), to the interferences in radio waves of Imaginary Landscape 
Nº 4 (1951) and their constant detuning, to the preparations in pianos, that enhanced 
sounds and timbres that were often unwanted in such an instrument. The prepared 
piano, as popularized by Cage or in the work of other composers, can be thought of 
as a ‘glitched’ instrument, one where the defects and faults are reinforced and exac-
erbated, much like with Oval’s or Tone’s CDs.
In spite of the popularization of CD as the delivery technology for recorded music, 
we could find other media being used for similar purposes, as in Asmus Tietchens’s 
scratching of magnetic tapes in Daseinsverfehlung (1993), or Aki Onda turning a 
pair of old Sony Walkman portable players and a suitcase filled with cassette tapes 
into his instruments, or various sound artists manipulating vinyl records. 467 Par-
ticularly interesting examples of the exploration (some would say abuse) of vinyl 
glitch are the works of American composer Christian Marclay and of the Czech 
artist Milan Knížák, this last one affiliated with the Fluxus group. During the 1960s 
Knížák used to play vinyl records at variable speeds to explore the changes in the 
quality of the music that these manipulations provoked — something that Cage 
had researched earlier, in Imaginary Landscape Nº 1 (1939) for two variable-speed 
turntables, frequency recordings, muted piano and cymbal — later on, he started 
to physically damage or destroy the records, by scratching them, by punching holes 
or otherwise breaking them. Once played, 468 these records created an entirely new 
music — “unexpected, nerve-racking, and aggressive” (Knížák qtd. in C. Kelly 2009, 
142) — and created compositions that “lasted a second or for an infinitely long time 
(when the needle got stuck in a deep groove and played the same phrase over and 
over again)” (144). He developed the system further, by sticking tape on the surfaces 
of the records, by painting them, burning or cutting them up, and gluing fragments 
of different records back together into a playable form, so as to achieve the widest 
possible variety of sounds. Unlike Cage’s speed variations, or the hip hop DJ ma-
nipulation of the recorded surface through pitching and scratching, Knížák’s ac-
tions intended more than ‘remixing’ the recorded sound or to shape it to a different 
context, they were meant to totally transform the medium, to bring it beyond the 
467 And entire urban cultures arising from their work, especially Hip Hop, since the 1970s.
468 Playing these records was a violent act on itself, that according to Knižák not only damaged the 
needle as, very often, also the record player.
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original intentions of the technology and to transform the disc and the information 
it stored (C. Kelly 2009, 148).
Remixing the medium altogether can produce interesting results, as in the Vinyl 
Video project, 469 introduced in the late 1990s. This project performed a retro-evolu-
tion of video media, using vinyl discs to store not only sound but also video content, 
encoding in the disc’s grooves an analog video signal that could be decoded and 
reproduced on analog television sets with the use of a custom set-top box. Never 
intended as a mass market project, it nevertheless spawned the production of several 
specially produced audiovisual projects, by artists such as Olia Lialina, JODI, Nuno 
Tudela, Vuk Ćosić, among others, that explored the aesthetics of the medium’s in-
herent low bandwidth, low resolution and glitch. Carsten Nicolai’s Telefunken CD 
and installation (Nicolai 2000; Noto 2000), encoded on an audio CD several analog 
video signals, and was composed from these sources.
 
Fig. 120: Frames from Vinyl Video projects, as reproduced in an analog television screen.
I destroy, I scratch, I act against the fragility of the record in order to free the 
music from its captivity. (Christian Marclay qtd. in C. Kelly 2009, 150)
In the 1980s, Marclay’s abuse of vinyl records and of their glitches rediscovered many 
of the techniques deployed by Knížák, adding a sometimes very strong conceptual 
layer 470 and, perhaps more importantly, exploring the natural glitches of the me-
dium. In two works from the late 1980s, Marclay created records containing music 
469 By Gebhard Sengmüller, Martin Diamant and Günter Erhart.
470 Marclay’s conceptual approach was perhaps taken to the extreme in a work that can be compared to 
Cage’s or Paik’s empty pieces, his 12” vinyl Untitled (Record Without a Groove) (1987), a black vinyl record 
with no grooves.
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that was intended to be further modified by the medium, by the noise it acquired 
and by its degradation over time. Record Without a Cover (1985) was a one-sided 12” 
vinyl with a recording of Marclay manipulating records on multiple turntables. As 
the title implied, the disc was distributed without a cover and all the credits were 
printed on the (not recorded) back side of the disc, along with an instruction in bold 
type: “Do not store in a protective package”. So as to pick up dirt and scratches, and 
to transform the recorded music through that process, one assumes. A later work, 
Footsteps (1989), also a single sided 12” vinyl, bore a composition based on recordings 
of footsteps, walking, running and tap dancing. All the 1,000 records produced were 
displayed in the floor of a gallery in Zürich during six weeks, as an installation that 
invited visitors to walk over the discs 471 thus dirtying and scratching the records. If 
on Record Without a Cover it is the passage of time, the manipulation and use that 
contribute to the individualization of each disc and to the actual final sound that 
each of them is permanently in the process of developing, in Footsteps the compos-
er’s work was aided by the contributions of several different visitors of the exhibition 
that, willingly or not, altered the records’ surfaces and made every disc unique. 472 In 
both cases, heavy glitching of the original sound recordings is added by processes 
that are conceived so as to be uncontrollable by the composer, so much as to, in cer-
tain cases, effectively destroy the record’s surface and render it unplayable.
Fig. 121: Record Without a Cover (Marclay 1985).
471 Or literally forced them, as the room was the only access route to adjacent rooms where other pieces 
were on display.
472 Physical evidences of the process, such as actual footprints, were easy to perceive in the records, and 
sand or dirt were often packaged with the discs that were distributed in standard paper covers.
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These works elevate the vinyl disc to something other than a physical distribution 
medium for the recorded sound. They also make it more than an instrument, in 
the cagean or the hip hop perspective. They make it become a very concrete (and 
individual, idiosyncratic) physical object that happens to carry sound but that is far 
more complex than an otherwise simple and industrially reproduced sound con-
tainer. In a certain sense these two works by Marclay can almost be regarded as 
multimodal objects, almost with the character of sculptures, because each of the 
multiple copies carries a distinct sound with itself. They can be seen as software, be-
cause they are pieces that in a way decide their own evolution and the minute details 
of their outputs. They are objects that display their code, and that are, along with 
their glitches, living processes. While Knížák’s broken records or other damaged 
discs from Marclay were manipulated as instruments and used to record sounds 
that were then stored on vinyls, tapes or compact discs that with more or less fidelity 
reproduced the glitches from the external sources, Marclay’s discs are gathering (or 
even producing) the glitches themselves, a process that ends differentiating every 
single one of them, turning it into an original.
Still within the music domain, we find the most varied approaches to glitch, from 
the exploration of obsolete technologies, either digital or analog, for the production 
of music. A good example can be found in the works of German composer Stephan 
Mathieu, that crosses digital technologies with early gramophones and phonograph 
cylinder players, used as instruments in his compositions, exploring all the surface 
noise, distortion and other malfunctions of the devices as aesthetic resources. Even 
in his earlier, computer generated works (Mathieu 2001; 2004), we can find a similar 
attraction for the grittiness of low resolution sound, aliasing and other digital errors. 
Another source of glitches and richly random sound matter that Mathieu has also 
used was the radio receiver (2008), thoroughly explored by Tod Dockstader (2005a; 
2005b; 2006) and much earlier by Cage on Imaginary Landscape Nº 4 (1951). Radio 
as a sound source generator offers some degree of control, through tuning, volume 
or tone control, manipulation of the antenna or of nearby generators of interference 
but, above anything else, it provides a seemingly unlimited source of variety and 
novelty through an almost total lack of control over the broadcasts that are tuned 
and canalized into a particular piece. In the context of a live performance this is far 
more evident than on a recorded piece, where to some extent happy coincidences 
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can be created through the compilation of and selection from sometimes very large 
databases of recordings. 473
Older or obsolete technologies gain some momentum at a time when current tech-
nologies for music production and performance are mostly computer based and, 
as most computer based technologies, they tend to a certain dematerialization, to 
become progressively less present on a physical level and therefore, once used in 
live performances, to become acousmatic. Analog music production technologies 
almost inevitably imply physical movement: of parts, of the musician, performer 
or operator. Even if erroneously, they present a causal source for a sound or set of 
sounds that are produced at a performance and heard by the audience. The com-
puter, and most digital technologies, do not, unless they glitch.
Analog, old or obsolete technologies deploy a visible code, a code that is understood 
by the audience because it is at least partially shared with it. A large part of the audi-
ence of contemporary music has had if not first hand contact, at least some experi-
ence of vinyl disc players, analog radios or tape players. They know how to operate 
them or, in the worst case scenario, know that their operation is accessible to them 
and know the expected outputs of the technologies. Whenever they see them being 
performed, they can read the actions of the performer, and understand when these 
actions produce unexpected results, when for example they transform the sound of 
a disc by scratching the vinyl or by changing its speed.
Many among those in the current contemporary music audiences have experienced 
a badly dubbed tape, have had a cassette’s tape scrambled by the deck, a vinyl disc 
that was old, dirty, full of hiss or scratched, or a skipping CD. They are familiar with 
the panoply of possible malfunctions of the media and respond to those glitches 
sometimes with surprise, sometimes with affection or a hint of nostalgia. These de-
fects are part of the experience of the media, and once used creatively, their presence 
is understood as being desired and not as an error or imperfection. As Olga Gori-
unova and Alexei Shulgin suggest, a glitch reminds us of our cultural experience at 
the same time as it develops it by suggesting new aesthetic forms (2008, 115). They 
are produced by error and as such are usually not intended by humans. They are 
473 This was the process developed by Dockstader in his Aerial series of compositions, for which he col-
lected thousands of hours of recordings of shortwave radio noise that were later selected and compiled 
into a coherent structure published as three CDs.
Processes and Systems322
therefore a not-entirely human-produced reality, “its elements are not one-hundred 
percent compatible with customary human-logic, visual, sound, or behavioral con-
ventions of organizing and acting in space” (115). An almost radical example of using 
decay and the (literal) disintegration of the media can be found in William Basin-
ski’s series of works The Disintegration Loops (2002; 2003a-c), accidentally created 
in 2001 while archiving old magnetic reel-to-reel tape loops to digital, a process that 
ended up destroying the aged tapes and recording that destruction. All six composi-
tions are simply the direct recording of the tapes’ decay as they were played, and the 
listener is presented with the experience of listening to the slow disintegration of 
the orchestral tape loops, sometimes for periods as long as forty minutes, much as 
the composer originally experienced it. As Kim Cascone suggests, in these musics 
the tools have become the message, and techniques have been developed by artists 
and composers to expose the minutiae of errors and artifacts for their own aesthetic 
value, helping to blur the boundaries between what is content and what are the de-
livery technologies, and forcing us to examine our preconceptions of failure and 
detritus (2000, 17). Sometimes it is because of glitches that repetitive, monotonous or 
totally predictable processes come to surprise us. It is not when the system behaves 
properly but rather when it misbehaves that our attention is refocused in it. Because 
digital technologies are acousmatic, and because their code is normally not shared 
with the audience, their operation (on stage or in the studio) tends to become far 
more opaque. That is, unless they glitch.
Disintegration is not exclusive to physical media such as magnetic tapes, discs, CDs, 474 
film, paintings or sculptures. Digital files can also deteriorate and disintegrate, be 
it through the effect of errors in reading or writing or from deliberate behaviors 
that are coded by their designers. Unwilling disintegration can sometimes happen 
due to the enforcement of DRM 475 systems that lock content that is incompatible 
with current platforms or protocols 476 or that just degrades it, lowering its quality 
or introducing artificial noise. Successive transcoding, particularly if accompanied 
by data compression and substandard error checking can also result in the creation 
of glitches 477 and their long-term preservation in the medium. Finally, the death of 
474 Physical media themselves, although they carry digital information.
475 Digital Rights Management.
476 This is a ‘success’ of the DRM system in the perspective of its designers or of the copyright holders, 
although it most often is experienced as a failure of the systems from the perspective of its users.
477 Mostly in the form of compression artifacts or artifacts created by attempts to correct bandwidth 
problems.
3232.3 Algorithmic / Rule-Based
platforms, operating systems, protocols or the lack of support for specific file for-
mats can also destroy or severely damage digital information, when not enough care 
is put on ensuring its compatibility, redundancy or backup.
But disintegration can become a part of the aesthetic and the conceptual discours-
es. Artists deal directly with digital errors and deletion by literally coding into the 
pieces, as Caterina Fake in her online piece Mount Fuji (2000) or Zach Gage in 
temporary.cc (2009a), two artworks that literally destroyed themselves. Fake’s piece 
presented a small 300 × 500 pixel image of Mount Fuji in Japan, a reproduction of 
a classic Japanese painting, accompanied by a haiku stating that should one tap 
Mount Fuji with a silk scarf every day, in time one would manage to completely 
erode it. Upon each visit to the project’s web page, a single random pixel was deleted 
from the image, until ultimately nothing at all was left from the image. Fake pre-
sented this project as a commentary on the lightning-fast speeds that are expected 
from online media (or digital media in general) and how these media do not neces-
sarily need to respond to these expectations by accelerating but can, on the contrary, 
give rise to slowly evolving pieces that are not focused on acceleration but rather on 
slowness and contemplation.
Gage’s website temporary.cc is another online study about decay, data corruption 
and disintegration within a language’s standards. Gage intends to question the 
paradigm of the seemingly “eternal shelf-life” of data on the Internet, caused by 
the collection and storing of data between “search-engine caching, cloud-hosting, 
re-blogging, plagiarizing, and the way-back machine” (Gage 2009b). This is done 
by programming temporary.cc to delete part of itself each and every time it is ac-
cessed by a visitor. “These deletions change the way browsers understand the web-
site’s code and create a unique (de)generative piece after each new user. Because 
each unique visit produces a new composition through self-destruction, temporary.
cc can never be truly indexed, as any subsequent act of viewing could irreparably 
modify it.” (2009b) In the end of the process, after falling apart completely due to 
self-erasion, temporary.cc will become a blank website, a 404 or a 410 error page, 478 
and all its previous contents and configurations will be “remembered only by those 
478 The 404 error is the HTTP standard response to indicate that the client was able to communicate with 
the server but that this could not find the document that was requested. The 410 error indicates that the 
resource requested is no longer available and will not be available again because it has been intentionally 
removed.
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who saw or heard about it”. The sporadic, discrete, single dysfunctional events that 
were identified as glitches when read in a context of normality, become the rule and 
take over the space of the artwork, and ultimately consume it, either by overtaking 
or by erasing it.
 
 
Fig. 122: Different (de)generations of temporary.cc (Gage 2009a).
Glitches expose the media behind the delivery technologies. They are always con-
crete, and make the medium become concrete, because they break the ‘fourth wall’ 
and lead the audience to experience hypermediacy. All the transcoding processes 
developed inside the black box, all the mechanical or algorithmic processes that 
were in principle not intended to be witnessed by a system’s readers or users, can be 
exposed by an accidental glitch, or the designer can willingly invite its audience to 
peek the innards of the system by providing glitches as access points. Ewan Meaney 
is able to find other meanings for the aesthetic use of glitch by returning to the hand-
made films of Stan Brakhage 479 and other experimental film makers that work with 
the direct manipulation of the film or with archive and found materials, like Gustav 
Deutsch in his Film ist. series (1998). In their works Meaney finds an abundance 
479 1933-2003.
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of scratching and warping, of fading of the stock itself, of technical imperfections 
affecting focus, color temperature and exposition that are effectively incorporated 
into the pieces, making very explicit some of the natural processes of decay and 
erosion of the media, as well as parts of the process of their creation and remind-
ing us that cinema is also a medium and a physical tool, not just a technology of 
distribution (Meaney 2008). Glitch denotes the wear and aging of the medium, and 
can naturally also fake it, by adding an artificial patina or simply by accelerating it. 
Grainy photography, distorted sound recordings, scratched film with burn marks 
on photograms, or jumps in the film edits are all marks of imperfection, but also 
recognizable traces of a medium’s mechanics, of its chemistry, of its grammar, and 
of its existence. Much in the same way as digital media transcodes and remediates 
analog media and previous digital media, it also appropriates their glitches too.
Iman Moradi proposes that we observe an ontological distinction between ‘pure 
glitch’ and ‘glitch-alike’ as two related but fundamentally different approaches to 
glitch in aesthetic production (2004, 8). While pure glitch defines the outcomes of 
malfunctions, errors and generally unplanned phenomena, glitch-alike refers to the 
synthesis of glitches that are alien to the medium being operated, regardless of how 
well simulated these may be, and to the creation of glitches in the medium that is 
used, such as the deliberate corruption of files or media (2004, 10). While several 
characteristics are common to both pure glitch and glitch-alike, namely the frag-
mentation, linearity, repetition and complexity (37), Moradi identifies a set of five 
distinguishing and contrasting features (2004, 11):
Table 1: Five distinguishing features of pure glitch and glitch-alike according to Moradi (2004).
Pure glitch Glitch-alike
Accidental Deliberate
Coincidental Planned
Appropriated Created
Found Designed
Real Artificial
Following this classification, a pure glitch can never be produced, not even searched, 
because from the moment that an artist creates the possibility for the occurrence 
of a glitch, she will be working with glitch-alike phenomena. The only way one can 
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incorporate glitch in an artwork is to appropriate it, by sampling, by working with 
what we may perhaps call ‘glitch concrète’. One may use the medium to fixate its 
own glitches, thus incorporating them in the artwork.
We should finally mention that glitches in an aesthetic system, regardless of whether 
they are pure or alike, can have a fundamental role in the chronological develop-
ment of the system, by acting as internal generators of information, as sources of 
randomness and novelty that is incorporated in and developed through the system. 
Therefore we can regard glitches and ‘failures’ not as a simple aesthetic resources, but 
as effectively being (at least in potential) creative inputs in the systems. If we can say, 
as Cascone did, that “our control of technology is an illusion”, and that digital tools 
are “only as perfect, precise, and efficient as the humans who build them” (2000, 13) 
we can also see how these apparent shortcomings can in effect be major strengths. 
Glitches can be signs of failure but they have the potential to be tools of creation.
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An Analytical Model for Procedural Works
3.1 Fundaments
3.1.1 Phenomenological Approach
Procedural aesthetic artifacts are a very diverse set of objects. Their computational 
nature can in some ways be seen as a unifying characteristic, but it diversifies more 
than unifies the outcomes of the processes, and these are, in the end, the perceiv-
able phenomena that will communicate. As Dunne puts it, the “electronic object is 
a confusion of conceptual models, symbolic logic, algorithms, software, electrons, 
and matter”, where the “gap between the scales of electrons and objects is most dif-
ficult to grasp” (2005, 7). These artifacts are “on the threshold of materiality”, not 
because they don’t have a physical, material existence, but rather because the “CPU of 
an electronic object is, essentially, physically embodied symbolic logic or mathemat-
ics” (11), not form or matter.
Although one could discuss whether or not it is possible to identify true computa-
tional art forms, as Steven Holtzman defines them — art forms that one could not 
even imagine to have been developed without the “calculative capabilities of com-
puters” (1994, 241) and the expressive possibilities that they open — one can also 
accept that sometimes what we come to identify as being characteristic computer 
aesthetics do not result from an excess but rather from a certain lack of capabilities.
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There are moments in the history of computer technology that are rich in 
computer functionality producing distinct aesthetics. At such times, computer 
functionality reveals itself through technological limitations. Bottlenecks, such 
as processor speed, screen resolution, color depth, or network bandwidth — 
4-bit, 8-bit music, 16-color pixelated visuals, slow rendering, compressed image 
and video with artifacts — create an authentic computer aesthetics, that is, the 
aesthetics of low-tech today. (Goriunova and Shulgin 2008, 113)
Naturally, all of these constraints or technical limitations can be incorporated in 
the culture of the media and are consequently recreated and emulated, thus becom-
ing superficial aesthetic layers and not structural outputs. 480 As black and white 
photography, film, television or video, became a choice and not the only possibili-
ties; as grain, smudges or scratches in film became something other than simply 
marks of the wear and tear of the medium and turned to stylistic choices rather than 
the inevitable consequences of the system’s use, so did low resolution, low polygon 
count, limited color depth, compression, aliasing or other marks of the past of digi-
tal media. 481 They’re not anymore a “manifestation of genuine software aesthetics” 
(Goriunova and Shulgin 2008, 111), because computational aesthetics are universal, 
visually able to emulate the aesthetic characteristics of most (if not all) media. While 
some designers may use computers and digital processes to produce objects of hy-
perrealistic or classical beauty, the same tools and processes can alternatively be 
used to produce abstract, dissonant and dysfunctional outputs. 482
In Formalized Music (1992), Xenakis describes his approach to composition as con-
sidering “sound and music as a vast potential reservoir in which a knowledge of the 
laws of though and the structural creations of thought may find a completely new 
medium of materialization, i.e. communication”, he ensues that for this purpose, 
480 They can be seen as not being outputs from the generative processes of a system, such as they were 
when their creation was subject to the technical limitations of a particular system, but rather as being 
created or affected by the transformational components of the system. In a sense, and adopting Chom-
sky’s terminology, as technology evolves the signs cease to be the effect of the limited competence of the 
machines and start to become intentional products of the system’s performance.
481 A recent arena for this phenomenon is electronic music, where to each new wave of technological re-
finements it almost inevitably follows the splash of emulators for the past (and by then most certainly ob-
solete) machines. Technology inexorably moves on, but some sounds become ‘old-school’ and are prized 
for their low resolution, for the digital or electrical noise or other defects turned to patina. Much of the 
so-called ‘clicks and cuts’ music, as well as of the IDM (or ‘intelligent dance music’) exhibits a plethora of 
recreated glitches and errors, very often simulated at great computational expense.
482 At least to some members of their audience.
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an epithet as “‘beautiful’ or ‘ugly’ makes no sense for sound, nor for the music that 
derives from it” and that “the quantity of intelligence carried by sounds must be the 
true criterion of the validity of a particular music”. Some years earlier, when consid-
ering the history of computer-aided algorithmic composition systems and replying 
to a question about the musical quality of those attempts, he bluntly replied that 
from the point of view of aesthetics the results were meager and that the “hope of an 
extraordinary aesthetic success based on extraordinary technology is a cruel deceit” 
(qtd. in Ariza 2009, 66). Xenakis was distinguishing the systems (or the technologies 
that built the systems) from the aesthetic artifacts they produced, a distinction that 
suggested that the aesthetic success or failure was dependent on humans and inde-
pendent of any technologies (Ariza 2009, 66). This is an expectable point of view in a 
composer, trained to always interface and isolate systems, structures and technolo-
gies and their aesthetic outputs — happening as they do at different instances, in dif-
ferent contexts and with different participants — but that one cannot certainly ex-
pect from technologically grounded artists like those working with and for media, 483 
for whom the aesthetic success (or failure) is directly dependent on the technologies 
(and not only on the humans operating or collaborating with them). Still, even for 
creators that depend on the technological realization of the outputs, the conceptual 
aspects of a given system can weight more than the aesthetic evaluation of the out-
puts per se. One wouldn’t certainly experience Cohen’s AARON’s (1973a) drawings or 
Musgrave’s landscapes 484 in the same way knowing they were produced by a human 
rather than by a computer program. One wouldn’t even be able to listen to Cage’s 
4’33” (1952) without some previous knowledge of its conceptual foundation. 485 
483 Where one can certainly classify Xenakis’s electronic pieces (or tape music) as Persepolis (1971), in 
contrast to his other pieces scored for orchestra or instruments. If the later are computer-assisted com-
positions, the former can be seen as being integrally computer-realized compositions, composed and 
performed through computers. Such was also the case with the pieces developed with and for the UPIC 
(Unité Polyagogique Informatique du CEMAMu) system, as e.g. Mycenae Alpha (1978).
484 Musgrave uses computer graphics to create the “most ancient of artistic genres, the landscape” (Blais 
and Ippolito 2006, 20), developing algorithms that have since been used in software packages dedicated 
to animation and film. “Although landscapes have hitherto been the province of painters trained in two-
point perspective, Musgrave has cited Mandelbrot to underscore the inadequacy of Euclidean geometry 
for describing nature: ‘Clouds are not spheres, mountains are not cones, coastlines are not circles…’ What 
shapes can accommodate Nature’s wispy, rugged, meandering profile? Fractals, of course, because they 
marry repetition and randomness. Musgrave writes recursive algorithms that perform the mathematical 
equivalent of Genesis, building mountains crag by crag and trees limb by limb, tracing the paths of virtual 
light rays to cast shadows of virtual peaks and to paint reflected sky in virtual water.” (20)
485 One could argue that without the conceptual framing, 4’33” wouldn’t even exist and that therefore it 
simply wouldn’t be possible to hear. Defined singularly by conceptual aspects, 4’33” is formed before the 
listening act, not during it, as it would normally be expected. The focus of the listener has to be attuned 
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Built from systems and computational procedures, all digitally produced aesthetic 
artifacts can be seen as being conceptual in essence. In computational art as in con-
ceptual art, much of the artist’s attention is focused on exploring different systems 
for their own intrinsic value, exploring ideas that become machines that “make the 
art” (LeWitt 1969b). After these processes are defined, after the ideas or concepts are 
in place, the actual construction of the work is, according to LeWitt, a “perfunctory 
affair” (qtd. in Galanter 2003, 18), something that although necessary, is neverthe-
less secondary to the conceptual part of the artistic process. 486 In the domain of 
digitally generated artifacts, the actual construction of the work is also, at many lev-
els, a matter of processes and ideas, a matter of algorithms and code. Musgrave, for 
example, describes his aesthetics by invoking a notion of proceduralism, to explain 
the algorithmic nature of the work.
If I dislike the resulting hue in a particular highlight (a local effect) I may 
change the color of the light source accordingly, but this changes tones every-
where that light falls in the scene. Similarly, if I dislike the shape or location of 
a given wave in the water or mountain peak in the terrain, I may change it, but 
this change will also affect all other waves or peaks and valleys. The random-
ness at the heart of the fractal models I use grants both enormous flexibility 
and expressive power, but it also entails complete abdication of control over 
specific details in relation to their global context. (Musgrave qtd. in Blais and 
Ippolito 2006, 20)
As with conceptual art, a considerable part of the aesthetic value of the artifacts is 
to be found at the level of the ideas and not at the level of the actual construction of 
the perceived outputs.
A piece of software is a set of formal instructions, or, algorithms; it is a logical 
score put down in a code. It doesn’t matter at all which particular sign system 
to the typology of sounds that form the piece and not those that would normally constitute a musical 
composition (particularly one performed, as 4’33” originally was, on a piano).
486 “LeWitt regarded the execution of the conceptual plan as a tactic for avoiding the ‘expressive’, or self-
consciously authored, art object, and the conceptualists developed the form of ‘instructions for the mak-
ing of art’. This represented a shift in authorial hegemony, from a centralised model (centred on the body 
of the artist) to a distributed one. However, although by following the instructions anyone could make the 
artwork, the instructions themselves retained the authorial privilege. The ‘original’ idea remained sacro-
sanct. This highlights a contradiction in the stated intention — to de-subjectify the artwork — and the 
final result, in which the user/viewer is still subjected to the didactic stance of the artist.” (Albert 2009, 89)
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is used as long as it is a code, whether digital zeros and ones, the Latin alpha-
bet, Morse code or, like in a processor chip, an exactly defined set of registers 
controlling discrete currents of electricity. (Cramer 2002)
Therefore, as in conceptual art, we run into the problem that these ideas must ei-
ther be carried explicitly, communicated by or with the artifact. When this doesn’t 
happen the experience of the artifact will necessarily be lacking because it will be 
misinformed (or under-informed) and it will be up to the reader to find clues of the 
process in the outputs that the system produces.
Art is the external representation of things that happen in the head of the artist. 
Art forms differ in terms of the materials they employ, the way the representa-
tions are created, what they purport to represent, and how they are manifest in 
the world. (Laurel 1993, 30)
Art is the external representation of the computational processes that the artist cre-
ates, and these can be seen (at least partially, one might say) as already being repre-
sentations of what happens in the head of the artist. Either way, the final represen-
tation will always be dependent of the representation that exists at the level of the 
code and it will not necessarily represent it, in the sense that it may not allow 487 the 
reader or user to fully understand the structure and the processes being developed 
at that level. Viewers are placed in art contexts but may have no interaction whatever 
with the machines, other than by seeking their rationale through their outputs. They 
are, as Saul Albert puts it, invited to examine how the artist’s relationship with the 
machine affects her status as the artist, and theirs as viewers (2009, 91).
Fig. 123: Sleep (Thayer 2009b), from the Microcodes series (2009a).
487 Or more often than not, will most certainly not accurately represent the level of the code.
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But unless the source code of a system is available and readable — something that 
may happen in some cases but that is far from being the norm 488 — and unless the 
reader is capable of reading and understanding the code (in whatever programing 
language it may have been written) subsequently understanding the processes that 
the creator developed, her role as a user in the system, which other external influ-
ences will have any effect in the system’s outputs and how these effects can affect it, 
she will not truly be in the possession of enough information about which things 
happen in the machine, much less about which things may or may not have hap-
pened in the artist’s head, to return to Laurel’s quip, and a multitude of questions 
related to the openness of the artwork, of its possible links, metaphors and analogies. 
This is the space of critic, a space that quickly spreads beyond the artist, the artwork 
and their multiple motivations, a layer of interpretation that according to Mansoux 
and de Valk is often forgotten but that is very present as a direct consequence of 
the openness of an artwork impacting not only its relation to its audience but also 
greatly influencing the process that underlies it — that is why it is “important to 
understand that software is not just a technical component of digital art, it is the 
artwork and its code provides another reading of it” (2008b, 10).
One must raise questions concerning the extent to which the artist developed the 
code, not only which parts of the code were of her own creation — a minor question, 
in the days of sampling, collage, GNU, copyleft and shared or open source code li-
braries — but to what extent is the artist or designer a skilled programmer, to which 
extent she understands the tools and the code and is ‘procedurally literate’, to follow 
the definition proposed by Michael Mateas (2005). 489 This is a challenge to the prac-
titioners as well as to the readers and critics.
488 Thayer’s Microcodes (2009) are very small code-based artworks, presented as code and as fully con-
tained works of art, where the conceptual meaning of each piece is revealed through a combination of the 
title, the code and the results of running them on a computer.
489 It is not so much a matter of historically framing a work, thus trying to understand what was feasible 
by a certain author at a certain time, but also to try to understand what was easier to produce by a given 
author at a certain time, with the set of tools that were available to her — tools that are not always imme-
diately visible in the finished artifact. As Mateas puts it: “Procedurally illiterate new media practitioners 
are confined to producing those interactive systems that happen to be easy to produce within existing 
authoring tools.” (Mateas 2005). Although craft and technical expertise can always be difficult to discuss, 
particularly in the artistic context, it is clear that one must regard Musgrave’s coded landscapes, created 
from algorithms that he devised and developed in an altogether different way from the countless similar 
images one comes across more recently, generated by plug-ins of 3D modeling software (that may happen 
to be developed from Musgrave’s algorithms) that demand very little (both in creativity or craft) to be 
deployed. This shifts the role of the creator (temporarily in some cases) to the role of a user, much in the 
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This metainformation problem was present throughout the twentieth century. The 
more the conceptual aspects of the artwork or the artistic process were fundamen-
tal to the reading of the pieces, the more the lack of information on how to read 
and comprehend the artwork was felt. As a consequence, several of the fundamen-
tal artists of the twentieth century are unknown to audiences at large and to most 
besides a somewhat small group of literati that is able to understand the context 
of creation and the framing of the pieces. This phenomenon happened with many 
artistic fields and the problem is inherited by digital arts, operating as they are in 
similar grounds. 490 Stephen Wilson (2002) argues that the terms ‘digital’ or ‘com-
puter-based’ may no longer be enough to describe a coherent aesthetic category, es-
same sense as someone using Mozart’s Würfelspiel would not really be composing — as Mozart was when 
creating the game — but rather deploying the system and exploring the results of the possible combina-
tions. The user was supplying the chance element and therefore she was indispensable to a particular 
instantiation of the game and to the particular output being produced, and so one may regard her as 
coauthoring the output, but never as its creator or composer.
490 Fuller and Morrison discussed the tensions in this relation in two articles in the Mute Magazine, 
in the end of the 1990s: Ten Reasons Why the Art World Loves Digital Art (Fuller 2009) and Ten Reasons 
Why the Art World Hates Digital Art (Morrison 2009). In our view, both arguments fail to address the 
fundamental point of the question as their authors try to make of digital art something other than the 
traditional, or non-digital art — “‘Digital Art’ does not exist. In proclaiming itself as a new medium, digi-
tal art has failed to recognise that art is no longer medium-specific. Artists now operate across disciplines 
— text, image, moving image, event — and use whatever tools are at their disposal.” (Morrison 2009, 82) — 
“Both fields, art and digital art, attempt to control what art and artists should do and what they should be 
called.” (Fuller 2009, 88) — identifying several aspects where both differ but failing to identify the most 
important of these. That is the fact that what turns digital arts into something fundamentally different are 
not the techniques or the technologies with which the artifacts are created — those, as Morrison points 
can very well almost be anything that is at the artist’s disposal at a particular time — but the concepts 
behind the artifacts and the artist’s work. It is not the medium but the procedural layer of the medium. It 
is not the surface layer but what lies at the core of the work, the seed at the core of the apple — to use Scott 
McCloud’s analogy (1999) — from where rest of the fruit grows. It is not what one sees, smells or tastes, 
although all these layers are naturally important, but rather what is enveloped by the fruit and is its raison 
d’être. “Digital technology exists. Art exists. Art which uses technology exists. Digital art does not exist 
‘in its own right’.” (Morrison 2009, 82) We believe one can use the term digital art, provided it is used not 
to refer to art that is developed with digital technology but to art that makes use of generative processes, 
or procedural principles in its development. Art that uses code, art that is programmed. In this sense, this 
art is not about visual (or sensorial) pleasure, it is rather an art about intellectual pleasure, because it is 
intelligence that builds procedural, generative, truly digital artifacts. As Holtzman notes, from a creative 
perspective, “what is interesting is not how well computers can emulate traditional human models for 
performing their tasks and solving problems, but, rather, the new territory that computers will reveal. 
What are the new possibilities opened by computers? What ideas and means of expression will we dis-
cover that are only conceivable with computers? What new models will we develop for viewing the world 
in light of computers? What means of expression are idiomatic to computers?” (Holtzman 1994, 240) 
Although some genuinely new visual or audial forms will undoubtedly arise from computational creation, 
like fractals or granular synthesis, for example, it is perhaps not at this sensorial level that we will find the 
idiomatic means of expression.
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pecially now that the power of digital systems to create or emulate practically any 
output one can think of. He therefore suggests a broader approach, and the use of 
the term ‘information arts’, a proposal that has the merit of shifting the focus from 
the medium or the tools into the process. 491 The question is not what one can do 
with digital tools, but rather how one can work with digital tools, which processes 
give rise to the work that is, itself, also defined as a process. 492 Not what is ultimately 
output at the system’s surface — although that is certainly important — but much 
more which structures are developed in the system, creating the outputs. 493
In order to perform an analysis of diverse computational aesthetic artifacts, one must 
therefore not rely exclusively on the physical characteristics of the aesthetic outputs 
of the systems. As Blais and Ippolito note, artists working with procedural systems 
not only tolerate, as they even celebrate, outputs that are unruly or downright ugly, 
provided they allow them to “focus on the code itself as the object of interest” (2006, 
21). If we follow the definition proposed by Galanter, that sees generative art as “any 
art practice where the artist uses a system, such as a set of natural language rules, a 
computer program, a machine, or other procedural invention, which is set into mo-
tion with some degree of autonomy contributing to or resulting in a completed work 
of art” (2003, 4), it becomes clear that we will face a dilemma previously identified 
by Cramer: 494 should these works be “evaluated according to code (form) or result 
(function)?” (Blais and Ippolito 2006, 24)
491 Conversely, Dominic McIver Lopes proposes a distinction between digital art forms and ‘computer 
art forms’ based in the definition of a computer art form as an item that “1) it’s art, 2) it’s run on a com-
puter, 3) it’s interactive, and 4) it’s interactive because it’s run on a computer.” (2010). We will not debate 
this definition here, it may suffice to say that in the context of this work we generally disagree with it.
492 “Taking a cue from A. Michael Noll, graphic design maven John Maeda of the MIT Media Lab en-
courages designers to think of computers as impertinent collaborators rather than slavish layout tools.” 
(Blais and Ippolito 2006, 47)
493 “The computer is essentially a structure manipulator. The workings of a computer program involve 
defining relationships between different objects — assigned parts of memory, bytes and words, variables 
or absolute values, operands — and object manipulators or operators — machine instructions that can 
relate and transform different objects, adding them together, shifting them left or right, comparing them 
for differences, moving them from one place in memory to another.” (Holtzman 1994, 139)
494 “If software art could be generally defined as an art: 1) of which the material is formal instruction 
code, and/or 2) which addresses cultural concepts of software, then each of their positions sides with 
exactly one of the two aspects. If Software Art would be reduced to only the first, one would risk ending 
up a with a neoclassicist understanding of software art as beautiful and elegant code along the lines of 
Knuth and Levy. Reduced on the other hand to only the cultural aspect, Software Art could end up being 
a critical footnote to Microsoft desktop computing, potentially overlooking its speculative potential at 
formal experimentation. Formal reflections of software are, like in this text, inevitable if one considers 
common-sense notions of software a problem rather than a point of departure; histories of instruction 
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The correct answer lies within and across both views. Audience, critics and creators, 495 
must be procedurally literate. They need to be able to read and analyze computation-
al artifacts, valuing them either by their final aesthetic outputs or by the processes 
that produce the aesthetic outputs and that may very well be, by themselves, part of 
the aesthetic experience. “Without an understanding of how code operates as an ex-
pressive medium, new media scholars are forced to treat the operation of the media 
artifacts they study as a black box, losing the crucial relationship between author-
ship, code, and audience reception.” (Mateas 2005)
Although one usually has no access to the code in order to read or criticize the 
artwork, one may try to infer from the experience of the artifacts enough informa-
tion to understand the processes that are being developed within it. In cases where 
information about the process is communicated with or in the artifact, like e.g. Si-
mon’s Every Icon 496 (1997b) it is easy for any viewer to incorporate the knowledge 
about the core process (even if the precise technical details of the implementation 
may be unknown) into the analysis of the artifact and into its aesthetic fruition. The 
presentation of the core process 497 becomes an integral part of the artifact, once that 
simply the visual representations that emerge from the process may not be able to 
communicate it as swiftly as the author would like. 498
codes in art and investigations into the relationship of software, text and language still remain to be writ-
ten.” (Cramer 2002)
495 Or the metacreators, should we adhere to Whitelaw’s view (2004).
496 Simon composes a simple statement in the piece, adjacent to the grid where the process is set in mo-
tion: “Given: An icon described by a 32 × 32 grid. Allowed: Any element of the grid to be colored black or 
white. Shown: Every icon.” In an artist statement published in the Parachute magazine, Simon develops 
the concept: “Can a machine produce every possible image? What are the limits of this kind of automa-
tion? Is it possible to practice image making by exploring all of image-space using a computer rather 
than by recording from the world around us? What does it mean that one may discover visual imagery 
so detached from ‘nature’? Every Icon progresses by counting. Starting with an image where every grid 
element is white, the software displays combinations of black and white elements, proceeding toward an 
image where every element is black. In contrast to presenting a single image as an intentional sign, Every 
Icon enumerates all possibilities. The grid contains all possible images. Any change in the starting condi-
tions, such as the size of the grid or the color of the element, determines an entirely different set of possible 
images.” (1997a)
497 Albeit in a very simplified manner, once that it is simply the idea of the process that is presented, not 
the actual code that algorithmically describes the process.
498 One can argue that with a process as simple as that behind Every Icon, and with the speed at which 
it is developed (100 frames/icons per second in Simon’s original 1997 version) would eventually be under-
standable by most of its audience, but it is nevertheless easy to understand Simon’s will to introduce the 
algorithm, in a way that would clear any doubts about the process or the intent driving the piece and as 
to whether any viewer should expect to see a particular image or would indeed just be invited to witness 
a part of the development of the process: “When Every Icon begins, the image changes rapidly. Yet the 
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Fig. 124: Every Icon (Simon 1997b).
This is somewhat similar to the experience of seeing one of LeWitt’s Incomplete Open 
Cube (1974a) sculptures (or ‘structures’, as he preferred to call them) or an exhibition 
of several of these pieces titled Variations of Incomplete Open Cubes (Baume 2001), 
in the sense that the title contextualizes the conceptual process that is developed 
in all the pieces of the exhibition and thus prepares and frames the aesthetic ex-
perience. In LeWitt’s case it also deliberately places each sculpture inside a broader 
corpus of work, raising the viewer’s awareness to its existence as part of a methodic 
process of formal research, of an enumerative presentation of the work. 
progression of the elements across the grid seems to take longer and longer. How long until recognizable 
images appear? Try several hundred trillion years. The total number of black and white icons in a 32 × 
32 grid is: 1.8 × 10308 (a billion is 109). Though, for example, at a rate of 100 icons per second (on a typical 
desktop computer), it will take only 1.36 years to display all variations of the first line of the grid, the 
second line takes an exponentially longer 5.85 billion years to complete.” (Simon 1997a) The image the 
viewer is presented with is that of the process, not of any particular frame, of any particular icon but, as 
the title states, of every icon. This is a piece of and about potential, a piece where the recombinations are 
not a means to a final configuration but where the multiple configurations achieved through recombina-
tion are the aesthetic object. This is also a piece about time and its passing, as many pieces that deal with 
systematic iteration and recombination of parts inevitably tend to… This is a piece of machinic aesthetic, 
of logic and method and process turned into sensorial outputs.
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Fig. 125: Incomplete Open Cube (LeWitt 1974a).
Through the repeated experience of the artifact and of its multiple outputs one may 
in some cases be able to grasp part of the underlying process, even if this is not 
represented directly by, with, or in the artifact. This will be particularly feasible in 
those cases where the systems visualize processes, but more difficult if there is a high 
degree of randomness coded into the process or if this is using real-world data as 
a source for control. 499 Every Icon is a good example of the first, as is phiLia 01 (Lia 
2009), a visually complex but structurally simple application that allows the user to 
manipulate the motion of several particles towards the creation of dynamic visual 
compositions, or Text Rain (Utterback and Achituv 1999). In Text Rain, the user sees 
herself in a mirror projection where text permanently falls, respecting the boundar-
ies of the body or of any objects one may be holding, and piling over it unless one 
shakes it off. Text Rain deals with the principles of gravity and motion that are fa-
miliar to everyone, and uses the user’s body as the control device, thus needing no 
introduction or explanation before its use.
499 Of course that the work may also deliberately hide any clues to the system, instructions of operation 
or mentions of the code or process — this happens for example in some of Lia’s online pieces (both in the 
turux (Lia and Dextro 1997-2001) website as in the later re-move project (Lia 1999-2003), where she created 
control menus that have cryptic iconic marks or descriptions and that sometimes don’t even produce an 
immediate and clear feedback from the piece. The creators of these pieces may intend to develop a game 
of discovery with the user or player, to turn the experience of learning how to control (or not) the system 
inside the black box into a part of the narrative that is created by the piece and its users.
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Fig. 126: phiLia 01 (Lia 2009).
Fig. 127: Text Rain (Utterback and Achituv 1999).
Merce’s Isosurface (Levin 2009) is a good example of the later, a video created from 
data captured from a performance by Merce Cunningham 500 and later interpreted 
by Golan Levin. The elegant motion of the rendered form is reminiscent of Cun-
ningham’s hand dance but, unless one is explicitly informed of the provenience of 
the data, it will be very unlikely to infer it from the piece alone. In Verostko’s series 
of plotted paintings Seven Sisters: the Pleiades (1998b) (as in many other of his works) 
no information is given to the viewer about the algorithms of the production pro-
500 1919-2009.
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cesses used in the work. Although occasionally the pieces can be presented in the 
context of computer art exhibitions, due to the nature of the production process — 
the use of paint and brushes attached to a multi-pen plotter driven by the artist’s 
software — there aren’t many clear signs that suggest the computational origin of 
the structure, besides the total horizontal symmetry, so uncanny in such a complex 
form. There is an air of familiarity between all the seven pieces in this series because 
all of the pieces “were rendered algorithmically within a specified set of param-
eters”, something that generated a set of “forms with a strong familial resemblance. 
The Sisters resemble each other as they were created with the same form generator 
sharing a common set of parameters.” Verostoko further explains that this work 
“demonstrates the similarities between the artist’s software and epigenesis” and that 
“somewhat as in a garden, the family of Pleiades were ‘grown’ with the artist’s soft-
ware.” (1998c) But, in the absence of such an explanation, one wouldn’t expect the 
viewer to deduce any of this.
 
Fig. 128: Merce’s Isosurface (Levin 2009).
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Fig. 129: Celaeno and Electra from Seven Sisters: The Pleiades (Verostko 1998b).
Naturally, what one may or may not grasp in the systems is not the actual code but 
rather an understanding of the principles of operation, of the ground rules of the 
piece that are enunciated by the code. What one will then need to understand in or-
der to analyze the pieces are not the programming languages per se, but the general 
programming principles and the behaviors coded through these. We can argue that 
what seduces the viewer in the works of these artists is not necessarily the finished 
physical objects by themselves (however aesthetically pleasing or simply beautiful 
these may be in many cases) but much more the way in which each of them carries 
with it a process, a logic, a grammar and a set of concepts that are inseparable (and 
in some cases indistinguishable) from the artifact itself. Besides all other concerns 
central to the creation, interpretation and critical analysis of any aesthetic (or artis-
tic) artifact, computational art uses code to speculative or critical ends (Blais and 
Ippolito 2006, 25), it perverts it, by turning the cold logic of algorithms into an ex-
pressive tool, a “playful perversity” that distinguishes the artistic use of code from 
“the merely technical one” (25), and that turns computational art into something that 
is much more than art made for or with machines, into something that is “highly 
concerned with artistic subjectivity and its reflection and extension into generative 
systems.” (Cramer and Gabriel 2001) It follows that beyond and besides the senso-
3413.1 Fundaments
rial aesthetic experience of the artifact, the narratives it may develop, 501 and the 
mechanical aspects of the system’s operation, 502 one permanently needs to consider 
the code layer of the system because it is ultimately this that generates and develops 
all the other layers. It is a fundamental part of both the aesthetic and the narrative 
experiences and it is at the core of the mechanical implementation of the system. It 
also is, however, mostly invisible to the users of the system, so in most cases it will 
be impossible to evaluate it directly and one will have to rely on indirect information 
or on clues presented by the system to hypothesize on it. One will have to develop 
an analysis that is not based on the code but that is phenomenologically based, that 
uses the outputs of the code to try to discern the processes and what is happening 
inside the black box of the system.
One thing that really makes this complicated is that, as an artist who writes 
code, I don’t think that ‘my medium’ is the same as the ‘viewer’s medium’. My 
medium is the code. That’s what I shape and manipulate to convey my ‘mes-
sage’. The viewer’s medium can be something else. It could be the Internet or 
the computer or the screen, depending on how they regard the work. It could 
even be the code as long as I reveal it. But I’m not really in a position to dictate 
to the viewer what they may or may not refer to as ‘the medium’. That’s depen-
dent on their own experience. Regardless, whatever I consider as ‘my medium’ 
has a big impact on the nature of the work itself. In many ways it defines and 
guides the creative process. (Thayer 2008)
501 One can argue that time-based experiential pieces always develop a narrative, although they may 
not tell a narrative, in the traditional sense one associates with narrative media. If, as Laurel proposes, we 
define experiential activities as those that, “such as computer games” are “undertaken purely for the expe-
rience afforded by the activity as you engage in it, while productive activities such as word processing have 
outcomes in the real world that are somehow beyond the experience of the activity itself (…) ‘productivity’ 
as a class of applications is better characterized not by the concreteness of outcomes but by their serious-
ness vis-a-vis the real world” (1993, 22-23), we should regard experiential pieces as always containing or 
being able to generate a narrative during their experimentation.
502 The mechanical aspects of a system mostly refer to whether the computational processes that are 
developed in the system are digital, analog or hybrid, whether the system is self-running or if it depends 
on user input, etc.
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3.1.2 On the Importance of an Analytical Model
Several new media, digital media, computer arts or digital aesthetics critics and 
scholars recognize that the lack of an established and rigorous terminology is one 
of the major problems found in their study. On one hand, as practitioners origi-
nate from a variety of backgrounds, they bring with them terminologies inherited 
from aesthetics, computer sciences, mathematics or life sciences 503 that aren’t always 
compatible. On the other hand, several of the phenomena that are discovered are 
genuinely new and unprecedented, without clear references in other arts or fields of 
knowledge, 504 thus lacking study and a clear nomenclature.
This nomenclature must necessarily deal with questions of authorship, with techni-
cal issues, with narrative and dramatic issues and finally, with the cognitive aspects 
of aesthetics, 505 with interaction and agency. It must recognize computational aes-
thetic artifacts as a diverse group of objects and systems, with links not only to art 
and design theory and history but also to computer sciences, and many of its prac-
titioners as often operating in both fields. It must also bear in mind that even if one 
could argue that to a certain extent everyone is minimally conversant with digital 
technologies, we can safely assume that most are knowledgeable in what is usually 
referred to as an ‘end-user’ perspective, that is, in the usage of computer programs 
and platforms following models of operation that are largely dictated by the appli-
cations and their designers, and not in the production of code, of new applications 
503 “Digital artists need no longer emulate traditional media only! The computer allows us to create new 
media, with new rules, more naturally suited to the new tool. But such rules are best when they too follow 
physical phenomena, instead of arbitrary mathematical constructs. I have learned to paint with electrons 
moving over a potential landscape, quantum waves trapped between walls, chaotic dynamics, and with 
colliding molecules… You could say that I’m using physics as my brush.” (Eric Heller qtd. in Blais and 
Ippolito 2006, 40)
504 With perhaps the exception of computer sciences, to which, according to Bolz, media theory will 
resort for its foundations: “The task that media theory is confronted with is the transformation into com-
puter theory, because that will certainly become the metatheory in this area. Within it, the connection 
will have to be made between the electronic media and the metamedium computer.” (2004, 25)
505 Media theory is necessarily based on a new aesthetics, “if you define aesthetics as the ‘theory of 
perception.’ The eye absorbs five gigabytes per second. This is such an enormous amount that the biggest 
mainframes can only barely equal it. With the eye, one can absorb much more information than with any 
other sense or intellectual capacity. This means that information processing must be visual in the future, 
because the eye possesses the potential for processing large quantities of information in a meaningful 
way.” (Bolz 2004, 25)
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or programs. People are well-versed in the usage of existing software, not in the 
creation of new software or on what Mateas would call procedural literacy (2005). 506
As digital technologies become ubiquitous, as they are embedded in multiple de-
vices and almost all of the media, they are increasingly produced by a combination 
of human and mechanical activities, all arts tend to become cyborg arts and all 
communication becomes cyborg communication. These are in dire need of a “criti-
cism and terminology with less clear-cut boundaries between human and machine, 
creative and automatic, interested and disinterested” (Aarseth 1997, 134), a terminol-
ogy that has a “distinctive power as well as unproblematic connotations” (59), that 
is “not grounded in computer industrial rhetoric (cf. hypertext, interactive, virtual, 
etc.) but purely on observable differences in the behavior” between the artifacts and 
their users. Aarseth defends that the recent visibility of the so-called ‘new media’ 
has inspired everyone to look at the old media in a new light. What results from 
these observations is the conclusion that the ‘stability’ of the traditional media (and 
in the case of his study particularly of the printed book and other supports for texts) 
is “just as metaphysical and illusory as the (…) claims of a new electronic writing 
that alters the functions of (…) communication in singular and revolutionary ways”. 
All media share properties and modus operandi, regardless of their digital or ana-
log foundations, therefore, for “reasons of formality”, the physical differences of the 
media 507 should not be given substantial status in a terminology for the study of the 
artifacts. As is “evidenced by the history of the media, the physical stratum of the 
medium does not necessarily influence the user-text relationship. An illustration of 
this is the transition from long-playing records to compact discs in the music in-
dustry, where the analog-to-digital shift of the artifact did not change any substan-
tial aspects of the cultural production or consumption of music”. As such, Aarseth 
defends an approach that configures the terminology functionally, that makes it 
less dependent of ad hoc perspectives and particular contexts of implementation 
— there are analog artifacts that function more like digital artifacts than other arti-
506 “By procedural literacy I mean the ability to read and write processes, to engage procedural repre-
sentation and aesthetics, to understand the interplay between the culturally-embedded practices of hu-
man meaning-making and technically-mediated processes. With appropriate programming, a computer 
can embody any conceivable process; code is the most versatile, general process language ever created. 
Hence, the craft skill of programming is a fundamental component of procedural literacy, though it is not 
the details of any particular programming language that matters, but rather the more general tropes and 
structures that cut across all languages.” (Mateas 2005)
507 Such paper vs. screen, paint vs. light, etc.
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facts in the same physical medium, therefore, the analog-digital dichotomy “cannot 
be given analytical power as such, but it must be further examined if we wish to de-
termine the exact significance of the materiality of the medium. The false simplicity 
of these terms must be abandoned, just as the poststructuralists deconstructed the 
simple dichotomies of the structuralists. In their place, a more discerning model 
based on empirical observations, able to accommodate future media patterns, must 
be constructed.” (59)
Introducing his own effort to build a terminology, grounded in an analytical model 
that provides a typology of textual communication, Aarseth describes some previ-
ous efforts to create typologies that reflect media diversity. He mentions Jan Bor-
dewijk and Ben van Kaam, that proposed a typology of four modes of information 
‘traffic patterns’: 508 allocution, consultation, registration, and conversation, ordered 
by two questions: “Who owns the information?” and “Who controls the program 
for information access?” Questions that are answered by individual consumers or 
a ‘central provider’. Secondly, Richard Ziegfeld’s Interactive Fiction: A New Liter-
ary Genre? (1989) compares the elements of interactive fiction with those of other 
media, introducing a variety of what he terms ‘software options’, such as movement, 
simulation or interaction, which are related to the various literary elements. How-
ever promising the premises of the essay may seem, they are however “marred by 
[Ziegfeld’s] lack of conceptual rigor and focus of interest” (Aarseth 1997, 60). Finally, 
Aarseth notes the distinction that is proposed by Joyce in Siren Shapes (2003) be-
tween explorative hypertexts “versus texts that can be changed, added to, and reor-
ganized by the user” (1997, 60), that Joyce terms constructive hypertexts 509 a classifi-
cation that proved particularly useful to the user functions section of his model, that 
we will analyze soon, and that will also be rather important in this work.
508 In their 1986 article Towards a New Classification of Tele-Information Services (Bordewijk and van 
Kaam 2003).
509 “Constructive hypertext quits the text and enters the laboratory. Constructive hypertext requires a 
capability to create, change, and recover particular encounters within a developing body of knowledge or 
writing process. Like the conference or the classroom or any other form of the electronic book, construc-
tive hypertexts are versions of what they are becoming, a structure for what does not yet exist. For silence.” 
(Joyce 1995, 101)
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3.1.3 Aarseth’s Model
Grounded on these three previous models and on his own investigation, Aarseth 
proposes a new ‘textonomy’, a typology of textual communication. He tries to estab-
lish a basis for a common terminology and the basic concepts that apply to all the ob-
jects under consideration, those that he defines either as texts or as cybertexts. 510 The 
first step to do so is then naturally to define what is the focus of the analysis — textu-
ality — therefore defining what is a text, or “what circumstances allow us to describe 
a certain object as a text?” (62) ‘Text’ itself is something without a universal defini-
tion, to which disciplines “both within and outside of literary theory attach different 
meanings”, but that as Aarseth recognizes, needs a definition that is very pragmatic 
and broad, “one that will reveal, rather than obscure, any inherent flaw.” (62)
A text, then, is any object with the primary function to relay verbal informa-
tion. Two observations follow from this definition: 1) a text cannot operate 
independently of some material medium, and this influences its behavior, and 
2) a text is not equal to the information it transmits. Information is here un-
derstood as a string of signs, which may (but does not have to) make sense to a 
given observer. (62) 
Aarseth finds it useful to distinguish between the strings as they appear to the read-
ers and the strings as they exist in the text, once that these may not always be the 
same. “For want of better terms, I call the former scriptons and the latter textons. 
Their names are not important, but the difference between them is. In a book such as 
Raymond Queneau’s sonnet machine Cent mille milliards de poèmes, where the user 
folds lines in the book to ‘compose’ sonnets, there are only 140 textons, but these 
combine into 100,000,000,000,000 possible scriptons.” (62) He recognizes that, in 
addition to the textons and the scriptons, a text consists of something other that 
he calls the ‘traversal function’, “the mechanism by which scriptons are revealed 
or generated from textons and presented to the user of the text”. It is particularly 
important to note that a text’s scriptons “are not necessarily identical to what read-
ers actually read, which is another entity (…) and one not determined by the text”, 
scriptons are what an ‘ideal reader’ would read if she would strictly follow the linear 
structure of the textual output.
510 Texts are analyzed in the typology almost as control artifacts, that need to be present to ensure that 
the typology accurately distinguishes them from the newer forms that are the object of the analysis.
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In order to describe a text according to its mode of traversal, Aarseth proposes a set 
of seven variables: dynamics, determinability, transiency, perspective, access, linking 
and user functions, each with a range of two to four possible values. These variables 
and values taken together create a “multidimensional space of 576 unique media po-
sitions (576 = 3 × 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 × 3 × 4)” (64) and any text classified by this typological 
model will have a profile “which identifies it as belonging to a specific class of the 
576 genre positions” (65).
Employing correspondence analysis, a branch of exploratory data analysis, Aarseth 
analyzes categories and variables as well as objects, trying to link categories and 
objects, singling out variables that “can describe substantial differences between the 
textual modes” (61). Correspondence analysis (CA) is a well-established method in 
other scientific areas, but one that Aarseth nevertheless argues should only be re-
garded as tentative in this context. 511 CA is a multivariate statistical technique that 
was developed by the French data analysis school of Jean-Paul Benzécri (60), and 
that is conceptually similar to the method of principal component analysis (PCA) 
but that scales the data (which must be non-negative) so that rows and columns are 
treated equivalently. In essence, both methods try to transform a number of possibly 
correlated variables into a smaller number of uncorrelated variables. 512 In each case 
the first principal component accounts for as much of the variability in the data as 
possible, and each succeeding component accounts for as much of the remaining 
variability as possible. Therefore, these methods generally allow to reveal the inter-
nal structure of the data in a way which best explains the variance in the data, largely 
simplifying (or even making possible) its analysis and mapping. In the case of Aars-
eth’s typology, CA is used to reduce the “multidimensional space to two synthetic 
axes, with a two-dimensional position for each of the texts and categories.” 513 (65) 
The set of seven original variables is condensed to fewer dimensions and the CA per-
511 “Although correspondence analysis has been applied to a wide variety of disciplines and problems, 
ranging from textual criticism to economics and archaeology, I am not aware of any previous applications 
in the field of literary genre or textual media typologies. I have previously used the method to describe 
media variety in computer games, but it seems that very few literary applications exist. The technique was 
not developed with this kind of application in mind, and my approach seems fairly unrepresentative of 
mainstream applications of this method. So although the method itself is well established, in this context 
it should be considered tentative.” (Aarseth 1997, 61)
512 Called principal components in PCA.
513 Aarseth also notes that if the model “should be shown to contain errors (such as misreadings, incon-
sistencies, or idiosyncrasies) that render it unacceptable, a better model can be constructed and displayed 
following the same principles.” (1997, 65)
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formed on the data allowed to understand that one synthetic variable would manage 
to account for 31.13% of the variation, while two would account for 49.38% and three 
for 63.95% (70), while further variables would add relatively little to the accuracy, 
and would make the data become much less readable. “The third axis, as it turns out, 
is not very interesting: it shows mainly that the text Agrippa is very different from 
all the others; that is, it has an unusual combination of attributes that positions it 
far away from the other texts in the three-dimensional space of the three main axes. 
With this in mind, we can concentrate our interpretation on axes one and two.” (67) 
Describing the data by only the first two of these synthetic dimensions provided by 
the CA, Aarseth gives up “51 percent of the completeness, but that is the price we pay 
for readability.” (67) He defends the usefulness of the technique by pointing that the 
gain in interpretability of the data far exceeds the loss in information.
Mapping the data gathered from the CA, Aarseth concludes that there aren’t clear 
signs of the classical dichotomy between printed and electronic texts, as proposed by 
Bolter (2001) and other authors. From the 23 texts analyzed, 10 are printed texts (as 
diverse as Herman Melville’s Moby Dick, the I Ching or the Cent mille milliards de 
poèmes), and when one looks at their distribution along the two axes of the synthetic 
variables, one finds that the group of printed texts largely overlap with the group of 
electronic texts, “instead of clustering together and away from each other” (Aars-
eth 1997, 70). 514 In the light of the typology “there is no evidence that the electronic 
and printed texts have clearly divergent attributes”, and it is in fact clear that the 
variation within each group is much larger than the variation between the groups, 
although it is also clear that two of the corners of the triangle formed by the distri-
bution of all the texts are clearly dominated by each of the groups.
514 There are some distributions that can be mapped to conventional genre partitions. If one compares 
each quadrant of the plot with those genres one sees that “the northwest quadrant is dominated by typical 
adventure games (…) and that the northeast quadrant is similarly (but not so strongly) occupied by fork-
ing texts and hypertexts. The southeast quadrant is less homogeneous, and in the southwest we find the 
most unpredictable and user-oriented group of samples” (Aarseth 1997, 70).
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Fig. 130: Plotting of the analyzed texts over the two axes of the CA, the unmarked dots are the categories 
(Aarseth 1997, 71).
Fig. 131: Plotting of the overlap between the group of 13 electronic texts (dotted line) and the group of 10 
paper texts (solid line) (Aarseth 1997, 72).
There seems to be at least three different ways to partition the material. The first 
and simplest is to follow the primary axis and divide the plot into two areas, 
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west and east. In the west we find most of the ludic texts, those that invite the 
user to role-play and to creatively participate. In the east we find calmer, more 
contemplative texts, with fewer features but also freer access. If we divide the 
plot according to the second axis, we find a clear group in the north, identical 
to the adventure game corner of the triangle and dominated by intratextonic 
dynamics and the exploring user function; in the south there is a clear split be-
tween east and west. This brings us back to the triangle model, which provides 
three poles: static texts (southeast), adventure games (north), and unpredictable 
texts (MUDs and text generators, southwest). North is further divided between 
adventure games (northwest) and hypertexts (northeast). The southeast is best 
described by interpretative user function and no linking. Further subdivisions 
may be useful, such as between the MUDs and text generators in the southwest, 
but I leave this to the reader’s imagination. (72-3)
Concluding his analysis, Aarseth questions whether we could be witnessing yet an-
other reconfiguration of the always contested and problematized concept of text. He 
questions if one should use the same term for “phenomena as diverse as Moby Dick 
and MUDs? Or for that matter the I Ching and Moby Dick? If the answer is yes, we 
face some hard rethinking about the subject of media analysis.” (74) Searching for 
common features to all the samples, Aarseth concludes that the main question is 
related with the user activity, as any text directs its user, by convention, mechanism 
or social interaction.
The reader is (and has always been) a necessary part of the text, but one that 
we now realize can (or must) perform more than one function. If these are all 
texts, perhaps the word reader no longer has any clear meaning. However, if 
the answer is no, we still have to construct a viable terminology to describe 
the literary games and rhetorical rituals we can observe both in the new media 
and in the old papery ones. There is still much to be said for the concept of 
text, and the various samples examined here in no way invalidate the category. 
The important lesson to be learned from discontinuous and forking texts is 
that when two readers approach a text they do not have to encounter the same 
words and sentences in order to agree that it probably was the same text. And 
this is not new: it is a classical feature of reading, as Roland Barthes points out 
in his comment on tmesis. (74)
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Based on this analysis Aarseth discusses the question of what to call these texts, 
dismissing the hypothesis of following the tendency to call all electronic texts of hy-
pertexts (and to call paper based texts with paths or similar forking devices of pro-
tohypertexts), classifying it as imperialist and deeming it not useful, “considering 
the wide variety of textual types (many of which are already known by other names, 
such as MUDs and adventure games)” (75). Hypertext may be a useful term when 
applied to the structures of links and nodes that support forking texts (whether elec-
tronic or paper-based), but it is far less useful if includes all digital texts, regardless 
of their structures (one may consider Agrippa as being a truly digital text, but one 
that bears no resemblance whatsoever with any hypertextual structure), therefore 
Aarseth suggests that the term cybertext should be used for those texts “that involve 
‘calculation’ in their production of scriptons.” (Aarseth 1997, 75) This is a criteria 
that nicely fits the results of the analysis and almost perfectly follows the division 
established by the main axis, while to “distinguish further between the southwest 
and northwest quadrants, we might borrow Joyce’s terms and describe the south-
west texts as constructive cybertexts and the northwest group as exploratory”. Fur-
thermore, Aarseth states that this designation was a consequence of the model, not 
something planned, and that it resulted as something of a surprise to him, as ‘calcu-
lation’ was not one of his formal categories.
3.1.4 On a Model for Procedural Media
‘Calculation’, algorithms, or effective procedures, must be at the basis for the defini-
tion of a typology for procedural aesthetic artifacts. We will leave the discussions 
around terms such as ‘media’ or ‘artifacts’ for other grounds — in this context, most 
times both of the terms can be in effect be used interchangeably, although we gen-
erally prefer to use ‘media’ when referring to the communication technologies and 
‘artifacts’ when referring to the contents of communication or to the actual pieces, to 
what one may call the work of art or the communicational object, regardless of the 
particular media through which it is conveyed (when that distinction is possible). 515 
The simplest example to give is perhaps that of cinema, where a particular work can 
usually be conveyed through a variety of alternative media: film or digital projec-
tion in theaters, digital video, television, computers, portable devices, etc. Naturally 
each medium will constrain the work to a particular format or choice of formats 
515 And we have to grant that the distinction between media and artifacts, media and systems or be-
tween media and works is very often confusing, especially in those cases where the work is the medium.
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and to specific limitations in its final sensorial output, but one can argue that the 
piece that is conveyed by all is fundamentally the same, in disregard of the medium-
specific metamorphosis it may be subjected to. In this sense, many of the artworks 
and aesthetic artifacts that we discuss in this work are ‘notational’, as proposed by 
Goodman. 516 They are not unique artifacts as paintings are, “bound up with the 
question of who produced [them]” (Lee 2006, 33) and naturally forgeable, as “a faith-
ful reproduction can be illicitly presented as the original”. Texts are not forgeable in 
this sense because any textual sequence that corresponds with the original text is a 
genuine instance of the artifact. “According to Goodman, when Pierre Menard hap-
pens to write a novel identical to Cervantes’s Don Quixote, in Borges’s story, Men-
ard’s novel just is the Quixote — who wrote it, and where or when it was written, are 
irrelevant to its identity as a work.” It is important to notice Goodman’s distinction 
between ‘autographic’ works, such as paintings and other unique objects — not only 
bound by the authority of their producers but also by the specific medium in which 
they are produced and through which they are communicated 517 — and notational 
or literary works, that he calls ‘allographic’. 518
516 “Goodman claims, pictures are a language no less than is English, and the nature of their capacity 
to refer to or represent things in the world is essentially the same. They are used, according to systems of 
rules, by people who agree that certain symbols will stand for certain things.
Nonetheless, pictures are clearly a different kind of symbol system from some others, and Goodman 
approaches this subject by distinguishing notational symbol systems from those that are not, in some-
what technical terms. According to Goodman, five basic conditions are required for a symbol system to 
be notational, the first two syntactic, and the rest semantic:
1. The system must consist of symbols (utterances, inscriptions, marks) that form equivalence classes 
(characters), which can be exchanged without syntactical effect. Alphabets are a prototypical example — 
any ‘a’ is as good as any other; they are ‘character-indifferent.’ The characters have to be disjoint, so that o 
mark qualifies as an instance of more than one character. In general, Goodman takes compound inscrip-
tions (e.g., sentences) to be characters as well.
2. Characters have to be ‘finitely differentiable’ (or ‘articulate’) in the sense that their disjointness is 
feasibly testable; this rules out, in particular, ‘dense’ systems in which any two (ordered) characters have 
another between them.
3. Notational systems must be unambiguous, so that the extension (i.e., what is referred to, which Good-
man calls the ‘compliance-class’) of an inscription is invariant with respect to time, context, and so on.
4. The compliance-classes of all characters must be disjoint. (Also, the system will ideally be nonre-
dundant.)
5. Compliance-classes must also be finitely differentiable. Thus, for example, any system that is ‘se-
mantically dense,’ in that its compliants form an ordering such that any two have another between them, 
is excluded.” (Lee 2006, 30-31).
517 Not a broadly defined medium like oil painting, marble or other stone but the specific molecules of 
the medium in which they are produced, a specific stone, not a type of stone, specific paints or canvas…
518 We may make a note for implementations of allographic works that become authographic works, 
such as first editions prints of books or original manuscripts that were later reproduced. Of course that 
in this sense, the manuscript or a first edition of Don Quixote are not equivalent to the latest paperback 
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Music, of the typical Western kind, is notated, and the creation of the nota-
tion Goodman calls the ‘execution’ of the work, but it still needs to be ‘imple-
mented’ through performance to properly exist. This idea of implementation 
is given considerable prominence. A novel is implemented by being printed, 
published, promoted, circulated, and ultimately read. A play is implemented 
through performance before an audience in a theater, an etching by the taking 
of impressions, a painting perhaps by being framed and hung. A work is some-
how incomplete until it has fulfilled its communicational destiny: execution is 
the making of a work, but implementation is what makes it work. (33)
Of course that one wouldn’t go as far as to state that allographic works completely 
remove the authorial authority from the equation, as McKenzie Wark suggests in 
Gamer Theory (2007, 219), 519 but one would rather say that traditional authorship is 
increasingly turning into what Murray calls ‘procedural authority’, something that, 
according to Bogost “not only expresses systems of interrelated actions, but also 
teaches us to read both technology-based works and non-technology-based works 
from the single perspective of their shared procedurality” (2006, 46). Our definition 
cannot be grounded on the set of signs used in the communicative act, nor on the 
particular kind of information that one exchanges with the system, therefore the 
simple definition of an “object with the primary function to relay verbal informa-
tion” (Aarseth 1997, 62) will be as useful (or useless) as any definition mentioning 
visual, aural or any other specific kind of information. 
What we can retain from his definition are the two observations, that we can re-
phrase as: 1) an aesthetic artifact cannot operate independently of some material 
medium, and this influences its behavior, and 2) an aesthetic artifact is not equal to 
the information it transmits. We should however bear in mind that this rewording 
is (perhaps too simply) just replacing the somewhat undefined object of Aarseth’s 
study, text, with the apparently even less defined object of this study, aesthetic arti-
facts. But, one can question, is ‘aesthetic artifact’ a sufficient definition for our object 
of study? What is an aesthetic artifact then? It is something concerned with beauty 
edition, but it is the medium and the tangible (and historical, in this example) artifact that creates the 
difference, not the Quixote, the literary work.
519 “Writing sends the word — logos — out into the world estranged from the authority of its author, 
erasing the line of its paternity, making of it an orphan.” (Wark 2007, 219)
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or its appreciation 520 and something that is man-made (directly or otherwise) but 
that is not naturally occurring in the world. It is then necessarily a communica-
tional artifact, in the sense that it either deploys information to convey the aesthetic 
effect or that it uses the aesthetic effect as a resource for an effective communication 
of its information. As we previously noted, which information and class of signs are 
used by the artifact are certainly relevant to its analysis under an aesthetic perspec-
tive, but this analysis would have to focus on and to depend upon the particular 
classes of signs being used and in the meaning of the information that is transmit-
ted. 521 Therefore, the analysis of a sound-based artifact would necessarily differ from 
the analysis of a text-based artifact, despite many hypothetical similarities at the 
level of the processes developed in the pieces. What we propose in this work is that 
the analysis can perhaps be developed at the level of the processes and that, despite 
obvious disparities at the sensorial level, similarities can be found between pieces 
that are driven by similar processes. 
Obviously we are not defending that an analysis based on the procedural aspects 
of these artifacts should replace one that is focused in the aesthetic features, as one 
wouldn’t defend that an aesthetic analysis should replace a broader cultural or con-
textual analysis. What seems clear as more and more procedural aesthetic artifacts 
are produced, as they reach broader audiences and as they become part of the main-
stream of communication design and of the arts, is that the analysis of the proce-
dural aspects of these artifacts should also become part of their study. 522
The typological approach is one way to question conceptions about texts, read-
ers, and the limits of such concepts. Its reductionist perspective makes it easy 
to check, criticize, modify, or even reject if necessary. The larger categories 
attained by this method explain themselves through their construction, and 
the problem of industrial-rhetorical terminology that haunts so much of the 
current theoretical discussions of the new media can thereby, we hope, be 
avoided. The same approach could probably be used in other typological stud-
ies of cultural phenomena, such as the study of literary genres. The open cat-
egories approach also allows for a prediction of hypothetical textual modes, by 
520 From the Greek root of the word, aisthetikos, from aistheta ‘perceptible things’, from aisthesthai or 
to ‘perceive’.
521 Which naturally also opens the way to a multitude of cultural, political and sociological analysis.
522 And by extension of the study of arts, music, communication design, etc…
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combining functions that are not found together in any existing texts. Thus the 
model works both on an abstract, synthesizing level and on a particularizing, 
predictive one. (Aarseth 1997, 74)
Taking a cue from Aarseth’s proposal, we will attempt to develop a typology for 
procedural aesthetic artifacts, striving to find common characteristics among the 
immense diversity of these systems. We will take Aarseth’s textonomy as a starting 
point, already focused as it is in the ‘calculations’ happening beyond the artifacts, in 
the systems’ ‘black boxes’ more than in their sensorial outputs. 
3.2 Aarseth’s Variables
3.2.1 Dynamics
The first variable in Aarseth’s typology is dynamics, describing the contrast between 
the behavior of scriptons in a static text, where they are constant, from that observed 
in dynamic texts, where “the contents of scriptons may change while the number of 
textons remains fixed (…) or the number (and content) of textons may vary as well” 
(63). A hypertext as Afternoon (Joyce 1990) will present a fixed number of scriptons 
(and textons), while a game like Colossal Cave Adventure (Crowther 1976) will pres-
ent a fixed set of textons but a variable number of scriptons, that are of course the 
result of different texton combinations and are determined by the progress of each 
individual play. “In a MUD, where other concurrent users can type in anything, the 
number of textons is not known.” (Aarseth 1997, 63) Aarseth therefore classifies Af-
ternoon as a static text, 523 the Colossal Cave Adventure as displaying ‘intratextonic 
dynamics’ or IDT and a MUD as displaying ‘textonic dynamics’ or TDT.
When used to describe text-based pieces this variable is easily understandable, but 
it can be somewhat harder to apply to other classes of signs, 524 particularly if one 
considers temporal media, but the experience should nevertheless be undertaken. 
Whenever a system presents a fixed number of signs and of their combinations 525 
523 Although it is a hypertext where one can develop a nonlinear reading experience.
524 ‘Signs’ as something that stands for something, as discrete units of meaning, a definition that not 
only includes words (textons and scriptons) as well as images, gestures, scents, tastes, textures, sounds or 
any other way through which information can be communicated as a message.
525 However freely the reader or user can roam between these, and regardless of whether the signs are 
dynamic in time, or ‘transient’, as we shall see.
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we will be able to classify it as static. This will be the case in printed works such as 
Nake’s Hommage à Paul Klee 13/9/65 Nr.2 526 (1965) or Watz’s Conical (2009), but also 
in time-based works such as linear videos, where in spite of temporal dynamism, 
very often one does not witness the introduction of new elements or articulations.
Fig. 132: Hommage à Paul Klee 13/9/65 Nr.2 (Nake 1965).
 
Fig. 133: Two prints from the Conical series (Watz 2009).
526 Klee’s drawings led Nake to think about programming visual art as a tension between macro and 
microaesthetics. They were based on linear structural elements that stretched out across the plane of the 
drawing but that also allowed for smaller groups and for clustering in intricate local sets. Nake developed 
the language COMPARTER ER 56 referring to the Standard Elektric ER 56 computer, for which it was writ-
ten. ER 56 contained three sub-packages, a space organizer, a set of different random number generators, 
and selectors for the repertoire of graphic elements. The program chose a stochastic matrix, raised the 
quantities to powers, and then visualized the numerical results by allocating characters or colors accord-
ing to their amount.
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Beyond static dynamics, where Aarseth analyses the difference between textons and 
scriptons, we will need to focus on a similar but broader distinction that is possible 
to analyze in other media besides text. Signs may exist at various levels in an aes-
thetic artifact: the entire artifact may in many cases be interpreted as being a single 
sign and it may be interpreted as being composed of several signs, much like a text, 
as described by Aarseth, is composed of scriptons that are themselves composed by 
textons.
If texts are to be described in topological terms, they must be shown to consist 
of a set of smaller units and the connections between them. Further, the func-
tion of these units must be relevant to our notion of nonlinearity. It is not diffi-
cult to partition any text into graphemes (letters), lexemes (words), or syntagms 
(phrases or sentences), but none of these elements indicates nonlinearity by its 
presence. (…) Therefore, the unit for which we are looking is clearly not defined 
by linguistic form. This unit, which is best conceived as an arbitrarily long 
string of graphemes, is identified by its relation to the other units as constrained 
and separated by the conventions or mechanisms of their mother text. As a 
suitable name for such a unit I suggest texton, which denotes a basic element of 
textuality. In accordance with the concept of textuality developed in the previ-
ous section, a more logical name might seem to be scripton, but this term posits 
that the textual unit belongs to the reading process rather than that it inheres 
in the textual structure as a strategic potential. A scripton, then, is an unbroken 
sequence of one or more textons as they are projected by the text. 527 (1994, 60-61)
When looking at the signs in a non-textual artifact, 528 we will need to distinguish 
two broad classes 529 that are also not clearly defined: those we could perhaps name 
‘macro-signs’, or simply ‘signs’ and those that can be seen as the micro components 
527 Aarseth also discusses alternative nomenclatures: an “alternative to texton might be lexie, after Ro-
land Barthes’s ‘unités de lecture’ (‘units of reading’) in S/Z. This candidate, adopted by George P. Landow 
(1992) from an English translation as ‘lexia,’ I want to avoid because of Barthes’s emphasis on seriality 
(‘ fragments contigu’) and the destructive process of its separation (‘découpé’) from the text.” (Aarseth 
1994, 61)
528 Or for that matter in a multimodal artifact that includes text but is not exclusively composed of text.
529 This is not a semiotic analysis, distinguishing between iconic, plastic (colors, shapes, textures) and 
linguistic signs, but rather one that tries to understand how, in the heterogenous artifacts one is studying, 
all these are articulated and where they stand in the hierarchy of the system’s structure.
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from which the signs are built. 530 The first can be roughly compared to Aarseth’s 
scriptons 531 and can be understood as those forms that are directly perceived in the 
system’s output, while the later are the parts from which these are built. 532 These are 
not necessarily indexes, icons or symbols 533 (Callahan 1994), although they may be 
(and usually are) on the way to become either of them, or they may forever stand in 
the delicate balance between realism and abstraction, as expressed by Wassily Kan-
dinsky 534 (2008). They will generally not be the technological structural components, 
like pixels, or voxels, 535 but will be built from these, and will stand in the middle-
ground between these and the signs. We can understand this in phiLia 01, where the 
forms that are perceived at the surface of the system are constructed from several 
circles (of regular diameters, in this case, but of varying colors and moving around 
more or less freely in the plane of the composition) or, one could also put it, emerge 
from the behaviors of these. 536 It is tempting to (however simplistically) compare 
the two roles of forms and components to Chomsky’s deep and surface structures 
when referring to the structure of sentences or messages. Although we are reluctant 
to appropriate terms from linguistics, as we would be to use a nomenclature from 
any particular area of artistic or aesthetic field because the phenomena that we are 
trying to identify are transversal to all of these, and can be identified across visual, 
aural or verbal systems, these designations are very attuned to what we are trying 
to describe.
530 This bears some resemblance to Nake’s tension between macro- and micro-aesthetics, macro- and 
micro-elements, or signs.
531 Although they can very often be seen as being the entire sensorial output of the system — which 
in Aarseth’s model would correspond to the whole text — but this is not something that contradicts the 
model.
532 In a sense the first can be seen as the gestalt components of the artifact and the later can be seen as 
structural components.
533 ‘Icons’ are a class of signs whose signifier keeps a direct analogy with what is represented, ‘indexes’ 
keep a causal relation of physical contiguity with what is represented, and lastly, symbols are related 
with what they represent merely by a convention (Joly 2008, 38-39). This classification, first proposed by 
Charles Sanders Pierce (1839-1914) remains somewhat controversial and is often criticized, it is neverthe-
less useful for the study of images and of the different kinds of images so, according to Martine Joly it is 
still commonly used (2008, 39).
534 1866-1944.
535 A volumetric pixel, or Volumetric Picture Element.
536 There are a dozen or so components in the system, all of them moving across the plane and reacting 
to the user’s inputs and to each other. These leave traces that ultimately compose the perceivable form.
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Fig. 134: phiLia 01 (Lia 2009).
We can then maybe talk about ‘surface forms’ and ‘deep structural forms’ or, pick-
ing up after Alexander’s definition (2002a), we could also (and probably more ac-
curately) describe these elements as ‘centers’ or, if choosing to follow Krome Barrat’s 
(1980) nomenclature, we could finally propose to call them ‘surface units’ and ‘deep 
units’. What is important in this context, however, is to name the phenomena and 
not the actors that create it. Consequently, to the dynamics value that Aarseth calls 
IDT or intratextonic dynamics, when scriptons change but the textons do not, we 
can tentatively call ‘surface unit dynamics’ (SUD) or simplifying, ‘surface dynamics’. 
This will describe all systems where a fixed number of deep units are articulated in 
the production of several (or varying) surface units (or forms). phiLia 01 is such an 
example, as is Every Icon or Page 0 (Paterson 2004) an online system that creates il-
lustrations from recomposing a limited (albeit large) set of deep units every time the 
user clicks the window.
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Fig. 135: Page 0 (Paterson 2004).
If we look at design systems like the identity for the 2007 Lovebytes festival in Shef-
field 537 (Universal Everything 2007), and particularly if we study the entire system 
and not any single piece produced within it, we will also find an example of surface 
dynamics. The system was designed to create twenty-thousand different ‘creatures’, 
a population that appeared throughout the festival’s literature, very often in unique 
digital prints (such as posters and postcards). These forms were produced from vari-
able parameters for hair color and length, head shape, and eye shape and number, 
using a somewhat limited array of deep structural units, 538 from which a remarkable 
diversity of surface units resulted. Likewise, in the design program for the Faber 
Finds collection of print on demand books 539 (Wall and Schmidt 2008), we find that 
a repertory of “micro templates” that “form a shape vocabulary” for the borders of 
the covers (Schmidt 2008c) from which the print-ready files are created. 540
537 Concept and art direction by Matt Pike, programming by Karsten Schmidt.
538 Something that obviously had the benefit of making all the different forms that were produced (or 
‘spawned’, in the words of the art director) bear a strong look of familiarity between each other.
539 Art direction by Darren Wall, design and programming by Karsten Schmidt.
540 “The custom software written in Processing, straight Java and PHP works as an internal webservice 
at Faber which receives new batch orders and then generates complete, print ready PDF files with all 
copy, branding, spine, ISBN, barcode and optional high-res JPG preview using the book details supplied. 
Generating a single cover only takes about 1 second, but due to its iterative and semi-random nature can 
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Fig. 136: Postcards for the Lovebytes Festival (Universal Everything 2007).
 
Fig. 137: Faber Finds collection (Wall and Schmidt 2008).
Finally, in a phenomenon equivalent to what Aarseth calls TDT or textonic dynam-
ics — when textons change (and consequently also do scriptons) — we will find that 
in some systems the deep units change automatically or can be changed by the user, 
invariably leading to consequences in the surface units. To this we can call ‘deep 
units dynamics’ (DUD).
An example of a system that displays deep unit dynamics is found on the Perpet-
ual Storytelling Apparatus (von Bismarck and Maus 2009b), “a drawing machine 
sometime require hundreds of attempts until a ‘valid’ design is created which is judged to be ‘on brand’ 
by software itself.” (Schmidt 2008c)
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illustrating a never-ending story by the use of patent drawings” 541 (2009a) direct-
ly fetched from online databases. The basic procedure starts from the parsing of a 
text, 542 eliminating all the words that are meaningless in the context of the process, 
namely pronouns, articles, prepositions and conjunctions, mostly keeping nouns 
and verbs, and using these as keywords for a search for patents in public-access 
online databases. Relating patents found through the keyword search and the refer-
ences that these patents contain to prior patents, the system is able to semantically 
connect the patent drawings, using these in the creation of large-format composi-
tions.
Although the Perpetual Storytelling Apparatus outputs by plotting on paper, one 
should perhaps regard it as being closer in essence to a screen-based system rather 
than focusing on the more obvious physical similarities with for example Verost-
ko’s paintings. The Apparatus emphasizes the performative aspect of the system 543 
over its outputs as artistic objects per se, 544 while Verostko’s paintings, or the im-
ages produced by AARON (Cohen 1973a) are aesthetic artifacts per se, they are, in a 
sense, finished works. We can argue that much like the Apparatus, systems like Jean 
Tinguely’s 545 Méta-Matics or Leonel Moura’s Robotic Action Painter (2006), although 
producing outputs that are physically independent from the system are not created 
as artistic devices intended to produce artworks but rather as artworks that produce 
aesthetic outputs. Therefore, if with Verostko or Cohen the final outputs are the 
works of art and the systems that produce them are in a sense metacreators, 546 with 
Tinguely, Moura or von Bismarck and Maus, the systems are the works of art and it 
is the operation of the system that is focused by the authors when communicating 
their work, while the outputs that are created can sometimes almost be seen as mere 
byproducts of the systems. 547
541 “The machine translates words of a text into patent drawings. Seven million patents — linked by 
over 22 million references — form the vocabulary. By using references to earlier patents, it is possible to 
find paths between arbitrary patents. They form a kind of subtext. New visual connections and narrative 
layers emerge through the interweaving of the story with the depiction of technical developments.” (von 
Bismarck and Maus 2009a)
542 The texts used are taken from recent best seller books, found online.
543 Comprised by the software, the data, the plotter and the paper where the output is drawn.
544 Although of course one may justly consider that the outputs are interesting aesthetic objects in their 
own right.
545 1925-1991.
546 Systems that are produced to produce art.
547 We could, as many do, call them ‘drawing machines’, but we believe that such a designation some-
how misses the point, as in these cases what is valued as an artistic creation are not the drawings them-
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Fig. 138: Perpetual Storytelling Apparatus (von Bismarck and Maus 2009b).
Fig. 139: Yellowtail (Levin 2000).
Concluding the analysis to the dynamics variable as proposed by Aarseth and 
repurposed here, we arrive to the apparent contradiction of classifying temporal 
media such as film or audio as static, 548 but if we regard the global structure of the 
artifacts and particularly the fact that the immutability of that structure creates a 
canon whose invariability defines the identity of the piece, we see how adequate 
such a description can be. 549
selves but rather the systems that create the drawings (that are in many cases secondary to the machines, 
and not the primary focus, as in Verostko’s case).
548 Something that Aarseth himself already did, classifying some digital texts, such as Jenny Holzer’s I 
Am Awake at the Place Where Women Die (1993) as static, although their experience is necessarily tempo-
ral, in the sense that the contents of the projection are altered during the reading. The overall number of 
textons, and the articulation of these into scriptons is however fixed.
549 It is not that the artifact does not change — what we perceive of it permanently changes, repeated 
viewings of the artifact may lead to different experiences (as in Afternoon or other hypertexts) — but the 
structure over which the experiences are developed is unchanged.
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3.2.2 Determinability
The determinability variable concerns the stability of an artifact’s traversal func-
tion. In Aarseth’s typology a text is determinable if the scriptons adjacent to every 
scripton are always the same, otherwise it will be indeterminable. As an example 
he describes how in “some adventure games, the same response to a given situation 
will always produce the same result” while in “other games, random functions (such 
as the use of dice) make the result unpredictable” (1997, 63). Applied to a broader 
universe of aesthetic artifacts, determinability may describe whether multiple read-
ings of (or interactions with) the same artifact will result in exact repetitions of the 
same experience or if, on the contrary, they will evolve differently. 550 ‘Determinable’ 
systems will repeatedly behave similarly and will allow the reenactment of previous 
experiences, while ‘indeterminable’ systems will sometimes lead the traversal func-
tion as much as the user herself, pulling the experience into unknown territories 
and forcing the user to adapt or react to new usage scenarios. 551
We can find examples of determinable systems in Every Icon, Agrippa, Moving Pixel 
Portraits 552 (Laric 2006) or Three Buttons (Leegte 2005). The first two present the user 
with a sequence of events that regardless of their intervention or of any other factors 
(given that the systems are not susceptible to external influences and do not include 
inner sources of randomness or variation) is repeatable. 553 Laric’s and Leegte’s works 
are systems that although allowing for a multiplicity of configurations to be devel-
oped from their initial states respond uniquely to the user’s interaction and do so 
linearly, without any noise or randomness, allowing the user to perfectly reproduce 
any sequence of interactions, thus reproducing the configurations they develop.
550 Let us presume that the hypothetical user’s behavior is repeated without changes or variations, either 
at the level of which actions are developed as at the level of their sequence and relative timings.
551 Classic computer games come to mind, where after repeatedly clearing a level, a player could almost 
replay it without looking at the screen, much as one solves a Rubik’s cube blindfolded. The memorization 
of full levels or games of ‘shoot-em-ups’ wasn’t an uncommon practice among frequent gamers of what we 
can maybe call the ‘pre-AI’ era of computer games.
552 A work where a single row of scaled-up pixels is wrapped in variable configurations depending on 
the user-defined window size.
553 Even, at least theoretically, in Agrippa, provided one can break the encryption or have access to 
multiple copies of the work.
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Fig. 140: Moving Pixel Portrait of Aleksandra Domanovic (Laric 2006).
  
Fig. 141: Three Buttons (Leegte 2005).
Contrasting with these, systems like Page 0, phiLia 01, Yellowtail or Robotic Action 
Painter can be classified as indeterminable, in some cases due to random functions 
that create varying and unpredictable behaviors, in other cases due to the fine degree 
of control that the systems allow, repeating the exact same outputs may become an 
impossibility. 554 Finally, if the system relies on information that is fetched from other 
sources besides the user — from the real world, from online databases, from other 
users (in synchronous or asynchronous time) — the determinability of the system 
may be directly connected to the determinability or lack of it in that information.
One should also question whether there is a relation between dynamics and deter-
minability. One could expect static systems to always be determinable — which of 
course happens to be true in linear videos, printed pieces or some hypermedia sys-
tems like My Boyfriend Came Back from the War (Lialina 1996) or Afternoon (Joyce 
1990) — but that is not universal, both in Aarseth’s analysis and in our own. Two of 
the texts that Aarseth classifies as being both static and indeterminable are the I Ch-
ing and Saporta’s Composition Nº 1 (1961), 555 texts that rely on randomization proce-
dures. It should be pointed that although Composition Nº 1 is indeterminable, the 
554 If the actions are timed to the millisecond, or tracked to a tenth of a millimeter it may be impos-
sible for all users to repeat exact sequences of actions because the motor control necessary to do it will be 
outside of human reach.
555 Composition Nº 1 consists of loose sheets, shuffled and read in a random sequence.
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structurally similar novel Hopscotch 556 (1966) by Julio Cortázar 557 is determinable. 
Although both texts can be read freely by connecting different pages or chapters, 
only Saporta’s clearly states that the individual pages should be shuffled random-
ly, while Cortázar provides predetermined paths as reading suggestions and then 
leaves the reader to determine her own paths across the novel, but without ever ex-
plicitly suggesting that chance and randomization should play a role in the process.
Systems displaying surface unit dynamics can be found to be determinable — Agrip-
pa or Every Icon — or indeterminable — 30×1, Page 0, Vanitas (Harvey and Samyn 
2010) — mostly depending on whether they make use of randomization procedures 
to organize the deep units. 
 
Fig. 142: Vanitas (Harvey and Samyn 2010).
Artifacts displaying deep units dynamics are typically indeterminable, both in 
Aarseth’s analysis as in ours.
556 Rayuela in the original Spanish version.
557 1914-1984.
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3.2.3 Transiency
Transiency, as defined by Aarseth, is related to the temporal existence of the artifact. 
“If the mere passing of the user’s time causes scriptons to appear, the text is transient; 
if not, it is intransient. Some texts (…) scroll (…) at their own pace, while others do 
nothing unless activated by the user.” (Aarseth 1997, 63) Agrippa is a perfect example 
of the former, relentlessly scrolling by the user regardless of her actions, while many 
hypertexts passively wait for interaction. Jenny Holzer’s I Am Awake at the Place 
Where Women Die (1993) and two MUD systems are also identified by Aarseth as 
being transient, while the majority of the texts that were analyzed were classified 
as intransient. 558 In our analysis we have found that most time-based outputs 559 are 
transient, while those outputs that are not time-based are in general intransient, 
as exemplified by My Boyfriend Came Back from the War or Page 0. ‘Drawing ma-
chine’ systems like the Perpetual Storytelling Apparatus are transient, although the 
artifacts they produce are intransient and a system as temporary.cc, although not 
producing time-based outputs, can be classified as transient because each output 
is ephemeral within the system, that continues to evolve as other visitors access it 
through the World Wide Web.
3.2.4 Perspective
Aarseth’s perspective focuses on the text requiring the user to play a strategic role as 
a character in the world described by the text, in which case the text’s perspective 
is ‘personal’, otherwise being ‘impersonal’. “A text such as Italo Calvino’s If on a 
Winter’s Night a Traveler… pretends to involve the reader as a participant, but there 
is nothing for the real reader to do but read. In a MUD, on the other hand, the reader 
is (in part) personally responsible for what happens to his or her character.” (Aars-
eth 1997, 63) This is not simply a question regarding the narrative and the place that 
the reader as narrator or character takes in it, it is a variable that looks at how the 
reader or user actually becomes a character in the narrative and is allowed to shape 
it directly, influencing the evolution of whatever events may or may not take place. 
558 In an earlier version of the typology Aarseth proposed a distinction between two modes of tran-
siency, related to the diegesis of the texts, a distinction that is not mentioned in the final version: “If the 
transiency has the nature of ‘real time’ it is synchronous; if the relationship between the user’s time and 
the passing of fictional time is arbitrary, we call it asynchronous.” (Aarseth 1994, 61)
559 All the processes whose output is developed in time. The expression ‘time-based processes’ seems 
almost oxymoronic.
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In this sense, this variable is intrinsically linked to the diegesis of the narrative that 
is created by the system and the user’s actions with it.
It is difficult to repurpose this variable to systems where a narrative is not explicitly 
created, 560 even though we can certainly identify narratives in contexts that are not 
traditionally regarded as being narrative, such as for example in simulations, 561 one 
should perhaps only consider a system to offer a personal perspective if it creates a 
narrative where the user is allowed to step in, becoming a fundamental part of it, ei-
ther as a character or as some sort of a diegetic operator. 562 This is largely the domain 
of games or game-like systems, and even in these it is not always clear in which cases 
the player becomes a character in the narrative and therefore when the perspective 
becomes personal. Manipulating the events through interaction is hardly the same 
thing as embodying or becoming a character in the narrative — in hypertextual 
narratives such as Victory Garden (Moulthrop 1992) or Afternoon, the reader has a 
substantial power to control the narrative, through the choices that are made and 
the unique traversal of the text that she will define. Despite this, the reader never be-
comes a character in the narrative. Much in the same sense that a checkers or chess 
player has the fundamental power to shape the development of the game without 
ever becoming a piece of the game, without becoming a character in the particular 
narrative of the game. 563
560 Be it as a purposeful creation from the author, as in clearly narrative works such as literature or film, 
be it as a side effect, as Sean Cubbit defends may have happened in the early days of cinema: “Narrative, 
then, is not an essential quality of film, but only a potential and secondary quality arising from the pro-
duction of time in the differentiation within and between frames.” (2004, 38)
561 “Frasca (…) clarifies that simulations are indeed narrative, in that ‘for an external observer, the out-
come of a simulation is narration.’ Frasca privileges simulation over narrative, the former providing an 
interactive experience for representations, the latter providing, at best, a more distant and less ‘first-hand’ 
experience of the representation in question. Murray calls this phenomenon of first-handedness immersion, 
or the ability to construct new beliefs through interaction with computational media.” (Bogost 2006, 98)
562 In games as The Sims (Wright 2000) or Civilization (Meier 1991), the player does not play a character 
or a group of characters but rather controls the diegetic world, thus influencing the behavior of all the 
characters in the game world and the unfolding of the narrative. In these games we could conceive of the 
player’s role as (and it is often described as such) god-like, because of the relative omnipotence towards 
the characters of the game and the distance that is simultaneously kept from these.
563 The player is a character in another narrative, one that exists at a level above from that of the game: 
the narrative of the board configurations and of the movements of the pieces, from the start of the game 
until its conclusion, does not include the players although it is caused by them. One can describe a com-
plete chess game without ever mentioning the players, or even acknowledging their existence, taking the 
board and the 32 pieces as the diegetic world. One can conceive of a higher-level narrative that includes 
the players, but this will not be the narrative of the game, although it will contain it.
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We can find that in very specific cases where a literary narrative is not created the 
user interacts with the system not only with her body but by placing it (or its image) 
in the outputs of the system. Such is the case of Text Rain (Utterback and Achituv 
1999), where one not only interacts but also acts within the system, thus becoming 
a surface unit in it. What is relevant in this example is not the use of the body for 
the interaction but the fact that the body is also represented in the system’s outputs, 
it is in a sense appropriated by the system and then returned to the user and other 
spectators. A similar phenomenon happens in Reface [Portrait Sequencer] (Levin 
and Lieberman 2007), where the user’s face is captured by the system and used as a 
deep unit in the production of new outputs or in Inner Forests (Kontopoulos 2007), 
where the viewer’s shadow is appropriated by the system and used as a seed surface 
where to grow trees and shrubs. The longer the user stands still, the more growth 
occurs, but if the user moves, the growths quickly disappear. In other cases where 
full body interaction may be used, but where the user’s bodies are not appropriated 
by the system and are strictly used in the interaction, 564 the system could be classi-
fied as impersonal.
Fig. 143: Text Rain (Utterback and Achituv 1999).
Fig. 144: Reface [Portrait Sequencer] (Levin and Lieberman 2007).
564 That is, in a layer that is external to the system and the outputs it produces.
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Fig. 145: Inner Forests (Kontopoulos 2007).
These three systems are examples of what Bolter and Gromala describe as incorpora-
tion of the users in the displays of the pieces (2003, 12). Here the “visitor immediately 
discovers [that] she herself becomes the show”, that is “as much an expression of its 
viewers as of its creators (…) [and] is about the process of its own making.” (13) Still, 
if one wishes to comply with the spirit of Aarseth’s model, one will have to classify 
these three pieces as being impersonal, because neither of them develops something 
that can be remotely described as a conventional narrative or a diegesis. Even if the 
user participates and leaves a trace of her participation (and image) in the system, 
this trace is not incorporated in a manner that is remotely similar to that what hap-
pens in a narrative where the user becomes an acting character.
3.2.5 Access
The access variable in Aarseth’s typology describes if “all the scriptons of the text 
are readily available to the user at all time” (Aarseth 1997, 63) in which case the text 
is random access or if, alternatively, the access is controlled. “In a codex novel, you 
may turn to any passage at any time, directly from any other point. In a hypertext 
such as Victory Garden, to get to a specific passage you must typically follow an ar-
bitrary path involving other specific passages before you get what you want. In other 
words, hypertexts without free text search capabilities are more, not less, linear than 
the codex.” (63)
This is a topological variable that at first look may be related to the transiency of the 
systems because it will seem natural to consider that transient systems should have 
controlled access. One may consider that transient and linear systems such as videos 
may be deemed to be random access, provided the user is not kept from scrubbing 
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the playback or, to put it another way, provided that the user has control over the 
temporal flow of the system and is not forced to always follow a predefined pace. 
We are aware that this may be a controversial option but in this context we may 
regard what can be seen as fundamentally the same work as having different access 
modes depending on how it is presented to the user. In an exhibition or projection, a 
transient linear work such as Merce’s Isosurface can certainly be classified as having 
controlled access, 565 while if the same piece is viewed in a DVD or in a personal com-
puter, the user can have random access to its contents. 566 We have however classified 
all linear video pieces, regardless of the contexts of exhibition or distribution as 
having controlled access. We considered that independently of what certain devices 
or formats may allow users to explore in linear videos, the pieces were nevertheless 
created with the intention of controlling access, not of allowing random access to 
its parts. 567 Systems that output static images can be classified as random access 
when the images themselves are the final works, 568 as in Verosko’s case, or as hav-
ing controlled access in other cases, such as the Perpetual Storytelling Apparatus or 
Tinguely’s machines, when the sum of all the images that are produced can (at least 
ideally) be considered as part of the work.
3.2.6 Linking
Linking classifies the organization of a text “by explicit links for the user to follow, 
conditional links that can only be followed if certain conditions are met, or by none 
of these” (Aarseth 1997, 64) when no links exist. In Aarseth’s model it describes the 
existence of a hypertextual topological structure and of its working process. Texts 
565 The arrow of time points in only one direction, and the pace of the piece is fully determined by the 
system or the author.
566 The arrow of time can be made to point backwards, and the pace can be controlled or even halted 
by the user.
567 One can disassemble or deconstruct many other systems, altering not only their access as well as 
other characteristics. This will however, most likely result in new systems. We can therefore posit that 
the systems are transformed (just slightly in some cases, profoundly in some other) when their platform, 
context or media is shifted. When one removes a linear video from an installation or projection context 
and ‘brings it home’, whether in a DVD disc or through a download, one does not only loose scale (visual 
and audial), darkened surroundings and the communal watching experience. One also gains the power to 
randomly access it, and this, like all the other changes fundamentally alters the perception we have from 
the piece, as well as our capability to read it (if on one hand that capability is increased by random access, 
we can also propose that it may also be diminished by it, decreasing the potential concentration of the 
viewer, turning every cinema-like experience into a television experience).
568 And the scope of the random access is within each image, not across all the outputs of the system.
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such as the Cent mille milliards de poèmes, Composition Nº 1 or traditional paper-
based literary works 569 present no linking, hypertexts such as Victory Garden or 
Hopscotch present explicit links because they direct the user in the traversal of the 
text, 570 while other hypertexts such as Afternoon, the Colossal Cave Adventure and 
several MUDs are classified as presenting conditional links. 571
We like to think about linking as describing the topology of the system and not the 
specific tools or resources that are available to the reader or user in the traversal. In 
this sense, conditional or explicit linking will be related to the existence of devices 
and/or rules that lead the user through the traversal. Random access systems can 
present explicit links (as is the case of Hopscotch) but they cannot, however, present 
conditional links, as these contradict the possibility for random access. Controlled 
access systems may present any of the three linking values. 572
In non-literary systems linking can also be identified whenever the user is able to 
navigate through different possibility spaces within a system, as in Page 0, where the 
linking is explicit or in temporary.cc where the linking is conditional. 573 Systems like 
Yellowtail, phiLia 01 or Inner Forests all present explicit links, because they place the 
users in possibility spaces that they are allowed to leave and to where they are not 
able to return (the access is controlled). 574
569 Such as Moby Dick, Don Quixote or Apollinaire’s Calligrammes.
570 Regardless of the medium — print in Cortázar or screen in Moulthrop — as linking describes the 
structures that guide the traversal function of the text. Gibson’s Agrippa is also, according to Aarseth, 
explicitly linked. One could interpret it as being linked so explicitly that in fact it forces the user to follow 
the links by following them itself, while it inexorably scrolls forward during reading. We could argue that 
maybe Aarseth was simply focusing on the links that the user needs to follow from the opening screens to 
the main body of the text, but we think that would maybe be oversimplifying.
571 The links are presented depending on the paths that are followed by the user or the context where the 
user is led to. The user may or may not be forced to follow the links, and they are not followed automati-
cally by the system.
572 The same holds true in our preliminary analysis, as we will later see.
573 This is a debatable classification, to say the least, and as we will again see in the next variable, one 
that is related to the nature of the process that is developed by each of the pieces. Page 0’s linking is explicit 
because linking to a new state is all that the piece allows the user to do and because those new states are 
virtually infinite and potentially repeatable. In temporary.cc, the configuration reached after each link is 
not repeatable and dependent on a series of actions from all the users of the system.
574 Navigation through these possibility space is commanded by the users, not by the system, through 
clearly labelled buttons or other interface controls in the system or through gestures and/or activities 
acted by the user (as in Inner Forests).
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3.2.7 User Functions
Finally, Aarseth’s typology describes the user functions that are present in each text 
besides an omnipresent interpretative function.
The use of some texts may be described in terms of additional functions: the 
explorative function, in which the user must decide which path to take, and the 
configurative function, in which scriptons are in part chosen or created by the 
user. If textons or traversal functions can be (permanently) added to the text, 
the user function is textonic. If all the decisions a reader makes about a text 
concern its meaning, then there is only one user function involved, here called 
interpretation. In a forking text (…) the reader must also explore, by making 
strategic choices about alternative paths and, in the case of adventure games, 
alternative actions. Some texts allow the user to configure their scriptons by 
rearranging textons or changing variables. And finally, in some cases the users 
can extend or change the text by adding their own writing or programming. 575 
(Aarseth 1997, 64)
The explorative user function is exemplified by texts such as Afternoon, Victory Gar-
den or Hopscotch, texts that are assemblies of discrete parts intended to be navigated 
non linearly by the reader. The configurative user function is found in works as the 
Cent mille milliards de poèmes, the I Ching or a system like ELIZA, all of them texts 
where the reader is able to arrange the order of the parts and to create (or shape, or 
influence) the navigable structure, more than just to move across it as in the explor-
575 Aarseth had earlier proposed to look at these functions as active feedback functions, suggesting 
the existence of four rather than three functions: “Besides the interpretative function of the user, which 
of course is present in the use of both linear and nonlinear textuality, the use of nonlinear texts may be 
described in terms of four active feedback functions: the explorative function, in which the user decides 
which ‘path’ to take; the role-playing function, in which the user assumes strategic responsibility for a 
‘character’ in a ‘world’ described by the text; the configurative function, in which textons and/or traversal 
functions are in part chosen and/or designed by the user; and the poetic function, in which the user’s ac-
tions, dialogue, or design are aesthetically motivated.” (1994, 62) Comparing both versions we find that 
Aarseth kept only those user functions that made sense topologically, splitting the configurative function 
into a clearer textonic function and dismissing those that were only aesthetically motivated or that ex-
tended to the diegesis of the work (the role-playing function seems to be found in the perspective variable 
that was later included in the Cybertext model, while the poetic user function was altogether abandoned). 
The split of the previous version of the configurative function is maybe inspired by the two dynamic 
modes, intratextonic dynamics, related to a configurative user function, and textonic dynamics, related 
to a textonic user function. They are however only conceptually related, as no correlation is found in the 
analysis between the two pairs of user functions and dynamics.
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ative texts. The textonic user function is exemplified by MUD systems or by a work 
as Book Unbound (Cayley 1995), a “literary work not easily classified by traditional 
aesthetics”, “a computer program (…), [that] takes over the screen and spits forth 
short suggestive sentences one word at a time” (Aarseth 1997, 56). Book Unbound 
assembles lines from its ‘hidden texts’ according to the programmed algorithms 
but, as “the process goes on, the hidden text is changed by what is displayed, and the 
user can select passages for inclusion in the regenerative process”, influencing the 
text output that becomes different for each copy of the text 576 (57). For Aarseth this 
work becomes an “impurity, a site of struggle between medium, sign and operator”, 
constructed of fragments that are “clearly not authored by anyone, (…) pulverized 
and reconnected echoes of meaning, and the meaning that can be made from them 
is not the meaning that once existed. (…) The pleasure of this text is far from acci-
dental; it belongs not to the illusion of control, but to the suggestive reality of unique 
and unrepeatable signification (…) it shows how meaning struggles to produce itself, 
through the cyborg activity of writing.” (57)
Aarseth’s four user functions are very useful in specifying the nature of the user’s 
interactions with the texts or other systems. Although he emphasizes the interpreta-
tive function (not making it primary to all the other but by asserting its omnipres-
ence and concurrence with the remaining) we should note that user functions are 
not always dominated by interpretative interests and goals, as in gaming in general 
and in computer games in particular, where one interprets in order to “be able to 
configure and move from the beginning to the winning or some other situation, 
whereas in ergodic literature we may have to configure in order to be able to inter-
pret.” (Eskelinen 2001)
We can consider that the user of a computational aesthetic system always performs 
an interpretative function, in the sense that she needs to decipher the surface units 
created by the system. If Aarseth defined ergodic texts as those “in which at least 
one of the four user functions, in addition to the obligatory interpretative function, 
is present”, something that may also be seen as “a depiction of a cybernetic feed-
back loop between the text and the user, with information flowing from text to user 
(through the interpretative function) and back again (through one or more of the 
other functions)” (1997, 65), we find that the objects of this study are very often de-
576 “Cayley calls the produced output ‘hologograms,’ fragments that contain holographic versions of the 
initial material…” (Aarseth 1997, 57).
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fined as requiring nothing more than the interpretative function, in all cases where 
no interaction is required from the user or reader or when this interaction does not 
affect the outputs that are produced. 577 Agrippa or Merce’s Isosurface are very similar 
at this level, characterized by the exclusivity of the interpretative function.
Page 0 requires the user to act on the system through a simple action that can almost 
be likened to the page turn in a book: the reading process advances, but the page 
turn is not shaping the narrative. 578 Unlike the printed book, however, in these con-
trolled access systems the user’s simple action becomes explorative because she’s ac-
cessing spaces and structures to which she previously had no access. This is similar 
to the user function present in My Boyfriend Came Back from the War, regardless 
of the possibility the user may have in this narrative to return to previous spaces, 
something very unlikely to happen in Page 0. If however the user’s input is used con-
structively 579 one may identify a configurative user function. As a rule we then find 
that when the user’s actions are navigational, accessing spaces of configurations that 
are not created with her intervention, we have an explorative user function. When 
the user’s actions are creating new spaces of configurations, we have a configurative 
user action.
577 We can however speculate if the interpretative function developed in these systems differs quali-
tatively from that of linear texts. What a reader interprets here is not narrative or description but rather 
(and also) the procedural nature of the systems, the rules upon which they are based and their creative 
capabilities. Perceiving them is a big, one would even dare say fundamental, part of the interpretation of 
these systems. “Perhaps a game (…) is not just an allegory but also an ‘allegorithm.’ Being a gamer is a 
different persona to being a reader or a viewer. (…) Alex Galloway: ‘To play the game means to play the 
code of the game. To win means to know the system. And thus to interpret a game means to interpret its 
algorithm (to discover its parallel allegorithm).’ What is distinctive about games is that they produce for 
the gamer an intuitive relation to the algorithm. The intuitive experience and the organizing algorithm 
together are an allegorithm for a future that in gamespace is forever promised but never comes to pass. 
The allegorithm by which the gamer relates to the algorithm produces a quite particular allegory by which 
gamer and algorithm together relate to gamespace. In a game, any character, any object, any relationship 
can be given a value, and that value can be discovered. With this possibility, a challenging but fair verdict 
can be passed on the profane world: it is characterized as a world in which any value is arbitrary, yet its 
value and its relation to other values can be discovered through trial and error.” (Wark 2007, 030)
578 One will actually never know for certain whether the user’s actions are influencing the system with-
out a further investigation of the workings of the system or without a longer experimentation period. In 
Page 0 one is led to believe that all compositions are created randomly and independently of the time 
between actions, of the place or location of the clicks, and that the user’s actions are simply triggering the 
refresh, not parametrizing it.
579 Regardless, one might add, of the user’s awareness regarding that constructive contribution.
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In pieces like Mount Fuji or temporary.cc, we find a user function that may seem 
similar to that in Page 0 but that upon closer inspection is found to differ in one fun-
damental way: in Mount Fuji and temporary.cc, each action has an inexorable and 
indelible effect on the system, causing it to progress towards a point of no return, to 
generate outputs that will never again be experienced. 580 The operational knowledge 
that is communicated about these two pieces could therefore lead us to classify them 
as textonic, in Aarseth’s sense. In the context of this work we could perhaps rename 
this user function as structural, because the user will be able to manipulate the deep 
units or the traversal functions, permanently adding either of them to the artifact.
3.2.8 Summing Up Aarseth (and Going Beyond)
In Aarseth’s typology we find the following variables and values:
Table 2: Variables and their possible values in Aarseth’s typology.
Variable Possible Value
Dynamics Static, IDT, TDT
Determinability Determinable, indeterminable
Transiency Transient, intransient
Perspective Personal, impersonal
Access Random, controlled
Linking Explicit, conditional, none
User function Explorative, configurative, interpretative, textonic
580 In Page 0, although the chances for repetition are astronomically small they are nevertheless higher 
than zero. In Mount Fuji and temporary.cc the hypothesis of a repetition is actually zero.
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In the context of this work this typology can be repurposed as (new values in italics):
Table 3: Repurposed variables and their possible values.
Variable Possible Value
Dynamics Static, SUD, DUD
Determinability Determinable, indeterminable
Transiency Transient, intransient
Perspective Personal, impersonal
Access Random, controlled
Linking Explicit, conditional, none
User function Explorative, configurative, interpretative, structural
Although this set of variables allows the analysis of systems whose outputs are not 
strictly textual, one wonders whether new variables should be added to the set in 
order to achieve a more complete typology. Before turning our attention to this 
problem we should consider if all seven variables are necessary in the context of 
this study or if some may be somewhat redundant or provide us with a negligible 
amount of information. We will therefore need to apply the model adapted from 
Aarseth (bearing all the seven variables) to a first series of systems and to analyze 
the results obtained with these variables. These systems will be selected from the 
works mentioned in previous chapters but, bearing in mind that this selection can 
be somewhat biased by the author, we solicited external help with further selections 
that could also be analyzed. We approached Austrian artist Lia, 581 Norwegian art-
ist and curator Marius Watz 582 and Golan Levin 583 from the USA, who were kind 
enough to provide us with selections of pieces — personal favorites or works other-
wise deemed relevant in this context. We did not provide them with extensive in-
581 Lia — liaworks.com — is one of the early pioneers of software- and net-art, known for her live visual 
performances and from online projects such as turux (with Dextro) and re-move. She currently lectures 
at the Fachhochschule Joanneum in Graz and lives in Vienna.
582 Watz — mariuswatz.com — is an autodidact artist working with visual abstraction through genera-
tive systems. In 2005 he founded the generator.x platform that has resulted in a series of events related to 
generative art and design. He is also a lecturer at the Oslo School of Architecture and at the Oslo National 
Academy of the Arts, Department of Design.
583 Levin — flong.com — received undergraduate and graduate degrees from the MIT Media Laboratory, 
where he studied in the Aesthetics and Computation Group. He is an Associate Professor of Electronic 
Time-Based Art at the Carnegie Melon University, where he also holds courtesy appointments in the 
School of Computer Science and the School of Design and directs the Studio for Creative Inquiry.
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formation about the project’s aim or scope, hoping with this to exert the minimum 
possible influence in their selections. The project was only briefly described and the 
request was made for a small selection of works that they would classify as ‘genera-
tive’, not necessarily computer-based but computational in nature.
At a second stage we repeated the exercise while selectively removing those variables 
that we suspected might have a marginal value in the model, so that we were able to 
understand what was their relative weight in the model’s effectiveness.
After this analysis we considered the expansion of the model through a series of oth-
er possible variables that might describe characteristics of the systems that were not 
accounted for by those in Aarseth’s model. We then classified all the pieces, trying 
to assess whether the new variables were applicable to all the systems 584 and if their 
inclusion in the typology resulted in a qualitative increase (for which we developed 
tentative multiple correspondence analysis).
3.3 Works Analyzed
3.3.1 Golan Levin’s Selection
Many of the works referenced by Golan Levin are included in the notes of his lec-
tures in Special Topics in Interactive Art & Computational Design (2010) at Carnegie 
Melon. They include, in chronological order, the following 10 artifacts:
 — Karl Sims, Evolved Virtual Creatures (1994a);
 — Christa Sommerer & Laurent Mignonneau, A-Volve (1994);
 — Camille Utterback & Romy Achituv, Text Rain (1999);
 — Andreas Müller, For All Seasons (2004);
 — David Lu, Droom Zaacht (2004); 
 — Mario Klingemann, Ornamism (2005);
 — Jonathan Harris & Sep Kamvar, We Feel Fine (2006a);
 — Michael Kontopoulos, Inner Forests (2007);
 — Karsten Schmidt, Print magazine August 2008 cover design (2008e);
 — Universal Everything & Karsten Schmidt, Nokia Friends (2008b).
584 And not to just a subset of those systems. We will focus on variables that can describe the procedural 
aspects of the systems and not their other aspects that are often successfully described by other theories.
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Sims’s Evolved Virtual Creatures (1994a) is a research project involving simulated 
Darwinian evolutions of virtual creatures. Sims created a population of several hun-
dred creatures that moved and behaved in a simulated three-dimensional physical 
world (Sims 1994b). A ‘genetic language’ using nodes and connections as its primi-
tive elements directed graphs that described both the morphology and the neural 
circuitry of the creatures (1). The phenotype of each creature was composed by a “hi-
erarchy of articulated three-dimensional rigid parts” while the genetic representa-
tion was a graph of nodes and connections containing “developmental instructions 
for growing a creature” and ways of “reusing instructions to make similar or recur-
sive components within the creature” (2). Each creature was tested for its ability to 
perform a given task, such as the ability to swim in a simulated water environment. 
Those that were successful, survived and were copied by combining and mutating 
their virtual genes into a new population that was, in their turn, subjected to the 
same fitness evaluation. As this cycle of variation and selection continued, creatures 
with more and more successful behaviors could emerge. 
The video selected by Levin shows some of the results from the project, final prod-
ucts from many independent simulations in which the creatures were selected for 
swimming, walking, jumping, following, and competing for control of objects. 
Sims’s system combined the development of morphology and systems of control in 
the creatures, so in a sense every creature documented in the video emerged from 
the system, from the challenges that every lineage of creatures had to face, from the 
fitness functions defined and of course, from evolution. As Sims’s states, all crea-
tures were autonomously generated from a language that “defines a hyperspace con-
taining an indefinite number of possible creatures” and that when searched “using 
optimization techniques, a variety of successful and interesting locomotion strate-
gies emerge, some of which would be difficult to invent or build by design” (1), in 
a process that does not require “cumbersome user specifications, design efforts, or 
knowledge of algorithmic details.” (8)
In Evolved Virtual Creatures, Sims has abandoned the goal of emulating the 
look of nature in favor of emulating its behavior. (…) The result is an astound-
ing wealth of evolutionary strategies for aquatic and terrestrial locomotion. 
(Blais and Ippolito 2006, 224-25)
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Fig. 146: A school of swimming ‘water snakes’ in Evolved Virtual Creatures (Sims 1994a).
Fig. 147: A slightly evolved population of block creatures, which are being selected for swimming velocity in 
Evolved Virtual Creatures (Sims 1994a).
Fig. 148: Two creatures struggling for possession of a block in Evolved Virtual Creatures (Sims 1994a).
Christa Sommerer & Laurent Mignonneau’s A-Volve (1994) is an interactive envi-
ronment where visitors interact with virtual organisms in the real space of a water 
filled glass pool. Visitors can create three-dimensional organisms by drawing the 
profile and shape of any possible form on a screen. These organisms are then trans-
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ferred to the water of the pool, displayed as three-dimensional creatures that are 
immediately animated, as if brought to life, moving and swimming in the water. 
The virtual creatures are sensitive to the user’s hand movements in the water, react-
ing to them in ways that are determined by the creature’s form. The viewer can also 
modify their forms and, as various visitors are able to interact with different organ-
isms at the same time, they necessarily interact with each other. Like Sim’s system, 
A-Volve includes evolutionary aspects, selecting the fittest creatures to survive longer 
and to be able to mate and reproduce, mutating into new forms.
 
Fig. 149: A-Volve (Sommerer and Mignonneau 1994), overview and detail of the projection.
Text Rain (1999) was previously discussed, so we will not further elaborate on it here.
Andreas Müller’s For All Seasons (2004) is an interactive typographic illustration 
originally developed as a desktop application and now also available for mobile plat-
forms. It is a “piece about memories, seasons and using the elements of the textual 
representation of the memory to create an interactive one” (2004) and it is scripted, 
in the sense that the actions are laid out in advance. 585 However, as the user has a 
considerable degree of freedom (or number of freedoms) to affect the development 
of the actions, and the actions themselves are algorithmically described in ways that 
incorporate randomness and chance, the overall experience of the piece will greatly 
vary.
585 As suggested by the storyboard.
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Fig. 150: For All Seasons (Müller 2004), iPhone version.
 
Fig. 151: For All Seasons (Müller 2004), storyboard.
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David Lu’s Droom Zaacht 586 (2004) is presented as “drawing tools for sleepy people” 
and it is a set of five “unconventional drawing tools (…) intended as an example of 
calm technology — that is, software that brings about a sense of calm and reflection” 
(2004). All tools are mouse-driven and semi-configurable through two sliders. 587 
One interesting aspect of this system is how while the user draws a longer line the 
shape of the line is affected by its position, the speed of the drawing and the curves 
that may be drawn, taking over some of the control that is usually handed to the user 
in such tools (particularly those that are more classic and utilitarian). In the fourth 
machine (pictured below) the lines are dynamic, permanently jiggling and moving, 
even after the user moves on to creating other lines.
 
Fig. 152: Droom Zaacht (Lu 2004), machines four and five.
Mario Klingemann’s Ornamism 588 (2005) is a non-interactive pattern generator in-
spired in the biological forms documented by Ernst Haeckel 589 in his book Art Forms 
in Nature (1904). Ornamism constantly mutates and moves, breeding forms of a very 
high complexity, rich in symmetries and reminiscent of organic and mineral forms. 
 
Fig. 153: Ornamism (Klingemann 2005).
586 Flemish for ‘Sweet Dreams’.
587 That are not labelled and do not have the same effect in all the machines.
588 This title is a portmanteau word blending ornament and organism.
589 1834-1919.
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Jonathan Harris & Sep Kamvar’s We Feel Fine (2006a) depends on a “a data collec-
tion engine that automatically scours the Internet every ten minutes, harvesting hu-
man feelings from a large number of blogs” (2006b). The sources are scanned for oc-
currences of the phrases ‘I feel’ and ‘I am feeling’ and, once such a sentence is found, 
“the system looks backward to the beginning of the sentence, and forward to the end 
of the sentence, and then saves the full sentence in a database”. The sentence is then 
scanned for one of about 5,000 pre-identified ‘feelings’. 590 Whenever a valid sen-
tence is found, the system interprets it as representing one person that feels accord-
ingly, and compiles as much data as possible regarding the author of the sentence. 591 
The process is then repeated, identifying an average of 15 to 20,000 feelings per day. 
The data collected is then presented in an interface created from “a self-organizing 
particle system, where each particle represents a single feeling posted by a single 
individual. The particles’ properties — color, size, shape, opacity — indicate the na-
ture of the feeling inside, and any particle can be clicked to reveal the full sentence 
or photograph it contains. (…) At its core, We Feel Fine is an artwork authored by 
everyone. It will grow and change as we grow and change, reflecting what’s on our 
blogs, what’s in our hearts, what’s in our minds.” (2006b) We Feel Fine is simultane-
ously a visualization system — a tool to access the data — and a large hypertextual 
narrative, as well as an aesthetic experience built from interpretations of that data.
 
Fig. 154: We Feel Fine (Harris and Kamvar 2006a).
590 A list of valid feelings was “constructed by hand”, and “basically consists of adjectives and some ad-
verbs” (Harris and Kamvar 2006b) from abandoned, abashed, abating, abdominal, abducted, abhorrent, 
abiding, abject and able all the way to zealous, zero, zillion, zippy, zoning and zonked.
591 “Because a high percentage of all blogs are hosted by one of several large blogging companies (…), the 
URL format of many blog posts can be used to extract the username of the post’s author. Given the author’s 
username, we can automatically traverse the given blogging site to find that user’s profile page. From the 
profile page, we can often extract the age, gender, country, state, and city of the blog’s owner. Given the 
country, state, and city, we can then retrieve the local weather conditions for that city at the time the post 
was written. We extract and save as much of this information as we can (…)” (Harris and Kamvar 2006b)
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Michael Kontopoulos’s, Inner Forests (2007) installation intends to reward slow in-
teractions, valuing a visitor’s investment of time to interact with the system, instead 
of handing a quick and immediate reward.
Fig. 155: Inner Forests (Kontopoulos 2007).
The last two pieces in Levin’s list share a common author, German born and Lon-
don based Karsten Schmidt. His cover for Print magazine August 2008 (2008e) is a 
typographic illustration work created for a print medium 592 through the usage of 
algorithmic code), 593 3D printing and finally photography.
 
Fig. 156: Print magazine August 2008 cover (Schmidt 2008e) and a view of the fabricated object.
592 It was awarded at the 2009 Type Directors Club competition.
593 A process called Gray-Scott reaction diffusion, a model used in chemistry and biology and related to 
Cellular Automation, although is not rule-based and cannot be used for computation.
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Nokia Friends (2008b), created by Schmidt and Matt Pyke’s studio Universal Ev-
erything, was an advertisement installation presented on five 14.8 × 3.36 meter LED 
screens at the terminal 5 of London’s Heathrow airport. The concept behind the 
system was “simple enough (…) A procession of diverse characters glide by on a 
travelator — friends, families, kids, lovers, rugby teams, fat couples, thin models — 
celebrating the diversity of people seen at Heathrow t5. Every character riding the 
travelator is unique, using generative software to create an ever-growing popula-
tion.” (Schmidt 2008d) The system created behaviors that “were not only suitable to 
support the formation and appearance of characters” (including body shape, color, 
hair styles, etc.) but could “also be ‘shaped’ and controlled fairly easily to create a 
variety of behaviours” (2008d) (including body and eye movement, collisions, etc.).
 
Fig. 157: Nokia Friends (Universal Everything and Schmidt 2008b).
3.3.2 Marius Watz’s selection
Marius Watz selected a group of fifteen works, listed chronologically:
 — Matthew Lewis, Sketch (1998);
 — Andy Huntington and Drew Allan, Cylinder (2003);
 — Mark Napier, Black & White (2003);
 — Jared Tarbell, Happy Place (2004);
 — Leonardo Solaas, Dreamlines (2005b);
 — Alex Dragulescu, Extrusions in C Major (2006);
 — C.E.B. Reas, Process series (2007; 2006a-f);
 — Boris Müller, Poetry on the Road (2006a);
 — Lab[au], 594 Pixflow #2 (2007a);
 — Eno Henze, Der Wirklichkeitsschaum (2007);
 — Brandon Morse, A Confidence of Vertices (2008);
594 Manuel Abendroth, Jérôme Decock, Alexandre Plennevaux, Els Vermang.
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 — Karsten Schmidt, Enerugii (2008b);
 — Andreas Nicolas Fischer, A Week in the Life (2008b);
 — FIELD, 595 Animations for Aol. Rebrand (2009);
 — Paul Prudence, Talysis II (2009b).
Sketch (Lewis 1998) is a digital print produced by a computerized ‘drawing machine’. 
A Linux program generates drawing strokes, combining them to produce abstract 
drawings with a hand-drawn quality. 596
Fig. 158: Sketch (Lewis 1998).
Cylinder (Huntington and Allan 2003) was already cited in this work, as an example 
of mapping from one domain to another.
595 Marcus Wendt and Vera-Maria Glahn.
596 Unlike other works as e.g. Cohen’s AARON (1973) or Burton’s Rose (1995; 1997), there is not a perceiv-
able search for figuration, rather perhaps a search for expressiveness and overall composition.
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Fig. 159: Cylinder (Breath) (Huntington and Allan 2003).
Mark Napier’s Black & White (2003) was developed as a Carnivore 597 client that 
reads every bit from cnn.com and visualizes that information by moving two pixels, 
a black one horizontally whenever a 0 is read, and a white one vertically whenever a 
1 is found. Furthermore, the pixels are mutually attracted, creating a chaotic motion.
 
Fig. 160: Black & White (Napier 2003).
597 ‘Carnivore’, also known as ‘DCS1000’ is a surveillance tool for data networks, developed in the USA by 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation to monitor email and electronic communications. In 2001 the Radi-
cal Software Group developed a ‘personal edition’ of DCS1000, also called carnivore, and distributed it to 
several artists that built interpretive interfaces to the information gathered by the system. CarnivorePE 
(Personal Edition) is now distributed by the RSG. “The prospect of reverse-engineering the original FBI 
software was uninteresting to RSG. Crippled by legal and ethical limitations, the FBI software needed im-
provement not emulation. (…) Reverse-engineering is not necessarily a simple mimetic process, but a 
mental upgrade as well. RSG has no desire to copy the FBI software and its many shortcomings. Instead, 
RSG longs to inject progressive politics back into a fundamentally destabilizing and transformative tech-
nology, packet sniffing. Our goal is to invent a new use for data surveillance that breaks out of the hero/ter-
rorist dilemma and instead dreams about a future use for networked data.” (Radical Software Group 2002)
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Jared Tarbell’s Happy Place (2004) is an applet that renders the resulting configu-
ration of a system of ‘friendly’ nodes connected at random. Connections between 
nodes are considered ‘friendships’ and the nodes position themselves with only two 
goals: a) move close to friends but no closer than some minimum distance; b) dis-
tance self from non-friends as reasonably as possible. Initially all nodes are posi-
tioned around the perimeter of a circle but as the system runs, a rudimentary best-fit 
structure takes form and it rearranges its configuration as a result of the individual 
desires of the nodes it is composed of.
 
Fig. 161: Happy Place (Tarbell 2004) (with 500 nodes).
Dreamlines, by Leonardo Solaas (2005b) is presented as “a non-linear, interactive vi-
sual experience” that starts by requesting a user to input one or more keywords as a 
subject for a “dream”. The system then searches the Web for “images related to those 
words, and takes them as input to generate an ambiguous painting, in perpetual 
change, where elements fuse into one another, in a process analogous to memory 
and free association.” (2005a)
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The pictures are never actually shown. The drawing itself is produced by 1500 
autonomous particles in perpetual movement. The last image loaded serves as 
a sort of virtual terrain for them. The direction and speed of each particle is 
given, at each step, by the color values of the pixel they are stepping on. Differ-
ent sets of formulas translate the hue, saturation and brightness of the pixel in 
angle and velocity values for the particle. The path of each particle is traced to 
the screen, and this forms the output seen by the user. Thus, the work is at the 
same time a study on population dynamics, or on the emergent behavior of a 
multitude of very simple autonomous agents. (2005a)
 
 
Fig. 162: Dreamlines (Solaas 2005b).
Extrusions in C Major by Alex Dragulescu (2006) is an experiment in music visu-
alization developed from Mozart’s Trio in C-Major for Piano, Violin, and Cello. A 
range of note characteristics such as value, velocity, duration, and overall tempo are 
analyzed (and translated as the weight, length, and rotation of different segments) 
and the notes of the various instruments are differentiated by color: white for piano, 
yellow for violin, and blue for cello.
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Fig. 163: Extrusions in C Major (Dragulescu 2006).
Reas’s Process is an ongoing series of works started in 2004, implemented in various 
programming languages and formats. All the pieces in the series have as a common 
ground a text from which each work is started. “The text is the Process described in 
English, written with the intention of translating its content into software. The soft-
ware interpretation is secondary to the text. The text leaves many decisions open to 
be determined by a programmer. The decisions must be made using personal judg-
ment, thus the text is interpreted through the act of translating the Process from 
English into a machine language.” 598 (Reas 2008) Common to all the pieces in the 
series is also a library of forms and behaviors to be used in the processes.
Element 1: Form 1 + Behavior 1 + Behavior 2 + Behavior 3 + Behavior 4  
Element 2: Form 1 + Behavior 1 + Behavior 5  
Element 3: Form 2 + Behavior 1 + Behavior 3 + Behavior 5  
Element 4: Form 1 + Behavior 1 + Behavior 3 + Behavior 5  
Element 5: Form 2 + Behavior 1 + Behavior 5 + Behavior 6 + Behavior 7  
Element 6: …
598 “The hardware running this software Process is inconsequential. In time, the hardware will inevi-
tably fail. The current hardware was selected to be as robust as is possible with current technology, but 
contemporary electronics are fragile. If an element of the hardware fails, it can be replaced without di-
minishing the work. Eventually, compatible components will no longer be available because computing 
technologies are continually changing. When this event inevitably occurs, a new hardware system will 
need to be acquired and the software should be rewritten for the new hardware to take advantage of the 
technical advancements since the original interpretation.” (Reas 2008)
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Form 1: Circle  
Form 2: Line  
Form 3: …
Behavior 1: Constant linear motion  
Behavior 2: Constrain to surface  
Behavior 3: While touching another, change direction  
Behavior 4: While touching another, move away from its center  
Behavior 5: After moving off the surface, enter from the opposite edge  
Behavior 6: While touching another, orient toward its direction 
Behavior 7: Deviate from the current direction
Behavior 8: …
Process 18 (Reas 2007) is developed from the following text: “A rectangular surface 
filled with instances of Element 5, each with a different size and gray value. Draw a 
quadrilateral connecting the endpoints of each pair of Elements that are touching. 
Increase the opacity of the quadrilateral while the Elements are touching.” (2008) 
The text is displayed next to a dual projection surface, where the process is shown in 
execution on both sides. The mechanisms are exposed on the right and the process 
surface generates on the left.
 
Fig. 164: Process 18 (Reas 2007).
Process 16 (2006f) is developed from the following text: “A rectangular surface filled 
with instances of Element 3, each with a different size and gray value. Draw a small, 
transparent circle at the midpoint of each Element. Increase the circle’s size and 
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opacity while it is touching another element and decrease these values while it is 
not.” (2008) It is presented in a dual projection, as Process 18.
 
Fig. 165: Process 16 (Reas 2006f).
Process 14 (2006d) follows: “A rectangular surface densely filled with instances of El-
ement 4, each with a different size and direction. Display the intersections by draw-
ing a circle at each point of contact. Set the size of each circle relative to the distance 
between the centers of the overlapping Elements. Draw the smallest possible circle 
as black and the largest as white, with varying grays between.” (2008)
 
Fig. 166: Process 14 (Reas 2006d).
We will refrain from presenting the remaining works in the series. They are all 
equally interesting, but, being developed from the same principles, we find that 
these three suffice as examples.
Poetry on the Road (Müller 2006a) is the visual theme for the eponymous interna-
tional literature festival held every year in Bremen, Germany. Müller designs the 
identity of the festival since 2002 and, although the theme of the festival regularly 
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changes, the underlying idea for the visual identity remains constant: all the imag-
ery is generated by a software that transforms text into images, so that every image 
is the direct representation of a specific text. The concept for the 2006 identity was 
based on an old system for encoding text: by assigning a numerical value to every 
letter of the alphabet and adding the values of all letters, one gets a number that 
represents the overall word.
Using this system, an entire poem could be arranged on a circular path. The di-
ameter of the circle is based on the length of the poem. So you can see the short 
poems in the centre of the poster, while the longer ones form the outer circles. 
Red rings on the circular path represent a number. As many different words 
can share the same number (‘poetry’ shares the [number] 99 with words like 
‘thought’ and ‘letters’), most rings represents different words. The thickness of 
the ring depends on the amount of words that share the same number. Finally, 
gray lines connect the words of the poem in their original sequence. So solid 
lines represent repetitive patterns in the poem. (Müller 2006b)
Müller’s software was used to generate the image for the poster and in the produc-
tion of brochures and of a catalogue, introducing the poems of each writer by ab-
stract visual representations of themselves.
Fig. 167: Poster for Poetry on the Road (Müller 2006a).
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Pixflow #2 (Lab[au] 2007a) is a generative artwork based on a vector field that deter-
mines the paths of particles, shaping them into flows as their density evolves. “From 
the mutual influence between vectors and particles, changing their orientations as 
they meet, and calculating these changes according to two different number sets, 
integers and floating numbers, emerge due to rounding errors in between both sets 
an unsuspecting behaviour of particles shaping vertexes, migrating lines and turbu-
lences by following the combinatory play of numbers. It is the use of an error in the 
set of a system to achieve an evolving and organic behaviour.” (2007b) 599
 
Fig. 168: Pixflow #2 (Lab[au] 2007a), detail and overview of the piece.
Der Wirklichkeitsschaum 600 (Henze 2007) is a 9.47 × 3.45 meter computer-generated 
mural assembled from 288 A3 color laser prints.
599 The authors further describe the set of rules built into the system. “At system launch, 1,500 particles 
in form of pixels and the 5,040 vectors, constituting the 90 × 56 matrix of the vector field, are initialised 
at random (…) The particles start to move at a constant speed (…) in the direction set by its own heading 
vector. (…) Consequently the conception of the generative system does not rely on any random set (except 
at launch initialisation), but builds its evolution on a recurrence of system errors occurring between two 
numerical systems, one defining the pixel movement angle; floating numbers, and the other the vector 
orientation; integers. The set of a system producing at each iteration errors is the starting point of the 
generative art work and form the backbone of a highly evolving and ever varying system. The resulting 
fluid behaviour is visually reinforced by a trail the particles leave along their path. The trail is a buffer of 
the last 10 frames, an imprint of the last 10 positions of the moving particles, rendered with a decreasing 
alpha value ranging from the actual particles rendered at 100% opacity to its previous position rendered at 
90% opacity ... This leads the moving particles leaving a 50 pixel long and progressively fading away trail. 
These trails on the screen are imaging the smooth movement of the particles shaping vortexes, migrating 
lines and turbulences.” (Lab[au] 2007b)
600 Translatable as ‘The Reality Foam’.
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Fig. 169: Der Wirklichkeitsschaum (Henze 2007).
A Confidence of Vertices (Morse 2008) computer generated video is an exercise in 
tension, a procedural animation in which two structures morph and twist under 
their physical constraints. “Stripped-down architectural forms that ought to ex-
hibit the rigidity of highrise buildings instead engage in a tug-of-war, the result of a 
string simulation distributing kinetic force through a network of nodes. (…) Unlike 
software-based generative artworks that exhibit endless timelines, Morse’s videos 
(created in the high-end animation package Houdini) display a clear dramaturgy. 
But rather than being a side effect of their status as ‘canned’ video, the presence of 
an explicit beginning and end is here part and parcel of the work’s logic, reinforcing 
the movement towards the inevitable.” (Watz 2008b) 
Fig. 170: A Confidence of Vertices (Morse 2008).
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Enerugii (Schmidt 2008b) is also a linear video, created for Advanced Beauty (Uni-
versal Everything 2008a), a collaborative project curated by Matt and Simon Pyke 
that compiles 18 ‘sound sculptures’, audio-reactive visual pieces exploring the con-
cept of synesthesia. Schmidt’s goal with this piece was “to create a structure which 
would be in a constant flux between two behaviours forming either crystalline forms 
or disperse into a number of polygons flocks” (2008a).
 
Fig. 171: Enerugii (Schmidt 2008b).
Fig. 172: Enerugii (Schmidt 2008b).
A Week in the Life (Fischer 2008b) is a visualization of telecommunications data, 
representing the author’s movement and communication with his cell phone in one 
week. “What can be read from the sculpture is my position in the city through the 
cell sites I used. The density of the cell sites reflects the speed and frequency of move-
ment within the city. The more often I visited a place, the more cell sites were added 
to the map. To get the information for the data set, I wrote a software for my cell 
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phone which recorded all the coordinates of the antennae, which I then converted to 
latitude and longitude. With this data I was able to create a map of Berlin.” (2008a)
 
Fig. 173: A Week in the Life (Fischer 2008b).
In 2008 FIELD participated in Wolff Olins NYC’s rebranding project for North Amer-
ican Internet provider Aol. by developing a series of animations for web video, mo-
bile, digital campaigns and outdoor LED displays. The creative direction was from 
Matt Pyke at Universal Everything.
 
Fig. 174: Animations for Aol. Rebrand (FIELD 2009).
Talysis II (Prudence 2009b) is a real-time software, “constructed with a circuit of 
video renderers, each passing its output to the next renderer to produce a closed 
visual information loop — a software simulation of the classic analogue video feed-
back loop. These particular high resolution outputs where generated with unitary 
modulation in mind and to accentuate the hyperbolic geometric properties of the 
resultant form.” (2009a)
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Fig. 175: Talysis II (Prudence 2009b)
3.3.3 Lia’s selection
Lia selected eleven works, listed chronologically:
 — Soda, Soda Constructor (2000);
 — Marius Watz, Amoebaabstract 01, 02 and 03 (2002a-c);
 — Jared Tarbell, Substrate (2003);
 — Meta, Emeral (2004) and Folia (2007);
 — Karsten Schmidt, Print magazine August 2008 cover design (2008e);
 — Andreas Muxel, Connect (2008a);
 — Universal Everything and Karsten Schmidt, Forever (2008a);
 — Erik Natzke, works from the Colors of Nature exhibition: Found, Rouge, Shine 
and Crimson (2009a-d).
The Soda Constructor (Soda 2000) can be described as an environment to create 
and manipulate virtual creatures or physical systems. It is a construction kit us-
ing virtual masses and springs. By altering physical properties like gravity, friction, 
and speed, curiously anthropomorphic models can be made to walk, climb, wriggle, 
jiggle, or collapse into a writhing heap. The creations are then shared online — at 
sodaplay.com — with all the users of the system.
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Fig. 176: Soda Constructor (Soda 2000).
Watz’s pieces are three abstract animations. They are responsive to user input but 
the user is not given too many degrees of freedom inside each of the pieces. “Ab-
stract 1 is a playful, interactive, not-quite drawing tool” (2004) that evolves complex 
shapes at the point where the user clicks the screen and is inactive when she does 
not act. “Abstract 2 is an endlessly emerging geometric pattern” that reacts to mouse 
movement in a very discrete way, following its coordinates in what can maybe be 
described as ‘slow motion’. “Abstract 3 is a color study, merging bright hues fit for 
a lady’s makeup compact” and also responsive to the user input, tracking the hori-
zontal coordinate of the mouse and using it to control speed and hues. In abstracts 
2 and 3 a user click will clear the screen and start the composition from a new set of 
parameters in an empty canvas. In abstract 1 the click has the opposite effect, adding 
information to the screen instead of removing it, the system resets the canvas after 
it detects a reasonably long time without user interaction.
 
Fig. 177: Amoebaabstract 01 (Watz 2002a) and Amoebaabstract 02 (2002b).
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Fig. 178: Amoebaabstract 03 (Watz 2002c).
Substrate (Tarbell 2003) is an applet that grows lines on a computational substrate, 
from a simple perpendicular growth rule that creates intricate city-like structures. 
This is a simple rule that produces very complex results with an enormous potential 
for modification.
 
Fig. 179: Substrate (Tarbell 2003).
Meta’s two pieces, Emeral (2004) and Folia (2007) are, like much of his output, pre-
sented with little or no information. Although these pieces are created from time-
based systems, they are documented as static images. We should therefore analyze 
them as images, not forgetting however, their time-based procedural genesis, testi-
fied by traces of their temporal origins, a display of their prochronism.
 
Fig. 180: Emeral (Meta 2004).
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Fig. 181: Folia (Meta 2007).
Andreas Muxel’s “feed-back driven sculpture” Connect (2008a) is built from thir-
teen modules connected to a matrix.
Each module consists of a microcontroller, a stepper motor and a sphere of 
steel attached to it with a rubber band. A piezo sensor is placed between motor 
and sphere. So each element can measure and activate its oscillation through a 
simple feedback mechanism programmed on each chip. An analog bar with a 
magnet on each side controls the action of each of the system elements. Once 
a sphere is connected to the bar, it starts swinging as long as the bar detaches 
and rebuilds a new connection to another sphere. There is no main program 
outside of the sculpture and no digital connection between the elements. Each 
module has its own simple program logic and they just start to react to each 
other because of the physical connections built. (…) The system produces com-
plex behaviour, although its structure and rules are very simple. (Muxel 2008b)
 
Fig. 182: Connect (Muxel 2008a).
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Forever (Universal Everything and Schmidt 2008a) was an audiovisual installation 
presented during the winter of 2008 at the Victoria & Albert Museum in London. A 
large video wall presented endless animations that reacted to a permanently chang-
ing soundtrack.
Our role as designers was to define the parameters in which the work evolved. 
In response to the pond, the sculpture continually grows upwards from the wa-
ter, all movement stems from a central ‘spine’ which reacts to the music, and it 
has evolutionary points set over time, causing the work to alter in appearance 
and intensity over its 2 month lifespan. (Universal Everything 2008b)
 
Fig. 183: Forever (Universal Everything and Schmidt 2008a).
The Colors of Nature exhibition by Erik Natzke presented a series of computer gen-
erated digital prints inspired not only by the colors but also by the forms found in 
nature. Natzke’s works are algorithmically created through rule-based processes yet 
they are reminiscent of manually created paintings.
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Fig. 184: Found (Natzke 2009b) and Rouge (2009c).
 
Fig. 185: Shine (Natzke 2009d) and Crimson (2009a).
3.4 Initial Analysis
3.4.1 Notes on Dynamics
All the systems that are procedural but not computational, that is, those that are 
publicly presented or documented not as the system itself but rather as the outputs 
that the system produces — regardless of their modality or medium — were classi-
fied as being static. This is the case of pieces as Sketch and Seven Sisters: The Pleiades, 
but also of Cylinder. This is also what happens with linear video pieces such as for 
example A Confidence of Vertices or Merce’s Isosurface, regardless of the systems that 
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were used in their production. Even if initially we may have considered linear video 
pieces as displaying SUD, upon closer study and further ponderation we concluded 
that it would be a mistake to classify them as such. Linear video pieces are transient, 
because they exist in time and their surface units change over time, but they are 
static because all the articulations that may be displayed are frozen in the structure 
of the video, and can be precisely repeated upon playback. Because it is displayed in 
real time, in a contextual and singular articulation, Agrippa was classified as having 
surface unit dynamics.
Perpetual Storytelling Apparatus was classified as having deep unit dynamics be-
cause the piece fetches information from online sources and uses this information 
directly in its outputs. Therefore, and following Aarseth’s classification of such texts 
as TinyMUD as displaying textonic dynamics (1997, 68), we propose the classification 
of the Perpetual Storytelling Apparatus as displaying deep units dynamics.
Page 0 was classified with surface unit dynamics because it is clear that the system 
is not creating and composing new drawings (as AARON (Cohen 1973) and other sys-
tems are, in which case it would have deep unit dynamics, as they do) but rather only 
recomposing a set of predefined drawings.
Connect was classified as static. Although it is a kinetic sculpture its parts are ar-
ranged in fixed articulations.
3.4.2 Notes on Determinability
In general all the pieces classified as static regarding dynamics were also classified 
as being determinable. There were however four exceptions: Agrippa, Every Icon, 
The Inability to Solve a War at a Cocktail Party (an Awkward Dance with Mr. Henri 
Van Zanten) and Three Buttons. The first three of these are systems that although 
displaying surface unit dynamics either follow a regular and predictable process or, 
as in Hoogerbrugge’s piece, although the system seems complex and indeterminable, 
upon closer inspection one notices that all its actions and every single behavior di-
rectly depend on actions from its user. If these are timed and reenacted, the system’s 
behavior will be recreated. We are therefore in the presence of a system that can be 
classified as determinable. The later of these, Three Buttons, is somewhat different. 
We have classified it as displaying deep unit dynamics because the system’s reaction 
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to every user input creates a new unit. However, the user is able to predict the reac-
tions of the system with a very high (one could almost say absolute) degree of exact-
ness, hence the classification as determinable.
3.4.3 Notes on Transiency
In most of the drawing machines that are part of Droom Zaacht the user’s actions 
are necessary to make the outputs of the system vary. Furthermore, once any new 
structure is added to one of the compositions it stays in place until further actions 
of the user delete them from the screen (or clear the entire composition). This would 
usually be classified as an intransient behavior, however, in one of the machines 
(machine four) once any line is drawn, the resulting structure is permanently ani-
mated. Therefore, we have classified this work as transient. 
Inner Forests presents an interesting example of a transient system that becomes 
intransient as soon as the user acts on it. 601 The user contributes to the system by 
lending her projected shadow but by not doing anything else besides observing the 
system’s actions over that shadow. If no visitor is present, the system does not act but 
if a visitor is present and active, the system also does not act, remaining still while 
waiting for the visitor’s stillness.
3.4.4 Notes on Access
Digital video can be seen as offering the possibility of random access, even if only in 
potential. Linear pieces presented as digital video can almost always be temporally 
controlled by the user (regardless of whether the video is accessed in a computer, 
in a DVD or in another playback system). In cases where the video is presented as 
an installation or a public projection, that control is usually not possible, but such 
pieces can often be found online or are also distributed as linear videos, therefore 
we may consider the exhibition context as something that is at least to a certain 
point independent of the piece itself. In our analysis we have nevertheless chosen 
to classify all the video systems that were not designed to be interactive and clearly 
601 We can find a similar principle of interaction, of acting by not acting, in Aus Lage [in Arbeit] (Car-
valhais and Lia 2003). This installation, shown at Huddersfield’s Media Centre, generated a continuous 
array of slowly evolving visual forms that were, as described in the project’s presentation, almost ‘shy’ of 
the visitors, slowing down and desaturating colors whenever a visitor entered the room or moved inside it. 
Stillness of visitors was then the only strategy to be able to visualize the multiple mutations of the system.
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presented as interactive systems as having controlled access, and not the random 
access that the playback systems may allow. With this we are not trying to directly 
classify the potential for interaction but we are rather recognizing that although 
digital media tends to permit a very high degree of manipulation, that manipulation 
is not always a part of the pieces that are produced to a particular medium. Unless 
otherwise and explicitly stated by the authors, most audiovisuals are usually con-
ceived to be experienced as linear experiences. Although their distribution media 
may allow for pausing, skipping and for what is described as random access, the 
pieces are conceived with controlled access and linearity in mind, and this control 
is an intrinsic part of their aesthetic nature — it informs the composition, the nar-
rative, and almost all the aspects of the piece. Controlled access determines the time 
and rhythm of the piece and once one manages to escape it — by pausing, rewinding 
or otherwise manipulating the video — one may actually consider to be fundamen-
tally altering the artifact and starting to experience an altogether different artifact 
(or different version of the artifact).
3.4.5 Notes on Linking
All systems that, like Ornamism or phiLia 01, allow the user to reset the current 
configuration or evolution of the output and to restart the process, thus exploring 
new fields of possibilities, were classified as having explicit linking. Amoebaabstract 
01 was classified as conditional, while Amoebaabstract 02 and 03 were classified as 
explicit. The reason for this is related to the reset mechanism programmed in 02 and 
03, while on 01 the reset is programmed to be automatically performed by the system 
once a prolonged lack of interaction is detected. Therefore linking is still partially 
controllable by the user but it is not always available, as in the later two pieces. In-
ner Forests deploys a system similar to Amoebaabstract 01, but is not dependent on a 
time-out and therefore is classified as explicit.
3.4.6 Notes on User Functions
While non-interactive systems are largely interpretative, we found it hard to define 
whether those systems where the interaction is kept to a bare minimum — typically 
reduced to a single click or gesture to restart the process, eventually defining new 
variables in the process, such as Page 0 or Substrate — should be classified as inter-
pretative, as configurative or even as explorative, given how reduced is the human 
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input. The fact is that even if one’s actions on the system are very simple, they never-
theless may have a visible effect in it, refreshing or restarting the process, sometimes 
fundamentally altering it. We have therefore found it adequate to classify the major-
ity of these systems as configurative. 
During the development of our analysis we found that there was a less then clear 
distinction between the configurative and structural user functions. Following 
Aarseth’s model we should rule user functions as structural only when and if the 
user’s configurations can be permanently added to the system. In cases where the 
user contributes to physical (and therefore permanent) outputs this may be easy to 
evaluate but in all other cases it is very difficult, if not impossible, to understand the 
longevity of the added information, how and when it may be diluted, discarded or 
replaced by the system or other users. It is also difficult to evaluate the amount of 
control that a user may have over these configurations, because structural additions 
should, in principle, be controllable and not, as in Mount Fuji or temporary.cc be 
uncontrollable. 602 We have therefore chosen to simplify the model and to allow only 
three user functions, merging the original structural and configurative user func-
tions into a single configurative value.
3.4.7 Multiple Correspondence Analysis
Using the R software package 603 we started by trying to replicate Aarseth’s analysis 
and results from his data presented in Cybertext (1997, 68-69):
Table 4: Aarseth’s analysis.
Dynamics Determinability Transiency Perspective Access Linking U. Functions
Adventure IDT Determinable Intransient Personal Controlled Conditional EF
Afternoon Static Determinable Intransient Impersonal Controlled Conditional EF
Agrippa IDT Determinable Transient Impersonal Controlled Explicit IF
Book Unbound TDT Indeterminable Transient Impersonal Controlled Conditional TF
Calligrammes Static Determinable Intransient Impersonal Random None EF
602 A case in which, we may argue, the configurations are created by the system upon the user’s action, 
not by the user, with her actions.
603 R is a language and environment for statistical computing and graphics. It provides a wide variety of 
statistical as well as graphical techniques and is an integrated suite of software facilities for data manipu-
lation, calculation and graphical display. R is available as free software from r-project.org
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Dynamics Determinability Transiency Perspective Access Linking U. Functions
Cent mille milliards Static Determinable Intransient Impersonal Random None CF
Composition Nº 1 Static Indeterminable Intransient Impersonal Controlled None IF
Eliza IDT Determinable Intransient Personal Controlled Conditional CF
Falcon IDT Indeterminable Intransient Personal Controlled Conditional EF
Holzer Static Determinable Transient Impersonal Controlled None IF
Hopscotch Static Determinable Intransient Impersonal Random Explicit EF
I Ching Static Indeterminable Intransient Personal Controlled Conditional CF
Moby Dick Static Determinable Intransient Impersonal Random None IF
Money Spider IDT Determinable Intransient Personal Controlled Conditional EF
MUD1 TDT Indeterminable Transient Personal Controlled Conditional EF
Norisbo Static Indeterminable Intransient Impersonal Controlled None CF
Pale Fire Static Determinable Intransient Impersonal Random Explicit IF
Racter TDT Indeterminable Intransient Personal Controlled Conditional CF
Tale-Spin TDT Indeterminable Intransient Impersonal Controlled None CF
TinyMUD TDT Indeterminable Transient Personal Controlled Conditional TF
Twin Kingdom Valley TDT Indeterminable Intransient Personal Controlled Conditional EF
Unending Adventure Static Determinable Intransient Personal Controlled Explicit TF
Victory Garden Static Determinable Intransient Impersonal Controlled Explicit EF
We rebuilt the data table and performed a multiple correspondence analysis, achiev-
ing values that are close to those that Aarseth presents: 604
Table 5: Multiple correspondence analysis results calculated from Aarseth’s analysis.
Number Eigenvalue Inertia Cumulated
1 0.235013 41.60 41.60
2 0.074244 13.14 54.74
3 0.057228 10.13 64.87
4 0.02248 3.98 68.85
And plotted the results in a two dimensional graphic. Although we found some 
minor variations in the plotting of the texts and categories, the relative positions are 
nevertheless consistent with Aarseth’s plottings.
604 We performed a multiple correspondence analysis using the ‘lambda’ option of ‘adjusted’, based on 
the Burt matrix with an adjustment of inertias, the default option of the ca package used in R.
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Fig. 186: Aarseth’s texts, replotted in R.
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Having thus confirmed the reproducibility of Aarseth’s results, we proceeded to sub-
mit our initial analysis to a multiple correspondence analysis, testing different sets of 
Aarseth’s variables and interpreting the clustering of the pieces in the plots, trying 
to understand: 1) if clusters were formed; 2) how significant these clusters were, that 
is, which pieces formed each cluster, how similar these were among themselves or 
how diverse were pieces that might be in the same cluster (or even in the same point 
in the plot) and that, owing to marked differences perhaps shouldn’t be. A certain 
amount of clustering was naturally interpreted positively — after all it seems only 
natural that pieces as linear audiovisual works such as Animations for Aol. Rebrand 
or Enerugii are tightly plotted, and the same can be said of printed or fabricated 
artifacts or static images. Our first conclusion however, was that Aarseth’s perspec-
tive variable was not adding information to the analysis. Testing it with something 
that could be regarded as a concession or as an attempt to try to make the variable 
work in this context we first found that the results were considerably shifted in a way 
that was not creating useful information, that is, it was moving pieces away from 
clusters but not creating new meaningful clusters. Alternatively, when classifying all 
the systems as impersonal, the variable simply lost any information value. We have 
therefore decided to drop the variable from this model, eventually reserving its use 
for future work where systems that are clearly narrative and diegetic are analyzed.
With the remaining seven variable, dynamics, determinability, transiency, access, 
user functions and linking we found that the model plotted far more satisfactory 
results but that if the clustering was logical it was nevertheless somewhat excessive, 
creating a big divide between the explorative user function and the remaining func-
tions and between transient and intransient systems. We therefore proceeded to, as 
planned, testing the integration of new variables in the model.
4113.5 New Variables
3.5 New Variables
3.5.1 Modes
The first potential variable to be considered was modes, in an attempt to describe 
how many levels of perception are involved in the outputs manifested by the sys-
tems: one when the output is only audial or visual; two when the output is audio-
visual, or visual and haptic; 605 three in systems that are both audiovisual as haptic. 
Quantifying modes is not the same thing as quantifying the number of dimensions 
in which the output of a system exists. 606 It is also different from an assessment of 
the medium through which a piece is created: “Medium is defined as the means of 
expression (material and other technologies); mode is defined as the manner of ex-
pression.” (Riley 2002) Following our phenomenological approach to these systems, 
the study of modes concerns the reception of their outputs. “Reception (…) repre-
sents the stage at which the artwork is ‘taken in’, or received within the public do-
main. The complexities of media (the means of expression) and modes (the manners 
and expression) may range from the properties of the display environment and the 
manner in which its ambience is manipulated, to the manner in which the work is 
publicised and reviewed. Here too, it is argued, there is the possibility of a common 
means of analysis based upon the recognition that selections have been made from 
systems of choices.” (2002)
We will follow a more physical and sensorial definition of modes, closely bound 
to the different regimens of human sensorial perception, as proposed by Whitelaw 
(2008) and by Blesser and Salter (2007). It is interesting to note that Stephanie Strick-
land (2007) expands the definition of modality to include not only visual, audial 
and haptic manners of expression, but also mathematics and motion. This suggests 
that the perception of motion 607 and the perception of mathematical structures — 
rhythm, harmony, etc. and the “struggle between mathematical abstractions and 
605 Or tactile. The haptic mode may include vibration, texture, temperature, physical three-dimensional 
movement and so on.
606 If they are uni-, bi-, tri- or tetra-dimensional.
607 Steven Pinker (1999) notes how the common motions of patches in an image is used by human cogni-
tion to identify complex objects, being the top criterion in the identification of unity of form. According 
to this, we can consider the perception of movement or motion as a sensorial mode that, although closely 
related to vision can be analyzed independently from it.
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words” (36) — can be regarded as altogether different modes of perception. The 
mathematical modality should not be understood in the Pythagorean sense or tra-
dition, as a correspondence between art (or aesthetics) and mathematics in terms 
of numerical ‘harmony’ but more as the intellectual and intuitive understanding of 
structure and process, and the aesthetic pleasure that is felt through it. 608 It is the 
beauty of abstract understanding, not of bodily contact but of cerebral perception. 609
In new media, our task is the measure of measure. To accomplish this we 
write less ‘with places’ and more with ‘transitions’. Space does open up, per-
haps monstrously, to a world of currents and translations. We don’t see these 
spaces full so much as feel them fill. We don’t watch them perform; we perform 
them, in part, in connection with others, in processes of conjugal transfer that 
propagate themselves. Our probes help us draw the connections and form the 
perceptions needed to flow, to participate in and comprehend an increasingly 
complex patterning that enfolds us, from nano-techniques to cosmic extent 
through genetic alteration and the new world disorders. (42) 
We have therefore chosen to consider five modes: visual, audial, haptic, movement 
and procedural. Regarding the haptic mode, pieces were qualified as using it when-
ever they involved the direct manipulation or physical contact of the user. A-Volve 
involves the direct manipulation of a water tank where the ‘creatures’ are projected 
and where they can be interacted with, while 30×1 exists in a large space that needs 
not only to be explored by the visitors but also leads them to feel the space (the space’s 
temperature and its variations, the moisture in the air, the variations in lightness 
of the different rooms, etc.), and therefore creates a complex sensorial experience 
where proprioception also plays an important role. We chose not to regard interac-
tion as a modality, mainly because there were already variables that described user 
608 Daniel Dennett (qtd. in Pinker 1999) notes how humans always tend to search for a design stance in 
inanimate objects and an intentional stance in animate objects. The first tries to assign a purpose to an ob-
ject while the later tries to understand the motivations of animals or humans (which were, evolutionarily 
speaking, the two main classes of animate objects with which humans cohabited). The mathematical or 
procedural modality can be seen as the result of these stance identifiers in human perception.
609 Sometimes we can consider that it is not only the strict (or literal) understanding of the process that 
triggers the procedural mode but also the curiosity about the process. Although it may not be apparent, 
or immediately understandable, what is the process behind the system, it may nevertheless be clear that 
there is some logic in the development of the outputs, that there is ultimately a cause driving the system. 
Therefore we can consider that the outputs of the system offer some clues, or communicate, its procedural 
nature.
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functions, linking and access and that by doing so were in effect describing parts 
of the interactive experience. The mere existence of interaction was not enough to 
classify a system as haptic. Whenever systems were executed in computers or other 
universal computational devices and used their standard input devices 610 in what 
can be described as ‘standard’, or ‘normal’ ways, although there is involvement of 
the sense of touch with the input device, we did not consider this to endow the sys-
tem with a haptic mode because such interaction devices are not part of the piece 
but rather a part of the computational system that runs the piece and their usage is, 
in most cases, absolutely transparent for the user. In this sense we should classify as 
haptic those systems where the sense of touch and the user’s body is involved in non-
conventional and hypermediated ways. The same principle was applied to printed 
or physical objects.
3.5.2 Dimensions
After modes, the quantification of how many dimensions are used by the system’s 
outputs was considered as a variable. In a preliminary analysis no systems were 
classified as being unidimensional. Any visual system is at least bidimensional, al-
though we can defend that (at least in an abstract analysis) a work such as Arnulf 
Rainer (Kubelka 1960) is a unidimensional visual experience (comprised as it is by 
a sequence of dimensionless light and dark frames) or that a musical piece is uni-
dimensional, no systems with these characteristics were part of our analysis group. 
Moles proposes a dimensional classification of messages that classifies the printed 
line of text as a message that exists in “a single spatial dimension (L): a sequence of 
linearly assembled symbols” 611 (1966, 8), while paintings, drawings or photographs 
code messages in two spatial dimensions. 
The messages of the plastic arts or of architecture, as arrangements of volumes 
or masses, those of a set of punched cards arranged in a card index box, are, 
in a first approximation, esthetic or utilitarian messages of three dimensions 
(L3). Messages such as animated cartoons or movies, having two spatial dimen-
sions and one temporal dimension, belong to the temporal arts (L2T). In the 
610 Such as keyboard, mouse, trackpad, trackball or joystick, touch screen, etc.
611 “The written elements of the Central American countries emerged from quipus, linear successions 
of symbols composed of knots on a string. By exploring the line, or the quipu, we perceive successively 
the elements of the message, which are arranged in an order imposed by the unidimensional character of 
the string.” (Moles 1966, 8)
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following, we shall grant a special place to purely temporal messages, speech 
and music, which are modulations of duration. they correspond to the “arts of 
time”; the others (dance, movies, animated cartoons) have some spatial char-
acteristics. The former will give us relatively simple examples which are more 
accessible than the polydimensional messages (cinerama, for example). The 
esthetics of such complex messages, generally belated in comparison with tech-
nical achievement, is still only beginning. (Moles 1966, 8)
As expected, most systems presented outputs in two (15) or three (35) dimensions 
and only a minority (5, just over 9% of the total) used all four spatial and temporal 
dimensions.
3.5.3 Prochronism
The third potential variable that we considered in this model was prochronism. In 
this model we should not interpret prochronism in the classical sense, that of nar-
rative, when something appears in a temporal context in which it could not yet be 
present, but rather in the sense proposed by Bateson (1979) for natural sciences (and 
biology in particular): prochronism as a record of how, in the past configurations 
of a system, forms and patterns were created. Bateson defined prochronism as the 
“general truth that organisms carry, in their forms, evidences of their past growth. 
Prochronism is to ontogeny as homology (q.v.) is to phylogeny.” (229) A prochronist 
view of systems is also a morphological view, a regard at the way how forms are 
temporally created and how the systems keep perceivable traces of that process. 612 
Dominick Chen (2008) recognizes that “we are not able of focusing on the process” 
and that despite “the fact that even in every action of a child when he is drawing we 
can observe a rich accumulation and layering, we have developed neither culture 
nor technology that concentrates upon the accumulation over time of the informa-
tion that we daily exchange” (64). We have eliminated process from the analysis and 
in doing so we “classified the world in a grid-like manner and acquired technology 
to associate similar elements within the system of classification” (64). By developing 
612 “Every natural phenomenon, however simple, is really composite, and every visible action and effect 
is a summation of countless subordinate actions. (…) The concept of an average the equation to a curve, 
the description of a froth or cellular tissue, all come within the scope of mathematics for no other rea-
son than that they are summations of more elementary principles or phenomena. Growth and Form are 
throughout of this composite nature; therefore the laws of mathematics are bound to underlie them, and 
her methods to be peculiarly fitted to interpret them.” (Thompson 1942, 1028)
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the concept of prochronism he further proposes the construction of a method for 
“collectively sharing not only the result but also the gradual process that leads from 
generation to the present. This entails the shifting of our frame of reference from 
form to time. It also points to the necessary experimentation towards a critical prac-
tice through which human beings can dynamically record and share the processes 
of all the activities that affect interpersonal structure, from conscious self-expres-
sion to unconscious bodily gestures in the everyday. Philosophy was constructed as 
philo-sophia or ‘love of wisdom’, but what we today should begin to consider is ‘love 
of process’ of information.” 613 (2008, 64) 
613 “One day as [Gregory] Bateson came into the class, he abruptly placed a boiled crab that he had 
bought at the Fisherman’s Wharf in front of the students. He then asked the students to assume that they 
did not know about an entity known as a ‘crab’ and to prove that the object in front of them was the ‘re-
mains of a living organism’. The bewildered students took some time to handle the crab to observe it, until 
one of them proposed an answer: ‘This object is symmetrical. As all living organisms are symmetrical 
this object too is a living organism.’ To this Bateson replied that ‘it [was] a good answer, but there [was] 
something more fundamental’, prompting a different answer from another student: ‘the sizes of the right 
and left claws are different and therefore its morphology isn’t symmetrical’, however ‘the two claws are 
made of the same pattern’.
Bateson appraised this answer as touching on the most fundamental point that can be: the evidence 
of the crab being connected with other living organisms. In other words, he encouraged the students to 
draw their attention to the crab’s embryological origin. By observing the morphology of each part of the 
crab and by speculating about the temporal transition that it underwent during its growth, it is possible 
to ‘understand’ that the crab is a living organism just like the observer. In this case, the serial homology 
between the parts in the object’s internal morphology forms first-order connections, the phylogenetic 
homology between the crab and other similar living organisms (e.g. the lobster) forms second-order con-
nections and the homology between crabs and lobsters on one hand and human beings and other living 
organism (e.g. mammals) on the other form third-order connections. This shows that the homological 
pattern is, unlike a simplistic analogy, a hierarchical connection.
Bateson asked the students to carry out the same task with a conch shell. In this case the students 
could no longer rely either on the similarities between different parts nor on the symmetrical property 
of the object. What Bateson was here pointing to, was a law of higher order: symmetry and segmentation 
are only the supervening outcome of the phenomenon of growth, and growth itself follows a morphologi-
cal law. He described this as both the crab and the conch shell retaining the ‘prochronism’ that presents 
the temporal transition that it underwent in its growth. In other words, all living organisms mark their 
own ecological process in their own body and exhibit this to the external world. It is because of this that 
living organisms can, through the observation of each other’s morphological layout, be ‘homologous’ to 
each other.
Bateson emphasizes that this hierarchical thinking owes itself to embryology. This means that the 
time that the living organism underwent from being an embryo to the present can be read ‘at once’, thus 
supplementing temporal observation on how the organism mutually interacts with the surrounding envi-
ronment. This concept of prochronism is reminiscent of the concept of the invariant, a group of elements 
which persists as invariable for a significant amount of time to the observing subject, coined by James 
Gibson in his theory of affordance. By perceiving the layout of invariants within an environment, living 
organisms understand what actions are possible within that environment (affordance).” (Chen 2008, 64)
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With this variable we then propose a classification of systems that display clearly 
perceivable traces of their past structures or configurations. These marks do not 
need to be permanent, although in certain cases they can be, they also do not need 
to account for the complete range of the system’s evolution and can represent only 
a chronological slice or fragment. A simple example of such a system is Three But-
tons, a system where every interaction leaves a mark that is permanently displayed 
until the system is reset. A more complex example can be seen in Substrate or phiLia 
01, two systems where the macroscopic configuration is created from the accumu-
lation of a large number of local (and minute) actions, almost as if by accretion. 
These traces do not need to be perennial, they can be erased or covered by other 
outputs, but for a system to be classified as displaying prochronism, it should allow 
the viewer or user to understand its morphology as a temporal process and to iden-
tify at least some vestiges of former configurations. It is also not strictly necessary 
that the traces are even visible: a system as Every Icon has such a clear and strong 
structure that just the procedural mode of its output allows a viewer to infer all of 
the previous configurations of the system, almost at once, from any given present 
configuration or any other in the future. On the other hand, it is not simply enough 
that a system is found to be transient to be classified as displaying prochronism — a 
temporal evolution of the output (or the form) of the system needs to be reinforced 
by remains of its past. 614
614 Systems like temporary.cc are not classifiable as displaying prochronism, although they change over 
time and although that change is traceable to its user’s influence. This is because every change is actually 
erasing part of its past configuration. Therefore, based on any current configuration, it will not be clear 
which previous configurations were displayed by the system, or how the configurations evolved to reach 
the previous state — an extreme case in either systems will be the final, empty or blank configuration. 
One knows how and why the process evolved but is left without clues as to which particular steps were 
taken in that process. In a system as Amoebaabstract 01, although one may not be able to understand what 
was the exact chronology of the events happening in the past of the piece’s outputs, one nevertheless is 
able to understand which events occurred and how many.
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3.5.4 Autonomy
By autonomy — literally the “control of the self, from the Greek autos (self) and no-
mos (a law)” (Bateson 1979, 126) — the fourth potential variable under consideration, 
we understand a system’s capacity to generate novelty, to be creative at least to some 
degree, without resorting to external input (whether machinic, human or both). 615 
By classifying a system as autonomous we will not recognize that the system is suf-
ficiently independent to pass the Lovelace test (in any of its possible variants), some-
thing that, if achieved, would naturally be describable by this variable.
From a Batesonian perspective, autonomy is what injects life in a system. 616 Accord-
ing to Ariza it is also what makes generative works become less human and more 
artificial, more machine-authored (2009, 64). Autonomy of the systems, even if only 
apparent, also contributes to the perception of a transparency of technology, balanc-
ing out the opacity caused by interaction (Bolter and Grusin 1999, 33) and systems 
to which authors confer varying degrees of freedom by granting them autonomy 617 
are able to produce subjectivity in ways that non-autonomous systems will never be 
able to. This is a continual process of becoming, as Doruff puts it (2008, 119), not a 
simpler act of being.
The existence of autonomy is a step towards autopoiesis — also from Greek roots, 
autos and poiesis (the creation or production) — a concept proposed by the biolo-
gists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela 618 in the 1970s (Annunziato and 
Pierucci 2000) that describes how living systems are characterized by the produc-
tion or transformation of themselves. This is, literally, the self-creation of the system 
and/or its outputs. As with creativity and intelligence, by classifying a system as 
autonomous we are not proposing that it is truly, and absolutely autopoietic in the 
strict sense of Maturana and Varela. This would, among other things, imply that 
615 This should be minimally clear in the system’s operation. Otherwise one cannot, of course, under-
stand when the system is fetching information from the World Wide Web or any other remote (and 
external) source of information. Likewise, internal databases or lookup tables (as those in the Arca Musa-
rithmica, for example) should be seen as being part of the system and thus of its autonomy.
616 And consequently, the removal of autonomy is the breaking up of the circuits and therefore, the 
death of the system. (Bateson 1979, 127)
617 By programming it in the system, in the context being analyzed, not by achieving it through delega-
tion to users and/or external sources of data.
618 1946-2001.
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the systems would be able to bootstrap themselves 619 and that they would be ‘totally’ 
generative. 620
The progression 621 of systems towards autonomy is described by Jacques Tisseau in 
a metaphor named after a famous story. The Pinocchio metaphor describes those 
systems that become autonomous and that thus free users (or creators) from con-
trolling them. “A user, partially free from controlling his model, will also become 
autonomous and will take part (…) as a spectator (the user observes the model), ac-
tor (the user tries out the model) and creator (the user modifies the model to adapt it 
to his needs).” (2001, 8) Tisseau further proposes three classes or types of autonomy 
for a system: sensory-motor autonomy, where “each entity is provided with sensors 
and effectors that allows it to get information and respond to its environment”; de-
cision-making autonomy, when “each entity makes decisions according to its own 
personality (its history, intentions, state and perceptions)”; and finally execution au-
619 This computer science term, bootstrapping, began to be used during the 1950s as a metaphor for pro-
grams that became self-sustaining processes, that is, that were able to proceed without external help from 
manually entered instructions. It is currently used to refer to the first steps in the starting up of a compu-
tational system, when the basic operational codes are loaded by the system. Hofstadter provides a (sim-
plified) explanation of the process: “The first compilers were written in assembly language, rather than 
machine language, thus taking full advantage of the already accomplished first step up from machine 
language. Now as sophistication increased, people realized that a partially written compiler could be used 
to compile extensions of itself. In other words, once a certain minimal core of a compiler had been writ-
ten, then that minimal compiler could translate bigger compilers into machine language — which in turn 
could translate yet bigger compilers, until the final, full-blown compiler had been compiled. This process 
is affectionately known as ‘bootstrapping’ (…) It is not so different from the attainment by a child of a 
critical level of fluency in his native language, from which point on his vocabulary and fluency can grow 
by leaps and bounds, since he can use language to acquire new language.” (Hofstadter 1999, 300) Dawkins 
also used the term, with this sense, applied to biology, particularly to the processes of cell differentiation.
620 That the systems would be autonomous not only in the sense of defining their own progress and 
choices during the processes they execute but also autonomous to the point of actually being able to pro-
gram themselves. In a sense this would be the ultimate generative, and machine authored, system — one 
that has no human intervention whatsoever during not only all the stages of the execution but also of 
the programming of the system. “The autonomy of an autopoietic system constitutes its minimal cogni-
tion. We must remember that an autopoietic system is a composite unit, much like an element-producing 
network in which the elements 1) via their interactions, recursively regenerate the network of production 
which produced them and 2) construct a network in which they exist by building up a frontier with their 
external surroundings via their preferential interactions within the network. Autopoietic systems possess 
the properties of emergent systems as they are able to create natural phenomena independent of those 
from which they were generated.” (De Loor, Manac’h and Tisseau 2009, 325)
621 We are wary about using this term in this context, because it may imply a directed evolution, some 
sort of teleology. In human-authored systems this will inevitably be the case but not necessarily in ma-
chine authored, autopoietic systems (as wasn’t certainly also in biology, at least if one subscribes to a 
Darwinian point of view).
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tonomy, when “each entity’s execution controller is independent of the other enti-
ties’ controllers” (2001, 35). He also proposes three lines of thought to understand 
the autonomy of systems: autonomy by essence, by necessity and by ignorance (2001, 
29). The first of these characterizes all biological organisms, “from a simple cell to 
a human being”, the second involves the recognition of changes in the environ-
ment or context, 622 while the later simply “reveals our current inability to explain 
the behavior of complex systems through the reductionist methods of an analytical 
approach” 623 (2001, 29).
Simply put, we classify as autonomous systems all those that contain (or generate) 624 
all the data they need to work and that, in doing so, produce novel outputs. All 
other systems, fed by external sources of information, are classified as being data-
driven. Outputs in static media, or those that are classified as static according to 
their dynamics, should — as far as possible — also be classified according to these 
principles. A work as Verostko’s Seven Sisters: The Pleiades can be classified as au-
tonomous, while My Boyfriend Came Back from the War, Cylinder or Poetry on the 
Road, because they map real-world data or are only usable through externally fed 
information 625 are classified as data-driven.
622 The autonomy will therefore be an outcome of the adaptability of the system and of the way it inter-
faces with the outside (world or other systems). “Physical modeling of mechanisms usually takes place by 
solving differential equation systems. Solving these systems requires knowledge about the conditions of 
the limits that restrict movement, but in reality, these conditions can change all the time, whether the 
causes in themselves are known or not (interactions, disturbances, changes in the environment). The 
model must then be able to perceive these changes in order to adapt its behavior during execution.” (Tis-
seau 2001, 29)
623 “A complex system is an open system made up of a heterogeneous group of atomic or composite 
entities. The behavior of the group is the result of the individual behavior of these entities and of their 
different interactions in an environment that is also active. Based on schools, the behavior of the group is 
seen as either organized through a goal, which would be teleological behavior, or as the result of an auto-
organization of the system, which would be emergence. The lack of overall behavior models for complex 
systems leads us to distribute control over the systems’ components and thus, autonomize the models of 
these components. The simultaneous evolution of these components enables a better understanding of 
the behavior of the entire overall system. Hence, a group of autonomous models interacting within the 
same space has a part in the research and experiments of complex systems.
Autonomizing models, whether by essence, necessity or ignorance, plays a part in populating virtual 
environments with artificial life that strengthens the impression of reality.” (Tisseau 2001, 29)
624 A distinction that is not always possible to do by merely observing the system in operation.
625 Which also includes user input.
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3.5.5 Class
The computational class to which a system’s output belongs can eventually be used 
in its classification. Following Wolfram’s definitions (2002) and Rucker’s interpreta-
tions (2005) we could approach this variable through at least three alternative un-
derstandings:
We could inspect the outputs trying to recognize the typical patterns created by 
class 1 to class 4 computations. This would certainly lead to a classification of most 
systems as either class 2, whenever the outputs presented static structures, or as 
class 4 whenever they would develop evolving and localized structures. In this case 
we would only find class 1 computations whenever the output would be a uniformly 
filled or empty canvas and class 3 would only exist in true random outputs. In this 
case we would be classifying the computational class of the system that produces the 
outputs by looking at the outputs and by trying to infer from them the properties of 
the system that created them.
We could alternatively use the information processing interpretation of the com-
putational classes to classify the systems according to their capacity to process or 
to preserve information. This would however be difficult to infer from the system’s 
outputs alone, whenever one was not able to interact with the system directly, or to 
witness its real-time operation, 626 thus hindering the classification of all the artifacts 
that do not develop real-time computation.
Finally, we could try to classify the outputs according to the class of computation 
that they may develop or represent. In this sense we could classify most of the static 
intransient outputs as being class 1, 627 most of the static transient outputs as be-
ing class 2 628 and all those outputs that exhibit complex behaviors as being class 3 
or class 4. The structure of the outputs would then determine whether the system 
would be classified as class 3 (random, totally unpredictable) or class 4 (structured, 
626 Although this is possible in some cases, it is far from being a universal possibility
627 According to a pancomputationalist view, we can consider inert objects as being instances of class 1 
computations.
628 Class 1 is found in printed or otherwise physically immutable objects while class 2 is found in time-
based, transient, outputs. Class 2 systems can be regarded as being cyclic outputs that once replayed 
always repeat the same pattern of surface units. There are of course exceptions to this rule of thumb, most 
notably Connect, a static, transient and yet indeterminable system that was classified as class 4.
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at least locally and at least partially predictable). 629 We have chosen to follow this last 
approach in our classification.
3.5.6 Interstice: Autonomy and the Pleasures of Digital Environments
A system’s autonomy can be regarded not only as an amount of control that is con-
ferred to or appropriated by it, but also as a transfer of some amount of agency to the 
system. Returning to Hamlet on the Holodeck (1997), we find that Murray elaborates 
a description of digital media in terms of the pleasures that are characteristic to 
them, of their own “unique patterns of desire” as expressive media. Their “own way 
of giving pleasure, of creating beauty, of capturing what we feel to be true about life; 
its own aesthetic” (94). These pleasures are agency, navigation and transformation. 
From these it is the first that matters most in this context.
When things are going right on the computer, we can be both the dancer and 
the caller of the dance. This is the feeling of agency. Because of the vague and 
pervasive use of the term interactivity, the pleasure of agency in electronic 
environments is often confused with the mere ability to move a joystick or click 
on a mouse. But activity alone is not agency. For instance, in a tabletop game of 
chance, players may be kept very busy spinning dials, moving game pieces, and 
exchanging money, but they may not have any true agency. The players’ actions 
have effect, but the actions are not chosen and the effects are not related to the 
players’ intentions. Although gamemakers sometimes mistakenly focus on the 
number of interactions per minute, this number is a poor indicator of the plea-
sure of agency afforded by a game. Agency, then, goes beyond both participa-
tion and activity. As an aesthetic pleasure, as an experience to be savored for its 
own sake, it is offered to a limited degree in traditional art forms but is more 
commonly available in the structured activities we call games. (128-29)
629 Rucker develops a somewhat similar interpretation, stating that “in classical (prequantum) physics, 
a vacuum is the simplest, most orderly kind of matter: nothing is going on. A crystalline solid is orderly in 
a predictable, periodic way. And fluids such as liquids or gasses are fairly disorderly, more along the lines 
of being class three. Matter is computationally at its most interesting when it’s near a phase transition, as 
when a liquid is freezing or coming to a boil. Matter near a phase transition to some extent has a nested 
class two structure, with similar kinds of features occurring at widely different scales. But the phase tran-
sition structure is very dynamic, with information-laden patterns moving about, and is, I believe, best 
thought of as class four.” (Rucker 2005, 115)
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By transferring some agency to the system and by endowing it with a degree of 
autonomy one could think that the system would loose part of its potential to give 
pleasure to the viewer, user or reader. We can however propose that an increase 
in the system’s autonomy may create an additional pleasure besides the triad that 
is enunciated by Murray: a procedural pleasure. 630 As Rucker proposes, observing 
physical computations is a simple human pleasure (2005, 103). As well as generative 
artifacts, they are systems where the potential number of states is so high that it 
becomes impossible to repeat any given state 631 but where, in spite of this, one can 
intuitively grasp 632 an operational logic, a course of action. In procedural systems 
one can understand a statistical tendency for certain outputs to be produced, some 
attractors where the outputs tend to fall. One is rewarded when the systems behave 
according to our expectations (if these are proven correct). 633 Simple systems are not 
rewarding the viewer at this level, because by being so straightforward they do not 
imply any significant effort, and the reward is, as in so many cases, proportional to 
the effort. This is related to, but goes beyond what Dominic McIver Lopes calls of 
‘active appreciation’ of an artwork (2010, 41) but it is also rather different from an 
interactive engagement with the system because there are no physical bidirectional 
exchanges of information (where those exchanges happen they exist in one single 
direction, from the communicating system to the viewer).
When Duchamp remarked that ‘the spectator makes the picture’ he was referring to 
how strenuous an activity is the appreciation of art. One needs to look, listen, read, 
“try out alternative interpretations of what is perceived, import relevant knowledge 
about authorship, genre and history, and imbue the whole process with personal 
associations, if they’re relevant” (Lopes 2010, 41), one needs to fill in missing infor-
mation and details of objects that are represented, to move the body to experience 
630 It is a procedural pleasure that we can relate to the presence of the procedural mode in a system.
631 Or at least where it is very difficult to predict any future state from the current state of the system.
632 Grasping, not understanding, seems like a more adequate verb to use in this context, because one 
does not necessarily understand all the details of the processes well enough to be able to rebuild it (or 
even to explain it to other observers or to oneself) but, computational beings that we are, we can follow 
the processes, react to their algorithmic nature and even, as Hofstadter suggests (2007), somehow emulate 
the algorithm, by running on our brains processes that are similar (if not even identical in some cases) to 
those that are deployed in the system. In most cases this does not happen consciously, but it nevertheless 
happens, and it leads one to expect that the outputs of a procedural system will evolve in what is their 
‘natural’ way, that which is dictated by their code and literally ‘followed’ by the observer (here turned to a 
coprocessor). “Computer art runs on computers, so if brains are computers then some computer art runs 
on brains.” (Lopes 2010, 48-49)
633 And where one is frustrated by failing to correctly (or approximately) predict the behaviors or results.
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spatial structures (Manovich 2001, 56) and with these artifacts, to further try to 
fathom the system and to even come to emulate it.
3.5.7 Other Rejected (or Deemed Unfit) Variables
Besides the proposed new variables we have pondered several other alternative char-
acteristics of these systems that could have eventually resulted in new variables. By 
and large these have not proven to be universally applicable to the analysis of all 
the pieces in this set or they have been found to describe aspects of the systems that 
were not deemed significant enough or that did not contribute to the efficaciousness 
of the model. Among those considered we find creative amplification, degree of re-
peatability, homeostasis, self-similarity, the existence of catastrophes, number and 
kind of attractors, the autonomous production of novelty, coherence and unity, the 
rate or pace of flow, and finally the scales in which the output of the system may be 
developed. 
Creative amplification: Scott Draves proposes that in a system with “human-com-
puter collaboration”, we can define the system’s “creative amplification as the ratio of 
total content divided by the human-created content.” (2008, 74) A variable such as 
this would be difficult to quantify in practice. One can understand the concept and 
even eventually compare systems according to their relative creative amplification 
ratios, but one would rapidly run into problems if trying to classify a larger number 
of systems according to this principle. On one hand, quantifying the total content of 
a system is not easy, or even always possible. A quantification of the human-created 
content can be easier in some cases, but still hard to compute for a group of systems 
with such different modes of interaction. Although appealing, creative amplifica-
tion would only be applicable to interactive systems. All those systems that do not 
demand human action would either not be classifiable under this variable or would 
have to be classified as possessing a ‘maximum’ or ‘infinite’ amplification.
Homeostasis is the scientific term for systems that tend to maintain a state of equi-
librium (Norman 2007, 79). Some procedural systems, as all of the biological sys-
tems, can be seen as a complex (and delicate) balance between morphogenesis and 
homeostasis, 634 two kinds of computation, the first developed by a mass of cells and 
the later by an organism in the world (Rucker 2005, 151). An alternative way to de-
634 And reproduction (Rucker 2005, 151).
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scribe this is, following Simon’s metaphor, to describe the ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ envi-
ronments of a system, “the substance and organization of the artifact itself (…) [and] 
the surroundings in which it operates” (1969, 7).
There is often a corresponding advantage in the division from the standpoint 
of the inner environment. In very many cases, whether a particular system 
will achieve a particular goal or adaptation depends on only a few characteris-
tics of the outer environment, and not at all on the detail of the environment. 
Biologists are familiar with this property of adaptative systems under the label 
of homeostasis. It is an important property of most good designs, whether 
biological or artifactual. In one way or another, the designer insulates the in-
ner system from the environment, so that an invariant relation is maintained 
between inner system and goal, independent of variations over a wide range in 
most parameters that characterize the outer environment. (9)
A variable such as homeostasis might then describe a system in terms of its organi-
zation and functioning, of its interface between inner and outer environments and 
of the drives that it tries to satisfy (and the balance it may or may not reach along 
the way). It would however also cover the same range of phenomena that the class 
variable describes, as noted by Rucker. “As soon as a system has two drives to satisfy, 
it becomes difficult for homeostasis to find a fixed point and stop. A homeostatic 
system with two drives may end up carrying out a periodic class two computation 
— akin to a thermostat-equipped furnace driven by the paired drives of ‘not too hot’ 
and ‘not too cold.’ In order to satisfy an opposing pair of drives, a homeostatic sys-
tem will hunt across the equilibrium, often in a regular periodic fashion. Once we 
have more than two drives, a class three or class four computation almost inevitably 
ensues.” (2005, 174)
Homeostasis can also be used to evaluate how a system responds to perturbations, 
how it preserves the information injected in it by external influences, if the system 
forgets this information or if it preserves it in any degree and therefore allows the 
external events to influence its behavior in any way. 635 As we have previously seen, 
this would also describe a characteristic of the system that is covered by the class 
variable.
635 Therefore this may be seen as being related to the autonomy variable.
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The autonomous production of novelty, inspired by Dorin’s text (2008, 289), intend-
ed to describe systems that would be independent from external sources of infor-
mation or control and able to create new information (or novelty) on its own, or to 
“explore large design spaces independently of human input” (2008, 294). During the 
development of this work, this potential variable evolved to the simpler (and more 
encompassing) variable autonomy.
Inspired by Barratt (1980) and Alexander (2002a), we investigated the possibility of 
using the scales of the output units as a classification variable. Using the diversity 
of ratios detectable in the outputs of the systems, regardless of their modes, would 
eventually allow an understanding of the rate of change, of rhythmic patterns and 
of the recursiveness within a system and its outputs. Besides the modular units or 
building blocks, we could also study the grouping procedures (Barratt 1980, 140) of 
the system, which by permutation, combination or simple similarity order the scale. 
The flow rate or pace of a system’s output could be seen as its temporal scale, some-
thing that could result in an expansion of the possible values of the transiency vari-
able. However, establishing an effective way to quantify scale across several media, 
modes and such diverse outputs as the ones being analyzed proved to be a difficult 
task and an unsurpassable difficulty when working this potential variable. 
Catastrophes, understood in a mathematical sense, are sudden changes in the state 
of a system (Buchanan 2004, 14), particularly, changes from one state of equilibrium 
to another where the symmetries of the system are broken and eventually reformed. 
Catastrophe theory was developed 636 as a general theory of morphogenesis, where 
the “growth of an organism is seen as a series of gradual changes triggered by, and in 
turn triggering, sudden jumps in the biochemistry” (Barratt 1980, 260). More than 
being mere accidents — the most common synonym for ‘catastrophe’ —, they are 
features of the systems that are connected to autocreativity (Goriunova 2008) 637 or a 
structure preserving development of the system’s formal outputs. 638
636 In the 1970s by mathematician René Thom.
637 “(…) a dynamic process occurring in the relationship between network systems, technology and 
human beings; autocreativity appears as an explosion within a particular combination of forces”, it is “a 
micro catastrophe, setting up a myriad of spaces of possibility rather than (…) annihilating”, finally, it is 
“a process, an explosion creating the valuable, creating, like love, something that we do not possess and 
giving it to someone who does not need it.” (Goriunova 2008, 114)
638 “This smoothness of evolution is visible in all the examples, essentially without exception. Even in 
those cases where there is a catastrophe — the mathematical term for the appearance of some new feature, 
not visible in the symmetries of the previous state — this catastrophe always begins as a feature which is 
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Self-similarity could be used to evaluate the existence of fractal-like structures in 
the output of the systems, as well as (to a certain extent) the organization of surface 
units. It could also be used to evaluate the regularity of the outputs, the system’s ho-
meostasis or the tendency to an equilibrium over different runs or experimentations. 
If existing, this property could be searched for in magnifications of the output, or in 
different areas of the output, either spatial, temporal or both.
The notion of self-similarity strikes ancient chords in our culture. An old strain 
in Western thought honours the idea. Leibniz imagined that a drop of water 
contained a whole teeming universe, containing, in turn, water drops and new 
universes within. “To see the world in a grain of sand,” Blake wrote, and often 
scientists were predisposed to see it. When sperm were first discovered, each 
was thought to be a homunculus, a human, tiny but fully formed. But self-simi-
larity withered as a scientific principle, for a good reason. It did not fit the facts. 
Sperm are not merely scaled-down humans — they are far more interesting 
than that — and the process of ontogenetic development is far more interesting 
than mere enlargement. (Gleick 1998, 115)
We could also analyze the degree of repeatability to be found in the structures 
produced in the system’s outputs, that is, whether the system’s behavior leads to a 
stream of regular outputs, or outputs that are recognizable as regular although they 
may not be strictly similar. All computational structures are in principle able to pro-
duce repeating outputs, as seen in Wolfram’s analysis. Class 1 and 2 structures are 
the most prolific in the production of repetition and of very rigid structures because 
they create nothing besides these. Class 3 creates very repetitive, although highly 
irregular outputs, and class 4 computations produce what are perhaps the less re-
peating of all the outputs but those that present human observers with the most 
meaningful structures, those that are imbued with meaning. Here we could also 
look for the system’s coherence and unity, one of the four basic properties exhibited 
by generative artworks, according to Dorin (2008, 289). This property is related to 
homeostasis and describes the system’s capacity to maintain its identity over time, 
essentially consistent with the symmetries of the earlier state, and which then develops, and continues to 
develop, as the new source of structure, thus still allowing a smooth and consistent evolution of structure.” 
(Alexander 2002b, 23) “In all these natural examples, one thing stands out. The process of formation that 
occurs in nature — whether it happens in microseconds or over millions of years, whether it is large or 
small, whether it comes from the organic or the inorganic world — is in every case smoothly structure 
preserving.” (32)
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despite eventual perturbations (influences from the outer environment) or catas-
trophes (from the inner environment), but this does not necessarily mean that the 
system should preserve whatever actual configuration of its output, rather that the 
intellectually perceivable structures of the output should be kept, that the system 
is able to communicate its identity, in spite of (m)any variations it may go through.
We could eventually look for this identity in any attractors that would be manifest in 
the outputs of the systems. Attractors are agglomerations of common or recurrent 
states in the phase space of a system that are one of the most well-known topics of 
the investigation in dynamical systems. 639 An attractor is not necessarily a well-de-
fined form or configuration in the outputs of a system, it can be seen as a statistical 
increase in the probabilities of the outputs generating a particular structure or sets 
of structures or, alternatively, a system’s output may be composed of several different 
attractors. Describing the gnarly zone in class 4 systems, Rucker (2005, 116) uses the 
mathematics of chaos theory to refine what happens along the space of possibili-
ties between ordered class 2 systems and absolutely disordered class 3. If in ordered 
systems we can propose the existence of a strong and absolute periodic attractor, as 
soon as one enters the gnarly zone one will find quasiperiodic behaviors, following 
into strange attractors, chaotic bifurcations and finally, just before meeting class 3 
systems, we will find pseudorandomness. 640
639 Particularly the so-called ‘strange attractors’ that consist “of an infinite number of curves, surfaces, 
or higher-dimensional manifolds — generalizations of surfaces to multidimensional space — often oc-
curring in parallel sets, with a gap between any two members of the set” (Lorenz 1995, 48).
640 “The most orderly kind of gnarly behavior is quasiperiodic, or nearly periodic. Something like this 
might be a periodic function that has a slight, unpredictable drift. Next comes the strange attractor zone 
in which the system generates easily visible structures — like the gliders in a CA rule, or like standing 
waves in a stream. Then we enter a critical transition zone, which is the heart of the gnarl. In the language 
of chaos theory, a system undergoes a bifurcation when a system switches to a new attractor. This is when 
a system begins ranging over a completely different zone of possibilities within the space of all possible 
phenomena. The term bifurcation is a bit misleading, as a chaotic bifurcation doesn’t necessarily have 
anything to do with something splitting in two. Bifurcation means nothing more than changing some-
thing about a system in such a way as to make its behavior move to a different attractor. As we turn up the 
disorder of a gnarly system, the system begins experiencing bifurcations in which one strange attractor 
repeatedly gives way to another. Initially the system may be dancing around on, say, an ellipse, and a mo-
ment later, the successive points may be scattered about on something shaped like a bow tie. And at the 
highest end of disorder we shade into the pseudorandom chaotic systems, whose output is empirically 
indistinguishable from true randomness — unless you happen to be told the intrinsically random algo-
rithm that is generating the chaos.” (Rucker 2005, 116)
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Homeostasis, attractors, self-similarity, repeatability and even catastrophes all lead 
to a certain hypothetical stability of the outputs of a system, while at last we could 
search for what can perhaps be the most difficult of characteristics to define, the vio-
lation of expectation. If a system establishes a pattern of anticipation in its observers, 
it may subsequently disrupt it, violating the observers’ expectations towards the fu-
ture development of the system. A class 2 system will tend to dull the receptivity of 
the observer, while a quasiperiodic system, already in the gnarly zone will be able to 
create periods of rest in which the reverberations of events “may subside, before they 
are repeated” (Barratt 1980, 299), the intervals permitting “time for contemplation 
and anticipation”. 641 Violation of expectation is at the core of drama and counter-
point 642 and we believe, also at the core of artificial creativity, as only a system able to 
‘think outside of the box’ will be capable to really create. Only a system that produces 
the unimaginable will be able to pass the Lovelace test.
3.6 Analysis
3.6.1 Tables
After the ponderation of Aarseth’s variables, from which we kept six, and the five 
proposed new variables, we arrived to the following set of variables and their pos-
sible values:
641 “Rhythmic grouping procedures organise the alternation of hits and rests. Robert Mitchum, the 
Hollywood film star, once described his films as: A sequence in which they knock me down and I get up. 
Then they knock me down, I think it over and get up. So they knock me down and I shake my head and I 
get up. So they knock me down… In a first-rate film this happens plenty of times. The (…) problem is to 
devise sufficient variety of ways to knock him down, revive him and wave a pattern of rests between the 
peaks of conflict.” (Barratt 1980, 299)
642 “Ultimately drama resolves into the juxtaposition of antitheses. Though they are interdependent, 
the head and tail of a coin battle for supremacy. In counterpoint, two contrasting themes which share a 
common space-time scale discuss, compete, debate, argue, fight for their points of view. Each must be a 
convincing contender and although the conflict may be resolved in the favour of one, the other cannot be 
obliterated. When the coin comes to rest head up, the tail must be underneath! One sustains the other. As 
one rises the other declines and the discourse is maintained through variations upon the two themes and 
and alternation of supremacy. Drama, counterpoint can be enriched beyond bald competition between 
two themes by the use of transitions and interweaving sub-plots.” (Barratt 1980, 301)
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Table 6: Variables and possible values.
Variable Possible value
Dynamics Static, SUD, DUD
Determinability Determinable, indeterminable
Transiency Transient, intransient
Access Random, controlled
Linking None, conditional, explicit
User Functions Interpretative, configurative, explorative
Modes 1 – 5
Autonomy Autonomous, data-driven
Prochronism Yes, no
Dimensions 1 – 4
Class 1, 2, 3, 4
Our classification of the 54 different systems is laid out in the following table:
Table 7: Our analysis of the 54 works.
Dyn. Det. Trans. Access Linking U.F. Modes Aut. Prochr. Dim. Class
1. Cent mille milliards… Static Det. Int. Random None CF 3 Aut. No 2 1
2. Cent mille milliards… (web) DUD Ind. Int. Cont. Cond. CF 1 Aut. No 2 2
3. Agrippa SUD Det. Trans. Cont. None IF 3 Aut. No 3 2
4. A-Volve DUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Cond. CF 5 DD Yes 4 4
5. Evolved Virtual… DUD Ind. Trans. Cont. None CF 3 DD Yes 4 4
6. My Boyfriend… Static Det. Int. Cont. Cond. EF 2 DD No 2 2
7. Every Icon SUD Det. Trans. Cont. None IF 3 Aut. Yes 3 2
8. Sketch Static Det. Int. Random None IF 2 Aut. No 2 1
9. Seven Sisters… Static Det. Int. Random None IF 2 Aut. Yes 2 1
10. Text Rain SUD Ind. Trans. Cont. None CF 4 DD No 3 4
11. Yellowtail DUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Explicit CF 3 DD No 3 4
12. Soda Constructor DUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Explicit CF 3 DD No 3 4
13. Amoebaabstract 01 SUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Cond. CF 3 DD Yes 3 4
14. Amoebaabstract 02 SUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Explicit CF 3 Aut. Yes 3 4
15. Amoebaabstract 03 SUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Explicit CF 3 Aut. Yes 3 4
16. Cylinder Static Det. Int. Random None IF 2 DD Yes 3 1
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17. Substrate SUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Explicit CF 3 Aut. Yes 3 4
18. Black & White SUD Ind. Trans. Cont. None IF 3 DD Yes 3 2
19. For All Seasons SUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Explicit CF 2 DD No 3 2
20. Droom Zaacht DUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Explicit CF 3 DD Yes 3 4
21. Page 0 SUD Ind. Int. Cont. Explicit EF 2 DD No 2 4
22. Happy Place SUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Explicit CF 3 Aut. Yes 3 4
23. Emeral Static Det. Int. Random None IF 1 Aut. Yes 2 1
24. Three Buttons DUD Det. Trans. Cont. None CF 2 DD Yes 3 2
25. Dreamlines DUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Explicit CF 3 DD Yes 3 4
26. Ornamism SUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Explicit CF 3 Aut. Yes 3 4
27. 30×1 SUD Ind. Trans. Cont. None IF 4 Aut. No 4 4
28. Extrusions in C Major Static Det. Int. Random None IF 2 DD Yes 3 1
29. Poetry on the Road Static Det. Int. Random None IF 1 DD Yes 2 1
30. Process 16 SUD Ind. Trans. Cont. None IF 3 Aut. Yes 3 4
31. We Feel Fine SUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Explicit CF 3 DD No 3 4
32. Moving Pixel Portraits Static Det. Int. Cont. Explicit CF 3 DD No 2 2
33. Process 18 SUD Ind. Trans. Cont. None IF 3 Aut. Yes 3 4
34. Der Wirklichkeitsschaum Static Det. Int. Random None IF 1 Aut. Yes 2 1
35. Reface… DUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Cond. CF 3 DD Yes 3 2
36. Pixflow #2 SUD Ind. Trans. Cont. None IF 3 Aut. No 3 4
37. Folia Static Det. Int. Random None IF 1 Aut. Yes 2 1
38. Inner Forests DUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Explicit CF 3 DD No 3 4
39. A Week in the Life Static Det. Int. Random None IF 1 DD No 3 1
40. Connect Static Ind. Trans. Random None IF 4 Aut. No 4 4
41. A Confidence of Vertices Static Det. Trans. Cont. None IF 2 Aut. No 3 2
42. Enerugii Static Det. Trans. Cont. None IF 3 DD No 3 2
43. Print cover Static Det. Int. Random None IF 1 Aut. No 2 1
44. Nokia Friends DUD Ind. Trans. Cont. None IF 4 Aut. No 3 4
45. Forever SUD Ind. Trans. Cont. None IF 3 DD No 3 4
46. Colors of Nature Static Det. Int. Random None IF 1 Aut. No 2 1
47. Animations for Aol. Static Det. Trans. Cont. None IF 3 Aut. No 3 2
48. Merce’s Isosurface Static Det. Trans. Cont. None IF 2 DD No 3 2
49. Perpetual Storytelling… DUD Ind. Trans. Cont. None IF 3 DD No 4 4
50. phiLia 01 SUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Explicit CF 4 DD Yes 3 4
51. Talysis II DUD Ind. Trans. Cont. None IF 2 Aut. Yes 3 4
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52. temporary.cc DUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Cond. CF 2 DD No 2 1
53. Vanitas SUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Explicit CF 4 DD No 3 4
54. The Inability to Solve… SUD Det. Trans. Cont. None CF 3 DD No 3 2
3.6.2 Multiple Correspondence Analysis
Using R and the CA package (Nenadić and Greenacre 2007), we developed a Multiple 
Correspondence Analysis on the data, arriving to the following results:
Table 8: Multiple correspondence analysis results calculated from our analysis.
Number Eigenvalue Inertia Cumulated
1 0.263767 53.5 53.5
2 0.032176 6.5 60.0
3 0.028604 5.8 65.8
4 0.021469 4.4 70.2
Plotting the results of the first two synthetic axes (that account for 60 percent of the 
total variance in the data) and performing the initial analysis of the plot, we came 
to discover that the Prochronism variable was not positively contributing to the 
description of the systems. 
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Fig. 188: Plot of the first two synthetic axes of the multiple correspondence analysis with eleven variables. 
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The two values of the prochronism variable are not only plotted very close to each 
other and near the center of the axes as the removal of the variable from the model 
does not significantly affect the distribution of the pieces. Comparing multiple com-
ponent analysis with and without the variable, we found that the differences were 
small enough to the point of being negligible, and also that when the number of 
total variables was reduced from eleven to ten, the multiple correspondence analysis 
would (predictably) result in a higher representation of the variance in the data with 
the same amount of synthetic variables.
When analyzing the relevance of the dimensions variable we have found that its 
contribution to the description of the systems, although positively separating the 
bi- and the tridimensional systems in the plot — in the single instance where this 
separation was not caused by other variables — was not doing much more besides 
that and, as a side effect, also led to the compression of the three and four dimen-
sional systems in the right hemisphere of the plot, thus actually having a somewhat 
negative contribution to the model.
With a reduction to nine variables, we arrived to the following multiple correspon-
dence analysis results:
Table 9: Multiple correspondence analysis results calculated from our analysis with nine variables.
Number Eigenvalue Inertia Cumulated
1 0.342199 54.1 54.1
2 0.054562 8.6 62.7
3 0.032972 5.2 68.0
4 0.023009 3.6 71.6
We have therefore chosen to drop the prochronism and dimensions variables from 
the model, in an attempt to simplify it through the removal of variables that did not 
really contribute to its perceived effectiveness in describing the systems. The final 
analysis was performed with the following variables and possible values:
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Table 10: Variables and their possible values in the final model.
Variable Possible Value
Dynamics Static, SUD, DUD
Determinability Determinable, indeterminable
Transiency Transient, intransient
Access Random, controlled
Linking None, conditional, explicit
User Functions Interpretative, configurative, explorative
Modes 1 – 5
Autonomy Autonomous, data-driven
Class 1, 2, 3, 4
-1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
-1
.5
-1
.0
-0
.5
0.
0
0.
5
27
41 29, 39
4
3, 7
13
14, 15, 17, 22, 26
4718 1
2 
40
16, 28 
425
23, 34, 37, 43, 46
19
45
48
32
6
44
21
49
50, 53
30, 33, 36
35
8, 9
51
52
10
54
24
31
11, 12, 20, 25, 38
Fig. 189: Plot of the first two synthetic axes of the MCA with nine variables, showing only the systems.
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Fig. 190: Plot of the categories.
We found that in the plotting of the multiple component analysis there was a fairly 
regular distribution of the systems along the four quadrants of the plot, with the 
highest number in the northwest quadrant, with 18 pieces, and the lowest in the 
southeast quadrant, with 10 pieces. The initial number of systems was not evenly 
distributed by a predetermined number of diverse typologies or genres of system, 
and this uneven distribution is reflected in the plot. If we choose to regard each dot 
where multiple systems are plotted as a possible typology 643 we can then count dots 
and not individual systems. Still, we find that the northwest quadrant is still the 
most populated, with 11 dots, and the southeast is again the less populated, with 7 
dots.
We find, somewhat predictably, the periphery of the graph taken by systems such as 
A-Volve [4], 30×1 [27] and Connect [40], pieces that from the start stood somewhat 
apart from the rest of the selection (and from each other). The piece that is more iso-
lated is My Boyfriend Came Back from the War [6], which happens to also be the only 
narrative hypertext in the lot. Still, as we shall see, although distant from the center 
643 Which naturally means that they share the same exact values for every variable of the analysis. This 
happens in nine cases, three of which cluster as many as five systems.
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of the map, My Boyfriend Came Back from the War [6] is still plotted in a logical 
location. The east edge of the plot is populated by printed or otherwise static outputs, 
while the west area is predominantly populated by interactive systems. If we circum-
scribe the area occupied by interactive systems and non-interactive systems, we find 
that they do not overlap and create two very defined islands in the graph.
Looking closely to the determining categories that are encompassed by each of these 
areas may allow us to understand which values are most typically associated with 
each group. In the east quadrant we find that the non-interactive pieces are most-
ly static, determinable, intransient and randomly accessible, with no linking and 
characterized by an interpretative user function. The interactive systems in the west 
quadrant are characterized by deep unit dynamics, conditional linking and explor-
ative and configurative user functions. They also tend to concentrate more modali-
ties and to develop higher computational classes.
The only system that in this circumscription calls our attention because of its rela-
tive placement is Queneau’s Cent mille milliards de poèmes [1] that sits in the middle 
of the non-interactive ‘island’. Albeit not a traditional one, this is the only book 
among the pieces we studied. Its placement obviously raises the question of whether 
books can be seen as interactive devices or if they are simply artifacts that can be 
manipulated into different configurations. Andersen’s semiotic definition of inter-
activity, stating that an “interactive work is a work where the reader can physically 
change the discourse in a way that is interpretable and produces meaning within the 
discourse itself” (qtd. in Aarseth 1997, 49) is not too helpful in this context. However, 
if we follow the definition presented by Schubiger, that an interactive system is one 
that supports communication in both directions, from user to system and back, one 
where the “system reacts accordingly, perhaps by displaying information, perhaps by 
activating machinery or performing some other useful service” (2005, 343), or that 
of Andrew Lippman, who sees interaction as “mutual and simultaneous activity on 
the part of both participants, usually working towards some goal, but not necessar-
ily” (qtd. in Aarseth 1997, 49) then we must certainly not consider a book as being an 
interactive device or its text as an interactive system. 644
644 A book is never capable to react or respond to a user, although the user can certainly interpret its 
(rearranged) contents as responding to a certain question or change of context. As what happens with 
the I Ching or with a game of Tarot, where the user thinks that the reconfiguration of the system or the 
random selections are meaningful when in reality it is the interpretation of those changes that creates the 
meaning.
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Fig. 191: Interactive (south-west quadrant) and non-interactive (north-east quadrant) systems.
The same happens when we circumscribe systems whose outputs are computer-
based and those that are not. This is not simply a split between class 4 systems and 
class 1 and 2 systems, rather it can be seen as a separation between systems that pro-
duce outputs that are real-time computations from those that do not.
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Fig. 192: Computer-based (west) and non computer-based (east) systems.
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The plot does not allow us to infer much about an eventual genre partitioning of the 
systems, and we wonder whether this can be seen as a shortcoming of the model or 
if, on the other hand, genres are simply too undefined, broad or blurred in compu-
tational media to be able to recognize encompassing genre definitions that can be 
applied to multiple pieces. If we look at the groups of pieces plotted in the same dot, 
we find that even when trying to fit traditional genre descriptions such as sculpture, 
painting or drawing, the boundaries are not clear. We can for example find two of 
the most rapidly identifiable sculptural works, Cylinder [16] and A Week in the Life 
[39], plotted near each other but in different coordinates nevertheless, and shar-
ing their respective positions with two visual-only outputs that could be classified 
as drawing, illustration or graphic arts. We do find that all linear videos are plot-
ted in neighboring positions, but still not ever sharing the same exact coordinates, 
something that is far more common among the printed or plotted outputs. It is also 
interesting to discover that two of the pieces where a certain directionality (and ir-
reversibility) of time is patent — Agrippa [3] and Every Icon [7] — share the same 
coordinates and are therefore plotted in the same location, although at first sight 
they may seem to be different systems, working in somewhat different media and 
belonging to different genres or artistic typologies.
3.6.3 Control Analysis
We have tried to devise this analytical model in such a way that it would allow ob-
jective classifications, reducing the subjectivity of the classifier to the minimum 
possible. It is however almost impossible to be certain that no subjective factors 
have influenced our classification of the selected systems. On the other hand, a clear 
definition of the variables is determinant for the success of the model and the re-
duction of subjectivity. Trying to test both our analysis as the definitions that were 
elaborated for each of the variables, we have decided to elaborate a second analysis, 
providing documentation of all the systems as well as a description of the model 
to an external analyzer, in order to assess whether (and to what extent) her classi-
fication would match ours. We approached a colleague, lecturer in communication 
design at the School of Fine Arts of the University of Lisbon, holding a masters de-
gree in multimedia art and, at the time, developing a doctoral thesis on audiovisual 
interactive media. The sharing of a common repertoire of references was naturally 
an influential aspect in the selection but this did not mean that the understanding 
of the variables was immediate and without any problems. 
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Determinability, transiency, access, user functions, linking and autonomy were 
clearly and swiftly understood, and the analysis (that was developed independently 
and without prior knowledge of our classifications) of these variables was fast and 
largely uneventful. Dynamics, modes and class proved to be more difficult, albeit 
each for different reasons. The goal of the dynamics and modes variables was clari-
fied after some examples were discussed, still some systems raised doubts that, upon 
further discussion were solved. When classifying modes there was at first a tendency 
to classify all systems with which the user could interact as being haptic, some-
thing that was gradually revised, and also to classify a vast majority of the systems 
as displaying the procedural mode. We believe that the knowledge that an output 
was produced by a procedural system in many cases influenced this classification. 
A procedural system does not necessarily create outputs that communicate or give 
clues of that procedurality. Although in some cases this may happen, it is also true 
that often an output without the proper contextualization is not able to express the 
least of its procedural origin. As we will see, the modes variable was the one where a 
greater divergence from our analysis was found. Finally, when addressing the class 
variable, there were (as expected) a few doubts as whether to classify systems as 
class 2 or 4 645 but, more importantly, some difficulty in differentiating the systems 
from the outputs they produce (and that are, in some cases, the analyzed artifacts). 
As with the procedural mode, the differences between the system and its outputs, 
between the capacity that one may have to develop a class 4 computational process 
and the other to develop merely a class 1 or 2 were in the basis of these doubts. After 
further discussion, all the pending doubts were cleared and the analysis finished.
Table 11: Control analysis of the 54 works.
Dyn. Det. Trans. Access Linking U.F. Modes Aut. Class
1. Cent mille milliards de poèmes Static Det. Int. Random None CF 3 Aut. 1
2. Cent mille milliards de… (web) Static Ind. Int. Cont. Cond. CF 2 Aut. 1
3. Agrippa SUD Det. Trans. Cont. None IF 3 Aut. 1
4. A-Volve DUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Cond. CF 5 DD 4
5. Evolved Virtual Creatures DUD Ind. Trans. Cont. None IF 3 Aut. 4
6. My Boyfriend Came Back… Static Det. Int. Cont. Cond. EF 2 DD 2
7. Every Icon SUD Det. Trans. Cont. None IF 3 Aut. 2
645 As Rucker noted, class 2 systems are invariantly periodic, while quasiperiodic systems already cross 
the class boundary and are already classifiable as being class 4.
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Dyn. Det. Trans. Access Linking U.F. Modes Aut. Class
8. Sketch Static Det. Int. Random None IF 2 Aut. 1
9. Seven Sisters: The Pleiades Static Det. Int. Random None IF 2 Aut. 1
10. Text Rain SUD Ind. Trans. Cont. None CF 4 DD 4
11. Yellowtail DUD Ind. Trans. Cont. None CF 4 DD 4
12. Soda Constructor DUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Explicit CF 4 DD 4
13. Amoebaabstract 01 DUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Cond. CF 4 DD 4
14. Amoebaabstract 02 SUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Explicit CF 3 Aut. 4
15. Amoebaabstract 03 SUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Explicit CF 3 Aut. 4
16. Cylinder Static Det. Int. Random None IF 2 DD 1
17. Substrate SUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Explicit CF 3 Aut. 4
18. Black & White SUD Ind. Trans. Cont. None IF 3 DD 4
19. For All Seasons SUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Explicit CF 4 DD 4
20. Droom Zaacht DUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Explicit CF 4 DD 4
21. Page 0 SUD Ind. Int. Cont. Explicit EF 2 DD 4
22. Happy Place SUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Explicit CF 3 Aut. 4
23. Emeral Static Det. Int. Random None IF 2 Aut. 1
24. Three Buttons DUD Det. Trans. Cont. None CF 2 DD 2
25. Dreamlines DUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Explicit CF 3 DD 4
26. Ornamism SUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Explicit CF 3 Aut. 4
27. 30×1 SUD Ind. Trans. Cont. None IF 4 Aut. 4
28. Extrusions in C Major Static Det. Int. Random None IF 2 DD 1
29. Poetry on the Road Static Det. Int. Random None IF 2 DD 1
30. Process 16 SUD Ind. Trans. Cont. None IF 3 Aut. 4
31. We Feel Fine SUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Explicit CF 4 DD 4
32. Moving Pixel Portraits Static Det. Int. Cont. Explicit CF 4 DD 2
33. Process 18 SUD Ind. Trans. Cont. None IF 3 Aut. 4
34. Der Wirklichkeitsschaum Static Det. Int. Random None IF 1 Aut. 4
35. Reface [Portrait Sequencer] DUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Cond. CF 4 DD 4
36. Pixflow #2 SUD Ind. Trans. Cont. None IF 3 Aut. 4
37. Folia Static Det. Int. Random None IF 2 Aut. 1
38. Inner Forests DUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Explicit CF 4 DD 4
39. A Week in the Life Static Det. Int. Random None IF 2 DD 1
40. Connect Static Ind. Trans. Random None IF 3 Aut. 4
41. A Confidence of Vertices Static Det. Trans. Cont. None IF 3 Aut. 2
42. Enerugii Static Det. Trans. Cont. None IF 4 DD 2
An Analytical Model for Procedural Works440
Dyn. Det. Trans. Access Linking U.F. Modes Aut. Class
43. Print cover Static Det. Int. Random None IF 2 Aut. 1
44. Nokia Friends DUD Ind. Trans. Cont. None IF 3 Aut. 4
45. Forever SUD Ind. Trans. Cont. None IF 4 DD 4
46. Colors of Nature Static Det. Int. Random None IF 1 Aut. 1
47. Animations for Aol. Static Det. Trans. Cont. None IF 2 Aut. 2
48. Merce’s Isosurface Static Det. Trans. Cont. None IF 2 DD 2
49. Perpetual Storytelling… DUD Ind. Trans. Cont. None IF 3 DD 4
50. phiLia 01 DUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Explicit CF 4 DD 4
51. Talysis II DUD Ind. Trans. Cont. None IF 3 Aut. 4
52. temporary.cc DUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Cond. CF 2 DD 4
53. Vanitas SUD Ind. Trans. Cont. Explicit CF 5 DD 4
54. The Inability to Solve a War… SUD Det. Trans. Cont. Cond. CF 4 DD 2
The test analysis revealed a divergency of the classification in 7.4% of the total num-
ber of variables analyzed: 36 differing classifications in a total of 486. It is however 
important to understand which variables presented the higher and lower divergen-
cies between classifications.
Table 12: Divergencies between our analysis and the control analysis (total and percentage).
Variable Total Divergencies Percentage
Dynamics 3 5.55%
Determinability 0 0%
Transiency 0 0%
Access 0 0%
User Functions 1 1.85%
Linking 2 3.7%
Modes 23 42.59%
Autonomy 0 0%
Class 7 12.96%
We therefore find that the biggest culprit for the divergency in classification was, by 
far, the modes variable, followed (with less than a third of the occurrences) by the 
class variable. The very high divergency in the modes classification is not, as it may 
seem at first sight, a sign of arbitrariness in the classification but rather, we believe, 
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a reflection of differences in the understanding of the nature of the procedural and 
haptic modes and on their positive identification in much more instances than those 
that were accounted for in our analysis. It is certain that this is perhaps the most sub-
jective of all the variables, especially when it comes to the evaluation of the proce-
dural mode. And in fact, when comparing both analyses of the modes variable, one 
finds that in almost all divergent cases, the difference in classification is explained 
by having classified (or not) the procedural (in eight cases) or haptic (in twelve cas-
es) modes for a given system and that only in three of the divergencies the control 
analysis identified a lower number of modes than our initial analysis did. We could 
therefore alternatively interpret this divergency as being much smaller, around 5.55% 
(if accounting the three divergencies) should we decide not to consider the disagree-
ing understanding of the modalities (or, what we could eventually call ‘false nega-
tives’ of our analysis or ‘false positives’ of the control analysis). 646 The haptic mode 
was identified in several pieces with which the user interacts with gestures, not only 
on those where the interaction devices are not standard computer input devices, but 
also those systems where these devices are used in more expressive manners. With 
class, we found that most of the divergencies were linked with the identification of 
systems that we had classified as class 2 as being class 4. 647 Only in six of the systems 
we found a divergency in the classification of two of the variables. 648
The summary of the multiple correspondence analysis was the following, again, 
close to the results of our analysis:
Table 13: Multiple correspondence analysis of the control analysis.
Number Eigenvalue Inertia Cumulated
1 0.336384 53.0 53.0
2 0.067925 10.7 63.7
3 0.028829 4.5 68.2
4 0.021316 3.4 71.6
646 In such case the total number of divergencies would also be much lower: 16 or 3.29%.
647 Both classes bordering with each other so subtly as they do, this would almost be an expectable out-
come of the comparison of multiple analysis.
648 The web version of Cent mille milliards de poèmes, Yellowtail, Amoebaabstract 01, For All Seasons, 
Reface [Portrait Sequencer] and The Inability to Solve a War at a Cocktail Party (an Awkward Dance with 
Mr. Henri Van Zanten). In 24 other systems we registered differences in the classification of a single vari-
able, in a large majority of the cases, modes.
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A plot of the multiple component analysis allows us to understand that, in spite 
of the divergencies, there is a big uniformity in the proximity relationships in the 
graph. We still find the clear divisions between interactive and non-interactive sys-
tems and between systems that produce computer-based outputs from those that 
do not. Due to the differences in values, the plots are rotated 180° in relation to our 
analysis but the overall spatial distribution is nevertheless very similar.
In spite of the divergencies, the main clusters are preserved with minimal altera-
tions and those systems that were plotted in peculiar locations, such as My Boy-
friend Came Back from the War or the original version of Cent mille milliards de 
poèmes are still plotted in similar (relative) locations.
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Fig. 193: Plot of the control analysis.
We therefore conclude that even in spite of the recorded divergencies the compara-
tive analysis achieved similar results to out own analysis, with minor variations 
in the classification of some of the systems but by and large confirming the initial 
analysis.
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Conclusion
Summary
This work proposed the development of an analytical model for a diverse and hetero-
geneous set of aesthetic artifacts, an array of objects that for the lack of a better term 
could be described as sharing procedural characteristics. As computational tools 
and media become more ubiquitous in the cultural landscape, we discover a grow-
ing number of artworks and communication systems that are not only digital but 
also computational. A survey of several fields of art and design creation allows us 
to understand that the production of computational aesthetic artifacts is very wide-
spread and that in spite of contextual variations inherent to each field, and regard-
less of each artifact’s function, subject, background or setting of production, there 
are several points of contact and similarities between artifacts, and furthermore, 
that most of these spring from their procedural or computational nature. Compu-
tational media are not only excellent remediators — something that contributes to 
a quantitative transformation — as they are also programmable and potentially au-
tonomous from their creators and users — a trait that contributes to a profound 
qualitative transformation. 
These media are also relatively recent and, although artists and designers have been 
exploring them for some decades now, they are still simultaneously discovering, 
learning and defining these media, in a process balanced by the dialectics between 
the pre-computational media — that for the most part shape our historic experience, 
our knowledge, skills, training and lexicon — and the new forms — that inherit 
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from their forerunners but also transform them almost beyond recognition. We live 
in a period of computational incunabula and in order to study, understand and fur-
ther develop them to the fullest, we need to unravel their specificities, not only tech-
nical as also aesthetic and communicational. We need to grasp their creative poten-
tial and their uniqueness. 649 We need a framework for their critique and we need an 
established and rigorous common terminology for their analysis. And we need it to 
be versatile, plastic and adaptable enough to accompany the ongoing transforma-
tion of the media, something we believe not to be a transitory phenomenon.
We resorted to Espen Aarseth’s model for the analysis of cybertexts (1997) — texts 
that involve procedurality in their production — as a starting point for this work. 
With seven variables and eighteen possible values, this model is not only broad and 
able to provide accurate classifications of the texts analyzed by its author, as it has a 
series of other advantages that led us to choose it: 1) it is not focused on the surface 
characteristics of the texts as it is on their structural, functional or procedural traits; 
2) it is broad enough to encompass different media and expressions; 650 3) its empha-
sis is on common features found across most of the texts and not on specific aspects 
particular to some of these; 4) it recognizes the interactive capacity of the media 
without establishing its precedence over other characteristics 651 and; 5) it is workable, 
with only two to four possible values for each variable, defining a large space of 576 
unique positions 652 that is nevertheless easy to navigate.
We tried to assert the model’s adequacy and to adapt and expand it in search of 
a better and more comprehensive description of the works under consideration. 
While Aarseth’s model is focused in the analysis and description of ergodic texts, 
we wanted to make it fit for the study of ergodic visual and audiovisual pieces, there-
fore we tested its seven variables for suitability, adapting them whenever necessary. 
Ultimately we managed to use all but one variable in the new model. Dynamics, 
determinability, transiency, access, linking and user functions proved to describe rel-
evant aspects of the pieces — repurposing possible values only in dynamics and 
user functions — while perspective was, at least for the time being, demonstrably 
649 A uniqueness that, owing to their remediative potential is not necessarily easy to fathom.
650 Aarseth uses it in the analysis of texts from the fourth century BCE to the twentieth century CE, texts 
in traditional paper media and texts in electronic media, etc.
651 Something that happens in other models that seem to be grounded in the interactive potential of the 
media and not in their procedural nature.
652 3 × 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 × 3 × 4 = 576.
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not contributing to our model. We also pondered over potential new variables, in an 
attempt to expand and ameliorate the model, deciding for the inclusion of three new 
variables: modes, autonomy and class, thus bringing the total number of variables in 
the model to nine. 653
We developed our analysis from a set of samples that represented diverse approaches 
to procedural creation, but focusing particularly on visual aesthetic creation and 
communication. We compiled a series of pieces drawn from the examples presented 
or discussed in the literature review chapters of this work, but we were aware that 
a personal selection of pieces could always be biased towards the model under de-
velopment, and tried to avoid this by requesting an external selection of works to 
analyze. We therefore approached three artists that also happen to have experience 
in teaching, critique or curation of media and computer arts. After being briefly in-
formed about the objectives of the work, but without a full disclosure of the model, 
the methods or even of which works were previously selected, Lia, Marius Watz and 
Golan Levin contributed with a total of 36 works that were added to our original list 
for a total of 54 different pieces.
Whenever possible the works were analyzed based on direct access and experimen-
tation. When this was not possible — something that happened in 11 cases — we had 
to resort to the available documentation, either provided by the authors or by sec-
ondary sources. We developed a phenomenological analysis of the works, based on 
those aspects that could be inferred by readers from their usage, or from whatever 
information was communicated with and through the artifacts themselves — either 
willingly, through titles, instructions or any other information explicitly conveyed 
in the pieces or subtextually. We are aware that the audiences of these works are 
diverse in terms of procedural literacy and that a procedural understanding of these 
pieces is not necessarily a technical understanding, not necessarily a comprehension 
of the actual code of the pieces, but rather an understanding of the principles of ac-
tion that are enunciated in the code.
The process of analysis of the 54 pieces was developed with the variables of Aarseth’s 
model added by our tentative variables, and was used to test the individual contribu-
tion of each of them to the model. Still following Aarseth’s methodology — and as 
653 And the total of possible values to 24, expanding the multidimensional space of the model to 4,320 
unique positions (3 × 2 × 2 × 2 × 3 × 2 × 5 × 2 × 3), from the 576 in Aarseth’s model.
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a way to be able to compare our findings with his — we developed a multiple cor-
respondence analysis of the data 654 and plotted it using two synthetic axes — a num-
ber that we deemed acceptable based on the results of the multiple correspondence 
analysis, encoding 62.7% of the data’s variance.
Although the goal was the development of the model so as to allow an objective clas-
sification, reducing the classifier’s subjective inferences to the minimum possible, 
we could not be certain of having achieved this without subjecting our analysis (and 
the model) to a control analysis. Only when laying pieces and model in the hands 
of a third-party and witnessing the handling of the tool, could we be certain of its 
usability and usefulness. We have therefore provided an external analyzer with the 
documentation of the pieces and a description of the model to assess whether (and 
to what extent) her classification would match ours. Some discrepancies were found 
between our analysis and this control analysis but in general the divergency was 
relatively low: 7.4% of the total variables analyzed, with 36 differing results in a total 
of 486. As important as corroborating our analysis, and attesting the accessibility 
of the definition of the variables, through a study of the divergencies this control 
analysis also allowed us to understand which variables need to be adjusted — or 
better described — in the future.
As a result of this work we have tested the partial adequacy of Aarseth’s model for 
the study of other artifacts beyond text-based systems, and expanded it to better 
suit the objects of our study. We believe that the model we elaborated produces 
a good description of the pieces, clustering them logically, reflecting stylistic and 
procedural affinities between systems that, if analyzed under a different light, would 
probably not be immediately found to be similar. These similitudes are not superfi-
cial or sensorial, they are rather structural or procedural, attesting the importance 
of the computational characteristics for the aesthetic enjoyment of the pieces. We 
verified our initial conjecture about the importance of procedurality not only for 
the implementation and development of the works but also as conceptual grounding 
and aesthetic focus in artistic creation, as an aesthetic pleasure comparable to others 
that were already identified in computational media. 655 Through the development of 
this model we understood that, in a field of work promoted by practitioners hailing 
from so many and so diverse backgrounds — visual arts, design, engineering, sci-
654 Using the R software and the CA package.
655 Such as e.g. agency, navigation and transformation, identified by Murray (1997).
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ences, architecture, industrial design, music and performance arts, etc. — there are 
grounds for the establishment of a common terminology to which all contributors, 
from creators to users, academics and critics, can resort.
Interpretation of Findings
We cannot understand any phenomenon or set of phenomena if we are not able to 
formulate their description. With this work we proposed to contribute to that task 
by attempting to develop a schema of the systems based on their procedural charac-
teristics rather than on their aesthetic traits, not only because these aesthetic traits 
have been thoroughly studied in several of the fields of work where these systems 
are used, but also because we believe that the procedural characteristics are them-
selves a fundamental part of the aesthetic appeal of these works, although they can 
be studied independently from the traits that traditionally fall under the definition 
of the term.
We alternatively defined these pieces as ‘computational aesthetic artifacts’ or as 
‘procedural computational artifacts’, deviating from the more common definition of 
‘generative artworks’ and the definition proposed by Aarseth (1997) of ‘ergodic’ me-
dia or artworks. Many of the artifacts that we studied can accurately be described 
as ‘generative’, as defined by Galanter (2003), but we believe that this term is better 
suited to a subset of the works, as are such terms as ‘evolutionary’, ‘chaotic’, ‘fractal’, 
‘stochastic’, etc. Among these, the ‘evolutionary’ and ‘generative’ epithets are those 
that describe what we believe to be the most interesting and important aspects of 
these pieces in terms of their implementation and development, they are also those 
that better describe where the future development of these systems will most likely 
be focused, and what we consider to be the best strategies to get the most out of 
them. They are not, however, the lowest level description that we could use. Should 
we be describing life and biology, we could likewise use terms as evolution, emer-
gence and generative potential to describe the creation of life and the diversity that 
is found in the natural world, but we would need to resort to terms as ‘procedural’ or 
‘computational’ to be able to explain the mechanisms that allow creation and evolu-
tion to take place in the first hand.
The same can almost be said of defining them as ‘ergodic’, a term that depicts a set 
of interpretative or communicational interactions that may not always be present 
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(at least as Aarseth defined them). 656 And naturally, defining them as ‘artificial’ art, 
design or aesthetic artifacts could also be adequate, wouldn’t it be for the excessively 
broad scope of this definition, that encompasses both procedural as non-procedural 
systems.
One may defend the existence of a difference between computational and procedur-
al systems, based on the fact that although both depend on the definition of rules, al-
gorithms or effective procedures and on the creation based on these, computational 
aesthetic artifacts will develop these procedures in real-time and in their outputs, 
unlike what happens with procedural aesthetic artifacts. If in procedural aesthetic 
artifacts the process may be represented but not be present — that is, if the process 
can be found only in the past of the artifact — in computational aesthetic artifacts 
the process must be present — i.e. found in the present of the artifact. During this 
work we often used both terms interchangeably, not eschewing the semantic distinc-
tion but recognizing a broader equivalence between both systems and their coexis-
tence in contemporary media, artistic practices and design. Either is an adequate 
definition to many of the works we discussed, although ‘procedural’ may naturally 
be of a broader use, especially if one considers historical examples. Currently, and in 
any case, most procedural systems are computational, because media have been pro-
gressing towards a total digitalization, and this digitalization is of course dependent 
on computational systems. 657 Therefore we can find a peculiar case of entanglement 
between the computational and the procedural natures of these systems. They are 
not quite the same thing but, more often than not, they may be difficult to differ-
entiate. The pairing of ‘procedural’ with ‘aesthetic’ is also very interesting because 
it summarizes the dialectic nature of these systems: due to their computational na-
ture, they are artifacts in motion and they stand in the balance between how they 
produce their outputs and how they communicate them. They hang in the dynamic 
tension between processes, between algorithms and aesthetics, and therefore they 
need to be approached non-conventionally in their creation and study.
656 “(…) we may define an ergodic text as one in which at least one of the four user functions, in addition 
to the obligatory interpretative function, is present. Not incidentally, this figure might also be seen as a 
depiction of a cybernetic feedback loop between the text and the user, with information flowing from text 
to user (through the interpretative function) and back again (through one or more of the other functions).” 
(Aarseth 1997, 65)
657 But as we have seen, even if the outputs are digital and the processes are developed in computers, 
they are not necessarily ‘computational’ according to this definition.
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Although we developed a phenomenological analysis of the pieces we examined — 
and although in most cases, as mentioned, this is all one is able to do — as prac-
titioners it is not enough to confront the systems, when one rather needs to create 
them. Hence the extreme importance of procedural literacy. Artists and designers 
do much more than to create the superficial aesthetic layers, or the surface struc-
tures of these systems, they create processes and it is then up to these processes, in 
their turn, to create the surface structures. Even when and if artists and designers 
work in collaboration with engineers, scientists or technicians, they will need to 
speak the procedural language, a language that is not only made of code but also of 
the manifestations of the code, of what the code becomes. An adequate terminology 
is therefore an integral part of the description of procedural aesthetic artifacts.
Arts and sciences have been crossing paths regularly (if not permanently) for as long 
as we have historical records, perhaps even longer. We did not delve much into the 
details of these relations during this work, partially because we believe that art and 
science are themselves articulated in a dialectic relation, that they are two aspects 
of human activity and two expressions of our need for self-expression, knowledge 
of the world and hope of (some limited) control over an uncontrollable universe. 
Depending as they do on what is still regarded as high-tech apparatus, and on the 
knowledge of computation and “the arcane art of computer programming” (Maeda 
2004, 113), computational approaches to art and design are very often regarded as 
being ‘scientific’. This can either be in the mistaken sense that these are two abso-
lutely independent aspects of human life and experience, that cannot but mutually 
influence each other at times or, what may be worst, it can be something born of 
demeaning and paternalist feelings from those who see computational arts as being 
unhuman and consequently lesser than human-produced arts, or that alternatively 
fear that they may turn human artists or human-produced arts obsolete. One of the 
reasons why we believe that computational approaches to so many arts are becom-
ing common, is because of the way in which, in spite of being artificial — like all 
arts except perhaps those that are exclusively somatic — and in spite of being pro-
duced by means that may seem to many to be closer to magic or alchemy than to 
science and techné, they produce artifacts that are very human. These are artifacts 
that speak to us in ways that noncomputational artworks are not — and will never 
be — able to, while being able to, due to their capabilities for remediation, commu-
nicate at all (or most of) the levels that noncomputational works do, to be as grand, 
dramatic, deep and moving as any other artworks. Granted that in many cases, and 
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due to the Eliza effect, this may be so much of our doing as the merit of the artifacts, 
but there are nevertheless grounds for evolution and amelioration. As noted, we are 
just starting to discover what can be done with these systems, how can it be done 
and, more importantly, why it should be done.
We are also able to start to draw some inferences regarding the effects of the devel-
opment of procedural aesthetic artifacts and of the metacreation allowed by these, 
for all the parties that contribute to their creation, usage and acceptance. Artists 
will need to learn how to deal with the dissolution of authorship that is brought by 
these systems and will most certainly discover new and unforeseen ways to take 
advantage of the possibility to create unique multiples, endless variation, massive 
customization and personalization of artifacts, and of the participative and collab-
orative potential of these media. They will also be able to create works of a far higher 
complexity and far broader reach (spatial as well as temporal), but will need to un-
derstand processes as artworks, not just the form, not just the conceptual layers or 
the narratives, as also the effective procedures and their development.
Designers will discover that, when working with these media and tools, the focus 
of their work will no longer be just the surface level of the artifacts (if it ever was), 
but that they will need to be involved to a much lower level in the production or 
authorship of the artifacts. They will not only produce forms as they will need to 
always produce systems, they will need to become programmers while (and because) 
they are designers. As so many of the things that are touched by computational sys-
tems, the work of designers is transforming. This happens to all designers, regard-
less of their specialities, and even those working in fields that are still (somewhat) 
less touched by computational media and tools may be certain of having to face the 
transformations in a not too distant future. It is not hard to foresee a future when 
not only what we traditionally call media are endowed with computational abilities 
but when most objects, regardless of their purpose or role in our lives, are also com-
putational, not only in their inception but also in their formalization. This is a fu-
ture where computers will really be ubiquitous but will simultaneously be invisible, 
because they will not sit on desks or be carried around in suitcases and backpacks 
but will be, very literally, everywhere. In this future, as now, the designer’s work will 
be less of a finishing or formal work but it will rather be an epigenetic work, a work 
that needs to be developed from deep within the structure of the artifacts, creating 
their forms, their functions, and their behaviors.
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Audiences, as they grow more familiar and intimate with computational media, will 
no longer expect or be expected to be merely passive, they will become more par-
ticipative as they are confronted with artworks and designs that are ergodic. Par-
ticipation is physical, because so many of these works demand interaction, and is 
also (one could even say mainly) intellectual and emotional, because even the less 
demanding explorative systems are ergodic and challenging in their traversal. We 
do not expect interaction to be the preeminent feature of all these systems, if there 
is something that our personal experience, the literature, the history of art and (to a 
degree) this study show is that the role of the non-intervening spectator is at many 
levels very rewarding.
Critics, academics and historians need to learn how to study these works — and 
we hope that this study provides some help — how to frame them in the broader 
artistic context, how to document and preserve them. 658 They need to rethink the 
definition of the work, again, not as an object, a set of objects or concepts but also 
as a dynamic system and the outputs it produces. And they will need to, as all other 
actors, be ready to discover artifacts that challenge their expectations and imagina-
tions. As Murray puts it, “one hundred years after the arrival of the motion picture 
camera, we have the arrival of the modern computer (…) Can we imagine the future 
of electronic narrative any more easily than Gutenberg’s contemporaries could have 
imagined War and Peace or than the Parisian novelty seekers of 1895 could have 
imagined High Noon?” (1997, 66)
If in Aarseth’s analysis we find that electronic and paper-based texts are largely over-
lapping and therefore that the medium is not as determinant to the ergodic nature 
of texts as one would suppose, in our analysis we do not reach the same conclusions. 
We believe that happens because, unlike in Cybertext, there are two large sets of data 
being analyzed in this work: the procedural, where the system and its output are 
different artifacts, where when examining outputs one can only recognize traces of 
the system, and on the other hand, those that are truly computational from source 
to output, where system and output are the same process and artifact.
One of the things we have learned from the history of the media in the twentieth-
century is that media are not static and immutable. Although they are created to 
658 When sometimes the works themselves contradict or even forbid efforts for preservation, as we have 
often seen along this work.
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make information static and immutable, they are themselves dynamic evolving 
systems, affected by the usage that is made of them (by creators, communicators 
and audiences or readers), by market pressures, by social and technological changes, 
among many other factors. As we have seen, the current transformation can in a 
sense be traced back to the ongoing metamorphosis of media, but it also results 
in a profound qualitative change of the media. Computational media do not only 
deliver more, faster or better (whatever these terms may actually mean in any given 
context) than previous media, but they deliver something entirely different. As the 
transformation continues, when sometime in the future we are faced with works 
that were not at least partially produced by humans, will we be able to recognize, 
value and cherish artificial creation? We so often regard arts as a pinnacle of hu-
man achievement, as something that defines what being human is, so what will we 
do when faced with artificial arts? Boden argues about this problem in her answer 
to the fourth Lovelace question: “whether computers can really be creative — is 
[a] very different [question]. It involves controversial debate about metaphysics and 
morals. (…) It raises the problem, for instance, of whether, having admitted that we 
were faced with computers satisfying all the scientific criteria for creative intelli-
gence (whatever those may be), we would in addition choose to take a certain moral/
political decision. This decision amounts to dignifying the computer: allowing it a 
moral and intellectual respect comparable with the respect we feel for fellow human 
beings.” (2004, 21)
Limitations
An evaluation of the limitations of this work may start with the data available for 
analysis. We studied 54 works but could maybe have compiled a longer list of pieces. 
We did not do it for practical considerations, as increasing the list of works would 
necessarily make our own and the control analysis more time-consuming. Com-
pared with Aarseth’s analysis, we considerably increased the number of works ana-
lyzed — more than doubling it from 23 to 54 — we nevertheless recognize that a 
broader set would allow to sample an increased diversity of works. Nevertheless 
we find that the number of works contemplated in the study and the results of the 
analysis are satisfying, even if eventually not conclusive. We intentionally limited 
our analysis to works that could be classified either as visual arts or as communica-
tion design, preserving a few pieces that were also analyzed by Aarseth and that can 
be classified as literary. We recognize that a broader field of analysis would be desir-
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able, incorporating works from other fields of design or art. Although this was not 
done in the present work, the common characteristics among the works that were 
analyzed lead us to believe that such a work should be developed in future follow-up 
studies.
Further control analyses could have allowed us to better detect possible flaws in 
the definition of the variables and to better attune their descriptions. The one con-
trol analysis we developed was extremely useful for our own understanding of the 
difficulties presented in the model and a very valuable contribution to this work. 
We hope that subsequent work allows the development of successive, and gradually 
more precise validations of the model we propose, extending the scope of the study 
to larger sets of works and necessarily producing more analyses.
Future Research
By defining an analytical model for computational aesthetic artifacts that is both 
independent from media and not-modal, we contributed towards the study of com-
putational arts and media. Helping to establish a common terminology for compu-
tational arts and artifacts was one of our goals and we believe to have succeeded to 
contribute to this purpose. There is however plenty more research work waiting to 
be developed in the future. First of all in refining the model: as a consequence of 
both our own as well as of the control analyses, we understood that both the pro-
cedural and haptic modes need to be the subject of deeper study. Both need better 
definitions in order to eliminate as much subjectivity as possible from the classifica-
tion and their exhaustive study can contribute to a better understanding by artists 
and designers.
The research of ways to describe systems through and beyond their outputs (when 
the system itself is not available anymore) is another interesting subject for future 
research. The prochronism variable seemed promising in this aspect, but as we saw 
it did not contribute much to the model and therefore was not included in its final 
version. The study of temporal scales in the objects, or of other characteristics that 
can be read in scales, can maybe give us some clues towards this, as well as an inves-
tigation into coherence and unity in the outputs of the systems. Cross-studying the 
works of Thompson (1942), Flake (1998), Alexander (2002a-b; 2004; 2005) and other 
authors that strive to understand the generative properties of natural forms can be 
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a starting point for this work, understanding form as a chronological phenomenon 
and trying to reverse the prochronist manifestations in order to comprehend the 
different processes that originate it. Another would be an enquiry as to whether all 
the positions in the multidimensional space of the model are equally valid, possible, 
or probable. Such a study would be very interesting follow-up research, but it would 
naturally need to be developed from much larger datasets that we could be able to 
explore statistically.
This work may also be expanded by studying not only the works but also their users 
and creators. The observation of the interactions between users and systems may 
provided valuable information to enrich this model, particularly at the level of the 
perception of procedurality and of the ergodic traversal of the systems. The observa-
tion and study of the users’ engagement with the works may also contribute to a bet-
ter understanding of the haptic modality, of when a user feels that she is interacting 
with the work in a physical way, not when she feels that she is acting over a computer 
and through this, acting on the work.
A more thorough study of the authors’ motivations and of their working methods 
and processes may also be an interesting sequence of this work. Some of the authors’ 
concerns are present in this work through various texts and artist statements, but a 
more comprehensive study, comprising interviews and surveys can also be realized, 
and may result in very useful insights, namely on how authorship is transformed by 
computational media.
Although computational media and its practitioners tend to blend borders and fields 
of activity or specialization, this does not by any means mean that those fields must 
loose their specificity, or their history and tradition, sometimes established over 
centuries of practice. Individual clusters of activity can and should be independent-
ly studied, regarding the effects of computational aesthetics and the transformations 
there operated by them.
Furthermore, characteristics related to the narrative aspects of these systems were 
not considered in this study. Not all systems are narrative in a classic sense of the 
term, maybe a large majority of the systems are not, however many are and we can 
consider that many of those that are not still contain some narrative properties. All 
computational systems are actions and processes and these always constitute some 
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sort of narrative. A complete study of procedural media needs to include their nar-
rative properties without loosing sight of the remaining procedural aspects. As the 
study of computer games — that are, of course procedural systems — is split be-
tween research in ludology and research in narratology, studying action and gam-
ing (or rule-based systems) and narrative aspects (or story-based systems), we can 
imagine a similar partition in the study of all procedural aesthetic artifacts. But we 
can also long for a dialectic model that can be used in the study of narrative pro-
cedural systems, one where we can perhaps manage to reincorporate perspective as 
it was originally defined by Aarseth. Recognizing that in this context narrative art 
forms are complex, and that at present their study should be complementary to that 
of the procedurality of the systems, we have intentionally left narrative out of this 
study. We incorporated some clearly narrative pieces in the analysis, but their inclu-
sion was motivated by form, structure and behavior, not by their narrative aspects. 
In the future we hope to test and further develop the model with narrative systems, 
including games, as well as other forms, studying narrative as a phenomenon that 
emerges from procedurality, particularly from the procedural modality and from 
the human desire to witness the unfolding of processes.
Computational media are not only already indispensable to our society, as their 
importance and ubiquity are growing by the day, as if they too were subjected to 
Moore’s law. They allow the development of unprecedented aesthetic artifacts but 
in order to use and develop them to their fullest potential, we need a deeper under-
standing of how they can be used, and of why and to what extent they should be 
used. We need an improved knowledge of their strengths and weaknesses, of how 
similar they can be to those media with which we are accustomed — with which 
we have grown and which they eventually will replace — but especially of how pro-
foundly different they are from them, how alien they may be if we try to understand 
them under the same schema.
We will perhaps never again have another period of several centuries over which 
to develop a medium, as we had with books, maybe not even decades, but what we 
have been discovering with computational media is that not only they are able of re-
mediation — and therefore of preserving and reusing what we deem positive or use-
ful from previous media — but also that in spite of the continuous transformation, 
several common traits between different media are preserved through the vortex of 
the metamorphosis. A theory of computational media may therefore dispense with 
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traditional rules or canons, or should only regard them as being as transitory as any 
particular medium is, and can be based on the juggling of history and the unknown 
ahead, knowing fully well that every new work that is created, every new system that 
is designed, are incursions towards the unknown and steps forward in the construc-
tion of new media.
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